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AMERICA,   ASIA   AND 

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vWITH  SPECIAL   REFERENCE  TO  THE  RUSSO- 
JAPANESE  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


BY 

WOLF  VON    SCHIERBRAND,  Ph.   D., 

J/ 1 

Author  of:    "Russia:    Her  Strength  and  Her  Weakness t*^ 

*' Germany :    The   Welding  of  a  World  Power,^* 

"  The  Kaiser'' s  Speeches,^'*    etc.,  etc. 


WITH   THIRTEEN  MAPS 


NEW    YORK 

HENRY    HOLT    AND    COMPANY 

1904 


Copyright,   1904, 

BY 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

Published  Junes  1Q04 


THE   MERSHON   COMPANY    PRESS, 
RAHWAY,    N.    J. 


PREFACE 

Why  add  still  another  to  the  numerous  books  bear- 
ing more  or  less  directly  upon  the  present  conflict? 
The  answer  is  that  the  author  does  not  merely  aim  to 
lay  bare  the  causes  which  have  led  to  the  war  between 
Russia  and  Japan,  the  elements  in  either  power  making 
for  success  or  failure,  and  the  probable  results  of  the 
war,  particularly  in  so  far  as  they  are  likely  to  affect 
our  own  interests,  but  that  the  book  has  also  a  wider 
scope. 

The  war  represents  but  the  initial  stage  in  an  inter- 
national struggle  throwing  deep  shadows  before,  a 
great  struggle,  but  one  which,  there  is  every  reason 
to  hope,  may  be  fought  solely  with  the  weapons  of 
peace.  But  it  will  be,  in  any  event,  a  long  contest, 
and  will  involve,  not  two  nations,  but  all  the  leading 
nations  of  the  globe.  Its  ultimate  outcome  will  settle, 
probably  for  centuries  to  come,  the  question  of  pre- 
dominance, commercial  and  political,  among  the  civ- 
ilised powers.  This  coming  conflict  will  be,  in  a  word, 
for  the  mastery  of  the  Pacific. 

That  the  Pacific  during  this  century  is  bound  to 
become  what  the  Atlantic  was  during  the  eighteenth 
and  nineteenth,  and  the  Mediterranean  during  the 
twenty-five  centuries  preceding,  is  one  of  the  author's 
chief  contentions.  The  argument  upon  which  it  rests 
he  deems  irrefutable. 

Of  almost  equal  interest  is  the  question  how  well 
or  ill  prepared  for  this  impending  conflict  is  each  of 


IV 


Preface 


the  competitors.  Investigation  in  this  line  forms 
another  part  of  the  book,  and  perhaps  one  of  more  than 
transitory  value. 

It  is  the  writer's  firm  belief  that  the  United  States 
is  the  nation  best  equipped  for  the  coming  race  in  the 
Pacific,  and  the  chief  reasons  for  it,  which  suggested 
themselves,  are  cited  more  or  less  fully.  But  the  fact 
is  also  dwelt  upon  at  some  length  that  American  ex- 
pansion in  the  Pacific,  immensely  favoured  as  it  will 
be  by  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal,  is  not  a  mere 
whim,  not  a  thing  merely  desirable,  but  something 
absolutely  necessary  to  safeguard  our  further  national 
development,  and  to  preserve  us  from  the  curse  of  ill- 
balanced  production — generally  called  overproduction 
— and  all  its  attendant  evils. 

With  the  exhaustion  of  our  free  arable  lands,  and 
with  American  re-emigration  across  the  Canadian 
border,  this  nation  has  entered  on  a  new  phase  of  ex- 
istence, has  lost  the  distinguishing  trait  of  youth  and 
risen  to  full  maturity.  That  condition  entails  new 
burdens  and  responsibilities.  Hereafter  this  nation 
will  furnish  emigrants  in  increasing  number. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  equipment  of  our  chief  rivals 
in  the  Pacific — Great  Britain  and  her  colonies,  Ger- 
many, France,  Japan,  and  Russia — is  also  carefully 
examined,  and  points  of  strength  or  weakness  are  set 
down. 

Another  topic  discussed  in  the  book  is  the  prospec- 
tive ownership  of  that  rich  inheritance — the  Dutch 
East  Indies.  It  is  one  to  which,  so  far,  little  attention 
has  been  paid  in  this  country. 

China  and  South  America,  prospectively  our  great- 
est markets  in  the  very  near  future,  are  considered  at 
considerable  length;  and  the  folly  of  neglecting  the 


Preface  v 

magnificent  opportunities  they  offer  American  enter- 
prise is  pointed  out. 

From  all  the  data  thus  marshalled  the  deduction  has 
been  drawn,  that  if  the  people  of  the  United  States 
use  but  wisely  and  promptly  the  surpassing  natural 
advantages  kind  fate  has  thrown  into  their  lap,  victory 
cannot  fail  them  in  the  end.  This  nation  will  play  in 
the  Pacific  the  dominant  note  in  the  concert  of  the 
great  powers. 

It  may  not  be  superfluous  to  mention  that  much  of 
the  general  argument  of  the  book  is  based  on  both 
geographic  and  historical  foundations.  In  every  in- 
stance, the  greatest  care  has  been  taken  to  derive 
the  statistics  from  the  latest  and  most  authoritative 
sources. 

W.  V.  S. 

New  York,  May,  igo4. 


CONTENTS 


THE  WAR  AND  ITS  OUTCOME 


Elements  in  the  Present  War 

Military  Notes  .... 

Opinions  of  Experts 

A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy 

The  Integrity  of  China 

Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation 


3 

14 
23 
32 
46 
52 


THE  FAR   EAST 


VII.  The  New  Japan 

VIII.  Awakening  China 

IX.  What  China  Means  for  This  Nation   . 

X.  Some  Little-known  Facts  about  Russia 


69 

86 
112 

128 


y 


THE  PACIFIC  AND  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

XI.     The  Panama  Canal 143 

XII.     South  America  Our  Natural  Market  .        .  162 

XIII.  The  Pan-American  Railway 189 

XIV.  The  Pacific  Hereafter  199 

XV.    The  Dutch  East   Indies 214 


THE  RACE  IS  TO  THE  WISE 

XVI.     Our  Equipment  for  the   Race 
XVII.     Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British 

vii 


231 
251 


viii  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XVIII.     Rivals    in    the    Pacific— German,   French,    and 

Japanese 266 

XIX.     American  Supremacy  and  the  Slav        .         .        .  285 

« 

XX.     Life  under  New  Conditions 297 

Conclusion 313 

Appendix 319 

Index 325 


LIST   OF    MAPS 

PAGE 

Pacific  Ocean {Front  Cover)  2 

COREA   AND   THE   NEIGHBOURING    PaRTS   OF   JaPAN      ...  21 

Formosa  Island 79 

China  and  Asiatic  Russia 95 

Panama  and  Vicinity 154 

South  America  {Northern  Half) -170 

South  America  {Southern  Half) 173 

Dutch  East  Indies 215 

Alaskan  Coal  Fields 234 

Hawaii 237 

Philippines 239 

Rainfalx  Map  of  Australia 261 

Plan  of  Tsing  Tao 276 


THE  WAR  AND  ITS  OUTCOME 


AMERICA,  ASIA  AND  THE    PACIFIC 

CHAPTER  I 
ELEMENTS    IN    THE    PRESENT   WAR 

The  great  drama  which  is  now  being  played  in  the 
Far  East  is  the  prologue  to  a  far  longer  and  more 
important  one,  involving  the  mastery  of  the  Pacific. 
As  such,  no  nation  on  earth  is  interested  in  it  in  the 
same  degree  as  the  United  States.  It  is  necessary  to 
keep  this  all-important  fact  constantly  in  mind. 

To  express  the  matter  in  another  way,  Russia  and 
Japan,  though  their  struggle  be  a  titanic  one,  form 
a  vanguard  of  the  greater  armies  made  up  by  the  civ- 
ilised nations  of  the  globe.  The  coming  strife  for 
commercial  and  political  supremacy  on  that  vast  high- 
way, which  the  irony  of  fate  has  dubbed  the  "  Pacific  " 
Ocean,  though  it  may  not  be  waged  with  powder  and 
shot,  will  be  the  most  gigantic  the  world  has  ever  seen. 
And — let  us  emphasise  this  again — it  is  the  American 
people  who  have  most  at  stake  in  it.  In  a  sense  it  is 
quite  true  that  Japan  is  fighting  the  American's  battle. 
The  "  Jap,"  our  pupil,  in  this  war  stands  for  most  of 
the  things  this  nation  is  striving  for. 

But,  very  naturally,  Japan  has  interests  exclusively 
her  own.  A  time  may  come  when  her  interests  will 
clash  with  those  of  America.  She  is  ambitious,  very 
ambitious,  and  though  quite  recently  a  leading  Jap- 


4  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

anese,  Jihei  Hashiguchi,  in  speaking  of  his  country's 
relations  with  the  United  States,  compared  them  to  the 
"  fiHal  affection  of  a  child  " — and  in  this  probably  was 
perfectly  in  the  right — that  is  not  saying  that  this 
feeling  is  not  subject  to  change. 

Certainly  Japan  owes  her  awakening  from  many 
centuries  of  slumber  to  Commodore  Perry,  President 
Pierce,  and  the  United  States.  This  country  first  un- 
bound the  cerements  which  had  held  Japan  in  her 
living  tomb,  isolated  and  estranged  from  the  entire 
world.  It  helped  the  Land  of  the  Rising  Sun  to  enter 
the  family  of  nations  as  a  full-fledged  member.  It 
guided  the  halting  steps  of  the  new  sister  nation  in  its 
path  onward  and  upward.  It  opened  wide  the  portals 
of  American  educational  institutions,  and  it  inaugu- 
rated a  policy  of  mutual  friendship  and  mutually 
profitable  commercial  intercourse. 

But,  after  all,  a  nation's  duty  is  first  to  herself. 
This  applies  both  to  the  United  States  and  Japan,  and 
it  is  quite  conceivable  that  the  future  holds  in  store 
situations  differing  so  much  from  the  present  one  as 
to  make  of  Japan  one  of  this  country's  most  assiduous 
rivals,  possibly  a  foe. 

As  to  Russia,  the  case  stands  very  differently.  Once 
Americans  ventured  forth  on  the  Pacific,  Russia  in- 
evitably became  their  enemy.  It  was  Captain  Mahan 
who  first  pointed  this  out  clearly  in  one  of  his  most 
thoughtful  books.  But  it  requires  no  laboured  argu- 
ment to  show  this.  Russia's  coast  on  the  Pacific  is 
to-day  longer  than  that  of  the  United  States  at  the 
other  extreme.  Russia's  aim  is  to  be  and  remain  the 
leading  Pacific  power.  She  is  the  archenemy  of  the 
"  open  door  "  in  China  as  well  as  in  her  own  posses- 
sions.     Economically  she  is  monopolistic  and  given 


Elements  in  the  Present  War  5 

over  to  fiscalism.  The  spread  of  her  suzerainty,  the 
enlargement  of  her  "  spheres  of  interest,"  mean  the 
narrowing  of  every  kind  of  opportunity  for  the  United 
States.  Conversely,  the  growing  power  of  the  United 
States  along  the  Asiatic  coast  of  the  Pacific  is  tanta- 
mount to  a  diminution  of  Russia's  power.  All  this 
without  considering  at  all  the  deep  racial  antipathy 
between  the  Slav  and  the  Anglo-Saxon,  the  irrecon- 
cilable differences  in  the  conception  of  life  and  its 
ideals,  in  government  and  policy. 

It  is  useless  to  mince  matters.  Let  us  look  the  facts 
squarely  in  the  face.  Russia  is  this  country's  foe  and 
will  remain  so,  all  sentimental  pleadings  to  the  con- 
trary. She  could  afford  to  be  the  friend  of  the  United 
States  so  long  as  the  latter  was  no  world-power,  and 
was,  furthermore,  on  more  or  less  strained  terms  with 
England,  Russia's  most  dangerous  rival  during  the 
whole  course  of  the  nineteenth  century.  This  fact  is 
so  self-evident  that  it  is  strange  indeed  Americans  as 
a  body  have  not  yet  grasped  it,  Russia's  friendly 
policy  during  the  great  Civil  War,  her  sale  of  Alaska, 
her  assurances  of  friendship  on  many  occasions  in  the 
past,  all  explain  themselves  in  that  way.  To  keep  the 
two  great  English-speaking  races  apart  was  the  task 
of  deep  wisdom  for  Russian  statesmanship. 

Since  John  Bull  and  Uncle  Sam  have  buried  the 
hatchet  and  forgotten  old  grievances  in  a  sincere  rec- 
onciliation, and  more  particularly  since  the  younger 
one  of  these  two  blood  relations  has  started  out  on  a 
vigorous  career  of  his  own  in  the  line  of  conquest  and 
colonisation  within  easy  reach  of  Russia's  own  Far 
East  possessions,  with  all  that  this  implies,  the  lion 
and  the  lamb  can  no  more  lie  down  in  peace  together 
than  can  Russia  and  the  United  States.     For  to  do  so 


6  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

would  mean  the  relinquishment  of  what  each  of  these 
two  nations  considers  its  "  manifest  destiny." 

We  see,  then,  that  the  war  between  Russia  and 
Japan  is  fraught  for  this  country  with  much  deeper 
meaning  than  many  seem  to  suspect. 

When  first  the  news  flashed  over  the  cable  that  hos- 
tilities had  actually  been  begun  by  Japan  in  her  dashing 
naval  attack  on  the  fleet  lying  within  the  shelter  of  the 
harbour  and  the  forts  and  coast  batteries  of  Port 
Arthur,  early  i-n  the  morning  of  February  8th,  just 
three  days  after  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations 
between  the  two  countries,  the  world  stood  agape. 
Little  Japan,  holding  a  territory  so  infinitesimally 
small  in  comparison  with  mammoth  Russia,  with  a 
navy  of  yesterday's  creation,  and  an  army  still  in 
process  of  formation,  to  beard  the  bear  and  his  cubs  in 
his  very  lair!  Why,  to  nine  out  of  ten  the  thing 
seemed  absurd,  even  more  absurd  than  Japan's  easy 
victory  over  China  in  1894. 

But  closer  reflection  modified  this  first  view  consid- 
erably. It  is  true  that  after  a  month  of  hostilities  the 
majority  of  military  experts  still  clung  in  the  main  to 
their  first  views.  On  this  side  of  the  water,  such  good 
judges  as  Generals  Francis  V.  Greene  and  Joseph 
Wheeler  pronounced  in  favour  of  ultimate  victory  for 
Russia.  But  General  Nelson  A.  Miles  was  non-com- 
mittal, and  General  Daniel  E.  Sickles  expressed  the 
emphatic  opinion  that  Russia  would  soon  "  lie  down." 

Yet  reliable  figures  show  us  the  following  relative 
strength  for  Russia  and  Japan : 

Naz'al. — Russia,  with  a  battle  fleet  of  22  vessels 
against  a  Japanese  battle  fleet  of  12,  an  enormous  dis- 
parity.    The  comparative  list  is  the  following: 


Elements  in  the  Present  War 


RUSSIA 


Names 


Borodino    . 

Alexander  III    . 

Kniaz  Suvoroff  . 

Slava  .... 

Tavrichesky 

Retwisan    . 

Tsarevitch . 

Tri  Svititelia      . 

Petropavlovsk    . 

Poltava 

Sevastopol ... 

Gheorgi  Pobiedononostseff 

Navarin 

Tchesme     . 

Ekaterina  II 

Sinope 

Emporor  Alexander  II 

Emporor  Nicholas  I  . 

Dvenadsat 

Apostolov  . 

Sissoi  Veliky 

Rostislav    . 


Tons 


13,400 
13,100 

12,700 


10,000 

to 
11,000 


8,000 

to 

9,000 


Launched 


CQ 


Nominal 
Speed— Knots 


CQ 


JAPAN 


Names 

Tons 

Launched 

Nominal 
Speed— Knots 

Shikishima 
Asahi  . 
Mikasa 
Hatsuse 

V 

15,200 

I 

M 

1 

•0 

Yashima 
Fuji 

Chin-Yen 
Tokiwa 

[- 

7.325 

00 

00 

a 

M 

(3 
a> 

Asama 
Idzumo 
Iwate  . 
Yakumo 

J 

9.450 

to 
q,8oo 

Officers  and  men  in  the  Russian  navy,  60,000.    Japanese,  28,000. 


8  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

The  total  naval  strength  of  the  two  opponents 
showed  this  disparity  still  more  glaringly.  The  Rus- 
sian vessels  outnumbered  the  Japanese  almost  three  to 
one.  In  the  matter  of  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers, 
Russia,  on  paper,  was  particularly  favoured. 

In  reality,  however,  Russia  at  the  start  was  in  far 
worse  condition  than  her  doughty  little  opponent,  for 
her  navy  necessarily  was  scattered.  Part  of  it  was 
in  the  Baltic ;  another  part  guarded  the  Black  Sea,  and 
only  the  third  part,  though  rather  the  largest  of  the 
three,  was  in  Far  Asian  waters. 

True,  Russia  had  prepared  herself  in  a  measure  for 
serious  complications  in  Far  Asia.  She  had  sent,  for 
eight  months  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
troops,  ships,  and  provisions  to  Vladivostok,  Dalny, 
and  Port  Arthur,  and  she  had  purposely  magnified  her 
forces  there  and  in  the  whole  of  Manchuria  and  neigh- 
bouring Siberia.  Russia,  in  other  words,  had  been 
playing  a  big  game  of  bluff  with  little  Japan,  and  had 
never  for  a  moment  taken  into  consideration  the  pos- 
sibility that  her  hand  might  be  called.  Thus  it  was 
that  she  was  taken  by  surprise,  unprepared,  and  wo- 
fully  behind  in  all  the  essentials  of  ready  and  efificient 
warfare. 

As  to  the  respective  land  forces,  Japan  was  over- 
matched far  more  prodigiously  than  in  the  matter  of 
sea  strength. 

General  Miles  computes  the  Japanese  army  at 
a  round  600,000,  and  the  Russian  at  1,700,000.  With 
the  reserves  of  every  kind,  he  calculates  that  Japan 
could  probably  mobilise  1,000,000  men  and  Russia 
4,000,000.  In  point  of  efficiency,  the  balance  is  some- 
what in  favour  of  Japan.  Her  army  is  more  active, 
enterprising,  better  trained,  and  better  disciplined  than 


Elements  in  the  Present  War  9 

is  the  Russian.  Her  general  staff  is,  man  for  man, 
brainier  and  more  resourceful  than  Russia's.  "  Jap  " 
and  Russian  have  demonstrated  their  prowess  on  many 
well-fought  fields.  Either  of  the  two  possesses  great 
endurance  and  sterling  fortitude;  either,  too,  is  inured 
to  hardship  and  scant  fare,  though  the  Russian  is  the 
heavier  feeder,  and  is  much  more  prone  to  physical 
ailments  and  serious  disease  on  Chinese  soil  than  is 
the  Japanese.  This  latter  fact  was  abundantly  proved 
during  the  Boxer  uprising,  when  the  rate  of  mortality 
and  illness  among  the  Japanese  troops  was  the  lowest 
of  all,  the  American  soldiers  coming  next,  the  Eng- 
lish and  Continental  troops  following, — the  rate  for 
them  being  about  the  same, — and  the  Russians  show- 
ing the  highest  figures,  their  rate — about  twelve  per 
cent. — being  just  eight  times  higher  than  that  of  the 
"Japs." 

Students  of  military  history  need  scarcely  be  told 
that  disease  works  generally  more  havoc  in  armies 
in  the  field  than  does  the  bullet.  To  confine  our  illus- 
tration only  to  the  more  recent  wars,  in  the  Crimea 
the  French  lost  236  men  from  sickness  to  64  from 
wounds  in  each  1000.  The  death-rate  of  the  English 
was  179  from  sickness  and  47  from  wounds.  In 
Mexico  the  French  lost  in  every  1000  of  their  troops 
140  from  disease  and  only  49  from  wounds.  In  the 
Russo-Turkish  war  the  Russians  lost,  per  1000,  113 
from  sickness  and  49  from  wounds.  The  losses  in  our 
own  Civil  War  during  two  years — June,  1861,  to  June, 
1863 — were  53.2  per  icxdo,  of  which  8.6  were  from 
wounds  and  44.6  from  sickness.  In  the  Boer  war, 
while  the  figures  are  not  at  hand  in  complete  form,  it 
is  well  known  that  sickness  was  vastly  more  fatal  than 
Boer  marksmanship,  deadly  as  that  was  admitted  to  be. 


lo  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

The  Russian  troops  in  Manchuria  are  pecuHarly 
susceptible  to  sickness.  They  have  been  enfeebled  by 
the  rigours  of  a  hard  winter,  with  incomplete  housing, 
insufficient  food,  and  probably  a  total  disregard  of  the 
hygiene  of  the  person.  Most  of  them  are  ignorant 
peasants  who  have  never  learned  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves at  home,  and  still  less  afield.  The  medical  staff 
is  not  as  efficient  as  might  be.  It  is  a  safe  prediction 
that  ten  will  die  or  be  incapacitated  by  sickness  for 
every  one  who  is  killed  or  incapacitated  by  Japanese 
bullets. 

Indeed,  the  precursor  of  the  ravages  to  be  expected 
from  disease  among  the  Russians  has  already  made 
its  appearance.  News  recently  came  from  Harbin, 
the  military  centre  of  Russia  in  Manchuria,  that  that 
place  has  already  become  a  hotbed  of  typhus  and 
other  zymotic  diseases,  a  class  of  physical  ills  easily 
preventable  under  rigid  official  sanitation,  but  not 
under  prevailing  war  conditions. 

The  men  from  Japan  are  spare  eaters  and  sparer 
drinkers,  their  regular  diet  both  in  peace  and  war 
being  fish  and  rice,  and  their  commissariat  is  cor- 
respondingly easy  to  handle.  This  fact  gives  them 
an  enormous  advantage  in  a  war  with  any  western 
nation,  Russia  included. 

Nevertheless,  the  chances  of  Japan  in  a  land  war 
with  Russia  seemed  slim  indeed.  It  looked  as  if  the 
overwhelming  numbers  of  Russia's  armies  would 
crush  her. 

But  here  again  circumstances  must  be  taken  into 
account.  Though  Japan  in  this  war  avowedly  fought 
for  her  very  existence,  she  would  not  have  gone  into 
it  if  the  disparity  were  as  great  in  actual  numbers  as 
at  first  sight  it  seemed. 


Elements  in  the  Present  War  1 1 

There  were  several  very  important  compensating 
features  for  Japan.  The  most  important  is  the  fact 
that  while  in  either  Corea  or  Manchuria  she  is  still 
very  near  to  her  basis  of  supply,  and,  in  any  case,  is 
fighting  in  a  congenial  climate,  Russia  is  from  5000 
to  6000  miles  away  from  her  sources  of  sustenance. 
Again,  the  sea  route  being  closed  to  her  by  the  vig- 
ilance of  the  Japanese  navy,  everything  Russia  needs 
for  her  army  in  the  way  of  supplies,  ammunition, 
provisions,  tents,  and  other  field  equipments,  as  well 
as  reinforcements,  must  come  overland,  and  by  the 
one  line  at  her  disposal — the  Transsil^erian  Railroad 
and  its  two  Manchurian  branches.  This  ramshackle 
affair  of  a  railroad,  though  built  at  an  expense  of 
$750,000,000, — a  single-track  road,  resting  at  many 
places  on  badly  graded  and  imperfectly  secured  beds, 
— is  the  one  hope  of  Russia  in  this  war.  Whenever 
and  wherever  it  fails,  she  is  temporarily  hampered  and 
outdone.  As  an  American  writer  of  distinction  graph- 
ically put  it,  this  thin  line  of  steel  means  Russia's 
victory  or  defeat. 

As  a  striking  illustration  of  the  insufficiency  of  the 
Transsiberian  Railroad  at  this  present  juncture,  the 
leading  French  military  journal.  La  France  Militaire, 
on  information  furnished  it  from  the  Russian  general 
staff,  makes  the  following  statement: 

"  The  Russian  army  assembled  by  April  6  on  the 
Mukden-Harbin  road  amounted  to  260,000  men,  and 
at  that  date  was  to  be  shortly  brought  to  300,000. 

"  Now,  such  an  army  involved,  according  to  the  ac- 
cepted military  computation,  and  on  territory  such  as 
this  sparsely  settled  one  of  Manchuria,  100,000  horses. 
Merely  to  feed  these  men  and  animals  required  a 
supply  of  1600  tons  of  food  and  forage  a  day.     To 


12  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

transport  this  amount  there  were  needed  six  trains 
of  from  30  to  35  each  of  the  kind  of  freight-cars  in 
use  on  the  Transsiberian  Railroad." 

And  this,  it  appeared,  was  very  nearly  the  capacity 
of  the  road,  and  to  transport  and  deliver  this  amount 
every  day  it  was  necessary  that  there  should  be  no 
movement  of  troops  or  other  passenger  traffic  in  the 
same  direction  to  interfere  with  the  process  of  supply. 

That  is  to  say:  it  was,  theoretically,  all  the  road 
could  do  to  supply  such  an  army  as  Russia  was  then 
preparing,  and  it  was  pretty  clear  that  her  prepara- 
tions were  not  excessive,  compared  with  the  number 
of  the  Japanese  troops  the  Russians  were  reckoning 
to  encounter.  There  was  absolutely  no  "  factor  of 
safety  "  allowed  for  accidents  and  partial  disablements 
on  the  railroad. 

True,  the  Transsiberian  Railroad,  it  was  given  out 
by  Russian  authorities,  was  not  their  only  source  of 
supply.  For,  according  to  these  authorities,  there 
were  at  that  time  considerable  accumulations  of  provi- 
sions at  Port  Arthur,  Vladivostok,  Mukden,  and  Har- 
bin. But  these  statements  were  clearly  exaggerated. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  supplies  at  those  points  were 
insignificant,  when  such  vast  masses  of  men  and  beasts 
were  concerned. 

As  to  Manchuria  and  the  maritime  province  of  Rus- 
sian Siberia,  neither  produces  agricultural  supplies  for 
export.  In  other  words,  they  raise  only  sufficient  for 
their  own  populations. 

But  putting  the  best  face  upon  the  matter,  certain 
things  are  beyond  dispute.  First,  the  Russian  forces 
in  the  Far  East  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  were  much 
smaller  than  had  all  along  been  stated;  instead  of 
200,000   or   250,000,    as    claimed,    they    were    barely 


Elements  in  the  Present  War  1 3 

50,000,  and  of  this  number  only  about  one-half  was 
really  available  against  the  enemy.  Second,  from 
three  to  four  months  had  to  elapse  before  Russia,  by 
her  sole  available  means  of  communication, — that  is, 
the  Transsiberian  Railroad, — could  concentrate  on  the 
theatre  of  war  an  army  large  enough  to  face  in  the 
field  such  an  army  as  Japan  herself  could  assemble 
within  one-half  of  that  time,  either  on  the  Liao  Tung 
Peninsula  or  in  Corea.  So  that  for  quite  a  length 
of  time  Japan  enjoyed  the  immeasurable  advantage, 
provided  she  bestirred  herself,  of  having  double  or 
treble  the  number  of  fighting  men  in  the  field  that  Rus- 
sia could  muster,  and  this  despite  the  enormous  supe- 
riority in  numbers  that  Russia  could  boast  of  in  theory. 
Now,  as  to  this  point  of  speed  on  Japan's  part,  all 
the  attendant  circumstances  are  not  plain  at  this  writ- 
ing. It  is  certain  that  her  navy,  compact  though 
small,  splendidly  officered  and  manned,  was  ready  at 
the  hour  when  the  scale  had  tipped  in  favour  of  w^ar. 
The  facts  in  this  respect  are  known  to  the  world.  In 
the  roadstead  of  Chemulpo,  Corea,  two  fine  Russian 
battleships  were  sunk  by  Japanese  broadsides.  At 
Port  Arthur  Admiral  Togo  inflicted  even  worse 
damage  upon  the  Russian  fleet  by  means  of  his  swift 
little  torpedo  boats.  Again  and  again  this  same  un- 
daunted naval  hero  went  to  the  charge  at  Port  Arthur, 
daringly  yet  cautiously  sacrificing  men  and  treasure 
in  the  attempt  to  "  bottle  up "  that  chief  Russian 
stronghold  in  the  disputed  territory.  Not  for  a  mo- 
ment has  Japan's  navy  failed  in  its  duty;  the  same 
dash,  valour,  and  shrewdness  have  characterised  every 
move  of  Japan's  fleet  since  the  war  clouds  burst.  In 
her  navy,  at  any  rate,  Japan  has  demonstrated  su- 
perior mettle  and  skill. 


CHAPTER  II 
MILITARY    NOTES 

As  to  the  Japanese  army,  it  did  not  suffer  in  its 
operations  from  an  insufficient  Transsiberian  Rail- 
road, but  the  obstacles  it  had  to  contend  with  in 
making  its  way  to  the  mainland  were,  nevertheless, 
of  a  similar  character,  and  in  some  respects  they  were 
even  harder  to  overcome. 

Weather  was  one  of  them.  Lack  of  sufficient  com- 
munications was  another.  Beyond  the  middle  of 
March  the  harbour  points  on  the  Corean  and  Man- 
churian  coasts,  where  landings  could  be  effected,  were 
ice-bound.  The  winter  was  of  unusual  severity  and 
length,  even  in  the  more  southern  latitudes  of  Japan 
and  Corea;  and  when  thawing  set  in,  the  poor  roads 
of  the  country  became  morasses,  scarcely  passable. 
Add  to  this  that  Japan  has  only  5015  miles  of  rail- 
road all  told  within  her  island  empire,  composed  as  it 
is  of  over  4000  separate  islands,  with  few  lines  pierc- 
ing the  mountainous  interior.  Thus,  the  amassing 
and  concentrating  of  large  armed  forces,  particularly 
in  the  dead  of  winter,  was  a  matter  of  extreme  diffi- 
culty for  Japan.  And  then  to  send  these  troops  from 
their  native  islands  over  various  arms  of  the  Japan  Sea 
to  the  mainland  presented  another  series  of  extreme 
difficulties. 

This  is  a  statement  of  the  chief  obstacles  Japan  had 
to  surmount  in  making  her  army  available  for  fight- 


Military  Notes  15 

ing  purposes  at  the  theatre  of  war.  Whether  they 
alone  account  for  the  failure  of  Japan  to  display  the 
same  swiftness  and  skill  in  utilising  her  land  forces 
that  she  had  shown  in  handling  her  navy,  is  at  this 
hour  matter  of  conjecture. 

Whatever  the  reasons,  in  any  event  the  fact  remains 
that  Japan  missed  the  golden  opportunity  fate  had 
thrown  in  her  way  at  the  opening  of  the  war.  It  was 
Baron  Hayashi,  Japan's  minister  in  London,  who 
made  the  broad  statement  shortly  after  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  that  his  country  meant  to  win  by  deliver- 
ing swift,  powerful  blows  at  the  enemy.  If  so,  that 
chance  has  gone.  If  Japan  had  concentrated  an  army 
of,  say,  150,000  men,  in  Lower  Manchuria  and  North- 
ern Corea.  between  February  5  and  April  5,  she  could 
have  driven  out  the  Russians  from  all  the  points  of 
vantage  in  dispute;  could  have  seized  Port  Arthur 
from  the  land  side,  and  could  have  fortified  her  land 
position  in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  it  almost  im- 
possible at  a  later  date  for  Russia  to  oust  her,  always 
providing  that  Japan  still  maintained  her  naval  supe- 
riority. Whatever  the  cause,  she  did  not  make  the 
land  operations,  and  by  this  omission  rendered  her 
task  doubly  and  trebly  difficult. 

One  great  disadvantage  in  a  military  sense  under 
which  Japan  is  labouring  is  her  lack  of  sufficient 
cavalry.  Russia  in  this  respect  is  exceptionally  well 
equipped.  Her  supply  of  Cossacks,  irregular  and 
very  hardy  cavalry,  is  practically  exhaustless.  From 
the  Cossack  settlements  in  Western  and  Eastern 
Siberia  alone  she  can  draw  some  twenty-five  regi- 
ments of  this  class  of  troops.  And  the  Cossack  with 
his  tireless  native  horse  is  an  excellent  man  for  cam- 
paigning in  Manchuria  or  Corea. 


1 6  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

Japan,  as  her  great  military  organiser,  Fieldmar- 
shal  Yamagata,  has  stated,  has  scarcely  any  use  for 
cavalry  at  home.  The  difficult  and  mountainous 
nature  of  the  main  islands  forbids  the  employment  of 
cavalry  on  a  large  scale.  Besides,  the  native  horse 
of  Japan  does  not  make  a  good  cavalry  mount,  and 
the  greater  expense  involved  in  that  arm  of  the  service 
for  a  poor  country  like  Japan  is  another  factor.  So 
in  cavalry  Japan  is  very  badly  off. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  measuring  the  respective  value 
of  Russia's  troops,  a  clear  distinction  ought  to  be  made 
between  those  coming  from  her  Asiatic  provinces,  and 
those  coming  from  the  European  ones.  The  latter, 
for  a  war  like  the  present  one,  are  greatly  inferior. 
This  will  show  itself  more  and  more  plainly  as  the 
war  progresses.  The  Russian  soldier  of  the  interior 
cannot  compare  physically  with  his  comrade  of  Siberia 
or  Central  Asia.  Nor  is  he  accustomed  to  the  diffi- 
cult climate  and  hardships  of  every  kind. 

A  word  as  to  the  finances  of  the  two  countries.  It 
is  a  common  mistake  to  suppose  Russia  to  be  a  wealthy 
country,  that  is,  so  far  as  capital  is  concerned.  There 
is  an  immensity  of  latent  natural  resources,  but  these 
for  the  overwhelming  part  are  not  yet  being  exploited, 
and  they  do  not  help  her  in  a  great  war.  For  the  mo- 
ment she  has  the  sinews  of  war,  but  how  about  six 
months  hence? 

The  unwary  are  apt  to  be  misled  by  the  flashy 
budget  reports  annually  issued  by  the  finance  ministry 
in  St.  Petersburg.  The  one  for  1904  shows  a  total 
government  revenue  of  almost  $1,000,000,000,  with 
the  ordinary  expenditures  several  millions  below  that 
figure.  But  this  total  is  arrived  at  by  bringing  under 
its  head  a  number  of  important  resources  which  are 


Military  Notes  17 

in  the  nature  of  government  monopolies,  and  which  in 
every  other  country  would  not  be  so  classed.  Among 
these  are  the  government  liquor  monopoly,  the  receipts 
from  the  entire  network  of  Russian  railroads  (alto- 
gether about  42,000  miles  in  length,  that  is,  less  than 
one-fifth  of  the  length  of  the  American  railroads),  the 
earnings  of  a  large  number  of  great  industrial  estab- 
lishments owned  and  operated  by  the  government,  and 
so  forth. 

Furthermore,  these  Russian  budgets  are  notoriously 
unreliable — there  is  always  more  or  less  juggling  with 
figures  in  them.  And  then  comes  the  vast  item  of 
Russia's  national  debt.  That  portion  of  it  for  which 
the  government  is  directly  and  indirectly  responsible 
amounts  to  over  $4,250,000,000,  according  to  a  com- 
putation recently  made  by  Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  a  well- 
known  financial  writer.  Foreign  creditors  hold  of  this 
something  like  $1,900,000,000,  France  alone  about 
$1,450,000,000,  with  Germany,  Holland,  and  Bel- 
gium next  in  importance  on  the  list.  To  meet  the 
interest  on  this  enormous  debt — most  of  it  at  four  per 
cent. — means  every  year  a  fearful  strain  on  Russian 
finances.  This  gigantic  debt,  as  will  be  pointed  out 
elsewhere,  is  also  responsible  for  the  fact  that  Russia 
is  compelled  to  maintain  a  vast  excess  of  exports  over 
imports.  And  as  these  exports  are  nearly  all  agri- 
cultural, not  enough  foodstuffs  are  left  in  Russia  to 
nourish  her  population  adequately. 

With  all  that,  Russia  has  been  obliged  every  year 
since  1893  ^o  pile  a  new  foreign  debt  on  top  of  her 
old  one,  and  since  1900  she  has  found  increasing  diffi- 
culty in  obtaining  new  loans. 

It  cannot,  therefore,  be  said  that  Russia's  finances  are 
in  a  sound  condition.   The  exact  opposite  is  the  truth. 


1 8  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

However,  when  comparing  her  financial  resources 
with  those  of  Japan,  Russia  is  superior,  so  far  as  the 
abiHty  to  raise  large  sums  of  money  abroad  is  con- 
cerned. 

True,  Japan's  debt  is  but  little  more  than  a  fraction 
of  Russia's.  Its  total  is  now  $370,000,000,  and  $50,- 
000,000  of  that  represents  the  new  domestic  issue 
(oversubscribed  enormously  by  patriotic  "Japs") 
made  since  the  beginning  of  this  war.  Again,  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  the  whole  debt  takes  the  form  of 
domestic  loans. 

But  despite  the  marvellous  advance  of  Japan  since 
1870  in  all  the  factors  of  civilised  life,  the  island 
empire  is,  after  all,  poor  when  compared  with  Western 
nations.  A.  R.  Colquhoun,  in  his  latest  book,  makes 
the  statement  that  the  average  annual  earnings  of  a 
Japanese  family  are  but  $45.00,  Such  a  figure  speaks 
plainly.  It  may  be  well  to  mention,  though,  that 
$45.00  per  annum,  ridiculously  low  as  it  seems  to  us, 
is  more  than  the  average  Russian  earns.  The  highest 
figure  claimed  by  the  Russian  government  itself  for 
the  average  yearly  income  of  a  Russian  peasant 
family  is  63  roubles,  about  $32.00.  And  the  Rus- 
sian peasants  form  95  per  cent,  of  the  total  popu- 
lation. 

All  the  same,  in  a  long  and  expensive  war — such  as 
this  present  one  is  going  to  be — ^Japan  will  find  it  a 
matter  of  extreme  difficulty  to  raise  the  funds  required. 

It  is  true  that  Japan  has  made  rapid  strides  forward 
in  industry  and  commerce.  Her  imports  and  exports 
for  1903  amounted  to  almost  $300,000,000.  Those 
of  Russia  have  remained  practically  stationary  for  a 
number  of  years,  at  about  $720,000,000.  Japan  has 
increased  her  foreign  trade  fivefold  since  1888.     Her 


Military  Notes  19 

cotton  industry  is  even  to-day  considerably  larger  than 
that  of  Russia. 

It  is  quite  safe  to  say  that  if  this  war  had  not  been 
forced  upon  Japan,  if  she  had  been  allowed  to  proceed 
peaceably  on  her  path,  the  surprising  rate  of  increase 
in  her  prosperity  would  have  been  maintained.  This 
war,  though,  inevitably  will  thrust  her  back  for  a  time. 

A  great  ally  of  Japan  during  this  war  has  already 
made  an  appearance.  That  is  Russian  official  corrup- 
tion. The  tremendous  defalcations  committed  in  the 
construction  of  the  Transsiberian  Railroad  were  par- 
tially known  before,  but  they  have  come  to  the  full 
light  only  since  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  same 
is  true  of  the  Russian  commissariat  department.  Am- 
munition, all  sorts  of  provisions  and  forage,  field 
equipments,  etc.,  which  the  "  Little  Father "  in  St. 
Petersburg  had  been  led  to  believe  had  been  sent 
months  ago  to  the  theatre  of  war,  have  been  purloined 
by  dishonest  contractors  and  officials  to  the  extent  of 
many  millions.  And  many  additional  millions  will 
disappear  into  the  pockets  of  Russia's  greedy  bureau- 
cracy before  the  war  is  over.  In  this  respect  Japan's 
record  is  clean,  and  is  likely  to  remain  so. 

The  real  issues  of  a  war  are  scarcely  ever  mentioned 
by  any  government  in  flinging  down  the  gauntlet  to 
a  foe.  This  present  war,  so  novel  in  many  respects, 
was  novel  also  in  that,  at  least  on  the  part  of  one  of 
the  belligerents,  namely,  Japan,  the  actual  reason  was 
given  for  resorting  to  war. 

In  the  diplomatic  correspondence  between  Japan 
and  Russia  since  August,  1903,  the  former  made  a 
clear  and  unvarnished  statement  why  she  considered 
existing  conditions  in  Manchuria  and  Corea  incom- 
patible with  her  vital  interests.     Russia  on  her  part 


20  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

followed  her  traditional  diplomatic  system  of  duplicity 
and  subterfuge.  But  the  world,  of  course,  knows 
what  the  real  animus  of  Russia  was  and  is  in  this 
struggle.  To  gain  an  ice-free  and  first-class  harbour 
on  the  coast  of  the  Pacific  led  her  to  seize  Port  Arthur, 
To  extend  her  sway  throughout  Manchuria,  and  thus 
connect  unbrokenly  her  older  northward  Far  Asian 
possessions  with  points  much  farther  south;  to  win, 
step  by  step,  by  hook  or  crook,  Corea,  and  thus  enor- 
mously strengthen  her  strategic  position,  and  in  this 
way  obtain  a  longer  and  better  frontage  on  the  Pacific 
than  any  other  nation  on  either  side  of  that  ocean  could 
dream  of — these  were  the  guiding  causes  of  Russia's 
aggressive  policy  towards  Japan  and  China. 

For  Japan  the  case  stands  differently.  Her  little 
island  empire  of  162,153  square  miles,  with  a  popula- 
tion of  about  48,000,000,  is  not  only  densely  popu- 
lated, but  actually  overpopulated ;  for  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  the  greater  part  of  her  territory  is 
mountainous  and  not  tillable,  and  that  many  of  her 
islands  are  but  barren  rock.  The  density  of  her  pop- 
ulation in  the  habitable  parts  is  double  that  of  either 
England,  Germany,  or  France.  She  needs  an  outlet 
for  her  teeming  millions.  Immigration  restrictions 
in  America  and  Australia  prevent  wholesale  Japanese 
emigration.  Corea  lies  on  the  adjoining  mainland, 
with  a  population  and  climate  closely  resembling  the 
southern  provinces  of  Japan  itself.  Possession  of 
Corea  would  solve  the  entire  problem  for  Japan.  An 
internationally  recognised  protectorate  over  Corea, 
with  a  close  customs-union  as  one  of  the  leading 
features,  would  serve  her  purpose  nearly  as  well. 

Aside  from  that  phase  of  the  matter,  Corea,  in  the 
words  of  a  Japanese  statesman,  is  "  pointed  like  an 


Military  Notes 


21 


arrow  at  the  heart  of  Japan,"  and  for  such  a  power 
as  Russia  to  either  hold  Corea  or  be  paramount  there 
would  actually  threaten  Japan's  national  existence. 
A  glance  at  the  map  will  be  sufficient  to  convince  any- 
fair-minded  reader  of  that. 


Map  showing  Corea  and  the  neighbouring  parts  of  Japan 


Thus,  then,  Japan  is  battling  for  her  independence, 
for  a  chance  of  expansion,  for  her  new-won  prestige 
as  a  world-power — in  fact,  for  all  an  ambitious  and 
patriotic  people  holds  dear.  It  may  be  called  a  war 
of  desperation  on  her  part,  but  history  affords  more 
than  one  example  of  a  small,  liberty-loving  people  tri- 
umphing over  a  big  and  haughty  foe. 

Of  course,  the  longer  the  war  the  less  Japan's  chance 
of  ultimate  victory:  the  more,  too,  the  danger  of  the 
gallant  little  people  bleeding  slowly  to  death.  Russia, 
large  but  unwieldy,  can  gradually  focus  her  energies 


22  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

upon  one  point,  can  bring  her  Baltic  fleet  to  Far  Asia, 
and  send  over  the  Transsiberian  Road  additional 
regiment  after  regiment.  But  the  Japanese,  small  in 
stature  though  they  be,  are  stout  of  heart,  and  the 
fortunes  of  war  frequently  take  surprising  turns. 

Great  fear  was  entertained  in  Europe  and  this  coun- 
try that  other  nations  would  be  involved  in  the 
struggle.  It  was  recognised  from  the  start,  both  in 
England  and  the  United  States,  that  Japan  fought  for 
American  and  English  interests,  for  the  "  open  door  " 
and  the  gradual  regeneration  and  liberalising  of  China 
and  the  whole  of  Asia.  Nevertheless,  it  was  justly  a 
matter  of  congratulation  for  both  English-speaking 
powers,  that,  owing  to  Secretary  Hay's  manly,  prompt, 
and  wise  action,  the  outlook,  soon  after  the  com- 
mencement of  hostilities,  began  to  brighten  in  this 
respect  at  least.  Several  grave  elements  of  danger 
were  eliminated  from  the  situation,  the  theatre  of  war 
was  narrowed  down,  and  the  issues  themselves  were 
more  clearly  defined  on  both  sides. 


CHAPTER  III 
OPINIONS   OF   EXPERTS 

It  is  a  trite  saying  that  a  body  of  experts  usually 
agrees  to  disagree.  This  is  particularly  true  before 
the  outbreak  and  during  the  earlier  progress  of  wars. 
John  Morley  in  his  "Life  of  Gladstone  "  tells  us  that 
in  1870  all  England  was  blind  to  Germany's  greater 
military  strength  when  measured  with  that  of  France, 
and  that  the  rapid  victories  of  the  Teuton  hosts,  cul- 
minating, blow  after  blow,  in  the  catastrophe  of  Sedan, 
fairly  floored  even  the  most  sagacious  Briton. 

It  was  so  in  1894-95.  Public  opinion  everywhere 
up  to  the  battle  on  the  Yalu  had  not  for  a  moment 
anticipated  Japan's  easy  successes.  Of  course.  Japan 
was  then  an  entirely  new  factor  in  world  politics. 
Practically,  she  is  so  now.  And  the  hesitancy  of 
military  and  financial  experts  to  commit  themselves  to 
a  definite  prognostication  is  easily  understood. 

Thus  we  have  seen  from  the  start  in  this  present 
war,  and  during  the  preliminary  diplomatic  stages, 
that  Japan  is  being  underestimated.  The  wish  is 
father  to  the  thought,  and  therefore  it  was  not  surpris- 
ing to  see  the  public  opinion  of  those  countries  most 
friendly  to  Russia — France  and  Germany — scoffing  at 
the  notion  of  Japan's  setting  up  as  a  serious  foe  to 
Russia.  The  Russians  themselves,  government  and 
people  alike,  have  persistently  laughed  at  Japan's  pre- 
tensions to  be  taken  in  dead  earnest.     Senator  Bev- 

23 


24  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

eridge  in  his  recent  book  on  Russia  gives  amusing  in- 
stances of  this.  But  what  is  more  astonishing  is  that 
even  in  those  countries  which  entertain  more  or  less 
sympathy  with  Japan's  defence  of  her  rights  as  a 
growing  and  independent  nation,  particularly  England 
and  the  United  States,  the  overwhelming  trend  of 
public  opinion  was  altogether  in  the  same  direction, 
and  but  relatively  few  predicted  ultimate  triumph  for 
Japan. 

In  this  country,  it  was  only  General  Daniel  E. 
Sickles  who  came  out  flatly  with  a  horoscope  favour- 
able to  Japan.     In  a  brief  magazine  article  he  said : 

"  The  probability  is  that  the  war  will  not  be  a  long 
one.  The  difficulties  Russia  is  obliged  to  encounter 
are  likely  to  prove  insurmountable,  while  Japan  would 
be  glad  to  make  peace  if  she  can  drive  Russia  out  of 
Manchuria  and  Corea." 

Our  soldier  foremost  in  common  repute.  General 
Nelson  A.  Miles,  is  non-committal.     He  says : 

"  I  think  it  is  reasonable  to  presume  that  the  war 
will  be  of  long  duration,  and  that  a  much  larger  num- 
ber of  men  will  be  brought  into  the  field  of  operation 
than  are  now  engaged.  It  is  likely  to  be  a  very  ex- 
pensive war  before  it  ends,  and  a  war  that  is  quite 
likely  to  involve  other  European  powers.  I  see  no 
occasion  for  our  own  country's  being  concerned  in  an 
entangling  alliance,  and  should  regard  it  as  a  great 
misfortune  if  it  should  become  involved.  ...  As  to 
what  the  result  will  be,  no  mortal  can  safely  predict. 
.  .  .  How,  when,  and  where  the  war  will  end,  is  as 
impossible  to  determine,  as  it  would  be  to  prophesy  the 
result  of  a  game  of  chess." 

Another  well-known  American  strategist,  General 
Joseph  Wheeler,  says: 


opinions  of  Experts  25 

"  The  chances  of  the  final  victory  are  certainly  with 
Russia.  Russia's  resources  and  army  preponderate  so 
greatly  that  it  would  seem  that  the  Czar's  troops  would 
be  able  to  overcome  the  forces  which  will  finally  be 
inferior  in  numbers." 

Still  another  American  soldier  of  great  distinction, 
and  one  who  knows  the  Russian  army  intimately  in 
peace  and  war,  General  Francis  V.  Greene,  firmly  be- 
lieves in  Russian  success,  pointing  to  the  almost  un- 
broken advance  of  the  Russians  in  years  past.  He 
takes  the  view,  however,  that  the  final  settlement  of 
the  quarrel  will  not  be  by  Russia  and  Japan  alone.  In 
this  connection  he  says : 

"  It  is  quite  certain  that  Japan  will  not  become  a 
Russian  province,  nor  will  there  be  any  '  yellow  peril  ' 
under  the  leadership  of  Japan ;  for,  no  matter  which 
side  wins,  the  treaty  of  peace  will  be  made,  not  by  the 
two  combatants,  but  by  a  congress  of  all  the  great 
powers,  including  ourselves — so  far  have  unforeseen 
events  carried  us  away  from  the  traditions  of  Wash- 
ington. The  terms  of  that  treaty  will  be  such  as  the 
great  nations  think  best  for  the  interests  of  the  whole 
world,  and  not  alone  of  the  two  nations  who  have 
carried  on  the  war." 

In  saying  this  General  Greene  might  have  pointed 
as  precedents  not  only  to  the  treaty  of  Shimonoseki, 
on  May  8,  1895,  the  terms  of  which  were  subsequently 
nullified  at  the  joint  demand  of  Russia,  Germany,  and 
France,  leaving  Japan  as  the  fruit  of  her  conquest 
merely  the  island  of  Formosa,  but  to  others  as  well — 
for  instance,  to  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano,  which  was 
broken  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  leaving  Russia  not 
an  inch  of  Turkish  territory. 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  Japan's  minister  in 


26  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

Washington,  Kogoro  Takahira,  has  repeatedly  made 
statements  in  pubHc  as  to  what  Japan  is  fighting  for. 
The  most  cogent  and  comprehensive  of  these  state- 
ments said,  among  other  things : 

"  The  indefinite  occupation  of  Manchuria  by  Russia 
would  be  a  continual  menace  to  the  Corean  Empire, 
whose  independence  Japan  regards  as  absolutely  es- 
sential to  her  own  repose  and  security.  .  .  .  Russia 
was  not  willing  to  bind  herself  in  any  manner  regard- 
ing the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
China." 

Another  Japanese  gentleman  of  distinction.  Baron 
Kentaro  Kaneko,  a  graduate  of  Harvard  University, 
and  a  former  member  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet,  recently 
was  heard  to  declare  that  "  We  are  not  looking  for  the 
acquisition  of  territory.  For  the  sake  of  peace  we 
gave  up  Manchuria,  which  we  had  won  by  loss  of 
blood  and  treasure.  Peace  was  and  is  the  sole  object 
of  Japan.  .  .  .  We  tried  in  every  diplomatic  and  con- 
ciliatory way  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  Russia,  but  she 
would  not  keep  her  word,  and  we  had  to  fight  for  our 
honour  and  existence." 

On  the  other  hand.  Count  Cassini,  Russia's  am- 
bassador in  Washington,  quite  recently  expressed  him- 
self in  a  very  different  way.  Some  of  his  statements 
were  as  follows : 

"  The  success  of  Japan  in  the  present  war  would 
imperil  the  interests  not  only  of  Europe,  but  of 
America  also.  It  would  make  the  Japanese  dominant 
in  Asia,  and  result  in  an  Asiatic  league.  Japan  is  an 
ambitious,  aggressive  nation,  eager  for  war  and  con- 
quest. No  one  who  has  any  acquaintance  with  the 
two  countries  can  doubt  that  if  Japan  were  to  become 
ascendant,  she  would  supply  military  instructors  to 


opinions  of  Experts  27 

China,  and  in  ten  years  she  would  raise  an  army  from 
the  430,000,000  inhabitants  of  that  empire  that  could 
defy  the  world.  .  .  .  The  Chinese  are  not  at  all  slow. 
As  Russian  minister  to  Peking,  I  had  excellent  oppor- 
tunities to  study  them.  I  was  there  in  1894  during 
the  Chinese-Japanese  War.  From  that  time  imtil 
1900,  when  the  Boxer  uprising  occurred,  a  period  of 
only  six  years,  the  Chinese  have  displayed  an  amazing 
development  in  military  spirit  and  capacity." 

Such  a  statement,  though  coming  from  so  high  a 
source,  must  not  go  unchallenged.  The  facts  contra- 
dict it.  Since  her  rise  as  a  military  and  naval  power, 
Japan  has  given  no  evidence  whatever  of  a  belligerent 
temper.  The  war  of  1894-95  grew  out  of  old  and 
well-founded  claims  which  Japan  had  on  Corea,  or 
rather,  on  the  maintenance  of  an  efficient  government 
there.  The  war  was  forced  on  Japan,  just  as  much 
as  was  this  present  war. 

The  "  yellow  peril  "  idea  is  a  bugaboo  which  Russia 
has  been  very  cleverly  manipulating  in  the  past,  and 
with  which  she  is  more  or  less  successfully  trying  to 
blind  the  eyes  of  the  seeing  now.  But  it  is  a  figment 
of  the  imagination,  a  phantom  which  has  no  real  ex- 
istence. Its  absurdity  will  be  shown  elsewhere  in  this 
book. 

The  author  of  one  of  the  most  valuable  books  on 
modern  Russia,  Henry  Norman,  M.  P.,  in  the  final 
paragraph  of  a  recent  article,  says : 

"  In  conclusion,  I  will  venture  upon  one  prophecy, 
namely,  that  the  result  of  this  war  will  be  for  Russia 
a  blessing  in  disguise.  The  policy  of  expansion  every- 
where, at  any  cost,  and  by  any  method,  whether  of 
arms  or  of  diplomacy,  together  with  its  authors  and 
upholders,    will   be   discredited.     The    canker    at    the 


28  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

heart  of  Russia — the  corruption  of  her  bureaucracy — 
will  be  cut  out.  The  statesmen  who  desire  to  curtail 
military  expenditure,  and  to  encourage  Russian  pro- 
duction and  commerce,  will  come  back  to  power.  The 
Czar  will  brush  aside  opposition  to  the  ideals  of  hu- 
manity and  peace  that  he  cherishes.  The  unparalleled 
natural  resources  of  Russia,  in  mines  and  forests  and 
wheat-lands  and  cattle-lands  and  oil-lands  and  great 
water-powers,  will  be  developed.  This  movement  will 
weed  out  the  incompetent  and  dishonest  official,  and 
Russia  will,  I  am  convinced,  date  a  new  and  a  better 
epoch  from  the  year  in  which  two  classes  of  her  offi- 
cials deceived  their  emperor  and  betrayed  their  coun- 
try." 

Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  vice-president  of  the  National 
City  Bank  of  New  York,  and  formerly  assistant  secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury,  in  a  recent  admirable  statement 
of  the  financial  resources  of  the  two  countries,  declares 
the  credit  of  both  Japan  and  Russia  in  the  world's 
money  markets  to  be  not  very  good.  Japan's  only 
market  for  her  securities  he  finds  in  London ;  Russia's, 
in  Paris,  Berlin,  Amsterdam,  and  Brussels,  the  capi- 
tals of  her  main  creditors.  He  cites  a  number  of  un- 
reliable data  in  Russian  budgets;  exposes  the  regularly 
recurring  "  free  balance  "  in  the  Russian  treasury  as 
a  sham,  and  points  to  the  "  extraordinary  expendi- 
tures," amounting  for  1904  to  some  $100,000,000,  as 
instances  of  curious  book-keeping;  but  he  admits  the 
great  strength  of  Russia's  gold  reserve.  Indeed,  he 
says  that  in  the  preceding  year,  Russia's  stock  of  gold 
increased  $90,000,000,  bringing  it  up  to  $525,000,000. 
One  statement  by  him  is  significant.     He  says : 

"  One  of  the  greatest  factors  in  the  strength  of  the 
Russian  financial  position,  however,  lies  in  the  vastness 


opinions  of  Experts  29 

of  her  existing  debt.  With  the  investors  of  France 
holding  $1,400,000,000  of  her  securities,  they  must 
of  necessity  buy  more.  They  cannot  permit  prices  to 
be  unduly  depressed ;  and,  rather  than  see  that,  in- 
vestors already  interested  in  Russian  securities  will 
certainly  buy  more.  The  same  is  true  in  only  a  less 
degree  in  Germany  and  Holland." 

An  inkling  of  the  extent  to  which  this  country  is 
materially  interested  in  the  present  war  zone  is  fur- 
nished by  a  recent  statement  from  the  pen  of  O.  P. 
Austin,  chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Statistics  in  Washing- 
ton. 

American  commerce  there  has  grown  from  tiny  be- 
ginnings to  great  heights.  It  amounted,  in  1843,  to  a 
trifle  over  $6,000,000,  exports  and  imports.  In  1903 
the  exports  from  the  United  States  to  Japan,  China, 
Corea,  Hong  Kong,  and  Asiatic  Russia  had  risen  to 
$49,970,000;  the  imports  from  these  countries  were 
$72,320,000.  Thus  we  have  at  present  a  trade  of 
over  $122,000,000  with  those  regions.  The  British 
Empire  alone  still  exceeds  us  in  the  magnitude  of  her 
commercial  interests  there. 

But  that  this  country  is  on  the  ascending  scale  in 
this  matter,  while  Great  Britain  is  declining,  shows 
itself  very  plainly  by  an  analysis  of  the  figures. 

In  1873  Great  Britain  did  a  trade  of  $121,000,000 
with  those  countries.  In  1883  it  had  declined  to 
$110,000,000.  and  in  1902  to  $98,000,000.  It  is  only 
by  grouping  exports  and  imports  from  British  India, 
Australasia,  and  other  British  possessions,  with  those 
of  the  mother  country,  that  the  whole  volume  of  her 
business  with  Far  Asia  can  be  shown  to  be  still  greater 
than  ours. 

American  trade  with  Japan  has  risen  e\en  more 


30  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

rapidly  than  that  with  China.  We  exported  to  Japan 
(in  1902)  $21,485,000  to  Great  Britain's  $26,000,000. 
Within  twenty  years  British  exports  to  Japan  have 
doubled,  American  ones  have  more  than  sextupled. 

Taking  the  whole  of  our  imports  and  exports  to  Far 
Asia,  we  see  that  since  1883  our  sales  to  them  have 
more  than  quadrupled,  and  our  purchases  doubled. 

In  a  pronounced  degree,  we  are  Japan's  best  cus- 
tomer. We  buy  from  her  the  bulk  of  her  unmanu- 
factured silk,  and  practically  all  of  the  tea  she  exports. 
Of  China  a  similar  statement  can  be  made.  At  pres- 
ent Japan  still  takes  most  of  her  cotton  from  India. 
That  cotton  is  of  shorter  staple  and  therefore  less  val- 
uable, but  for  Japanese  uses  it  has  until  now  sufficed. 
With  a  further  development  of  Japan's  cotton  in- 
dustry, she  will  need  our  better  cottons.  And,  it  must 
be  remembered,  the  cotton  industry  has  always  been 
the  leading  one  in  Japan.  That  nation  is  destined  to 
be  one  of  the  chief  cotton  goods  producers  of  the 
world. 

With  Russia  our  trade  relations  have  never  been 
even  nearly  as  large  as  they  ought  to  be  from  the  size 
and  population  of  the  country.  Those  with  Asiatic 
Russia  have  been  and  are  but  a  drop  in  the  bucket  of 
our  foreign  commerce,  just  a  paltry  million  or  two. 

We  exported  to  Russia  in  1880,  all  told,  $13,229,- 
000,  and  in  1903  $17,606,000,  about  $4,000,000  less 
than  to  Japan. 

Russia's  total  imports  from  all  parts  of  the  world 
increased  from  $242,000,000  in  1871  to  $305,000,000 
in  1901,  or  25  per  cent.;  Japan's  total  imports  in  the 
same  time  increased  from  $22,000,000  to  $127,000,- 
000,  or  480  per  cent. 

Some  other  facts  are  also  suggestive. 


opinions  of  Experts  31 

Russia  discourages,  by  every  means  at  the  disposal 
of  an  autocratic  government,  exports  from  other  coun- 
tries. Her  trade  with  foreign  nations  is  hampered 
by  an  excessive  tariff,  by  an  extremely  corrupt  cus- 
toms service,  and  by  every  kind  of  official  chicanery. 

Another  fact :  Russia  is  our  chief  rival  in  her  main 
exports — kerosene,  flour,  wheat,  lumber,  cotton  goods 
(by  paying  an  export  bounty  on  them),  provisions. 
In  short,  she  is  a  natural  producer  of  nearly  all  the 
articles  which  form  the  bulk  of  our  export  to  the 
Orient.  Doubtless  she  would  be  an  active  and  vigorous 
rival  in  the  contest  for  that  market,  while  Japan's  pro- 
ductions are  entirely  different  in  character  from  those 
of  the  United  States,  and  in  no  way  competitive. 


CHAPTER  IV 
A  TRIUMPH  OF  AMERICAN  DIPLOMACY 

To  Americans  it  must  be  matter  of  sincere  congratu- 
lation that  in  this  whole  Far  Eastern  problem  the  far- 
sightedness and  fairness  of  our  statesmanship  and 
diplomacy  have  excelled  those  of  any  other  nation. 

Indeed,  it  is  strictly  within  the  truth  to  say  that — 
so  far  at  least — American  good  sense  has  achieved  a 
signal  victory  in  handling  this  most  thorny  question. 

Of  course  there  was  plenty  of  precedent  for  that  on 
our  side.  From  the  very  outset,  this  country  has  dis- 
played singular  sagacity,  and  been  favoured  by  as 
singular  luck,  in  dealing  with  China,  Japan,  and  Corea. 
To  determine  how  much  of  it  was  sagacity,  and  how 
much  luck,  may  be  left  to  individual  taste  and  judg- 
ment. 

At  any  rate,  the  very  letter  which  inaugurated  reg- 
ular international  relations  between  the  Celestial  Em- 
pire and  this  republic,  sixty-one  years  ago,  was  a 
masterpiece  of  shrewdness  and  sound  sense.  It  is 
worth  reproducing: 

"  I,  John  Tyler,  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America — which  States  are  Maine,  New  Hampshire, 
Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  Vermont, 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware, 
Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Ohio,  Louisiana,   In- 

32 


A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy      3  3 

diana,  Mississippi,  Illinois,  Alabama,  Missouri,  Arkan- 
sas, and  Michigan — send  you  this  letter  of  peace  and 
friendship,  signed  by  my  own  hand. 

"  I  hope  your  health  is  good.  China  is  a  great 
Empire,  extending  over  a  great  part  of  the  world. 
The  Chinese  are  numerous.  You  have  millions  and 
millions  of  subjects.  The  twenty-six  United  States 
are  as  large  as  China,  though  our  people  are  not  so 
numerous.  The  rising  sun  looks  upon  the  great  moun- 
tains and  great  rivers  of  China.  When  he  sets  he 
looks  upon  rivers  and  mountains  equally  large  in  the 
United  States.  Our  territories  extend  from  one  great 
ocean  to  the  other;  and  on  the  west  we  are  divided 
from  your  dominions  only  by  the  sea.  Leaving  the 
mouth  of  one  of  our  great  rivers  and  going  constantly 
toward  the  setting  sun,  we  sail  to  Japan  and  to  the 
Yellow  Sea. 

"  Now,  my  words  are  that  the  governments  of  two 
such  great  countries  should  be  at  peace.  It  is  proper, 
and  according  to  the  will  of  heaven,  that  they  should 
respect  each  other  and  act  wisely.  I  therefore  send 
to  your  court  Caleb  Cushing,  one  of  the  wise  and 
learned  men  of  this  country.  On  his  first  arrival  in 
China  he  will  inquire  for  your  health.  He  has  strict 
orders  to  go  to  your  great  city  of  Peking  and  there  to 
deliver  this  letter.  He  will  have  with  him  secretaries 
and  interpreters. 

"  The  Chinese  love  to  trade  with  our  people  and  to 
sell  them  tea  and  silk,  for  which  our  people  pay  silver, 
and  sometimes  other  articles.  But  if  the  Chinese  and 
the  Americans  will  trade  there  should  be  rules,  so  that 
they  shall  not  break  your  laws  or  our  laws.  Our  min- 
ister, Caleb  Cushing,  is  authorized  to  make  a  treaty 
to  regulate  trade.     Let  it  be  just.     Let  there  be  no 


34  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

unfair  advantage  on  either  side.  Let  the  people  trade 
not  only  at  Canton,  but  also  at  Amoy,  Ningpo,  Shang- 
hai, Fuchau,  and  all  such  other  places  as  may  offer 
profitable  exchanges  both  to  China  and  the  United 
States,  provided  they  do  not  break  your  laws  nor  our 
laws.  We  shall  not  take  the  part  of  evildoers.  We 
shall  not  uphold  them  that  break  your  laws.  There- 
fore, we  doubt  not  that  you  will  be  pleased  that  our 
messenger  of  peace,  with  this  letter  in  his  hand,  shall 
come  to  Peking,  and  there  deliver  it;  and  that  your 
great  officers  will,  by  your  order,  make  a  treaty  with 
him  to  regulate  affairs  of  trade,  so  that  nothing 
may  happen  to  disturb  the  peace  between  China  and 
America.  Let  the  treaty  be  signed  by  your  own  im- 
perial hand.  It  shall  be  signed  by  mine,  by  the  author- 
ity of  our  great  council,  the  Senate. 

"  And  so  may  your  health  be  good  and  may  peace 
reign. 

"  Written  at  Washington,  this  twelfth  of  July,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
forty-three. 

"  Your  good  friend, 
(Signed)         "John  Tyler, 

"  President." 

Caleb  Cushing  was  the  man  who  delivered  this 
letter,  gauged  so  keenly  in  accordance  with  Oriental 
perceptions,  and  the  result  of  his  mission  was  a  com- 
mercial treaty  between  China  and  the  United  States. 
By  virtue  of  its  terms  certain  ports  were  opened  to 
Americans.  Similar  privileges  were  afterwards 
granted  to  other  nations. 

So,  then,  this  was  the  first  "  open  door  "  by  which 
our  products  could  enter.    It  was  the  inauguration,  in 


A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy      35 

other  words,  of  that  "  open  door  "  pohcy  to  which  this 
nation  has  since  consistently  clung,  the  only  one  in 
that  quarter  which  will  "  pay  "  in  the  long  run. 

Ten  years  later,  Japan,  which  up  to  that  time  had 
had  no  commercial  relations  with  the  outside  world, 
signed  a  treaty  at  the  request  of  the  United  States — 
Commodore  Perry  having  done  the  preliminary  work 
in  a  most  tactful  manner — by  which  American  vessels 
were  allowed  to  enter  certain  of  the  Japanese  ports, 
and  trading  privileges  were  given  to  American  mer- 
chants. 

Thus  it  was  that  the  United  States,  without  any  war 
of  aggression,  without  risking  blood  and  treasure,  did 
more  to  open  the  commerce  of  the  Orient  than  all  the 
European  powers  together. 

It  was,  therefore,  by  building  on  foundations  laid  by 
his  predecessors,  that  our  able  secretary  of  state,  John 
Hay,  pursued  his  own  Far  Eastern  policy. 

In  1899  a  fair  solution  was  advanced  by  Mr.  Hay 
of  the  troublous  problem  how  to  bring  Far  Asia  within 
the  range  of  western  civilising  missions. 

By  our  acquisition  of  the  Philippines,  China  had 
become  our  near  neighbour.  At  that  time,  Great 
Britain,  Russia,  France,  and  Germany  had  already 
gained  special  advantages  and  exclusive  privileges  in 
portions  of  China,  including  acquisitions  of  territory. 
The  dismemberment  of  China  seemed  at  hand. 

That  such  designs  were  rife  at  the  time  admits  of 
no  doubt.  They  were  cloaked  under  the  euphemistic 
phrase  of  "  spheres  of  influence."  But  they  meant 
nothing  else  than  the  gradual  slicing-up  of  China's  im- 
mense living  body.  These  plans  had  rapidly  matured 
since  the  close  of  the  Japanese-Chinese  war  of  1894-95, 
and  it  had  been  to  keep  the  younger  power,  Japan,  from 


36  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

sharing  in  these  spoils,  to  nip  in  the  bud  any  slumber- 
ing ambitions  on  her  part,  that  Russia,  Germany, 
and  France  had  torn  up  the  treaty  of  Shimonoseki, 
and  deprived  Japan  of  the  fruits  of  her  well-won 
victory. 

In  the  nick  of  time,  at  what  diplomats  call  the 
"  psychological  moment,"  this  country  intervened.  To 
retain  in  China,  as  Mr.  Hay  phrased  it,  "  an  open 
market  for  all  the  world's  commerce,  to  remove  dan- 
gerous sources  of  international  irritation,"  and  to  pro- 
mote administrative  reforms  in  China,  greatly  needed 
to  strengthen  the  imperial  government  at  Peking,  and 
to  maintain  the  integrity  of  China,  was  what  the 
United  States  demanded  and  urged. 

Mr.  Hay,  in  September,  1899,  inaugurated  a  series 
of  negotiations  with  those  powers  that  had  obtained 
"  spheres  of  influence  "  in  China.  To  secure  results 
which  would  benefit  the  entire  western  world,  he  in- 
sisted that  powers  holding  "  spheres  of  influence " 
should  give  assurances  in  writing  that  within  those 
*'  spheres  "  there  should  be : 

(i)  Non-interference  with  any  treaty  port  or  with 
vested  interests  of  any  nation; 

(2)  Equality  of  treatment  for  all  nations  in  the 
matter  of  tariff  duties  in  China,  and  provision  for  the 
collection  of  such  duties  by  the  Chinese  government 
itself;  and 

(3)  Equality  of  treatment  for  all  nations  in  the 
matter  of  harbour  dues  on  vessels  and  in  railroad 
charges. 

To  express  the  matter  differently,  it  was  proposed 
by  Mr.  Hay  that  all  non-privileged  nations  entertaining 
commercial  relations  with  China  should,  in  such  rela- 
tions, be  treated  as  if  there  were  no  "  spheres  of  influ- 


A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy     37 

ence  "  or  other  government  present  in  China.  All  that 
America  asked  was  a  fair  field  and  no  favour. 

These  negotiations,  vigorously  begun  and  pros- 
ecuted, and  on  this  side  pervaded  throughout  by  an 
evident  spirit  of  frankness,  proved  eminently  success- 
ful. The  governments  concerned  were  those  of 
Russia,  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France,  Japan,  and 
Italy.  Within  three  months  replies  from  them  all  had 
been  received,  giving  cordial  and  full  assurance  of 
adhesion  to  the  principles  suggested  by  our  govern- 
ment. 

It  deserves  mention  that  the  German  government 
was  especially  cordial  and  emphatic  in  its  adherence. 
In  his  note  of  February  19,  1900,  Count  von  Buelow, 
now  imperial  chancellor,  but  at  that  time  still  Ger- 
many's secretary  of  foreign  affairs,  said : 

"  The  imperial  government  of  Germany  has,  from 
the  beginning,  not  only  asserted,  but  also  practically 
carried  out  to  the  fullest  extent,  in  its  Chinese  pos- 
sessions, absolute  equality  of  treatment  of  all  nations 
with  regard  to  trade,  navigation,  and  commerce.  The 
imperial  government  entertains  no  thought  of  depart- 
ing in  the  future  from  this  principle." 

All  the  other  replies,  the  one  from  Russia  included, 
were  of  similar  tenor.  A  great  triumph  in  favour  of 
equality  of  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  the  nations 
had  been  achieved. 

This  had  scarcely  been  done,  however,  when  the 
world  was  startled  in  the  early  part  of  1900  by  reports 
of  frightful  massacres  and  atrocities  being  perpetrated 
by  the  Boxers  upon  all  foreigners  in  China.  The 
charge  of  collusion  has  been  laid  at  the  door  of  the 
imperial  government  at  Peking,  but  it  has  never  been 
clearly  proved.     Whether  or  no,  however,  the  central 


38  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

government  was  evidently  too  weak  and  indifferent  to 
restrain  those  large  bands  of  evil-doers  or  to  afford  pro- 
tection to  foreign  residents. 

The  person  actually  exercising  the  prerogatives  of 
the  throne, — the  dowager  empress,  Tsi  An, — with  her 
charge,  the  nominal  emperor,  and  the  whole  court  and 
nearly  all  the  government  officials,  fled  and  abandoned 
the  capital. 

It  was  during  the  awful  time  of  suspense,  while  the 
whole  civilised  world  turned  its  eyes  toward  that  small 
quarter  of  Peking  where  the  ambassadors  and  other 
representatives  of  the  powers  were  being  besieged  and 
in  momentary  expectation  of  a  frightful  death,  that  one 
nation  and  one  man  did  not  lose  their  heads. 

When  the  ancient  empire  seemed  tottering  to  its 
fall,  there  appeared,  on  July  3,  1900,  a  clear,  calm  note 
addressed  by  Mr.  Hay  to  all  the  powers  having  inter- 
ests in  China,  containing  a  statement  of  the  position 
of  our  government  with  respect  to  affairs  there. 

This  note  declared  the  intention  of  our  government 
to  abide  by  its  well-known  policy  of  peace  with  China, 
the  furtherance  of  commerce,  the  protection  of  Ameri- 
can citizens,  and  the  demand  of  full  reparation  for 
wrongs. 

The  purpose  of  the  United  States  was  declared  to  be 
to  act  concurrently  with  the  other  powers  in  re-estab- 
lishing communication  with  Peking,  to  rescue  Ameri- 
cans there,  to  protect  Americans  and  their  property 
everywhere  in  China,  and  to  prevent  the  further  spread 
of  disorder  in  the  empire.  The  note  also  declared  that 
it  was  the  policy  of  this  government  to  seek  means  to 
bring  about  permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China,  to 
preserve  her  territorial  and  administrative  entity,  to 
protect  all  rights  guaranteed  to  friendly  powers,  and 


A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy     39 

to  safeguard  for  the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and 
impartial  trade-  with  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

The  whole  spirit  of  this  note  was  so  reassuring  and 
sincere  that  it  met  with  a  most  sympathetic  and  hearty 
approval  on  the  part  of  the  other  powers.  It  did  more 
than  any  other  single  factor,  in  encouraging  and  pro- 
moting the  expedition  which  successfully  undertook  the 
rescue  of  the  besieged  diplomatic  corps.  It  helped  im- 
mensely to  bring  about  an  early  restoration  of  order 
and  peace  in  China. 

The  note,  however,  was  a  sledge-hammer  blow,  in- 
offensive as  it  seemed,  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
"  open  door." 

There  followed  negotiations  resulting  in  the  pro- 
tocol between  China  and  the  allied  powers.  This  pro- 
tocol was  signed  on  September  7,  1901.  It  served  to 
heighten  the  respect  of  the  nations  of  the  world  for  the 
straightforward  policy  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States.  In  the  course  of  these  negotiations  it 
was  due  to  the  skilful  endeavours  of  the  American 
commissioners  that  a  certain  degree  of  leniency  was 
shown  to  the  imperial  government  of  China.  The 
demands  of  the  other  powers  had  been  in  favour  of 
meting  out  to  the  leaders  of  the  Boxer  hosts  and  the 
Chinese  officials  implicated  in  the  anti-foreign  mas- 
sacres, punishments  so  drastic  and  humiliating  to  Chi- 
nese self-respect,  that  to  carry  them  out  would  have 
meant  the  perpetuation  of  the  spirit  of  intense  hos- 
tility to  all  persons  of  western  blood.  The  agreement 
finally  adopted  by  the  international  commission  avoided 
such  extreme  humiliation,  and  thus  opened  the  path  to 
eventual  reconciliation  between  the  allied  powers  and 
China. 

The  same  reasons  which  had  guided  our  govern- 


40  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

merit's  action  in  these  particulars  stood  it  in  good  stead 
in  insisting  on  a  course  of  measures  intended  to  pre- 
vent the  recurrence  of  such  internal  troubles  as  the 
Boxer  rising.  Our  policy  then  and  since  has  been  to 
further  the  existence  of  a  stable  and  responsible  gov- 
ernment in  China,  and,  by  strengthening  its  powers, 
to  secure  in  the  easiest  way  a  fair  measure  of  protec- 
tion for  our  citizens  and  our  interests  under  existing 
treaties. 

With  a  like  point  in  view,  Mr.  Hay  took  a  firm 
stand  against  the  exorbitant  demands  of  the  other 
allies  in  the  way  of  indemnity  for  wrongs  inflicted 
during  the  Boxer  troubles.  Not  only  was  the  total 
amount  of  this  indemnity  greatly  reduced — in  fact, 
more  than  cut  in  half — by  the  efforts  of  our  govern- 
ment, but  the  form  and  period  of  payments,  and  the 
coin  in  which  these  were  to  be  made,  were  also  brought 
more  in  consonance  with  the  actual  ability  of  the  Chi- 
nese government. 

It  was  in  accordance  with  this  spirit  of  considera- 
tion and  forbearance  towards  a  weakened  and  humbled 
power  that  the  share  of  the  indemnity  to  be  paid  to 
this  country  was  voluntarily  diminished  by  us.  This 
striking  and  almost  unheard-of  instance  of  interna- 
tional generosity,  could  not  fail  to  impress  even  so 
callous  a  race  as  the  Chinese.  They  saw  in  it  a  proof 
of  our  friendly  inclination,  and  the  then  Chinese  min- 
ister to  Washington,  Wu  Ting  Fang,  made  repeated 
and  zealous  expressions  of  gratitude. 

Practically,  though,  the  greatest  service  which  this 
government  rendered  downtrodden  China  was  the  suc- 
cessful insistence  on  the  silver  rate  of  payment  to  be 
made  by  China.  The  protocol  of  September  7,  1901, 
had  provided  for  Chinese  instalments  of  the  indemnity 


A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy     4 1 

in  haikwan  taels,  the  largest  silver  coin  in  vogue  in 
China,  and  at  the  time  worth  about  seventy-two  cents. 
Silver  thereafter  sank  rapidly,  and  the  allied  powers, 
with  the  single  exception  of  this  country,  thereupon 
insisted  that  the  haikwan  tael  was  to  be  accepted  only 
at  the  much  lower  value  to  which  meanwhile  it  had 
been  reduced  in  the  money  markets  of  the  world. 

Our  government  maintained  a  contrary  view.  It 
claimed  that,  as  a  matter  of  fairness,  Chinese  silver 
should  be  taken  for  the  instalments  of  the  indemnity 
at  the  same  value  which  it  possessed  on  the  day  of 
signing  the  protocol.  And,  though  this  view  was 
combated  fiercely  by  several  of  the  other  powers, 
notably  Russia  and  Germany,  it  finally  prevailed — an- 
other triumph  of  American  diplomacy. 

Early  in  1902  this  government  received  reliable  in- 
formation of  the  details  of  a  proposed  agreement  be- 
tween China  and  Russia  regarding  Manchuria.  By 
the  terms  of  this  proposed  agreement,  there  were  to 
be  conferred  on  Russia  in  that  important  province  ex- 
clusive rights  and  privileges  which  were  in  direct  con- 
flict with  American  treaty  rights.  Incidentally  they 
threatened  to  impair  seriously  the  sovereign  rights  of 
China  in  that  portion  of  her  dominion. 

Manchuria  is  a  province  of  China  which  holds  much 
in  store  for  American  commerce.  The  ports  of  Man- 
churia face  our  Pacific  coast  in  a  direct  line,  and 
though  American  trade  with  them  is  of  rather  recent 
date,  and  amounts  as  yet  to  only  a  few  millions  yearly, 
the  conditions  are  such  that  we  may  confidently  look 
there  to  commercial  supremacy  in  the  very  near  future, 
provided  Manchuria  remains  a  Chinese  possession  in 
the  full  sense.  The  imports  of  Manchuria  are  pre- 
cisely of  the  description  which  suits  us  best.    American 


42  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

cottons  and  calicoes,  petroleum,  hardware,  and  other 
products,  such  as  flour  and  canned  meats,  in  which  we 
are  strong,  are  much  in  demand  there;  and  within  a 
very  short  time,  we  have  built  up  a  safe  and  paying 
trade,  a  trade  which  may  be  expanded  almost  limit- 
lessly. 

Mr.  Hay  took  prompt  action  on  receiving  the  above 
information.  A  vigorous  protest  was  lodged  by  our 
government  with  both  China  and  Russia,  pointing  out 
the  deleterious  effects  of  the  proposed  agreement  upon 
American  interests  and  those  of  the  whole  world,  and 
also  calling  attention  in  unmistakable  terms  to  its 
conflict  with  solemn  assurances  previously  given  re- 
garding the  "  open  door." 

In  this  instance  again,  the  frank  and  open  language 
of  the  protest  did  not  fail  of  its  effect.  Considerable 
modifications  of  the  terms  of  the  agreement  were  made 
in  favour  of  other  nations ;  and  the  protest  called  forth 
from  Russia  a  renewal  of  her  assurances  that  she  had 
no  intention  of  violating  the  principle  of  the  "  open 
door,"  and  firmly  meant  to  maintain  it. 

Another  signal  step  in  the  same  direction  was  taken 
by  our  government  when  a  commercial  treaty  was 
signed  between  the  United  States  and  China,  dated 
at  Shanghai,  October  8,  1903.  This  instrument  rein- 
forced the  "  open  door  "  policy  by  removing  many 
annoying  restrictions  previously  placed  upon  foreign 
trade  by  Chinese  officials,  and  by  simplifying  the 
methods  of  intercourse  both  with  the  central  govern- 
ment and  local  authorities.  The  most  important  ad- 
vantage, however,  gained  by  this  treaty  was  the  open- 
ing to  "  international  residence  and  trade  "  of  the  two 
cities  of  Mukden  and  An  Tung  in  Manchuria.  These 
cities,  while  not  seaports,  are  important  trade  centres, 


A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy     43 

and  will  prove  of  immense  advantage  to  the  spread  of 
American  commercial  interests  throughout  that  whole 
region. 

Since  then  events  of  great  and  international  im- 
portance have  been  precipitated.  The  clash  between 
Russia  and  Japan  became  at  last  inevitable.  Hostil- 
ities once  begnn  by  those  two  powers,  their  geographic 
situation  as  well  as  that  of  the  theatre  of  war,  seemed 
to  make  it  likely  that  China  herself  would  become 
more  or  less  involved,  if  not  in  actual  warfare,  at 
least  in  armed  neutrality  and  in  the  extension  of  the 
territory  affected.  The  integrity  of  the  empire  might 
again  be  seriously  impaired,  and  the  principle  of  the 
"  open  door,"  with  all  its  benefits  to  this  country  and 
the  world,  seemed  gravely  imperilled. 

Again  Secretary  Hay  was  quick  to  perceive  and 
prompt  to  act  in  such  a  delicate  situation.  After  seme 
preliminary  negotiations,  he  sent,  on  February  10,  a 
note  to  the  governments  of  Russia,  Japan,  and  China, 
and  a  copy  of  it  to  other  powers,  requesting  similar 
representations  to  Russia  and  Japan.  This  note  was 
brief  and  to  the  point,  reading  as  follows : 

"  You  will  express  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  the  earnest  desire  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  that  in  the  course  of  the  military  opera- 
tions which  have  begun  between  Russia  and  Japan, 
the  neutrality  of  China,  and  in  all  practicable  ways  her 
administrative  entity,  shall  be  respected  by  both  parties, 
and  that  the  area  of  hostilities  shall  be  localised  and 
limited  as  much  as  possible,  so  that  undue  excitement 
and  disturbance  of  the  Chinese  people  may  be  pre- 
vented, and  the  least  possible  loss  to  the  commerce  and 
peaceful  intercourse  of  the  world  may  be  occasioned." 


44  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

The  government  of  Japan  responded  first,  on  Feb- 
ruary 13,  saying: 

"  The  Imperial  Government,  sharing  with  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  in  the  fullest  measure, 
the  desire  to  avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  any  disturbance 
of  the  orderly  condition  of  affairs  now  prevailing  in 
China,  is  prepared  to  respect  the  neutrality  and  admin- 
istrative entity  of  China  outside  the  regions  occupied 
by  Russia,  as  long  as  Russia,  making  a  similar  engage- 
ment, fulfils  in  good  faith  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
such  engagements." 

Nine  days  after  the  receipt  of  Mr.  Hay's  communi- 
cation, and  six  days  after  Japan's  reply,  the  govern- 
ment at  St.  Petersburg  likewise  answered  in  these 
words : 

"  The  Imperial  Government  shares  completely  the 
desire  to  insure  tranqtiillity  of  China ;  is  ready  to  ad- 
here to  an  understanding  with  other  powers  for  the 
purpose  of  safeguarding  the  neutrality  of  that  empire 
on  the  following  conditions : 

"  Firstly,  China  must  herself  strictly  observe  all  the 
clauses  of  neutrality. 

"  Secondly,  the  Japanese  Government  must  loyally 
observe  the  engagements  entered  into  with  the  powers, 
as  well  as  the  principles  generally  recognised  by  the 
law  of  nations. 

"  Thirdly,  that  it  is  well  understood  that  neutralisa- 
tion in  no  case  can  be  extended  to  Manchuria,  the  terri- 
tory of  which,  by  the  force  of  events,  will  serve  as  the 
field  of  military  operations." 


A  Triumph  of  American  Diplomacy     45 

The  central  government  of  China,  on  its  own  part, 
gave  emphatic  assurances  of  a  firm  intention  of  remain- 
ing strictly  neutral  during  the  war. 

European  powers  interested  in  China  enthusiasti- 
cally adhered  to  our  government's  declarations.  Mr. 
Hay  lost  no  time  in  notifying  the  governments  of 
Russia,  Japan,  and  China  that  the  answers  received  by 
him  were  "  viewed  as  responsive  to  the  proposal  made 
by  the  United  States,  as  well  as  by  the  other  powers," 
and  thus  the  matter  stands. 

It  was  another  victory  of  far-sighted  American 
statesmanship. 

This  last  action  gave  China  again  the  assurance  of 
continued  American  friendly  interest,  and  of  our  moral 
support  in  her  efforts  to  maintain  her  neutrality  and 
sovereign  sway  in  her  own  dominions. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  INTEGRITY  OF  CHINA 

Our  whole  Chinese  poHcy  has  been  built  from  the 
start  on  the  assumption  that  the  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  Celestial  Empire  can  and  must  be 
maintained.  This  is  its  cornerstone.  Failing  that, 
we  should  fail  in  our  whole  Chinese  policy. 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  it  has  been  shown  that  this 
policy  has  not  only  been  consistently  adhered  to  by  us, 
through  all  the  changes  of  administration,  the  enor- 
mous shifting  of  political  and  economic  opinion  in  the 
United  States,  and  even  during  the  bitter  trials  of  our 
great  Civil  War,  but  that  it  has  been  singularly  suc- 
cessful. On  many  occasions  this  country  has  stood  up 
alone  in  defence  of  Chinese  rights  and  of  Chinese  terri- 
torial integrity,  and  this  has  been  the  case  more  par- 
ticularly during  the  past  lustrum.  But  in  every  case  we 
have  won — won  even  at  a  time  when  the  United  States 
was  still  considered  in  the  light  of  a  western  hermit  na- 
tion, and  was  far  from  being  a  world  power  of  such  im- 
mense resources  and  far-spreading  influence  as  to-day. 

The  reason  for  this  uniform  success  must,  therefore, 
be  something  more  than  the  mere  weight  which  our 
voice  has  to-day  in  the  councils  of  nations.  It  was  due 
principally  to  the  inherent  righteousness  of  our  posi- 
tion. The  notable  simplicity,  directness,  and  openness 
which  have  characterised  our  Chinese  policy  have  been 
additional  elements  of  importance. 

46 


The  Integrity  of  China  47 

As  Mr.  Hay  has  well  said :  "  We  have  sought,  suc- 
cessfully, to  induce  all  the  great  powers  to  unite  in  a 
recognition  of  the  general  principle  of  equality  of  com- 
mercial access  and  opportunity  in  the  markets  of  the 
Orient."  Through  all  the  correspondence  on  the 
"  open  door,"  run  these  or  similar  plain,  frank  words : 
"  to  insure  to  the  whole  world  full  and  fair  intercourse 
with  China  on  equal  footing." 

We  can  justly  take  credit  to  ourselves  for  having 
been  the  first  champion,  and  the  most  consistent  one, 
of  the  "  open  door." 

Neither  England  nor  Japan  in  this  respect  has  been 
as  frank,  consistent,  or  unselfish  in  defence  of  this  great 
principle.  True,  both  England  and  Japan  have  been 
siding  with  us  for  a  number  of  years  past,  and  it  is 
just  as  much  to  their  well-understood  interests  to  pro- 
mote and,  if  need  be,  fight  for  the  "  open  door  "  as  it 
is  to  our  own,  though  in  the  case  of  England  not  in 
the  same  degree.  But  this  has  not  prevented  England 
from  wresting  Hong  Kong  from  China,  acquiring 
more  or  less  forcibly  Wei  Hai  Wei,  on  a  promontory 
of  the  province  of  Shan  Tung,  and  the  district  of  Kau 
Lung,  opposite  Hong  Kong,  on  the  mainland.  It  has 
not  prevented  Japan  from  seizing,  at  the  close  of  her 
last  war  with  China,  Port  Arthur  and  the  peninsula 
of  Liao  Tung,  and  Formosa  and  Ta  Lien  Wan. 

Overwhelming  public  opinion  in  Great  Britain  is 
now  in  favour  of  the  "  open  door."  But  this  has  been 
brought  about  almost  entirely  by  American  instru- 
mentality, and  there  are  very  many  of  the  most  influ- 
ential public  men  in  England  who  believe  with  the 
average  Briton  that  the  "  open  door  "  is  doomed,  and 
that  the  integrity  and  independence  of  China,  the  sway 
of  her  government    and  the  cohesion  of  her  several 


48  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

parts,  cannot  much  longer  be  safeguarded  by  the  west- 
ern powers.  The  opinion  indeed  is  very  widespread 
in  England,  editorials  in  her  weightiest  newspapers  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding,  that  to  prop  up  tottering 
China  is  a  thankless  and  hopeless  task, — that  China  is 
hurrying  to  her  ruin. 

What  real  public  opinion  in  Japan  is  on  this  subject, 
we  are  not  prepared  to  state.  Public  opinion  there  is 
only  in  the  making.  And  the  Japs  are  too  shrewd  a 
people  to  tell  their  inmost  longings  to  the  world.  It 
is  true  that  both  their  government  and  their  influential 
press  have  been  assuring  the  world  for  years  past  that 
nothing  is  further  from  their  minds  than  a  desire  to 
assist  in  an  autopsy  on  China. 

In  any  case,  whether  Japan  is  quite  sincere  in  the 
matter  or  no,  the  conformation  of  facts  relating  to  the 
external  and  internal  conditions  of  China  is  such  as 
to  make  it  the  part  of  wisdom  for  the  little  island 
empire  to  stay  her  hand  in  any  attempts  at  the  division 
of  her  huge  neighbour. 

Doubtless  the  keen  sense  of  Japan's  statesmen  has 
told  them  ere  this  that  she  holds  better  trump  cards 
by  siding  with  this  country  and  England  in  a  policy 
of  preserving  and  regenerating  China,  than  in  the  op- 
posite policy  espoused  by  Russia  and  France  and — till 
recently — by  Germany,  of  a  dismemberment  of  China. 

Certainly  the  march  of  events  since  1895  must  have 
taught  Japan  that  her  only  safety,  so  far  as  the  Chinese 
problem  is  concerned,  lies  in  co-operation  with  the 
English-speaking  nations,  and  the  alliance  she  con- 
cluded with  England  on  January  30,  1902,  would  seem 
a  striking  confirmation  of  this  supposition. 

The  belief,  then,  that  the  territorial  integrity  of 
China,   together  with   her   national   independence,    is 


The  Integrity  of  China  49 

feasible,  and  that,  at  any  rate,  it  can  be  prolonged  for 
many  years  to  come,  is  the  foundation  of  the  Chinese 
policy  of  the  United  States,  and  the  dismemberment  of 
China  would  destroy  our  carefully  raised  fabric,  would 
demolish  the  hopes  nurtured  for  many  years  of  an  in- 
creasingly important  market  for  a  surplus,  steadily 
growing,  of  American  manufactures  and  raw  stuffs. 
How  much  depends  on  the  realisation  of  these  hopes 
will  be  shown  in  detail  in  another  chapter. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  situation,  even  before 
the  outbreak  of  this  present  war,  was  very  difficult  for 
China.  The  empire  certainly  hangs  very  loosely  to- 
gether. The  present  dynasty,  the  Manchus,  is  hated 
or  despised  by  large  portions  of  the  Chinese  popula- 
tion. The  liberalising  element  in  China,  the  men  who 
have  received  a  western  education,  are  to  a  man  op- 
posed to  this  dynasty.  All  through  the  south  of  China 
the  feeling  of  dislike  and  contempt  for  the  Manchus  is 
especially  strong.  It  may  be  questioned  whether,  even 
in  such  a  conservative  country  and  with  a  population 
so  inured  to  passive  obedience,  this  present  dynasty 
will  outlive  the  decade. 

The  powerlessness  of  the  central  government  in 
China  is  pitiable.  All  the  sap  and  energy  which  the 
Manchu  conquerors  brought  with  them  from  their  free 
life  on  the  steppes  seem  to  have  left  them  forever. 
Official  corruption  gnaws  like  a  canker  at  the  vitals  of 
the  country. 

Additional  reasons  might  be  cited  making  toward 
the  downfall  of  China.  Many  of  those  Europeans  and 
Americans,  who  have  resided  there  longest  and  know 
country  and  people  best,  despair  of  a  national  future 
for  the  Chinaman. 

But  it  is  not  the  cue  of  the  United  States  to  magnify 


5©  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

the  dangers  threatening  China's  integrity.  And  there 
are,  without  any  manner  of  doubt,  good  and  weighty 
reasons  to  be  cited  for  the  other  contention,  the  Ameri- 
can one.  Above  all,  no  matter  how  bad  the  present 
government,  there  remain  the  Chinese  people,  a  people 
of  more  than  420,000,000.  What  is  to  be  done  with 
them?  No  matter  if  the  Manchu  dynasty  be  upset, 
this  immense  people  will  remain,  under  new  or  old 
rulers,  a  gigantic  factor  in  the  future  development  of 
this  globe.  A  people  numbering  more  than  one-fourth 
of  the  entire  population  of  the  earth,  a  people  showing 
individually  such  immense  vitality,  industry,  abstemi- 
ousness and  sobriety,  is  not  to  be  brushed  aside  by  a 
mere  phrase  such  as — The  Dismemberment  of  China. 

Dismemberment  would  only  make  the  Chinese  prob- 
lem much  harder  to  solve,  besides  depriving  us  of  a 
splendid  market.  Both  reasons  are  quite  sufficient  to 
make  it  worth  while  for  American  statesmanship  to 
bend  its  energies  to  the  utmost  in  the  maintenance  of 
China  as  a  political  and  economic  entity. 

The  system  of  "  interest  spheres  "  never  worked 
well.  It  is  full  of  dangers  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 
We  have  seen  that  in  Asia,  on  many  conspicuous  occa- 
sions, ancient  and  modern.  France  and  England  could 
nci  abide  together  in  India.  We  see  the  same  fact 
to-day  in  Africa.  Fashoda  almost  precipitated  a  war 
between  France  and  England.  Joint  administration 
and  joint  power  did  not  work  in  Egypt.  Neither  does 
codominion  ever  work  well.  We  ourselves  saw  that, 
even  if  in  the  case  of  a  rather  petty  object — the  Samoan 
Islands.  Collisions  of  a  more  or  less  serious  character 
are  bound  to  occur  between  different  powers  exercising 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  "  interest  spheres,"  and 
joint  dominion  in  any  shape  would  make  matters  much 


The  Integrity  of  China  5 1 

worse.  Moreover,  in  case  of  other  wars,  waged  per- 
haps in  another  hemisphere  or  at  home,  these  "  interest 
spheres  "  would  yet  unavoidably  participate  in  the  evils 
and  losses  incident  to  warfare. 

And  in  all  this  we  have  left  out  of  consideration  the 
question  whether  the  Chinese  themselves  would  su- 
pinely acquiesce  in  foreign  domination,  in  the  rule  of 
the  hated  foreigner — the  man  whom  they  look  upon 
as  a  barbarian.     This  may  be  doubted. 

It  has  been  stated  many  times  that  the  Chinaman  is 
devoid  of  patriotism.  An  American  who  by  reason 
of  almost  lifelong  residence  in  China  knows  the  people 
well.  Rev.  Arthur  H.  Smith,  sets  up  this  claim  in  his 
very  interesting  book  on  Chinese  social  life.  Others 
have  done  the  same.  But  these  men  wrote  before  the 
late  Boxer  rising.  And  this  internal  movement  in 
China  seems  to  disprove  such  a  contention.  All 
through  the  Boxer  rising  there  were  many  evidences  of 
what,  if  it  had  occurred  with  us  or  in  some  western 
countries,  would  be  called  patriotism.  Beyond  a  doubt, 
if  love  and  pride  of  country  have  been  slumbering  in 
the  Chinese  mind  and  heart  for  many  years,  there  seem 
to  be  ample  signs  of  a  reawakening. 

Let  the  world  not  add  another  glaring  misconcep- 
tion to  those  that  have  been  prevalent  about  China,  in 
denying  to  the  nation  outright  a  feeling  which  seems 
in  some  degree,  everywhere  inborn  in  the  human 
bosom.  Let  us  rather  conclude  that  Chinese  patriot- 
ism is,  like  so  many  other  things  Chinese,  only  of  a 
different  type  from  ours. 


CHAPTER  VI 
RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  TO  THIS  NATION 

It  may  be  objected  that  it  is  rather  taking  time  by 
the  forelock  to  devote  a  chapter  to  the  results  of  a  war 
which  at  this  writing  is  still  in  vigorous  progress. 
That  objection  may  be  urged  still  more  when  it  is  ad- 
mitted by  the  writer  at  the  outset  that  he  lays  no  claim 
to  being  a  prophet  or  the  son  of  a  prophet. 

To  define  distinctly  the  coming  results  of  the  present 
duel  between  the  Russian  and  the  Jap,  and  to  weigh 
accurately  the  composite  elements  that  will  form  its 
outcome,  and  not  only  for  the  belligerents,  but  for  the 
world  in  general  and  this  country  in  particular,  we 
shall  have,  of  course,  to  wait  for  some  time  after  the 
treaty  of  peace  has  been  signed.  No  attempt  will  be 
made  here  to  forestall  events. 

But  there  are  certain  things  which,  putting  two  and 
two  together,  may  be  stated  even  now,  with  some 
degree  of  confidence. 

Russia,  whether  she  ultimately  wins  or  loses,  will  be 
greatly  weakened.  In  any  event,  she  will  issue  from 
this  war  financially  impotent,  with  her  credit  strained 
to  the  utmost.  Perhaps  for  decades  to  come  she  will 
practically  be  out  of  the  race  in  Far  Asia,  commercially 
and  industrially,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  polit- 
ically. 

Obeying  her  internal  necessities,  Russia's  economic 
policy,  both  in  Europe  and  Asia,  is  and  must  remain 

52 


Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation       5  3 

monopolistic  and  protective.  In  any  case,  at  the  close 
of  this  war,  she  will  have  to  enter  on  a  course  of  in- 
ternal reforms,  taxing  her  energies  fully.  She  will 
have  to  build  up  a  national  industry  on  broader  and 
sounder  foundations  than  her  financial  genius,  Witte, 
was  able  to  do,  hurried  on  as  he  was  by  the  powerful 
Old  Russian  Party  and  by  the  urgent  demands  of  the 
hour.  Her  finances  crippled  for  many  years  to  come; 
her  enterprise  gone;  herself  no  longer  a  profitable  field 
for  foreign  capital — that,  in  a  few  broad  strokes,  will 
be  her  condition. 

Japan,  in  several  of  the  above  respects,  will  be  simi- 
larly situated,  although  her  enterprising  spirit  will  be 
undiminished,  probably  even  heightened.  But  the 
war  will  have  proved  an  enormous  strain  on  her 
finances,  too,  and  on  all  of  her  material  resources. 
These  and  other  facts  will  greatly  handicap  her,  for  a 
number  of  years  at  least,  in  the  coming  fierce  strife 
among  the  ruling  nations  for  commercial  supremacy  in 
the  Far  East. 

We  shall  have  England  and  Germany  as  our  main 
competitors  in  the  Pacific.  Either  of  the  two  will 
prove  a  formidable  rival. 

Now,  as  to  England,  the  case  is  plain.  She  is  com- 
mitted to  the  "  open  door."  If  we  can  beat  England  in 
her  own  home  market — as  we  have  been  doing  of  recent 
years — we  surely  can  in  Far  Asia,  for  that  part  of  the 
world  is  so  much  nearer  to  us,  and  will  be  still  nearer 
after  the  completion  of  the  Panama  Canal.  The 
Philippines  give  us  an  excellent  lever  and  base  for  all 
our  political  and  commercial  operations.  Besides,  the 
chief  commodities  in  demand  in  the  Far  East — cotton 
goods,  petroleum,  hardware,  agricultural  and  indus- 
trial machinery,  machine  tools,  flour,  and  canned  goods 


54  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

— are  precisely  the  things  we  can  produce  more  cheaply 
and  in  better  quality  than  any  other  nation.  We  need 
not  fear  competition  with  England. 

As  to  Germany.  Although  of  pro-Russian  sym- 
pathies and  affiliations,  she,  too,  is  in  favour  of  the 
"  open  door."  Her  interests  demand  this  imperatively. 
In  Manchuria,  where  the  United  States  is  strong,  com- 
mercially speaking,  Germany  has  never  obtained  a  com- 
mercial foothold.  But  in  Central  and  Northern  China 
proper,  she  is  and  will  be  our  most  formidable  rival. 

The  assets  in  Germany's  favour  are  very  great.  Her 
ambitions  are  greater.  The  Carolines  and  Kiao  Chao 
are  not  enough  for  her.  Unless  checked,  she  will  exert 
paramount  sway  over  the  whole  of  Shan  Tung  prov- 
ince,— one  of  the  most  important  in  China, — with  a 
population  of  38,000,000. 

But  Germany  has  her  weaknesses.  Her  financial 
and  commercial  horizon  is  too  narrow.  She  displays 
extreme  caution  in  risking  capital,  and  there  is  neither 
boldness  of  conception  nor  of  execution  in  her  mer- 
chants. Officialism  and  bureaucracy  are  great  hin- 
drances to  her.  Her  sea  route  to  China  is  too  far,  in 
comparison  with  ours,  and  land  routes  are  closed  to 
her. 

France,  too,  will  be  our  competitor,  but  no  dreaded 
one. 

All  these  facts  will  be  shown  in  detail  in  another 
chapter;  the  above  is  a  mere  outline. 

Now,  how  about  the  United  States? 

The  United  States  will  be  in  an  exceptionally  strong 
position  in  the  coming  struggle  for  supremacy  in  the 
whole  Pacific.  She  will  be  in  a  condition  to  reap  the 
main  harvest  when  it  shall  be  ripe. 

But  is,  then,  the  supremacy  in  the  Pacific  of  such 


Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation      ^^ 

enormous  importance  to  us?  It  surely  is.  To  show 
this  it  will  be  necessary  to  cast  a  glance  at  our  own 
internal  conditions. 

There  are  three  factors  that  chiefly  enter  into  play 
in  this  connection. 

EXHAUSTION    OF    ARABLE    PUBLIC    LANDS 

The  first  is  the  exhaustion  of  our  arable  public  lands. 
True,  there  are  still  more  than  500,000,000  acres  of 
vacant  government  land,  but  the  mad  rush  for  Okla- 
homa and  the  Cherokee  reservation,  when  thrown  open 
to  settlement  a  few  years  ago,  showed  how  little  of  this 
remaining  land  is  arable.  Much  of  this  remnant  of 
vacant  public  lands  would  afford  good  grazing,  and 
Major  Powell,  an  authority  on  this  question,  estimates 
that  100,000,000  acres  of  it  can  be  reclaimed  for  agri- 
culture by  irrigation.  But  this  would  mean  a  task 
beyond  private  enterprise.  In  any  case,  what  is  left 
of  arable  public  lands  is  a  mere  trifle,  comparatively 
speaking,  for  a  rapidly  expanding  and  increasing 
nation — a  nation  which  received  during  the  past  five 
years  some  3.000,000  immigrants,  not  to  mention 
its  own  natural  increase  in  population. 

Indeed,  the  practical  exhaustion  of  new  agricultural 
land  has  been  an  established  fact  for  some  years  back. 
It  has  brought  about  a  counter-emigration  from  this 
country  to  Canada.  This  is  a  curious  and  very  sig- 
nificant fact.  The  culmination  of  Canadian  immigra- 
tion into  the  United  States  was  reached  in  1890.  At 
that  time  there  were  392,802  Canadians  within  our 
borders.  During  the  decade  1890- 1900  Canadian  im- 
migration dropped  to  3064.  But  that  does  not  tell  the 
whole  story ;  for  to  offset  this  small  Canadian  immigra- 
tion, there  has  been  going  on  a  far  larger  American 


56  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

emigration  into  Canada.  Over  12,000  American  set- 
tlers crossed  the  Canadian  line  in  1900;  the  number 
rose  to  17,987  in  1901,  and  to  24,099  in  the  fiscal  year 
ending  June  30,  1902,  when  the  figures  for  American 
immigration  on  Canadian  soil  were  larger  than  those 
from  the  whole  of  continental  Europe.  The  United 
States,  then,  has  lost  to  its  northern  neighbour  about 
55,000  citizens  within  those  three  years ;  and  even  these 
reports  are  not  complete,  for  they  do  not  include  a  large 
number  of  American  settlers  who  trekked  across  the 
Canadian  border  in  their  own  wagons.  In  1903  immi- 
gration from  the  United  States  to  Canada  rose  even  to 
49,673,  being  8000  in  excess  of  the  British  immigrant 
contingent. 

These  American  settlers  were  all  of  the  substantial 
kind,  nearly  all  farmers  from  the  Prairie  states.  Their 
average  wealth  was  estimated  by  the  Canadian  author- 
ities at  something  over  $3000  per  family  in  money, 
cattle,  and  other  property.  This  sudden  turning  of  the 
tide  of  migration  is  due,  as  already  said,  to  the  ex- 
haustion of  our  supply  of  free  arable  land.  The  fact 
marks  a  crisis  in  the  relation  of  our  population  to  our 
area.  Abundance  of  free  land  gave  the  United  States 
the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  a  youthful  coun- 
try.    That  point  has  now  been  passed. 

Hereafter,  at  an  increasing  rate,  American  emigra- 
tion, mostly  from  the  Prairie  states,  to  Manitoba  and 
British  Columbia  will  be  a  permanent  feature. 

Within  one  hundred  years  the  population  of  the 
United  States  grew  from  6,000,000  to  70,000,000. 
Our  next  census  will  show  not  less  than  90,000,000. 
More  than  43^  million  farms  have  been  brought  under 
cultivation.  Half  a  thousand  cities  have  been  built. 
For  forty  years  there  was  an  average  of  16,000  acres 


Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation      57 

of  wild  land  subdued  daily.  Railroad  growth  has  been 
on  a  par.  The  latest  official  figures  show  221,000 
miles  of  railroads. 

Referring  to  what  Americans  have  accomplished, 
Henry  M.  Stanley  said :  "  Treble  their  number  of 
ordinary  Europeans  could  not  have  surpassed  them  in 
what  they  have  done.  The  story  of  their  achievements 
reads  like  an  epic  of  the  heroic  age." 

Mulhall,  the  noted  British  statistician,  in  1895  esti- 
mated the  energy  of  the  United  States  at  129,306,- 
000,000  foot-tons  daily,  nearly  as  much  as  that  of 
Britain,  Germany,  and  France  combined.  Mulhall 
adds :  "  If  we  take  a  survey  of  mankind  in  ancient 
or  modern  times,  as  regards  the  physical,  mechanical, 
and  intellectual  force  of  nations,  we  find  nothing  to 
compare  with  the  United  States." 

It  is  not  strange  that  this  amazing  energy,  applied 
to  resources  which  are  perhaps  unequalled,  has  made 
us  the  richest  nation  in  the  world. 

But  the  western  limits  have  been  reached.  Stand- 
ing on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  farther  west  is  the 
East. 

Hereafter  the  main  commercial  movement  will  be 
between  the  temperate  and  the  tropical  zone.  This 
movement  has  already  set  in.  European  powers  within 
the  last  twenty  years  have  seized  5,000,000  square 
miles,  an  area  far  larger  than  the  whole  continent  of 
Europe,  and  all  of  it  lying  in  tropical  or  subtropical 
regions. 

During  the  past  century  Europe's  population  in- 
creased 50  per  cent.,  her  manufactures  300  per  cent. 
— from  $5,000,000,000  to  $15,000,000,000  annually. 
Therefore,  the  increasing  necessity  of  foreign  mar- 
kets to  Europe.    These  markets  are  now  best  found  in 


58  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

the  tropics.  Formerly  the  commercial  movement  was 
mainly  east  to  west;  it  will  now  become  mainly  north 
to  south  and  west  to  east. 

Commerce,  like  water,  flows  only  where  there  is 
inequality.  A  dead  level  of  absolute  equality  means 
stagnation.  Inequality  or  unlikeness  of  natural 
products,  and  differences  among  peoples,  promote  com- 
merce. Development  of  the  belated  races,  many  of 
them  centuries  behind  others,  will  take  a  line  of  its 
own.  Neither  the  Malay  nor  the  negro,  the  Chinese 
nor  the  Hindoo,  will  ever  become  at  all  like  ourselves, 
no  matter  if  all  the  adjuncts  of  civilisation  and  all  its 
essentials  are  put  within  their  keeping. 

NEW    MANUFACTURING  SUPREMACY 

The  second  important  fact  for  us  is  our  new  manu- 
facturing supremacy. 

The  United  States  long  since  was  conceded  the  first 
place  in  agriculture.  With  5  per  cent,  of  the  world's 
population,  we  produce  32  per  cent,  of  the  world's 
food-supply.  Russia  is  the  next  largest  producer. 
But  she,  with  8  per  cent,  of  the  human  family,  sup- 
plies less  than  19  per  cent,  of  the  world's  food. 

To-day  the  United  States  is  admitted  to  be  the 
greatest  manufacturer  as  well.  This  is  not  a  tran- 
sitory fact;  it  will  remain  so.  Our  new  manufac- 
turing supremacy,  though  young,  rests  on  secure 
foundations.  The  balance  of  trade  in  our  favour  of 
late  years  has  been  steadily  an  enormous  one.  It  has 
risen  in  the  same  proportion  in  which  balances  on  the 
wrong  side  have  increased  in  the  leading  manufac- 
turing countries  of  Europe,  notably  Germany  and 
England.  In  1898,  for  the  first  time  in  our  history, 
American  manufactured  exports  exceeded  manufac- 


Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation      59 

tured  imports.     Since  then  the  matter  has  gone  on 
at  the  same  rate. 

Let  us  consider  for  a  moment  what  are  the  foun- 
dations on  which  this  manufacturing  supremacy 
rests : 

( 1 )  An  abundance  of  cheap  coal  of  good  quaHty. 
The  coal  supply  of  the  United  States  is  several  times 
that  of  all  Europe,  and  it  is  practically  inexhaustible. 
There  are  194,000  square  miles  of  coal  beds  in  this 
country,  twenty-one  times  the  area  of  all  the  coal  fields 
of  Great  Britain.  In  i860  we  produced  15,200,000 
tons  of  coal;  in  1900  we  produced  213,000,000,  a  trifle 
more  than  one-third  of  the  world's  production. 

(2)  Cheap  and  abundant  iron  of  good  quality — 
next  to  coal  the  most  important  factor,  indispensable 
to  manufacture  on  any  scale.  Iron  to-day  is  cheaper 
at  the  pit  mouth  in  the  United  States  than  in  Great 
Britain.  But  conversion  of  the  ore  into  the  finished 
product  is  also  cheaper,  despite  higher  wages.  England, 
Germany,  and  France  for  years  have  been  sending  over 
their  experts  to  fathom  the  apparent  mystery,  only  to 
return  with  the  report  that  the  thing  can't  be  helped, 
both  raw  stuffs  and  manufactured  products  coming 
lower  than  in  Europe.  In  steel  and  iron  American 
supremacy  is  now  generally  acknowledged.  We  left 
both  England  and  Germany  behind  in  the  race  several 
years  ago.  To-day  the  United  States  produces  nearly 
one-half  of  all  the  steel  made  in  the  world. 

(3)  Low  labour  cost.  This  nowise  means  low 
wages.  But  it  does  mean  that  for  every  dollar  paid 
in  wages  to  an  American  labourer  or  mechanic,  the 
American  employer  gets  more  labour  out  of  his  help 
than  does  the  European  out  of  his.  With  $15 
being  the  average   weekly   wage  of  an  operative   in 


6o  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

America,  and  $4  being  his  average  pay  per  week 
in  Germany,  the  American  employer  is  still  ahead. 
These  are  well-known  facts,  pointed  out  in  innumer- 
able consular  reports.  The  simple  explanation  of  the 
phenomenon  is :  Workmen  in  America  are  quicker 
both  in  brain  and  hand  than  those  in  Europe,  partly 
because  of  a  more  stimulating  climate,  and  partly 
owing  to  a  better  diet.  American  machinery,  too,  is 
usually  superior,  but  with  precisely  the  same  machine 
the  American  workman  will  turn  out  more  product 
than  the  foreigner.  An  additional  factor  in  this  line 
is  Yankee  ingenuity  and  inventiveness.  The  best 
available  statistics  show  that  the  productive  energy  of 
each  inhabitant  of  the  United  States  is  1940  foot-tons 
daily,  while  in  Europe  it  is  only  990  foot-tons.  This 
means  that  75,000,000  Americans  are  achieving  as 
much  in  useful  labour  as  150,000,000  Europeans.  In 
some  branches  of  labour  the  difference  is  even  greater ; 
the  American  farm  labourer  produces  four  times  as 
much  foodstuffs  as  does  the  average  European  farm 
labourer. 

(4)  An  exhaustless  supply  of  cheap  raw  materials. 
The  geographical  and  soil  conditions  of  the  United 
States  are  such  that  everything  is  produced,  except- 
ing luxuries.  In  cotton,  one  of  the  most  important 
items,  we  still  enjoy  a  practical  monopoly.  Though 
the  European  colonising  nations  are  making  strenuous 
efforts  to  oust  the  United  States  from  that  proud  posi- 
tion, it  will  require  many  years,  even  under  rapid 
conditions  of  development  in  their  tropical  and  sub- 
tropical possessions,  to  accomplish  that. 

(5)  Easy  access  to  markets.  This  country  lies 
midway  between  Europe  and  Africa  on  the  east  and 
Asia  and  Australasia  on  the  west,  while  another  con- 


Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation      6 1 

tinent  adjoins  us  on  the  south.  Our  coasts  are  washed 
by  two  great  oceans.  However,  after  the  completion 
of  the  isthmian  canal  these  present  advantages  will  be 
more  than  doubled. 

Of  the  above-named  five  advantages  four  are  as 
inalienable  and  permanent  as  is  our  location.  It  is 
probable,  therefore,  that  our  manufacturing  suprem- 
acy will  increase  rather  than  diminish. 

The  time  seems  near  at  hand  when  the  prophecy  of 
Mr.  Gladstone  concerning  the  United  States  will  come 
true :  "  She  will  probably  become  what  we  are  now, 
the  head  servant  in  the  great  household  of  the  world, 
the  employer  of  all  employed,  because  her  service  will 
be  the  most  and  ablest." 

There  is,  however,  one  flaw  to  this  calculation.  A 
time  must  come  when  American  goods  will  be  carried 
in  American  bottoms.  At  present  we  are  still  paying 
British,  German,  Scandinavian,  Italian,  and  French 
vessels  a  matter  of  $175,000,000  a  year  for  ocean 
transportation,  and  but  an  insignificant  part  of  our 
foreign  commerce  is  carried  on  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes.  The  movement  is  all  in  that  direction,  how- 
ever, and  with  the  impetus  given  to  American  enter- 
prise by  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines,  Porto  Rico, 
and  Hawaii,  the  opening  up  of  the  Far  East  as  a  great 
field  of  commercial  expansion,  our  recognition  as  a 
great  world  power,  and  the  ambition  thus  engendered 
to  deserve  that  title  by  the  rapid  growth  of  our  navy, 
and  most  of  all  by  the  necessity  of  larger  foreign 
markets,  as  well  as  by  reason  of  the  Panama  Canal, — 
whenever  that  shall  be  finished, — American  shipping 
will  once  more  rise  to  the  heights  it  occupied  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Civil  War. 

One  thing,  though,  must  be  borne  in  mind — our 


62  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

enorm6us  carrying  trade  on  the  rivers  and  lakes  and 
along  the  coasts  of  this  country.  Senator  Frye  sev- 
eral years  ago  computed  the  tonnage  of  this  trade  at 
about  8,000,000,  greater  than  the  corresponding  trade 
of  France,  Germany,  and  England  combined. 
Through  the  locks  at  Sault  Ste.  Marie  in  eight  months 
passed  vessels  with  a  combined  tonnage  of  16,500,000. 
Our  lake  fleet  alone  moves  annually  168,000,000  tons 
of  freight.  More  ships  sail  the  Detroit  River  than 
enter  Liverpool  or  London. 

To  us  foreign  markets  are  a  new  necessity.  To 
understand  this  necessity,  several  things  must  be  taken 
into  account.  For  many  years  the  American  manu- 
facturer bent  all  his  energies  to  securing  for  himself 
the  home  market,  a  market  so  rapidly  growing,  both 
in  number  and  purchasing  power  of  consumers,  that 
with  it  the  foreign  market  could  nowise  be  compared 
in  importance.  This  aim  was  reached  in  its  entirety 
but  a  few  years  ago.  Since  then  we  have  permanently 
got  to  the  point  pithily  summarised  by  Carroll  D. 
Wright,  the  Commissioner  of  the  Labour  Bureau  in 
Washington : 

"  It  is  incontrovertible  that  the  present  manufac- 
turing and  mechanical  plant  of  the  United  States  is 
greater — far  greater — than  is  needed  to  supply  the 
demand ;  yet  it  is  constantly  being  enlarged,  and  in 
the  present  state  of  human  nature  there  is  no  way 
of  preventing  the  enlargement."  Beside  the  mad  pas- 
sion for  gain,  there  is  no  charm  in  rest,  lettered  ease, 
travel,  still  less  in  labour  for  the  general  good — char- 
ity, education,  the  state ;  the  ruling  passion  must  rage 
.on,  business  must  be  expanded,  regardless  of  profit 
and  with  eyes  closed  to  impending  loss.  Instead  of 
making  ourselves   more   homes,   and   more  beautiful 


Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation      63 

things  and  cultured  people  in  them,  we  cherish  the 
tenement-house  and  the  narrow  hfe,  and  go  on  pihng 
up  and  shoving  out  what  we  are  pleased  to  call 
"  goods,  goods,  goods/' 

Manufactured  production  has  become  enormous  in 
this  country — overgrown,  disproportioned,  bloated. 
In  no  country  and  at  no  previous  time  was  this  pro- 
duction ever  equalled  in  volume  or  value — or  at  least, 
price.  In  comparison  with  its  total,  our  present  ex- 
ports to  foreign  countries  play  but  a  pitiful  figure. 
Whereas  England's  exports  are  larger  than  her  home 
consumption,  and  whereas  Germany's  exports  are 
nearly  one-half  of  her  total  manufactures,  our  own 
exports  form  but  a  beggarly  fraction  of  the  whole. 
True,  the  purchasing  power  of  our  home  market  is 
unrivalled,  even  during  times  of  depression,  and  far 
surpasses  that  of  the  other  leading  nations.  But,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  limit  has  been  reached. 

Our  methods  of  production  have  been  improved 
upon,  simplified,  and  correlated,  until  they  seem  well- 
nigh  perfect.  This  has  played  a  conspicuous  part  in 
winning  our  manufacturing  supremacy.  But  there  is 
an  obverse  side  to  this.  In  many  lines  and  establish- 
ments the  question  of  running  at  full  capacity  or  no 
has  come  to  play  a  vital  part.  For  large  numbers  of 
our  factories  running  at  full  capacity — even  when 
selling  at  very  low  margins,  or  disposing  of  part  of 
the  output  at  actual  loss — means  prosperity,  and  run- 
ning at  half  capacity  means  nothing  less  than  ruin. 
This  is  the  penalty  which  a  highly  wrought  system  has 
to  pay. 

Glutted  markets  at  home  are  now  the  rule.  If  at 
this  present  time  a  general  panic  such  as  the  one  of 
1873,  or  even  the  one  of  1893,  should  overtake  us,  the 


64  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

effects  would  be  far  more  disastrous  than  any  ever 
heard  of — countless  armies  of  men  and  women 
scourged  by  enforced  idleness,  and  hunger  and  social 
upheavals  beggaring  description. 

To  find  new  outlets  for  our  manufactured  products 
has,  therefore,  become  not  an  urgent  need,  but  an  abso- 
lute necessity.  From  one  point  of  view  inventions 
and  labour-saving  appliances  of  every  kind  will  make 
matters  in  this  respect  worse  instead  of  better.  At 
Homestead,  Pa.,  with  about  the  same  number  of  men, 
the  output  to-day  is  six  times  as  large  as  it  was  in 
1892. 

England  was  once  the  workshop  of  the  world. 
France,  and  later  Germany,  decided  to  supply  their 
own  home  markets.  They  succeeded,  and  now,  like 
the  United  States,  they,  too,  are  seeking  outlets  for 
their  surplus  products. 

All  this  means  that  the  great  manufacturing  peoples 
are  about  entering  on  an  industrial  conflict,  the 
bitterness  of  which  and  the  skill  and  energy  of 
which  have  never  been  parallelled  in  the  history  of 
the  world. 

Already  foreign  ministers  of  both  Germany  and 
Austria  have  publicly  and  officially  declared  that  it 
may  be  necessary  to  form  a  continental  European 
league  against  our  growing  commerce.  It  would  be 
an  easy  matter  for  them  to  shut  us  out  by  a  protective 
tariff. 

Great  Britain,  for  more  than  half  a  century  past 
vowed  to  absolute  free  trade,  shows  more  than  signs 
of  unrest.  She  sees  the  writing  on  the  wall.  "  Joe  " 
Chamberlain,  with  his  strong  following,  is  trying  to 
convert  the  masses  of  England  to  his  own  conviction : 
That  England  must  retrace  her  steps;  that  she  is  no 


Results  of  the  War  to  This  Nation      65 

longer  able  to  fly  the  free-trade  flag,  no  longer  able  to 
contend  with  us. 

The  aggressions  of  our  tariff  are  at  last  to  be  resisted 
in  kind. 

With  all  these  signs  and  portents  on  the  horizon, 
what  is  to  become  of  our  manufactured  surplus?  How 
and  where  shall  we  find  markets  for  this  increasing 
surplus,  when  even  those  now  remaining  are  in  ques- 
tion? At  present  they  must  be,  above  all,  the  Orient 
and  the  Tropics,  more  particularly  China  and  South 
America. 

The  prospective  results  of  this  present  Russo-Jap- 
anese war,  then,  will  be,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned, 
greatly  enlarged  opportunities,  commercial  ones  first 
and  political  ones  after,  in  the  Far  East.  Two  of  our 
most  formidable  competitors  there,  Russia  and  Japan, 
will  issue  from  the  fight  much  weaker  than  they  entered 
it.  This,  to  put  it  cold-bloodedly,  will  be  to  our  ad- 
vantage. Japan  and  Russia,  will,  nevertheless,  remain 
our  good  customers,  as,  indeed,  why  should  they  not? 
Only  their  powers  of  competition  with  us  will  have  be- 
come curtailed. 

An  important  item  on  our  credit  sheet  in  this  con- 
nection will  be  the  good  will  of  China,  and  the  great 
loss  of  prestige  of  Russia  throughout  Asia.  So  far 
this  prestige,  altogether  political,  has  been  Russia's 
greatest  asset  in  that  whole  region.  But  whether 
Russia  shall  ultimately  achieve  victory  or  suffer  defeat, 
the  mere  fact  that  little  Japan  was  powerful  enough  to 
give  immense  Russia  such  a  severe  tussle  will  be 
enough  to  lead  to  a  great  loss  of  prestige  for  Russia. 
This  will  react  on  her  position  in  Persia,  Afghanistan, 
Tibet,  Mongolia,  and  as  far  as  northern  India.  Add 
to  this  the  further  fact  that  commercial  expansion  will 


66  The  War  and  Its  Outcome 

have  become  impossible  for  Russia  at  the  close  of  this 
war,  inasmuch  as  she  will  have  to  reconstruct  her 
young  industry  after  the  complete  collapse  in  which 
it  has  been  since  1900,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  a  splen- 
did field  is  opening  out  for  American  push  and  enter- 
prise throughout  Central  Asia  and  China. 


THE    FAR    EAST 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  NEW  JAPAN 

If  Egypt  were  to  rise  again  to  splendour  and  power, 
if  her  people  of  their  own  strength  were  to  transform 
the  Nile  delta  into  what  it  once  was — the  "  corn-cham- 
ber of  the  world," — if  the  Land  of  the  Pharaohs,  we 
say,  were  to  do  all  this  by  her  own  sheer  will  and 
energy,  the  task  would  not  be  a  harder  one  than  that 
which  fell  to  Japan's  share  in  our  own  time. 

The  Briton  took  this  task  for  Egypt  upon  his  shoul- 
ders, and  within  twenty  years  he  has  wrought  miracles. 
But  even  to-day  the  trudging,  perspiring  fellaheen 
dwell  in  miserable  mud  hovels,  and  the  tax-gatheref 
lays  his  heavy  hand  on  the  naked  brown  shoulders  of 
the  poor  wretches.  Yet  Egypt,  even  to-day,  is  a  land 
of  unmatched  fertility,  producing  two  regular  crops  an- 
nually, and  the  eternal  Nile's  gifts  are  as  bounteous  as 
ever. 

What,  then,  shall  we  say  of  Japan's  case?  Cer- 
tainly ancient  Nippon  is  a  lovely  land,  charming  in  its 
natural  scenery,  pretty  to  the  eye  in  its  garments  of 
subdued  greens,  browns,  and  greys,  encircled  all  about 
by  the  purple  sea. 

But  Japan  does  not  front  the  Mediterranean,  old 
cradle  of  civilisation,  and  she  has  no  Father  Nile  to 
bestow  plentiful  crops  on  her.  She  lies  far  away  to 
the  east,  split  up  into  innumerable  islands,  farther  off 
even  then  remote  Cathay.     Steep  and  tall  mountains, 

69 


70  The  Far  East 

picturesque  in  their  outlines  and  capped  with  snow, 
but  barren  of  subsistence,  are  occupying  half  of  her 
territory,  and  Fusiyama,  fabled  from  of  yore  and 
sacred  to  every  loyal  Jap's  heart,  still  pours  forth  vol- 
umes of  death-laden  smoke. 

Neither  is  the  soil  of  Japan  very  fruitful.  The 
husbandman's  reward  is  meagre.  True,  the  sea  and 
the  rivers  everywhere  yield  fish  and  other  sea  food. 

Isolation  means  stagnation  and  gradual  decay. 
With  a  traditional  history  thousands  of  years  old  and 
reaching  back  into  those  hazy  mists  when  gods  walked 
the  earth,  the  country  had  fallen  under  the  curse  of  the 
Shogunate,  and  had  become  like  one  of  its  own  hermit 
crabs,  that  odd  creature  which  the  lapping  ocean  wave 
now  and  then  leaves  stranded  on  the  sandy  beach. 
She  had  encloistered  herself  from  all  communication 
with  the  outside  "  barbarian,"  seeking  sufficiency  in 
herself. 

From  a  centuries-long,  death-like  slumber  she  awoke 
when  Commodore  Perry  arrived  in  her  harbours,  offer- 
ing the  good  will  and  the  friendship  of  this  nation. 
That  was  fifty  years  ago,  and  from  that  recent  day 
dates  the  resurrection  of  Japan.  Even  then  it  re- 
quired another  number  of  years  to  free  her  people 
from  the  thraldom  of  the  Shogim,  and  it  was  not  until 
after  the  revolution  of  1868  and  the  re-establishment 
of  the  Mikado  on  his  throne  in  Tokio,  that  Japan  was 
in  a  condition  to  set  out  on  her  marvellous  career  of 
modern  progress. 

For  another  number  of  years  internal  strife  weak- 
ened her.  The  proud  samurai  class,  her  feudal  no- 
bility, would  not  easily  succumb  to  the  irruption  of 
western  spirit.  That  period  of  trouble  ended  in  1888, 
when  constitutional  government  was  formally  adopted. 


The  New  Japan  71 

Only  six  years  later,  in  1894,  Japan  whipped  China 
in  one  of  the  most  wonderful  wars  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  a  war  where  the  pigmy  was  pitted  against 
the  giant,  and  where,  nevertheless,  the  giant  had  not 
the  ghost  of  a  chance  from  the  outset. 

And  now,  ten  years  later,  Japan  is  again  in  the  field, 
but  this  time  in  a  death-grapple  with  a  foe  worthy  of 
her  steel.  Again  a  giant,  but  this  time  one  with  hard- 
ened muscle  and  ribs  of  iron,  not  one  of  flabby  flesh 
and  flaccid  sinew. 

Let  us  examine  on  what  foundations  rests  the  mag- 
ical self-confidence  of  this  wonderful  little  people. 

The  latest  official  statistics  show  the  population  of 
Japan  to  be  44,805,937 ;  to  that  must  be  added,  roundly, 
3,500,000  for  Formosa,  that  rugged  island  off  the 
Chinese  southern  coast  which  Japan  won,  as  her  sole 
spoils,  in  the  war  of  1894.  Altogether,  then,  the 
Mikado  bears  sway  over  48,305,937  subjects,  scat- 
tered over  nearly  4000  islands,  with  a  total  area  of 
162,153  square  miles.  Only  500  of  these  islands, 
however,  are  inhabited,  the  remaining  isles  being  mere 
heaps  of  rocks.  The  chief  islands  are  five  in  number, 
the  Hondo,  or  "  Main  Land,"  with  an  area  of  87,771 
square  miles ;  Shikoku,  south  of  and  separated  from 
Hondo  by  a  shallow  channel,  with  an  area  of  7030 
square  miles ;  Kiushiu,  west  of  this  province  of  Shi- 
koku, with  the  Bungo  Channel  between,  area  15,587 
square  miles;  Yezo,  north  of  Hondo,  with  an  area  of 
30,143  square  miles;  and  Formosa,  area  13,418  square 
miles. 

The  Japanese  archipelago  occupies  the  same  latitude 
as  that  part  of  North  America  between  Savannah  and 
Halifax.  Formosa,  more  to  the  south,  lies  between 
the  same  parallels  as  Tampa  and  Havana.     The  chief 


72  The  Far  East 

group  is  separated  from  the  Philippines  to  the  south 
by  the  Bashi  Channel,  from  China  by  the  Formosa 
Channel,  90  to  100  miles  wide;  from  Corea  by  Brough- 
ton  Channel,  less. than  25  miles  wide;  from  the  Russian 
island  of  Saghalien  by  La  Perouse  Strait,  25  miles 
wide,  and  from  Kamtchatka  by  the  Kurile  Strait.  Be- 
tween the  Japanese  archipelago  and  the  coasts  of  Corea 
and  Manchuria  lies  the  Sea  of  Japan. 

Rice,  the  chief  food  of  the  Japanese,  is  the  most 
important  crop,  and  rice  lands  are  worth  three  times 
other  arable  land.  In  1903,  about  7,000,000  acres  of 
rice  lands  produced  240,000,000  bushels  of  rice,  that 
commodity  forming  also  an  important  article  of  export. 
Sake,  a  liquor  distilled  from  rice,  is  likewise  one  of 
the  most  important  products  of  the  country.  Last 
year  173,051,000  gallons  of  sake  were  produced  by 
27,789  establishments. 

Next  in  importance  is  barley.  Some  103,000,000 
bushels  of  it  were  produced  in  1903,  grown  on  1,579,- 
096  acres.  Of  rye,  37,176,867  bushels  were  raised  on 
1,697,850  acres.  Wheat  was  produced  to  the  amount 
of  21,006,776  bushels,  on  1,147,747  acres.  To  silk 
culture  were  devoted  736,933  acres,  and  120,702  acres 
to  tea,  producing  63,210,100  pounds.  A  large  propor- 
tion of  this  tea  was  exported,  mostly  to  the  United 
States,  its  flavour  being  relished  in  no  other  foreign 
country. 

The  soil  is  held  for  the  most  part — since  the  abolition 
of  the  feudal  system — by  the  people  who  work  it.  The 
average  holding  is  about  one  acre,  valued  at  $90. 
The  rearing  of  cattle  for  dairy  purposes  has  only 
recently  been  introduced  into  Japan.  In  former  times, 
cattle  were  used  only  as  beasts  of  burden.  As  a  result 
of  Buddhist  teaching,  the  people  never  ate  beef,  and 


The  New  Japan  73 

regarded  butter,  milk,  and  cheese  as  poisonous.  Since 
the  opening  of  Japan,  the  government  has  encouraged 
dairies  and  the  breeding  of  cattle,  horses,  and  sheep, 
so  that  at  present  there  are  in  Japan  about  1,652,530 
head  of  cattle  and  1,572,607  horses.  Of  sheep  there 
are  very  few. 

As  to  the  revenue  and  expenditure  of  Japan  for  the 
year  ending  March  31,  1904,  we  find  the  tax  on  sake 
(rice  liquor)  the  largest,  amounting  to  $33,250,000, 
the  tax  on  land,  $23,500,000,  being  next  in  importance ; 
customs  duties  (very  low),  $8,300,000;  post  and  tele- 
graph service,  $13,000,000;  government  tobacco  mo- 
nopoly, $6,300,000;  and  sugar  excise,  income  tax, 
business  tax,  forests,  railway  profits,  Chinese  indemnity, 
and  other  inland  taxes.  Together,  the  revenue  of  the 
government  from  these  various  sources  was  $126,- 
000,000. 

The  main  expenditures  were :  For  the  army,  $20,- 
000,000;  navy,  $11,000,000;  national  debt  charges, 
$21,000,000;  public  instruction,  $2,500,000;  and  for 
foreign  and  home  affairs,  department  of  justice,  the 
imperial  court  ($1,500,000),  and  minor  purposes — al- 
together in*ordinary  expenditures,  $90,000,000 ;  for  ex- 
traordinary expenditures,  $33,000,000. 

Wages  run  extremely  low,  when  compared  with  a 
western  standard,  but  much  higher  than  in  China. 
Since  1887,  wages  have  increased  between  250'"and«300 
per  cent.     A  few  specimen  figures  are : 

Carpenters,  30  cents  a  day;  stone  masons,  30  cents; 
brickmakers,  22  cents ;  shoemakers,  22  cents ;  tailors, 
from  22  to  31  cents;  blacksmiths,  25  cents;  lacquer- 
ers,  25  cents;  labourers,  14  cents. 

These  figures,  low  as  they  seem  to  us,  are  from  three 
to  four  times  higher  than  those  prevailing  in  China. 


74  The  Far  East 

Now  let  us  look  at  the  purchasing  power  of  these 
wages.  In  1903,  average  prices  of  principal  commodi- 
ties in  Japan  were : 

Rice,  about  $1.25  per  bushel,  or  about  3  cents  per 
pound;  barley,  about  40  cents  per  bushel:  sake  (rice 
liquor),  next  to  tea  the  favourite  beverage  of  the  Jap- 
anese, per  koku  of  220  pounds,  about  $16;  tea,  about 
14  cents  per  pound;  leaf  tobacco,  about  14  cents  per 
pound. 

Since  Japan  was  opened  to  the  world,  it  has  been 
rapidly  growing  in  wealth.  The  cotton  industry  par- 
ticularly has  advanced.  Spinning  and  weaving  have 
been  the  most  important  industries  of  Japan  since  time 
immemorial.  Before  the  introduction  of  machinery 
there  were  spinning  wheels  in  nearly  every  home. 
Osaka  is  now  the  centre  of  the  cotton  industry,  where 
there  have  been  erected  so  many  factories  that  it  has 
been  called  the  Fall  River  of  Japan.  In  1888  the 
number  of  spindles  was  113,856;  in  1901,  1,181,762; 
in  1904,  1,502,346.  Male  and  female  operatives  em- 
ployed, 63,000;  average  daily  wages  for  males,  about 
17  cents;  females,  about  10  cents.  The  silk  industry  is 
another  important  one.  Noted  kinds  of  silk  are  the 
nishijin,  hachijo,  kaiki,  habutai  (for  handkerchiefs). 
In  1 90 1,  raw  silk  was  produced  to  the  extent  of  some 
14,000,000  pounds. 

About  12,000,000  pounds  of  sugar  were  produced 
last  year;  of  beer,  about  12,000  tons.  There  were  dis- 
tilled some  440,000  tons  of  sake. 

In  1901,  the  capital  invested  in  cotton-spinning,  and 
factories  for  cotton  goods,  was  about  $100,000,000. 
Numerous  new  mills  have  sprung  up  since  that  date. 
The  short  East  Indian  staple  is  preferred  because  of  its 
cheapness. 


The  New  Japan  y^ 

The  Bank  of  Japan  is  working  with  a  capital  of  $15,- 
500,000;  there  are  six  great  banks,  and  1802  small 
ones.  In  681  savings  banks,  there  were  deposits  $139,- 
534,330,  or  $2.79  per  head  of  population. 

A  large  new  government  foundry  was  established  in 
Wakamatsu,  at  an  outlay  of  $5,000,000;  nearby  are 
large  coal  mines. 

The  increase  of  Japan's  foreign  trade  has  been  five- 
fold since  1888.  In  1891,  it  amounted  to  $89,500,- 
000;  in   1903,   it  was  $298,000,000. 

Japan's  trade  with  China  has  increased  more  than 
fourfold  since  1893,  both  exports  and  imports. 

Her  exports  of  silk  have  risen  since  1885  from  $5,- 
503,172  to  $38,430,239  in  1902.  Even  her  waste  silk 
exports  now  amount  to  a  couple  of  million  dollars.  In 
silk  tissues  of  various  kinds,  she  exported  in  1902  al- 
most $17,000,000.  Of  rice  she  exported,  in  the  same 
year,  $3,340,544;  of  tea,  $5,242,009. 

Cotton  goods  of  various  kinds  she  exported  in  1902 
to  the  extent  of  $12,500,000;  coal,  $8,635,209;  porce- 
lains, $1,230,772;  of  copper,  coarse  and  refined,  $5,- 
130,992. 

The  leading  countries  from  which  Japan  obtains  her 
imports  are:  England,  with  $26,000,000;  the  United 
States,  $21,485,000;  China,  $14,890,200;  Germany, 
$14,491,800,  and  British  India,  $11,703,000.  This 
country  is  the  best  market  for  Japanese  exports,  as  we 
have  seen  elsewhere.  Great  Britain  and  Hong  Kong 
stand  next ;  China,  with  $15,886,200,  third.  To  Corea, 
Japan  exported  last  year  over  $5,000,000  worth. 
China  is  Japan's  best  customer  for  cotton  goods. 

As  Japan  has  evolved  within  a  few  years  a  power- 
ful navy,  small  in  size,  but  most  efficient,  so  she,  too, 
has  bent  her  energies  in  the  direction  of  creating  a 


76  The  Far  East 

large  and  able  merchant  marine.  She  has  now  four 
shipyards  for  the  building-  of  steel  steamers,  located, 
respectively,  in  Nagasaki,  Yokosuki,  Kobe,  and  Uraga. 
The  tonnage  of  steamers  which  passed  Japanese  ports 
in  1900  was  9,000,000,  of  which  3,000,000  were 
Japan-made.  The  largest  steamer  so  far  built  in 
Japan  is  the  Aki  Maru,  6000  tons,  of  the  Japan-Seat- 
tle line,  operated  by  the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha,  built 
in  Nagasaki ;  a  new  one  of  7500  tons  is  now  being 
built  for  the  same  line.  A  number  of  battleships  have 
been  built  for  Japan  in  Yokosuki,  two  of  them  being 
the  Akashi  and  Suma,  which  participated  in  the  battle 
of  Chemulpo.  A  dry-dock  is  now  being  built  in  Na- 
gasaki for  vessels  of  16,000  tons.  There  are  fifty 
shipyards  within  the  island  empire  for  the  construc- 
tion of  sailing  junks. 

Japan  began  with  the  building  of  railroads  in  1870, 
the  Tokio- Yokohama  line  being  first.  The  total  mile- 
age of  railroads,  in  1903,  was  5015.  In  1901  the 
mileage  was  2039.  There  are  300  American  locomo- 
tives in  operation,  although  England  and  Germany 
supplied  larger  numbers  of  them. 

The  manufacture  of  paper  employs  a  greater  pro- 
portion of  people  in  Japan  than  in  any  other  country. 
Japanese  paper  has  proved  superior  to  that  of  many 
countries  of  a  far  older  knowledge  of  its  manufacture, 
and  the  65,514  paper  establishments  of  Japan  in  1902 
turned  out  a  product  worth  $12,272,754. 

The  mineral  deposits  of  Japan  are  not  especially 
rich,  and  compare  nowise  with  those  of  China.  Coal 
beds  exist,  however,  both  large  and  of  fair  quality. 
The  best  coal  comes  from  Takashima,  on  the  island  of 
Kiushiu.  The  coal  output  in  1902  amounted  to  8,200,- 
000  tons.     From  the  iron  mines  in  the  same  year  63,- 


The  New  Japan  77 

000,000  pounds  were  taken.  Copper  mines  exist  in 
abundance,  but  those  of  lead,  gold,  and  silver  furnish 
only  small  quantities  of  valuable  ore.  Japan  has  four 
well-equipped  dockyards,  capable  of  both  constructing 
and  repairing  ships. 

The  Japanese  army  is  a  very  recent  creation.  Mili- 
tary service  is  compulsory,  and  so  far  as  military  in- 
struction is  concerned,  Japan  has  taken  Germany  as  a 
model.  The  same  is  true  of  organisation,  the  army 
being  divided  into  three  groups,  viz.,  the  permanent 
establishment,  consisting  of  7500  officers  and  190,000 
men;  the  reserve,  of  35,000  additional  men;  and  a 
"  territorial  reserve,"  which  would  bring  another  200,- 
000  men  into  line.  There  is  also  a  loosely  organised, 
and  not  very  well  drilled  body  for  "  territorial  de- 
fence," numbering  about  600,000.  The  artillery  num- 
bers 1200  guns,  and  the  cavalry  90,000  horses.  The 
latter  is  the  poorest  branch  of  the  Japanese  military 
service. 

In  electric  and  horse  street  railways,  Japan  is  also 
well  supplied.  In  fact,  electrical  science  stands  on  a 
high  plane  there,  and  both  the  telephone  and  telegraph 
services  (being  entirely  under  government  control)  are 
well  managed.  A  system  of  wireless  telegraphy,  dif- 
fering from  ]\Iarconi's,  was  invented  by  an  official  in 
the  Japanese  navy.  His  invention  was  utilised  in  the 
recent  naval  engagement  at  Chemulpo. 

Though  as  yet  a  poor  country — when  applying  our 
own  standard — Japan  has  produced,  of  late,  a  number 
of  daring  and  successful  financiers.  The  most  noted 
of  these  is  Baron  Shibuzawa,  called  by  his  admiring 
countrymen   the  "  J.  Pierpont  Morgan  of  Japan." 

These  are  a  few  of  the  data  regarding  the  marvellous 
development  of  late  of  Japan's  material  resources.    But 


78  The  Far  East 

this  does  not  end  the  tale.  In  intellectual  life  her  re- 
suscitation has  been  as  complete.  She  has  successfully 
adopted  modern  methods  of  government  and  educa- 
tion. Her  public  schools  far  outrank  both  in  number, 
efficiency,  and  money  expenditure,  those  of  Russia. 
This  test  of  civilisation  is  regarded  by  many  as  in  the 
last  analysis  the  decisive  one.  If  so,  Japan  stands  the 
test.  More  than  ii  per  cent,  of  her  population  in  1903 
v^ere  pupils  in  her  public  grammar  schools,  80,000  in 
the  middle  schools,  6000  in  the  higher  schools,  and  over 
4000  in  her  colleges  and  universities.  All  these  insti- 
tutions are  supported  either  by  the  respective  com- 
munities, or  by  the  imperial  government.  There  are, 
besides,  many  private  schools  and  colleges.  There  are 
night  schools  for  the  children  of  the  working  classes  in 
cities.  There  are  also  technological  night  schools  for 
them.  The  government  in  every  way  encourages  the 
cause  of  education. 

That  Japanese  science,  young  as  it  is,  already 
amounts  to  a  good  deal,  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  a 
number  of  very  important  discoveries,  more  particu- 
larly in  medicine  and  chemistry,  have  been  made  by 
Japanese  scholars. 

In  invention,  the  Japanese  have  progressed  at  a 
steady  rate.  In  1887.  the  Japanese  patent  office  re- 
ceived 906  applications  for  letters  patent,  out  of  which 
109  were  actually  granted.  In  1902,  the  number  of  ap- 
plications had  risen  to  3095,  and  the  letters  granted  to 

871- 

The  Japanese  newspaper  and  periodical  press  is  al- 
ready quite  respectable.  There  are  480  daily  papers 
within  the  empire.  Of  these,  1 1  are  of  national  repu- 
tation. Several  of  them  have  a  circulation  of  100,000 
and  more.   Magazines  there  are  innumerable.  A  favour- 


The  New  Japan  79 

ite  form  of  the  Japanese  periodical  is  the  technical  and 
economic  one.     Literature  is  now  in  a  transition  state. 


The  Japanese  national  parliament  is  patriotic  and 
morally  clean;  but  constitutional  government  there  is 
still  in  its  infantile  stage,  and  there  is  decidedly  too 


8o  The  Far  East 

much  talking  and  "  play  to  the  galleries."  Neverthe- 
less, at  every  critical  time  this  body  has  not  been  found 
wanting.  A  proof  of  this  was  given  on  March  29, 
last,  six  weeks  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The 
special  session,  convened  to  take  financial  measures 
proposed  by  the  government  to  meet  the  expenses  of 
the  war,  voted  almost  unanimously  the  special  taxes 
required  for  the  purpose,  amounting  to  a  matter  of 
$31,000,000 — a  sum  large  for  a  population  whose 
average  annual  earnings  figure  up  to  only  a  little  over 
$50  per  caput.  The  new  financial  programme 
adopted  on  this  occasion  will  considerably  modify  the 
Japanese  customs  tariff  and  the  conditions  of  economic 
life  of  the  country. 

Special  mention  seems  called  for  to  show  the  Jap- 
anese in  yet  another  role,  that  of  coloniser  in  the  island 
of  Formosa. 

Unfriendly  critics  have  claimed  that  Japan,  since 
1895,  has  neglected  her  part  in  this  respect.  And  with- 
out taking  the  explanatory  facts  into  consideration, 
there  is  some  ground  for  this  contention. 

Formosa  is  a  very  valuable  island,  and  of  sufficient 
size  to  afford  the  opportunity  for  millions  of  *'  Japs  "  to 
settle  and  develop  its  resources.  The  present  popula- 
tion of  the  island  is  about  3,500,000.  It  presents  a 
mingling  of  races,  in  good  part  Chinese,  both  from 
north  and  south,  and  speaking  greatly  differing  dia- 
lects of  Chinese.  In  the  eastern  half  of  the  island,  very 
mountainous  and  rugged,  there  are  savage  tribes  of 
aborigines ;  a  considerable  portion  of  the  people  are 
half-breeds.  The  mixed  race,  called  Pepo  Hwan, 
seems  the  most  promising. 

There  are  practically  no  good  harbours  in  the  island. 
Kee  Lung  and  Tarn  Sui  are  the  best  of  these  harbours, 


The  New  Japan  8 1 

situated  at  the  mouths  of  rivers,  and  the  Japanese  gov- 
ernment, at  great  expense,  is  now  rendering  them  ser- 
viceable. An  Ping,  the  harbour  of  the  capital  city  of 
Tai  Nan  Fu,  is  shallow  and  without  shelter,  and  Ta 
Kau  is  even  worse. 

The  history  of  the  island,  during  the  last  century, 
was  a  very  troubled  one.  Without  going  into  details, 
it  is  enough  to  say  that  the  "  Black  Flags,"  lawless  and 
troublesome  bands,  during  a  space  of  many  years  upset 
all  orderly  government. 

Since  Japan's  acquisition  of  the  island,  something 
has  been  done  to  mend  matters.  The  rebels  and  ban- 
dits were  overcome  by  main  force.  Public  order  was 
restored  everywhere.  A  system  of  administration,  re- 
sembling the  Japanese,  was  successfully  inaugurated. 

Internal  improvements  were  made  in  various  direc- 
tions, such  as  the  building  of  good  roads  and  the  deep- 
ening of  the  harbours,  the  establishment  of  a  postal 
service  and  the  protection  of  internal  traffic;  regular 
garrisons,  officered  by  Japanese,  but  made  up  of  na- 
tive soldiers,  were  established.  A  system  of  public 
education  has  been  introduced.  Christian  missions 
have  been  encouraged  within  the  island,  and  the 
whole  of  it  is  well-policed. 

Industrially  and  commercially,  matters  have  not  im- 
proved so  much.  Rice  and  tea  culture  occupy  the 
bulk  of  the  population.  The  camphor  trade  has  be- 
come a  Japanese  government  monopoly,  and  the  cam- 
phor forests  are  not  further  destroyed  without  re- 
planting. 

Within  the  past  five  years,  Japanese  immigration 
to  Formosa  has  been  encouraged,  and  many  thou- 
sands of  industrious  "  Japs  "  have  settled  there. 
Scores  upon  scores  of  cleanly  Japanese  villages,  ho- 


82  The  Far  East 

tels,  and  road-houses  have  been  built.  This  immi- 
gration, now  that  order  has  been  restored,  will  pro- 
ceed at  an  accelerated  pace. 

There  are  natural  resources  in  the  island  which  are 
only  just  beginning  to  be  exploited,  coal  and  sulphur 
being  the  most  valuable. 

With  undeniable  progress  already  achieved,  it  is  un- 
questionable that  Japan  would  have  done  much  more 
in  Formosa  under  more  favourable  circumstances  than 
those  that  have  obtained  for  ten  years  past.  For  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  disadvantages  under 
which  Japan  has  been  labouring  regarding  Formosa 
and  its  development,  since  1895,  have  been  many  and 
serious.  It  required  five  years  out  of  the  nine  to  thor- 
oughly re-establish  order.  The  Japanese  themselves 
were  ignorant  of  the  languages  spoken  in  the  island. 
But  the  main  trouble  was  that  Japan,  on  the  one  hand, 
is  not  as  yet  a  country  rich  in  capital,  and  that,  on  the 
other  hand,  she  has  been  preparing  strenuously  for  her 
coming  struggle  with  Russia,  bending  all  her  ener- 
gies in  that  direction. 

Making  due  allowance  for  these  untoward  circum- 
stances, it  may  fairly  be  claimed  that  even  as  a  col- 
oniser— wholly  novel  as  the  task  was  for  her — the 
dashing  little  nation  has  made  a  fair  success. 

There  is  thus  no  doubt  that  Japan  has  closed  defi- 
nitely her  accounts  with  the  past,  and  has  started  out, 
for  good  and  all,  on  the  career  of  a  modern  power. 
She  could  not,  if  she  would,  retrace  her  steps.  The 
whole  basis  of  her  new  society  rests  on  the  achieve- 
ments and  the  conceptions  of  western  minds.  She 
has  learned  many  things  within  an  incredibly  small 
space  of  time.  She  has  been  a  willing  pupil.  None 
of  her  teachers  has  been  as   readily  heeded  as  the 


The  New  Japan  83 

American.  She  acknowledges  her  debt  of  gratitude 
to  us  frankly  and  sincerely. 

Is  it  thinkable  that  Japan  will  herself  undo  all  for 
which  she  has  striven  so  hard,  and  sink  back  into  the 
morass  of  barbarism? 

Yet  that  is  precisely  what  people  mean  when  they 
tell  us  of  the  "  yellow  peril,"  The  very  idea  is  ab- 
surd. You  could  no  more  get  a  savage  who  has  once 
tasted  the  sweets  of  civilisation  to  go  back  to  the  wil- 
derness and  starvation,  than  you  could  get  the  Jap  to 
join  hands  with  the  Chinaman  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
stroying our  western  civilisation. 

Or,  if  the  "  yellow-peril "  argument  should  stop 
half-way,  and  should  mean  that  there  is  danger  of  this 
new  and  powerful  Japan  allying  itself  with  China  or 
other  Asian  powers,  merely  for  the  sake  of  conquest 
or  of  expansion,  it  is  none  the  less  devoid  of  founda- 
tion. 

The  case  of  Japan  proves,  once  for  all.  that  it  is 
possible  to  make  out  of  the  Asiatic  a  being  imbued 
with  the  spirit  of  modern  civilisation.  True,  the 
"Jap "  is  an  exceptional  Asiatic,  perhaps  the  most 
gifted  of  them.  That  China  cannot  exist  much  longer 
under  her  present  system  of  government  is  admitted 
by  all  competent  judges.  The  question  is,  how  will 
she  change? 

It  is  likely  that  Japan  will  become  her  most  im- 
portant and  effective  teacher  in  the  ways  of  western 
civilisation.  This  process  could  not  be  as  rapid  as  in 
Japan's  own  case.  There  are  several  reasons  for  this. 
The  chief  one  is  that  China  is  far  more  conservative 
in  spirit  than  Japan.  The  Chinese  intellect  is  keen 
and  impressionable  in  several  respects,  but  a  complete 
turn-over   in   her    social   and    economic   organisation 


84  The  Far  East 

would  require  many  years;  political  changes  in  China 
(especially  so  far  as  her  own  form  of  government  is 
concerned)  it  would  not  be  nearly  so  difficult  to  ef- 
fect. The  dividing-up  of  China  among  the  powers 
must  be  out  of  the  question.  That  point  has  been 
touched  upon  above. 

But  while  it  seems  to  be  the  "  manifest  destiny  "  of 
Japan  to  infuse  the  spirit  of  modernity  into  China, 
this  teaching  is  bound  to  be  of  a  purely  pacific  nature. 
Its  tendency  will  be  to  develop  China  materially,  to  in- 
crease many  times  the  powers  of  consumption  and 
purchase  of  the  average  Chinaman.  At  present,  the 
average  annual  earnings  of  the  head  of  a  family  in 
the  more  prosperous  provinces  of  China  are  $36  per 
year.  To  increase  this  to,  say,  $200,  would  mean  the 
sextupling  in  value  of  China  as  a  market  for  western 
wares.  In  no  case  would  Japan  exert  herself  to  make 
out  of  China  a  great  military  power.  To  do  so  would 
run  counter  to  Japan's  own  vital  interests. 

If  we  have  learned  to  admire  anything  in  modern 
Japanese  character,  it  is  its  sagacity,  its  eminently  prac- 
tical bent,  its  singular  capacity  to  choose  between  es- 
sentials and  non-essentials  of  western  civilisation. 
Japan  knows  precisely  what  is  good  for  her.  She 
will  certainly  not  assist  in,  or  herself  inaugurate,  the 
process  of  transforming  intensely  peaceful  China  into 
an  aggressive  military  or  economic  power. 

Divided  as  she  is  from  China  by  but  a  narrow  arm 
of  the  sea,  and  having  but  one-ninth  of  the  popula- 
tion of  her  huge  neighbour,  Japan  knows  as  well  as  she 
knows  anything,  that  it  would  be  suicidal  for  her  to 
raise  up  a  strong  military  power  along  her  whole  west- 
ern flank. 

Let  us,  therefore,  relegate  this  flimsy  talk  about  a 


The  New  Japan  85 

"  yellow  peril  "  to  the  limbo  of  forgetfulness.  It  is 
idle  to  waste  any  more  words  on  it. 

Russia  started  this  "  yellow-peril "  idea.  It  has 
been,  diplomatically,  among  the  most  serviceable  of 
her  stock  in  trade.  She  has  manoeuvred  with  it  most 
skilfully.  Years  ago,  she  understood  how  to  inject 
this  "  yellow-peril  "  bacillus  into  the  mind  of  the  Ger- 
man emperor,  and  he  forthwith  drew,  with  the  as- 
sistance of  his  former  drawing  master,  Professor 
Knackfus.  in  Cassel,  a  flamboyant  picture  of  alarm. 
He  labelled  it :  "  Nations  of  Europe !  Guard  your  most 
sacred  treasures !  "  And  then  he  sent  this  symbolical 
drawing  to  all  his  crowned  "  colleagues,"  as  he  calls 
them — a  copy  of  it  even  to  the  late  President 
McKinley. 

Even  in  English-speaking  countries  this  scarehead 
motto,  "  the  yellow  peril,"  found  entrance  and  belief. 
It  is  one  of  those  phrases  which  are  most  likely  to 
strike  terror  to  the  breast  of  the  gullible  and  im- 
pressionable. The  power  of  mere  phrase  over  the 
minds  of  the  many  is  one  of  the  most  curious  phe- 
nomena of  our  age,  and  no  other  instance  of  it  is  as 
curious  as  the  virulence  and  longevity  of  this  par- 
ticular phrase. 

Let  us  bury  and  be  done  with  it. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
AWAKENING  CHINA 

When  our  own  forbears  were  roaming  dense 
forests,  China  was  already  a  highly  civilised  country, 
in  some  respects  more  civilised  than  she  is  to-day. 

As  long  ago  as  the  seventh  century  b.  c,  the  face 
of  Confucius  was  set  towards  the  past.  That  great- 
est of  Chinese  sages,  whose  philosophy — entirely 
mundane  and  intensely  practical — suits  so  well  the 
natural  temperament  and  mental  bias  of  his  country- 
men that,  after  a  lapse  of  2500  years,  his  teachings 
form  still  the  code  of  ethics  with  the  whole  educated 
class,  already  complained  of  the  decadence  of  China. 

Due  to  her  geographical  position,  to  the  powerless- 
ness  and  lack  of  cohesion  of  her  neighbours  to  the 
north  and  west,  and  to  the  vast  desert  regions  and 
towering  mountain  chains  that  form  a  natural  barrier 
in  Tibet  and  Mongolia,  China  enjoyed  for  many  cen- 
turies the  blessings  of  isolation,  at  a  time  when  in- 
numerable wars,  rapine,  and  disorder  ravaged  the 
countries  to  the  west. 

For  a  period  of  1500  years  and  more  this  isolation 
was  indeed  a  blessing  to  her,  a  blessing  which  enabled 
China  to  cultivate  the  arts  of  peace  while  the  West 
was  a  prey  to  strife.  Babylonian  and  Assyrian  power 
sank  to  the  dust.  The  world-empire  of  the  Romans, 
during  a  thousand  years,  grew,  matured,  and  then 
decayed. 

86 


Awakening  China  87 

Persia  rose  to  splendour  and  wide  dominion,  only 
to  go  down  after  a  while.  Greece  evolved  a  har- 
monious civilisation,  of  part  of  which  we  are  still  the 
fortunate  heirs. 

Finally,  the  Arab  prophet  appeared,  and  enthused 
Mohammedan  hosts  carried  the  Koran  and  the  sword 
throughout  the  great  region  of  which  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  the  Indian  Ocean  are  the  bearers  of  trade. 
Djinghis  Khan  and  Tamerlane  poured  their  resistless 
flood  of  Mongolian  hordes,  not  over  China,  but 
through  the  immense  Sarmatian  plain  which  now 
forms  the  kernel  of  the  huge  Russian  Empire.  The 
Crusades  ran  their  feverish  course,  revolutionising 
Occidental  thought  and  culture. 

The  Reformation  came  and  moulded  the  creed  and 
mind  of  nations.  Modern  civilisation  all  through  the 
West  flowered  and  produced  fruit  of  unequalled 
savour.  The  wealth  and  power  of  the  Occident  at- 
tained dimensions  never  matched  before. 

Columbus  set  out  in  his  tiny  caravels  and  discovered 
a  New  World.  This  New  World  again  grew  through 
the  centuries,  achieved  independence  and  unheard-of 
prosperity. 

The  dawn  of  the  nineteenth  century  produced  an- 
other world-conqueror.  Napoleon,  and  he,  too,  at  last 
went  down,  and  his  life  was  snuffed  out  like  a  candle 
on  a  mere  speck  of  an  island  far  to  the  south. 

By  all  these  things  China  was  not  touched.  She 
pursued  the  even  tenor  of  her  way.  For  many  cen- 
turies China's  knowledge  of  the  outside  world  was 
confined  to  the  savage  aboriginal  tribes  on  her  fron- 
tiers. Why  should  she  accept  ideas  from  "  bar- 
barians "  ?  China  had  all  she  wanted — a  vast  coun- 
try,  densely  populated,   a   civilisation   for  cycles  su- 


88  The  Far  East 

perior  to  that  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  She  had  in- 
vented gunpowder  and  the  magnetic  needle,  the  arts 
of  writing,  printing,  and  the  making  of  paper,  and  be- 
come fairly  proficient  in  the  sciences  of  astronomy 
and  navigation.  She  printed  books  from  movable 
type,  and  had  an  extensive  and  highly  developed  lit- 
erature long  before  ours.  The  highest  class  of  in- 
dustrial arts,  such  as  the  making  and  decoration  of 
fine  porcelains  and  silks,  had  found  a  secure  home 
with  her.  In  some  cases  she  had  preceded  the  West- 
ern world  by  a  thousand  years  and  more  in  essential 
points  of  civilisation. 

In  a  word,  China  was  a  highly  developed  nation, 
enjoying  for  many  centuries  model  government  and 
wise  laws,  when  we — that  is,  our  ancestors  of  long 
ago — were  howling  savages. 

But  in  the  long  run  even  blessed  isolation  means 
first  stagnation  and  then  decay.  This  is  an  unalter- 
able sociologic  law.  China  could  not  escape  it. 
Necessarily  she  was  ignorant  of  the  fact,  because  she 
had  nothing  and  nobody  to  compare  herself  with. 
Throughout  ages  the  thought  had  gradually  crystal- 
lised in  the  Chinese  mind  that  there  was  no  country 
worth  mention  but  China,  and  no  civilisation  at  all 
commensurate  with  hers.  Looking  at  the  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances under  which  she  had  been  living  for  so 
long,  it  is  indeed  difficult  to  see  how  she  could  have 
escaped  this  fallacy.  A  highly  gifted  race  they  were 
from  the  outset,  and  that  they  have  remained  to  this 
day,  despite  the  canker  of  isolation.  To  what  they 
would  have  developed  if  they  had  been  in  constant 
contact  with  western  thought  it  is  idle  to  conjecture. 

As  it  is,  the  peculiar  conformation  of  the  Chinese 
mind   strikes   us   Occidentals,   at  first  blush,   as   un- 


Awakening  China  89 

canny,  and  yet,  when  we  come  to  analyse  it,  it  is  no 
more  than  might  be  expected.  We  speak,  and  with 
some  degree  of  justice,  of  the  "  insular  bent  of  mind  " 
of  the  Briton.  The  same  stricture,  though  in  a  less 
degree,  we  ourselves  were  subject  to  until  but  a  few 
years  ago.  And  in  both  cases  a  certain  amount  of 
isolation,  due  to  geographical  position,  was  at  the  root 
of  this  peculiarity.  But  what  is  the  case  of  England 
or  the  United  States  in  comparison  with  that  of 
China  ? 

Thus,  there  was  nothing  extraordinary  about  it 
when  the  British  embassy,  headed  by  Lord  Macart- 
ney, in  1792,  was  and  is  spoken  of  in  Chinese  annals 
as  "  barbarians  bring  tribute  to  China."  That  charm- 
ing book.  Smith's  "  Chinese  Characteristics,"  gives 
many  amusing  instances  of  the  curious  conceit  of  the 
people  of  China,  a  conceit,  however,  perfectly  natural 
under  the  circumstances  and  eminently  sincere.  It  is 
the  necessary  outgrowth  of  thousands  of  years  of 
national  isolation.  To  this  hour  the  Chinaman  looks 
upon  us,  quite  honestly,  as  rank  barbarians.  He  will 
get  over  that  notion  in  time,  and  it  is  part  of  our  task 
to  hasten  the  process. 

Nevertheless,  since  1895  China  is  awake.  True, 
she  is  still  rubbing  her  eyes  and  wondering  what  it  all 
means.  But  the  war  with  Japan,  in  1894,  served  as 
the  first  entering  wedge  into  the  thick  hide  of  Chinese 
prejudice.  Her  previous  two  encounters  with  Euro- 
pean powers, — the  "  Opium  War  "  of  1842  and  the 
Anglo-French  attack  upon  her  in  1861,  culminating 
in  the  sack  of  Peking  and  the  spoliation  of  the  Sum- 
mer Palace, — made  no  deep  impression  on  the  Chinese 
people.  The  events  which  followed  the  Boxer  up- 
rising,  a  couple  of  years  ago,   helped   somewhat  to 


9©  The  Far  East 

drive  this  wedge  home.  China  is  now  aware  of  her 
miHtary  impotency;  also,  to  some  extent,  of  her  eco- 
nomic inferiority.  Of  her  social  superiority,  how- 
ever, she  is  as  yet  quite  firmly  convinced.  Talk  on 
that  topic  with  any  intelligent  and  outspoken  China- 
man, and  he  will  tell  you  so. 

One  thing  is  certain.  The  Chinaman  has  already 
come  not  only  to  recognise,  but  to  adopt — in  some 
features  at  least — our  superior  material  civilisation. 
To  the  question:  "Does  it  pay?"  he  has  made  an- 
swer by  an  emphatic  "  Yes."  He  cares  nothing  as 
yet  for  western  literature  and  art,  social  and  political 
ideals,  and  least  of  all  for  western  religion.  But  that 
will  come  in  time. 

China  is  often  referred  to  as  a  "  dying  nation,"  as 
suffering  "  dissolution  "  or  "  vivisection."  The  proc- 
ess of  carving  a  living  body  into  convenient  fragments 
is  spoken  of  lightly,  and  that  the  day  of  dismember- 
ment is  close  at  hand  is  firmly  believed  by  many,  even 
by  some  who  ought  to  be  more  or  less  competent 
judges.  Such  dismemberment,  as  was  pointed  out  in 
a  previous  chapter,  would  be  diametrically  opposed  to 
American  interests,  and  we  must  do  everything  that 
is  humanly  possible  to  hinder  it. 

We  may  not  like  the  Chinaman  of  to-day,  exhibit- 
ing, as  he  does,  a  number  of  characteristics  that  are 
more  or  less  distasteful  to  our  nicer  western  percep- 
tions. But  that  is  not  the  gauge  to  be  applied  in  such 
a  case.  The  question  rather  is,  what  are  the  qualities 
fitting  the  Chinaman  for  the  present  and  future 
struggle  for  existence?  And  viewing  the  problem 
from  that  angle,  we  must  admit  that  the  slant-eyed 
Mongolian  is  most  powerfully  equipped.  Let  U5 
mention  just  a  few  of  his  racial  traits, 


Awakening  China  91 

Sticking  out  most  prominently  we  find :  a  physical 
endurance  most  wonderful  in  such  an  ancient  race; 
a  bodily  organisation  enabling  him  to  live  with  im- 
punity anywhere  on  the  globe,  in  the  tropics  as  in  the 
arctic  zone.  We  find  enormous  powers  of  propaga- 
tion, powers  which,  if  unchecked  and  in  their  effects 
undiminished  by  such  an  entire  disregard  of  hygiene 
as  he  lives  under  at  present,  w^ould  quickly  double  and 
treble  the  present  population  of  his  country.  We  find 
an  entire  absence  of  that  nervous  exhaustion  with 
which  the  whole  Occident  is  more  or  less  tainted.  In 
"  Chinese  Characteristics  "  we  are  told  by  an  eye-wit- 
ness the  story  of  a  Chinaman  losing  both  legs  in  an 
explosion,  lying  for  hours  untended  in  the  broiling 
sun,  at  last  being  taken  to  a  hospital,  where  the  double 
amputation  is  performed  on  him  without  the  aid  of 
anaesthetics,  the  patient  contentedly  smoking  his  pipe 
an  hour  later,  and  three  weeks  after  hobbling  just  as 
contentedly  about  on  the  streets.  W^e  are  told  of  a 
common  sight  in  Chinese  towns :  men,  women,  and 
children  sleeping  profoundly  and  peacefully  in  the 
glare  of  the  sun,  falling  asleep  at  a  moment's  notice. 
Apparently  they  have  no  nerves  at  all. 

The  vitality  of  the  Chinese  stock  is  simply  amaz- 
ing. The  abstemiousness  and  utter  sobriety  of  their 
mode  of  living;  their  imperviousness  to  disease  and 
hardship;  their  ability  to  labour  hard  and  long,  with- 
out loss  of  power,  on  a  diet  of  rice  and  dried  fish, 
washed  down  with  weak  tea;  their  hard-grained  com- 
mon sense;  their  persistent  economy  and  their  quick- 
ness of  perception ;  their  unfailing  keenness  in  seiz- 
ing and  utilising  opportunities  for  their  material  ad- 
vancement— all  these  are  leading  traits  in  the  average 
men  of  the  race. 


92  The  Far  East 

Imagine  such  a  people  fully  awake.  Imagine  them 
using,  with  their  natural  shrewdness,  the  superior  ad- 
vantages of  our  higher  material  civilisation.  Imagine 
them  under  a  well-ordered  government  once  more. 
Imagine  them  freed  from  the  manifold  hindrances, 
individual  and  collective,  from  which  they  have  suf- 
fered for  many  centuries.  Lastly,  imagine  them,  if 
your  fancy  runs  that  way,  as  a  systematically  trained 
military  power. 

Truly,  the  Chinaman  is  not  a  negligible  quantity. 

But  as  to  the  utter  improbability  of  China  ever  be- 
coming a  great  military  power,  a  word  will  be  said 
elsewhere.  For  the  moment  we  will  confine  our  pic- 
ture to  the  other  elements  mentioned. 

At  the  close  of  the  Boxer  troubles  a  census  was 
taken  of  the  whole  of  China  by  the  central  govern- 
ment, the  purpose  being  to  determine  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  indemnity  to  be  paid  the  allied  powers. 
This  census  is  therefore  not  to  be  suspected  of  in- 
flation, and  is  presumably  correct.  We  find  the 
following  figures : 

China  proper  (square  miles),  1,532,420;  Man- 
churia, 363,610;  Mongolia,  1,367,300;  Tibet,  463,- 
200;  Chinese  Turkestan,  550,340.  And  the  popula- 
tion we  find,  quoting  the  figures  in  the  above  order: 
407,337.305;  8,500,000;  2,580,000;  6,430,000;  I,- 
200,000.  This  gives  a  territory,  all  told,  of  4,277,170 
square  miles,  and  a  population  of  426,047,325. 

It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  of  this  immense 
territory — just  about  one-half  of  the  whole  of  Euro- 
pean and  Asiatic  Russia — China  proper  forms  only 
one-third,  being  but  slightly  larger  than  the  Missis- 
sippi Valley;  furthermore,  that  this  one-third  contains 
more  than  95  per  cent,  of  the  population. 


Awakening  China  93 

Again,  the  density  of  population  and  the  natural 
resources  of  even  the  18  provinces,  constituting  to- 
gether the  core  of  the  whole  empire,  differ  extremely: 


PROVINCES 

AREA 
ENG.  SQ.  MILES 

POPULATION 

POPULATION 
PER  SQ.  MILE 

ChiHli     .     .     . 

115,800 

20,937,000 

172 

Shan  Tung  . 

55,970 

38,247,900 

683 

Shan  Si    .     . 

81,830 

12,200,456 

149 

Ho  Nan    .     . 

67,940 

35,316,800 

520 

Kiang  Su . 

38,600 

13,980,235 

362 

Ngan  Hwei 

54.810 

23,670,314 

432 

Kiang  Si  . 

69,480 

26,532,125 

382 

Cheh  Kiang 

36,670 

11,580,692 

316 

Fu  Kien    . 

46,320 

22,876,540 

494 

Hu  Peh     . 

71,410 

35,280,685 

492 

HuNan    . 

83,380 

22,169,673 

266 

Shen  Si     . 

75,270 

8,450,182 

III 

Kan  Su     . 

125,450 

10,385,376 

82 

Szech  Wan 

218,450 

68,724,890 

314 

Kwang  Tung 

99,970 

31,865,251 

319 

Kwang  Si 

77,200 

5.142,330 

67 

Kwei  Chau 

67,160 

7,650,282 

114 

Yuen  Nan 

146,680 

12,324,574 

84 

Total 

1,532,420 

407,253,029 

266 

We  see,  then,  that  the  density  of  population  varies 
very  greatly.  The  most  populous  of  all  the  provinces, 
Shan  Tung,  where  there  are  683  inhabitants  to  the 
square  mile,  with  a  total  population  of  over  38,000,- 
000,  is  the  one  which  Germany  has  chosen  for  her 
special  field  of  exploitation.  From  that  figure  the 
population  per  square  mile  drops,  in  varying  degree, 
down  to  almost  one-tenth,  namely,  82  per  square  mile, 
in  Kan  Su,  and  to  less  than  one-tenth,  namely,  67  per 
square  mile,  in  the  province  of  Kwang  Si. 

It  is  a  curious  coincidence  that  nearly  all  of  the 
more   thinly   peopled   provinces   of    China,    such   as 


94  The  Far  East 

Shan  Si,  Shen  Si,  Kan  Su,  and  Kwang  Si,  are  pre- 
cisely those  which  have  the  largest  and  most  valuable 
natural  resources,  but  resources  which  up  to  now  have 
been  wholly  unexploited. 

The  outlying  territories  under  Chinese  sway,  though 
enormous  in  extent  and,  in  part,  possessing  great 
natural  sources  of  wealth,  are  not  only  loosely  con- 
nected with  the  empire  proper,  inhabited  by  races  dif- 
fering more  or  less  from  the  Chinese  themselves,  but 
are  also  the  most  sparsely  settled  and  poorly  culti- 
vated. This  is  a  significant  fact  which  will  play  a 
great  figure  hereafter  in  the  future  development  of 
the  empire. 

Indeed,  Providence  seems  to  have  reserved  these 
vast  territories  for  the  coming  expansion  of  the  Chi- 
nese race,  placing  at  their  very  door  and  under  their 
suzerainty  thinly  populated  lands  which  will  suffice 
for  centuries  to  come  for  the  awakening  ambition  and 
the  natural  increase  of  the  400,ooo,cxdo  of  China 
proper. 

The  territorial  losses  with  which  China  has  met, 
directly  and  indirectly,  have  not  been  considerable 
until  the  present.  The  loss  of  Manchuria,  if  it  should 
come  to  pass,  would  far  outweigh  all  the  others  that 
have  preceded  it.  True,  Russia,  in  the  guise  of  a 
frontier  regulation,  did  take  considerable  slices  of 
China  before,  those  being  in  the  region  watered  by  the 
Amoor,  Ussuri,  and  Shilka  rivers.  But  even  the  dis- 
tricts thus  alienated  by  Russia  were  neither  intrin- 
sically nor  territorially  to  be  compared  in  importance 
with  Manchuria. 

The  island  of  Formosa  was  ceded  to  Japan,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  treaty  of  peace,  ratified  and  ex- 
changed at  Che  Foo,  May  8,  1895,  ^"d  the  transfer 


Awakening  China 


95 


96  The  Far  East 

effected  on  June  2  of  the  same  year.  This  island  con- 
tains but  13,000  square  miles. 

In  November,  1897,  Germany  seized  the  port  of 
Kiao  Chao,  situated  on  the  coast  of  Shan  Tung.  In 
January,  1898,  the  Kaiser  obtained  from  China  a 
ninety-nine  years'  lease  of  the  town,  harbour,  and  dis- 
trict. This  colony,  territorially  small  as  it  is,  is  of 
vast  importance  to  Germany's  boundless  ambitions 
in  Far  Asia.  It  affords  her,  as  Count  Buelow,  the 
imperial  chancellor,  put  it  in  a  speech  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, "  a  powerful  lever  and  a  base  of  operations  in 
China — a  share  of  the  sunlight,"  This  will  be  shown 
further  on. 

By  agreement  with  the  Chinese  government,  Russia, 
on  March  2^,  1898,  leased,  for  twenty-five  years.  Port 
Arthur,  at  the  extreme  south  end  of  Manchuria. 
Russia  before  this  had  also  acquired,  on  similar  terms, 
Ta  Lien  Wan,  since  renamed  Dalny.  In  1900,  in 
consequence  of  the  Boxer  uprising,  Russia  occupied 
Manchuria,  and  her  failure  to  comply  with  her  re- 
peated pledges  of  evacuation  has  led,  as  the  world 
knows,  to  the  present  war. 

For  such  a  period  as  Russia  may  hold  Port  Arthur, 
Great  Britain  is,  by  agreement  with  China,  April  2, 
1898,  to  hold  Wei  Hai  Wei,  also  situated  on  the  coast 
of  the  province  of  Shan  Tung.  For  defensive  pur- 
poses Great  Britain  has,  in  addition  to  her  older  Chi- 
nese possession,  the  island  of  Hong  Kong,  obtained 
a  ninety-nine  years'  lease  of  a  district  called  Kau 
Lung,  on  the  mainland  opposite. 

To  compensate  her  for  these  various  advantages 
given  to  Russia,  Britain,  and  Germany,  France  ob- 
tained, in  April,  1898,  from  China  a  ninety-nine  years' 
lease  of  the  bay  of  Kwang  Chau  Wan,  opposite  the 


Awakening  China  97 

island  of  Hai  Nan.  In  November,  1899,  China 
further  conceded  to  France  possession  of  the  two 
islands  commanding  the  entrance  of  the  above-named 
bay,  and  this  ne\V  territory  has  been  placed  under  the 
authority  of  the  governor-general  of  French  Indo- 
China. 

Tien  Tsin,  an  important  trade  emporium  in  North- 
ern China,  which  had  been  occupied  by  the  allied 
powers  during  the  Boxer  troubles,  was  restored  to 
China  in  1902,  and  Shanghai  was  likewise  restored 
to  her  in  January,  1903. 

All  these  losses  of  Chinese  territory,  outright  or 
cloaked  in  order  to  "  save  the  face  "  of  the  imperial 
government  in  Peking,  do  not  amount,  however,  to 
more  than  a  tiny  fragment  of  China  as  a  whole.  So 
far  as  actual  loss  of  sovereignty  is  concerned,  China 
is  still  practically  intact. 

And  now  look  at  some  of  the  results  of  the — as 
yet — partial  awakening  of  China. 

Railroads :  870  miles  in  operation  in  China  proper ; 
675  miles  running  in  the  French,  English,  German, 
and  Portuguese  colonies,  independent  of  the  two  Man- 
churian  lines  built  by  the  Russians,  with  altogether 
a  mileage  of  about  3000;  2270  miles  are  now  being 
built  in  China  proper,  and  3577  miles  are  projected; 
Russia  means  to  build  a  railroad  through  Mongolia. 

China  ought  to  become  a  paradise  of  railroads,  for 
her  highways  are  the  worst  on  earth.  The  rivers, 
supplemented  by  the  great  canals, — now  in  a  bad  state 
of  repairs, — are  to-day  her  chief  arteries  of  trade, 
though  of  course  the  Chinese  coastwise  trade,  by  junk 
or  steamer,  is  also  very  large.  Her  rivers,  above  all 
the  famed  Yang  Tse,  afford  cheap  and  easy  transpor- 
tation, as  far  as  it  goes.     But,  of  course,  overland 


98  The  Far  East 

traffic  is  in  a  very  backward  state,  so  costly  and  cum- 
brous as  to  forbid  transportation  of  goods  for  any 
great  distance.  Goods  are  carried  on  the  backs  of 
coolies,  ponies,  mules,  and  dromedaries,  50,000  of  the 
latter  serving  even  to-day  as  the  means  of  conveyance 
for  tea  across  the  Mongolian  desert  to  Russia. 

In  natural  resources  China  has  only  one  equal — our 
own  country.  Colquhoun  says :  "  The  mineral  wealth 
of  China  is,  perhaps,  the  greatest  of  any  country  on 
the  world's  surface,  and  is  yet  hardly  touched." 

Professor  von  Richthofen  (brother  of  Germany's 
secretary  of  foreign  affairs,  and  one  of  the  greatest  of 
living  geographers),  after  extensive  travels  through- 
out the  interior  of  China,  during  which  he  visited  and 
thoroughly  examined  Chinese  conditions,  especially 
her  natural  resources,  makes  the  same  statement,  and 
in  his  book  on  the  subject  gives  definite  information. 

About  seven  years  ago  an  expert  commission  was 
sent  out  to  China  by  the  German  government,  and, 
after  a  very  thorough  examination  of  all  the  facts, 
reached  similar  conclusions. 

The  mineral  wealth  of  China  is  indeed  enormous. 
Coal  exists  in  layers  as  extensive  as  those  of  this  coun- 
try, occurring  in  abundance  everywhere  save  in  one 
out  of  the  eighteen  provinces  of  China  proper.  In 
iron  ores  the  facts  are  similar.  The  deposits  of  coal 
and  iron  in  the  provinces  of  Shen  Si  and  Shan  Si  are 
believed  to  be  the  most  valuable  in  the  world.  They 
alone  cover  an  area  of  27,500  square  miles.  They 
contain  enough  anthracite  coal  of  the  best  quality  to 
supply  the  world  at  the  present  rate  of  consumption 
for  2000  years.  England  and  France  will  penetrate 
this  region  with  a  railway,  and  have  secured  a  con- 
cession to  work  this  vast  wealth  for  sixty  years.     The 


Awakening  China  99 

province  of  Szech  Wan  is  of  similar  richness  and  this 
province  is  the  largest. 

Sir  Thomas  Jackson,  manager-in-chief  of  the  Hong 
Kong  and  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation,  says  that 
China  is  on  the  eve  of  a  commercial  development  that 
in  its  magnitude  could  not  be  estimated.  All  that  is 
required,  he  maintains,  to  bring  enormous  prosperity 
to  China  is  to  open  it  up  by  means  of  railways  and 
waterways. 

China  is  essentially  an  agricultural  country — that 
is,  as  yet.  The  land  is  all  freehold,  held  by  families 
on  the  payment  of  an  annual  tax.  Lands  and  houses 
are  registered.  Farm  animals  are  oxen  and  bufifaloes. 
The  implements  are  primitive.  Irrigation  is  very 
common.  Horticulture  is  a  favourite  pursuit,  and 
fruit  trees  are  grown  in  great  variety.  The  whole  of 
China's  agriculture  is  very  intensive. 

Wheat,  barley,  maize,  millet,  and  other  cereals,  also 
pease  and  beans,  are  cultivated  in  the  north,  while 
sugar,  indigo,  and  cotton  are  grown  in  the  southern 
provinces.  Opium  has  become  a  crop  of  increasing 
importance. 

Tea  is  cultivated  exclusively  in  the  west  and  south, 
in  Fu  Kien,  Hu  Peh,  Hu  Nan,  Kiang  Si,  Cheh  Kiang, 
Ngan  Hwei,  Kwang  Tung,  and  Szech  Wan.  China 
formerly  had  a  practical  monopoly  in  tea  up  to  not 
many  years  ago.  But  she  has  allowed  her  tea  exports 
to  decline,  being  unable  to  meet  the  keen  competition 
of  British  India  and  Ceylon,  Japan,  etc.,  although  it 
is  undeniable  that  even  to-day  she  produces  the  teas 
of  finest  flavour  and  daintiest  taste. 

The  mulberry  tree  grows  everywhere,  but  the  best 
and  the  most  silk  comes  from  Kwang  Tung,  Szech 
Wan,  Cheh  Kiang,  and  Kiang  Su. 


loo  The  Far  East 

An  important  feature  in  new  Chinese  industries  is 
the  erection  of  cotton  mills  in  Shanghai,  and  of  fila- 
tures for  winding  silk  from  cocoons  in  Shanghai,  Can- 
ton, and  elsewhere.  In  Shanghai  alone  are  twenty-six 
filatures,  with  8500  basins,  which  can  reel  off  12,000 
piculs  of  silk  per  year.  Two  native  mills  were  started 
in  1890;  in  1901  there  were  14  cotton-spinning  mills 
in  China  with  about  460,000  spindles,  turning  out 
some  60,000,000  pounds  annually.  This  number  since 
has  increased  about  50  per  cent. 

Flour  and  rice  mills  are  beginning  to  supersede  in 
large  centres  native  methods  of  treating  wheat  and 
rice.  Hang  Yang,  near  Han  Kow,  has  large  Chinese 
iron  works,  supplied  from  ore  mines  at  Ta  Yeh,  sixty 
miles  distant.  An  impetus  was  given  to  the  making 
of  firearms  by  the  prohibition  of  their  importation,  as 
provided  for  in  the  treaty  of  September  7,  1901. 

In  Shan  Tung,  the  coal  fields  of  Wei  Hsien  and 
Po  Shan  are  most  productive.  Besides  those  men- 
tioned before,  immense  coal  fields,  both  anthracite  and 
bituminous,  were  recently  discovered  in  the  south- 
eastern districts  of  Hu  Nan,  their  area  being  about 
21,700  square  miles.  In  Manchuria,  too,  iron  and 
coal  are  both  found  in  plenty.  Copper  is  plentiful  in 
Yuen  Nan,  and  near  ihe  city  of  Meng  Tse  are  found 
large  mines  of  tin,  lead,  and  silver. 

The  foreign  commerce  of  China  was  briefly  referred 
to.  Direct  imports  and  exports  now  range  between 
$320,000,000  and  $360,000,000.  The  Boxer  rising 
had,  of  course,  a  very  unfavourable  influence  on  this 
foreign  trade,  but  in  1902  it  began  to  rise  once  more. 
For  that  year  the  total  value  of  China's  direct  imports 
was  $195,590,575,  an  increase  of  10  per  cent.  In 
cotton  products  the  increase  in  imports  was  particu- 


Awakening  China  loi 

larly  pronounced,  the  whole  amount  being  consider- 
ably over  $80,000,000. 

Owing  to  the  decentralisation  that  in  China  has 
assumed  extraordinary  proportions,  the  revenues  of 
the  empire  as  a  whole  are  singularly  inadequate — in 
fact,  in  nowise  commensurate  wnth  the  size  and  popu- 
lousness  of  the  country.  Besides,  the  data  obtainable 
are,  at  best,  estimates  approximating  the  truth.  No 
general  statement  of  the  revenues  of  China  is  ever 
made  public  officially.  Such  estimates  as  are  formed 
by  foreigners  are  founded  on  the  financial  reports  of 
the  various  provincial  governors,  published  annually 
in  the  Peking  Gaizettc. 

Except  foreign,  maritime,  and  a  few  native  cus- 
toms, the  revenue  is  collected  by  provincial  agents. 
The  board  of  revenue  at  Peking  issues  annually  to 
each  governor  of  a  province  a  statement  of  the  amount 
required  from  his  province  for  the  following  year,  and 
when  to  this  amount  is  added  the  sum  necessary  for 
local  administration,  civil  and  military,  the  sum  to  be 
provided  by  each  collector  is  ascertained. 

The  amount  actually  levied,  however,  greatly  ex- 
ceeds this,  and  the  surplus,  which  may  amount  to  50 
or  70  per  cent,  of  the  total,  disappears  in  the  form 
of  costs  or  presents  and  bribes  to  official  superiors,  or 
else  it  remains  in  the  hands  of  the  collectors  them- 
selves. 

From  a  statement  published  not  long  ago  by  Sir 
Robert  Hart,  and  obtained  from  the  records  of  the 
Hu  Pu  (board  of  revenue),  the  latest  estimate  of  the 
revenue  and  expenditure  of  the  central  government 
of  China  amounts  to :  Revenue,  88,200,000  haikwan 
taels,  whereof  the  land  tax,  with  26,500,000,  forms 
the  largest  item,  while  the  li  kin  (internal  duty),  with 


I02  The  Far  East 

16,000,000,  and  the  general  cargo  duty,  with  17,000,- 
000,  are  next  in  importance;  the  salt  duty,  with  13,- 
500,000,  and  the  foreign  opium  duty,  with  5,000,000, 
are  likewise  large. 

Expenditure:  The  military  and  naval  appropria- 
tions, with  35,000,000  haikwan  taels,  form  the  larg- 
est item ;  next  to  that  the  provincial,  and  the  interest 
on  loans. 

To  meet  the  expenditure  on  interest  and  redemption 
of  the  large  debt  of  1901,  the  government  has  required 
viceroys  and  governors  of  provinces  to  increase  their 
annual  remittances  by  18,700,000  haikwan  taels  during 
the  period  1902-10. 

The  land  tax  varies  enormously  in  different  prov- 
inces— from  20  or  25  cents  to  $1.55  and  more  per 
acre.  The  rate  of  incidence  is  theoretically  fixed, 
but  under  other  names  additional  taxes  are  imposed 
on  land.  Salt  is  a  government  monopoly;  producers 
must  sell  to  the  government  agents,  who  resell  to  mer- 
chants provided  with  "  salt  warrants  "  at  a  price  to 
cover  the  duty. 

The  li  kin  was  a  provincial  tax  imposed  on  mer- 
chandise in  transportation,  payable  at  appointed  bar- 
riers. This  mode  of  raising  revenue  was,  however, 
abolished  in  September,  1902,  in  answer  to  the  re- 
monstrances of  the  western  powers,  and  the  deficiency 
thus  created  is  now  covered  by  a  surtax  on  foreign 
imports.  The  Chinese  government  can  levy  taxes  on 
native  articles  of  consumption  at  the  place  of  consump- 
tion itself. 

The  foreign  debt  of  China  amounts  now  to  $598,- 
775,000.  Of  this,  $320,000,000  was  contracted  to 
pay  the  indemnity  tn  the  allied  powers  growing  out 
of  the  Boxer  troubles  in  1900  and  1901. 


Awakening  China  103 

This  is  a  very  large  sum  for  a  country  financially 
and  economically  undeveloped,  and  the  interest  charge 
on  it,  averaging  between  5  and  6  per  cent.,  forms  a 
heavy  burden  for  China.  The  indemnity  for  the 
Boxer  injuries  constitutes  a  gold  debt  payable  in 
thirty-nine  instalments,  due  January  i  of  each  year 
up  to  1 94 1.  Interest  at  4  per  cent.,  and  amounting  to 
18,829,500  haikwan  taels  per  annum,  is  payable  half- 
yearly.  Securities  for  the  debt  are  the  imperial 
maritime  customs  otherwise  unappropriated,  and 
other  sources  of  revenue.  The  proceeds  thus  assigned 
are  paid  monthly  to  a  commission  in  Shanghai.  The 
annual  charge  on  all  debts  secured  on  customs  now 
amounts  to  about  $28,850,000. 

The  imperial  Chinese  post  office  was  opened  in  1897, 
and  China  has  now  joined  the  postal  union  of  the 
world.  Clocks  and  watches  are  seen  everywhere  on 
the  coast  and  for  some  distance  in  the  interior,  espe- 
cially in  the  provinces  lying  along  the  mighty  Yang 
Tse.  This  signifies  that  time  is  beginning  to  be  of 
some  worth  in  China. 

It  takes  about  seven  pounds  of  old  brass  "  cash," 
formerly  the  universal  coin  in  China,  to  make  a  dollar. 
This  is  now  gradually  giving  place  to  silver  coin,  indi- 
cating larger  transactions  and  a  slow  rise  in  the 
standard  of  living.  This  standard  is  as  yet  painfully 
low.  The  average  earnings  of  a  family  of  the  work- 
ing class  in  China  are  $3  per  month.  Low,  indeed, 
you  will  say.  but  keep  in  mind  that  the  average  earn- 
ings of  the  Russian  peasant  (and  that  means  the  Rus- 
sian people,  for  the  peasant  forms  95  per  cent,  of  the 
total  Russian  population)  are  even  lower,  barely 
$32  per  year.  And  whereas  food  and  raiment  in 
China  are  very  low  in  price,  and  the  climate  is  much 


I04  The  Far  East 

milder,  prices  for  these  necessaries  of  life  are  50  per 
cent,  higher  in  Russia. 

Another  point:  the  Chinaman,  when  he  attains 
wealth  or  even  moderate  affluence,  knows  how  to  live, 
and  he  fully  appreciates  good  things.  Foreign  ob- 
servers have  remarked  this  in  Shanghai  and  other 
ports  with  a  rich  Chinese  merchant  class.  The  fact 
is  still  more  noticeable  in  cities  outside  China  where 
the  Chinese  are  economically  strong.  In  Singapore, 
for  instance,  the  Chinese  merchant  displays  the  great- 
est luxury;  the  same  is  true,  in  slighter  measure,  in 
Hong  Kong  and  in  the  large  cities  of  Java,  such  as 
Batavia  and  Soerabaya. 

From  a  recent  detailed  table  of  imports  in  China  a 
few  significant  facts  in  this  connection  may  be  gleaned. 
This  table  shows,  among  other  things,  that  the  con- 
sumption of  flour  grew,  since  1877,  from  nothing  to 
185,892,600  pounds;  matches  (gross  boxes),  from 
559,117  to  11,254,000;  iron  and  manufactures  of 
iron,  from  61,672,580  to  285,130,700  pounds;  petro- 
leum, American,  from  nothing  to  56,213,000  gallons; 
petroleum,  Russian,  from  nothing  to  42,924,000  gal- 
Ions. 

Still  more  telling,  though  in  themselves  not  very 
high,  are  a  few  figures  taken  from  a  tabulated  state- 
ment of  Chinese  imports  from  the  United  States. 
They  show  that  the  import  of  American  books  and 
maps  from  nothing  has  grown  to  $15,836  in  1898; 
carriages,  cars,  etc.,  from  $413,  in  1889,  to  $56,547; 
scientific  instruments,  etc.,  from  $1869  to  $31,119; 
nails,  $32  to  $54,172;  iron  and  steel,  from  $67,214 
to  $464,521;  printing  paper,  from  nothing  to  $386,- 
376;  canned  meats,  from  $50,180  to  $300,970;  butter, 
from  $3547  to  $21,555 ;  salt,  from  $3000  to  $150,000; 


Awakening  China  105 

lumber,  from  $26,724  to  $120,251 ;  wood,  and  manu- 
factures of  wood,  from  $52,994  to  $167,881. 

Within  nine  years  such  a  rise  in  the  import  of  cer- 
tain American  manufactures !  The  above  items  and 
facts  are  prophetic  indeed  of  changes  infinitely  greater 
yet  to  come. 

There  is  now  being  forced  upon  China  a  demonstra- 
tion of  the  superiority  of  mechanical  power  over  mus- 
cular power.  Thus  far,  the  Chinese  people  and  gov- 
ernment have  reluctantly  permitted  us  to  demonstrate 
this  fact  by  granting,  bit  after  bit,  concessions  to  Occi- 
dentals for  the  erection  of  manufacturing  works,  rail- 
roads, telegraph  and  telephone  lines,  the  exploitation 
of  mines,  and  so  forth.  Once,  however,  this  demon- 
stration will  have  been  complete,  and  its  full  force 
entered  the  Chinese  mind,  China  herself  will  be  eager 
to  encourage  the  introduction  of  our  industrial  civilisa- 
tion. Intelligent  Chinese  have  begun  to  see  that  the 
natural  sciences  are  at  the  foundation  of  our  material 
civilisation.  Accordingly,  they  are  advocating  their 
study. 

New  schools  for  western  learning  have  been  estab- 
lished in  Canton,  Han  Kow,  Hang  Chow,  I  Chang, 
Woo  Chang,  and  a  half-dozen  other  cities.  A  million- 
aire Chinese  merchant  with  a  portion  of  his  wealth  has 
recently  founded  in  Shanghai  an  institute  for  boys 
modelled  after  such  American  institutions  as  the  Pratt 
of  Brooklyn  and  the  Drexel  of  Philadelphia. 

In  China,  as  in  all  Asiatic  countries,  the  education 
of  women  is  a  great  innovation,  but  a  Chinese  ladies' 
school,  where  western  learning  is  to  be  taught,  has 
been  started  by  voluntary  subscriptions  from  the  well- 
to-do  Chinese  classes  in  Shanghai. 

An  imperial  edict  was  issued  several  years  ago,  put- 


io6  The  Far  East 

ting  western  learning  on  a  par  with  Chinese  literature 
as  a  condition  of  obtaining  degrees.  Since  the  officials 
of  the  empire  are  all  drawn  from  the  literary  class, 
the  change  of  ideas  of  the  Chinese  students  necessarily 
means  the  transformation  of  the  Chinese  intellect  and 
government  system;  not,  perhaps,  in  this  generation, 
but  surely  in  the  next. 

Native  newspapers  are  springing  up,  not  alone  in 
Shanghai,  where  some  five  are  already  appearing,  but 
in  a  number  of  other  treaty  ports,  and,  as  recently  re- 
ported, in  Han  Kow  as  well. 

Such  various  agencies  set  in  motion  cannot  fail  to 
deeply  modify  the  Chinese  mind  within  the  very  near 
future. 

The  nineteenth  century  has  been  crowded  with  mar- 
vels, of  which  the  resurrection  of  Japan  was  the  great- 
est. A  short  while  ago  that  country  was  wrapped  like 
a  mummy,  bound  hand  and  foot  to  the  past.  She  is 
now  tingling  with  life  in  every  nerve.  Less  than  fifty 
years  ago  Japan  was  more  intensely  exclusive  than 
China.  For  a  native  who  attempted  to  leave  the  coun- 
try, and  for  a  foreigner  who  attempted  to  enter  it,  the 
penalty  was  death.  No  human  being  could  then  fore- 
see that  at  the  close  of  the  century  Japan  would  have 
been  received  into  the  sisterhood  of  nations  as  an 
equal, 

Japan  will  probably  be  China's  most  effective  and 
congenial  teacher.  That  China  is  willing  to  have  this 
so,  there  is  plenty  of  evidence,  quite  irrespective  of  her 
attitude  in  this  present  war.  China  several  years  ago 
began  to  place  an  annual  contingent  of  150  selected 
students  in  the  care  of  the  Tokio  government,  to  be 
educated  in  Japanese  universities.  The  result  was  so 
satisfactory  that  China  has  adhered  to  this  practice, 


Awakening  China  107 

increasing  the  number  of  such  students.  Even  at  this 
writing,  while  Japan  is  waging  war,  there  are  a  couple 
of  hundred  of  Chinese  students  at  her  seats  of  learn- 
ing, diligently  garnering  knowledge.  At  the  new 
university  in  Peking,  Japanese  professors  hold  several 
important  chairs.  At  the  new  Chinese  shipyards, 
Japanese  constructors  and  engineers  are  employed  by 
preference.  Though  the  military  reorganisation  of 
China  has  been,  and  still  is,  mainly  in  the  hands  of 
European  instructors,  during  the  last  two  years  a  num- 
ber of  Japanese  have  been  taken  into  the  service  of 
several  of  the  most  progressive  Chinese  provincial  gov- 
ernors. Yuan  Shi  Kai,  the  clearest  head  in  the  China 
of  to-day,  was  one  of  these. 

And  this  is  the  place  to  say  a  word  about  this  much- 
heralded  "  military  organisation  "  of  China. 

The  world  knows  how  complete  was  the  breakdown 
of  China's  military  organisation  during  the  war  with 
Japan,  in  1894-95.  True,  for  a  number  of  years  pre- 
ceding, the  governors  of  various  Chinese  provinces  had 
had  in  their  employ  foreign  military  instructors,  mostly 
German.  It  is  well  to  emphasise  the  fact  that  these 
governors,  though  owing  their  power  to  appointment 
by  the  central  government  in  Peking,  are,  during  their 
term  of  office,  practically  monarchs,  independent  rulers 
over  territories  some  of  which  are  treble  the  size  of 
England  and  holding  populations  of  from  30,000,000 
to  70,000,000.  Thus,  small  elite  corps  had  been 
formed,  well  drilled,  and  equipped  with  arms  of  the 
latest  make.  But  here  comes  into  play  one  of  the  most 
curious  features  of  Chinese  political  life.  There  was. 
up  to  that  war  with  Japan,  no  cohesion  whatever  be- 
tween the  different  provinces.  Each  of  them  practi- 
cally formed  a  political  and  administrative  entity  of 


io8  The  Far  East 

its  own,  and  the  governor  of  any  one  of  them  never 
dreamt  of  bothering  his  head  about  what  might  occur 
in  the  adjoining  province. 

Thus  it  came  about  that  the  Japs  in  that  war  had 
only  to  do  with  the  Chinese  troops  garrisoned  in,  and 
owing  allegiance  to,  those  maritime  provinces  of  China 
which  they  had  invaded.  The  well-organised  Chinese 
troops,  the  product  of  foreign  instructors,  they  had 
never  to  face.  But  these  well-equipped  and  well- 
drilled  bodies  of  Chinese  troops  were  at  that  time  but 
a  tiny  fragment  of  the  entire  so-called  Chinese  army, 
not  even  one  per  cent.  The  immense  remainder  was 
made  up — as  it  is  made  up  to-day,  though  in  less  per- 
centage— of  the  "  bannermen  "  of  various  classes.  And 
these  "  bannermen,"  when  compared  with  western 
standards,  could  be  called  nothing  but  ill-organised, 
worse-disciplined,  plundering  ruffians,  a  terror  to  their 
countrymen  and  a  gibe  to  their  enemies.  They  were 
armed  and  clad  in  mediaeval  fashion,  with  swords, 
spears,  lances,  and  bow  and  arrow.  They  were  offi- 
cered and  commanded  by  men  who  owed  their  appoint- 
ments to  money,  personal  influence,  or  both.  These 
military  mandarins,  as  they  were  called,  were  held  in 
as  general  contempt  as  the  men  they  led. 

The  total  number  of  these  "  bannermen  "  was  then 
computed  at  about  1,100,000,  scattered  over  the  broad 
lands  of  China,  without  the  possibility  (in  the  absence 
of  railroads  or  highways)  of  ever  concentrating  them. 
They  served,  in  fact,  more  in  the  capacity  of  military 
hangers-on  of  the  various  governors  and  as  a  species 
of  internal  police  than  for  anything  else.  And  that, 
let  us  repeat  it,  was  the  army  of  China. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  with  such  an  archaic  system 
China  was  at  that  time  practically  powerless  against 


Awakening  China  109 

any  invader,  even  if  that  invader  had  been  much  less 
alert  and  much  less  capable  than  was  the  Japanese. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  China  has  never  been 
an  aggressive  power,  never  a  conquering  nation.  The 
present  dynasty,  the  Manchus,  are  a  speaking  proof  of 
the  fact  that  China  was  a  weak  nation,  even  for  de- 
fence, centuries  ere  this.  And  yet  her  military  system 
was  built  up  on  the  theory  of  defence,  not  of  aggres- 
sion. 

The  intensely  pacific  character  of  the  people  is,  how- 
ever, the  main  reason  which  has  kept  China  from  being 
a  conquering  race.  This  pacific  character  is  as  strongly 
inherent  in  the  Chinamen  of  to-day  as  it  ever  was. 
The  Chinese  word  for  soldier  is  significant  in  this 
respect ;  it  means,  literally :  Man-who-plays-for-his- 
head.  Imagine  a  training  in  that  direction  for  some 
thousands  of  years — what  should  we  be  ?  The  China- 
man is  not,  like  the  Jap,  warlike  and  fond  of  glory. 
If  China  to-day  should  suddenly  make  up  her  mind 
to  become  a  warlike  nation,  even  supposing  she  had  the 
inherent  capacity,  it  would  take  her  centuries  to  wean 
herself  from  that  ancient  and  traditional  bent  of  mind. 
No  matter  who  hereafter  will  be  China's  military 
teacher,  whether  Japan,  Europe,  or  this  country,  there 
is  no  danger  of  her  becoming  a  strong  military  power. 
In  a  nation  holding  in  utter  contempt  the  soldier,  the 
very  defender  of  the  soil,  there  is  not  much  good 
material  out  of  which  to  fashion  a  strong  army.  And 
when  to  this  fact  is  added  the  just  as  important  one  of 
the  complete  lack  of  cohesion  among  the  various  prov- 
inces, the  deep-seated  selfishness  of  the  Chinaman  as 
an  individual,  the  absence  even  of  such  a  word  as 
"  patriotism,"  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Occident  has  no 
good  grounds  to  fear  the  "  yellow  peril." 


no  The  Far  East 

We  may,  therefore,  take  the  recent  information  with 
perfect  composure  which  tells  of  the  latest  attempts 
made  by  China  to  create  something  like  a  modern 
army. 

Sir  Robert  Hart,  inspector-general  of  Chinese  cus- 
toms, at  the  behest  of  the  imperial  government,  is  now 
undertaking  the  task  of  reforming  the  system  of  rais- 
ing revenues.  It  is  his  intention  to  increase  these 
revenues  to  400,000,000  taels  (about  $270,000,000) 
by  a  uniform  levy  of  65  cents  an  acre  on  cultivated 
land. 

This  is  to  provide  a  standing  army  and  reserves  of 
half  a  million  men;  also  an  adequate  fleet  and  a  reor- 
ganised civil  service,  with  a  salary  list  of  160,000,000 
taels.  The  scheme  assumes  that  the  Chinese  official 
class  would  be  honest  if  well  paid,  but  the  officials 
themselves  express  doubts. 

But  even  if  a  standing  army  of  half  a  million,  well- 
disciplined  and  efficient,  should  be  created  by  this 
means,  this  would  put  China  not  even  on  a  par  with 
Japan,  though  the  population  of  the  latter  is  only  about 
one-ninth  as  large.  A  Chinese  army  of  half  a  million, 
in  order  to  hold  so  vast  and  populous  a  country,  would 
have  its  hands  full  indeed,  even  if  we  are  rash  enough 
to  suppose  that  able  Chinese  generals  will  grow  up 
within  a  day. 

Yuan  Shi  Kai,  recently  appointed  viceroy  of  Chi 
Hli  (the  province  holding  the  capital,  Peking),  has 
followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the  late  Li  Hung  Chang 
in  making  serious  efforts  to  form  the  nucleus  of  an 
efficient  Chinese  army.  The  body  of  troops  now  under 
his  command,  and  of  which  the  Russians  are  so  appre- 
hensive, may  be  said  to  be  the  flower  of  China's  mili- 
tary forces.     These  troops,  officered  largely  by  Jap- 


Awakening  China  1 1 1 

anese,  with  a  sprinkling  of  former  European  officers, 
are  well-organised,  and  the  discipline  enforced  among 
them  shows  that  with  proper  teaching  the  individual 
Chinaman — that  is,  the  one  hailing  from  certain 
northern  provinces — may  be  turned  into  quite  a  re- 
spectable soldier.  But  even  this  Chinese  elite  corps 
has  yet  to  give  proofs  of  being  able  to  face,  man  for 
man,  a  western  foe. 

In  any  event,  it  is  a  fact,  as  well  established  as  any, 
that  there  is  no  immediate  prospect  of  China  becoming 
a  military  power.  Under  the  most  favourable  circum- 
stances it  would  require  several  generations  to  effect 
such  a  miracle. 

But  for  Americans  this  whole  question  is  really  an 
academic  one.  It  concerns  us  much  nearer  to  learn 
what  in  the  future  as  well  as  in  the  present  are  our 
commercial  chances  with  China. 

What  will  be  the  effect  of  China's  awakening  upon 
the  United  States? 


CHAPTER  IX 
WHAT  CHINA  MEANS  FOR  THIS  NATION 

Suppose  the  Chinese  were  as  much  westernised  as 
are  the  Japanese,  what  would  China's  foreign  com- 
merce be  ?  The  population  of  China  is  about  ten  times 
as  great  as  that  of  Japan,  and  between  the  resources  of 
the  two  countries  there  is  no  comparison,  as  we  have 
seen.  Lord  Beresford,  considered  an  authority,  says : 
"  Japan  is  a  country  without  a  tittle  of  the  natural  re- 
sources of  China." 

And  yet  the  foreign  trade  of  Japan  is  two-thirds  that 
of  China.  The  inference  must  be  that  if  China  were 
as  far  advanced  as  Japan,  her  commerce  would  be  at 
least  as  much  greater  as  is  her  population.  That  is, 
her  foreign  trade  would  reach  the  enormous  sum  of 
$3,500,000,000. 

If  another  America,  peopled  with  75,000,000  like 
ourselves,  should  rise  out  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  what 
a  tremendous  impetus  it  would  give  to  the  world's  in- 
dustries. To  raise  the  standard  of  living  in  China  to 
the  average  standard  in  the  United  States  would  be 
equivalent  to  the  creation  of  five  Americas. 

Raise  the  Chinese  standard  of  living  only  50  per 
cent,  and,  commercially  speaking,  it  would  add  200,- 
000,000  to  the  world's  population. 

We  see,  then,  what  the  awakening  of  China  means 
to  American  commerce.  Our  share  of  the  Chinese 
trade  is  next  to  that  of  Great  Britain,  and  rapidly  in- 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation    113 

creasing.  Our  geographical  position  and  our  other  un- 
deniable advantages  should  give  us  the  first  place  in 
China's  foreign  trade. 

Wu  Ting  Fang,  late  Chinese  minister  to  the  United 
States,  at  a  farewell  dinner  given  him  by  the  American 
Asiatic  Association,  said :  "  We  all  know  that  China 
is  one  of  the  greatest  markets  of  the  world,  with  a  pop- 
ulation of  over  400,000,000  that  must  be  fed  and 
clothed.  .  .  .  She  wants  your  wheat,  your  cotton, 
your  iron  and  steel,  and  your  manufactured  articles. 
.  .  .  She  wants  steel  rails,  electrical  machines,  and  one 
hundred  other  things  that  she  cannot  get  at  home,  and 
must  get  abroad.  It  is  a  fine  field  for  American  in- 
dustry to  fill  these  wants.  ...  If  you  do  not  come  up 
to  your  own  expectations  and  meet  this  opportunity,  it 
is  your  own  fault." 

The  new  necessity  of  finding  additional  foreign 
markets,  pointed  out  in  a  preceding  chapter,  together 
with  the  prospect  of  doors  more  or  less  closed  against 
us  in  continental  Europe,  or  of  being  hampered  by  a 
high  tariff,  lays  strong  emphasis  on  the  value  of 
China's  "  open  door  "  and  the  desirability  of  keeping 
it  open. 

When  we  remember  that  our  new  necessities  are 
precisely  complementary  to  China's  new  needs,  it  is 
not  difficult  to  see  a  strong  meaning  in  the  fact  that 
we  have  become  an  Asiatic  power,  close  to  the  Yellow 
Sea. 

This  nation  has  so  far  paid  little  attention  to  China, 
an  immeasurable  and  nearby  market.  Both  the  Rus- 
sians and  the  Germans  have  carefully  conceived 
theories  of  their  own  as  to  Chinese  trade  and  Oriental 
character.  We  have  applied  so  far  the  philosophy  of 
indifference.    What  American  trade  there  is  to-day  in 


1 1 4  The  Far  East 

the  Orient  is  the  result  of  superior  geographic  posi- 
tion, of  our  matchless  resources,  of  the  excellence  of 
our  goods,  and  of  the  tireless  efforts  of  a  mere  handful 
of  enterprising  American  merchants. 

It  is  true,  our  trade  is  growing  with  China  and  the 
whole  of  the  Far  East;  it  is  even  growing  rapidly. 
But  this  growth  is  far  slower  than  it  ought  to  be, 
taking  into  consideration  our  advantages. 

We  are  only  about  5000  miles  away  from  that 
market,  and  our  competitors,  England  and  Germany 
particularly,  are  distant  from  it  10,000  to  12,000 
miles.  Our  natural  resources  almost  defy  description, 
while  those  of  our  rivals  are  in  comparison  limited  and 
meagre. 

Germany  is  the  most  striking  case  in  point.  When 
placed  side  by  side  with  ours,  her  resources  are  not 
ample.  She  is  far  away  from  this  Far  Asian  market. 
Her  men  do  not  equal  ours  in  inventiveness,  bold 
spirit  of  conception  and  execution,  and  in  capital.  And 
yet,  by  first  patiently  evolving  a  system  of  dealing  with 
China  and  then  consistently  adhering  to  it,  Germany 
has  achieved  within  the  space  of  a  few  years  a  pre- 
eminent commercial  position  in  the  Far  East. 

Attention  has  been  called  to  some  of  the  strong 
traits  in  the  Chinese  character.  But  there  are  others 
just  as  strong  which  we,  as  a  nation,  have  so  far 
ignored  in  our  dealings  with  them.  Profound  indi- 
vidual selfishness  is  one  of  them.  Singly,  this  makes 
the  Chinaman  a  ruthless  and  formidable  competitor 
in  the  commercial  race.  Collectively,  it  makes  the 
Chinese  a  weak  nation.  Like  all  Orientals,  the  China- 
man shows  a  singular  respect  for  visible,  tangible 
power  and  force.  This  brings  it  about  that  that 
nation  which,  like  Russia,  impresses  the  Chinaman 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation     1 1 5 

through  his  senses,  by  a  ceaseless  display  of  military 
and  naval  strength,  is  held  by  him  in  great  esteem. 
Mere  patting  on  the  back  will  not  accomplish  much 
with  the  average  Chinaman.  As  Li  Hung  Chang 
once  put  it  in  conversation  with  an  American :  "  If 
you  Americans  expect  to  get  a  large  share  of  Chinese 
trade,  you  cannot  get  it  by  talk;  you  have  got  to  go 
after  it."  And  this  wily  old  man  knew  his  country- 
men thoroughly.  Furthermore,  he  was  a  typical 
Chinaman,  with  all  the  failings  as  well  as  the  strong 
points  of  his  race.  Though  he  hated  the  Russians 
bitterly,  he  accepted  huge  bribes  from  them,  and  fur- 
thered their  schemes  rather  than  those  of  their  more 
scrupulous  competitors. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  Chinaman  looks  upon  all 
Westerners  as  barbarians,  but  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
suppose  that  he  does  not  draw  distinctions.  He 
keenly  discerns  differences  of  method  and  character, 
as  shown  by  the  various  groups  of  these  "  barbarians." 

As  a  nation,  China  is  lethargic;  as  an  individual, 
the  Chinaman  is  enterprising  and  pushing,  resourceful, 
patient,  and  quick. 

China  will  never  advance  merely  by  her  own  will- 
power. She  must  be  taken  in  hand,  and  she  will  re- 
spect that  teacher  the  most  that  will  deal  with  her 
firmly,  though  kindly. 

We  ought  to  have  at  least  50  per  cent,  of  China's 
foreign  trade.  We  do  have  actually,  counting  in  our 
indirect  trade  with  her  (through  Hong  Kong  and 
via  London  and  Liverpool),  something  like  17  per 
cent. 

One  immense  barrier  that  stood  in  the  way  of 
American  trade  expansion  in  China,  the  li  kin  (or 
local  transportation  tax),  has  recently  been  done  away 


Ii6  The  Far  East 

with.  The  Chino-American  commercial  treaty,  lately 
signed  at  Shanghai,  confirms  the  abolition  of  this  nui- 
sance. American  trade  in  China  had  probably  suffered 
in  its  growth  more  from  the  li  kin  than  had  that  of 
any  other  power.  This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  most 
of  our  Chinese  exports  are  rather  bulky,  such  as  ma- 
chinery, flour,  cotton,  petroleum,  hardware,  and  other 
things.  Their  great  weight  was  an  insuperable  diffi- 
culty in  transporting  them  far  inland,  subject  as  all 
these  goods  were  in  transit  to  repeated, and  quite  ex- 
cessive inland  taxes  or  duties.  The  removing  of  these 
burdens  will  do  more  than  any  other  single  factor  in 
widening  our  market  in  China.  Competent  judges  on 
the  spot  predict  a  doubling  of  our  exports  to  China 
within  the  next  few  years.  But  this  only  in  case  half 
of  that  energy  and  intelligence  be  shown  by  American 
merchants  which  are  shown  by  them  in  supplying  the 
congested  markets  of  Europe. 

There  is  a  consonance  of  opinion  among  Americans 
in  China  that  minuter  methods  must  be  adopted  by  the 
merchants  of  the  United  States  in  trying  to  promote 
their  Chinese  trade.  If  syndicates  were  formed  in  this 
country  for  the  purpose  of  systematically  exploiting 
China,  and  if  the  same  sagacity  were  shown  by  them 
which  has  been  exhibited  at  home,  it  is  safe  to  say  that 
our  chances  in  China  would  be  simply  enormous. 
Good,  reliable,  and  energetic  agents  and  special  repre- 
sentatives in  China  would  form  part  of  this  pro- 
gramme. At  present  there  is  much  to  be  desired  in 
this  particular. 

Adequate  American  banking  facilities  are  another 
much-needed  feature.  At  present,  banks  in  China  are 
all  owned  by  Russians,  Germans,  and  Britons.  It  will 
scarcely  be  necessary  to  dwell  on  this  point.    Its  im- 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation    1 17 

portance  will  be  understood  by  every  American  of  any 
business  training. 

We  need  more  ships,  carrying  American  goods  to 
China  in  American  bottoms,  and  flying  the  American 
flag.  The  flag,  as  everyday  experience  teaches,  is  a 
great  promoter  of  trade,  a  great  advertisement.  To- 
day, the  American  in  Shanghai  or  any  other  Chinese 
port  vainly  strains  his  eyes  for  a  sight  of  the  starry 
banner.  There  is  absolutely  no  difference  of  opinion 
among  Americans  in  the  Far  East  upon  this  point. 
The  flag  impresses  the  Chinaman  as  a  visible  sign  of 
another  nation's  influence  and  resources,  and  he  cor- 
respondingly respects  that  nation. 

Our  consular  service  in  the  Far  East,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  probably  the  best  to  be  found.  This  may  run 
counter  to  the  preconceived  opinion  of  many  Ameri- 
cans; it  is  nevertheless  true.  Time  was,  and  not  so 
long  ago,  when  it  was  not  true.  That  was  the  time 
when  Far  Asia  was  like  Kamtchatka  to  us^ — a  remote, 
unknown,  and  unimportant  region.  But  since  our  ac- 
quisition of  the  Philippines,  the  state  department  in 
Washington  has  sent  men  to  the  Far  East  who,  in 
almost  every  instance,  have  proved  valuable  allies  in 
extending  American  influence  and  trade. 

Of  one  of  our  consular  representatives  in  Far  Asia 
it  is  admitted  all  around  that  he  supplies  Washington 
with  better,  earlier,  and  more  practical  information,  re- 
garding fluctuations  of  trade  and  the  means  of  reach- 
ing consumers,  than  any  half-dozen  representatives  of 
other  nations  do  with  respect  to  their  governments. 
Germany  runs  us  a  close  second  in  the  excellence  of 
her  consuls  in  the  Far  East.  They  certainly  have  the 
advantage  of  a  more  thorough  and  special  training  for 
their  positions,  and  the  Oriental  Seminary  in  Berlin 


1 1 8  The  Far  East 

does  also  much  to  give  them  a  better  equipment  Hn- 
guistically  than  our  consuls  can  show.  The  Kaiser, 
too,  has  his  eye  on  every  one  of  them,  and  they  are 
made  to  feel  that  they  are  sent  to  the  Orient  to  further 
by  every  means  the  greatness  and  commercial  expan- 
sion of  the  fatherland.  Public  opinion  in  Germany 
also  keeps  a  rather  close  watch  on  the  German  consuls 
in  that  part  of  the  world,  and  derelictions  from  duty 
or  the  slighting  of  national  or  individual  German  in- 
terests are  at  once  pointed  out  and  rebuked  in  the 
vigilant  home  press. 

But  these  advantages  are  more  than  offset  in  the 
American  consul  by  his  greater  alertness,  his  quicker 
perception,  his  greater  adaptability  to  foreign  condi- 
tions, and  his  inborn  commercial  spirit,  which  makes 
him  see  instantly  commercial  chances  for  his  country- 
men which  the  slower  intellect  of  his  diplomatically 
trained  German  competitor  often  fails  to  reason  out 
by  laborious  methods. 

In  any  event,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  at  present  no 
other  nation  has  such  efficient  agents  for  commercial 
expansion  on  the  ground  as  has  ours. 

In  some  things  it  is  wise  to  take  the  opinion  of  a 
rival.  Our  keenest  rival  at  present,  and  more  particu- 
larly in  the  Far  East,  as  has  been  said,  is  the  German. 
And  the  greatest  expert  in  Germany  on  foreign  trade 
conditions,  Dr.  Vosberg-Rekow  (who  is  chief  of  the 
Berlin  bureau  for  the  preparation  of  Germany's  pro- 
jected commercial  treaties),  calls  the  American  con- 
sular corps  "  the  most  vigilant  sentinels  who,  spying 
out  trade  openings,  make  them  their  advantage  and 
report  them."  Of  course,  this  is  not  saying  that  our 
consular  service  is  not  susceptible  of  improvement.  It 
may  be  that  a  securer  tenure  of  office,  and  the  complete 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation     119 

divorcement  of  politics  from  the  consular  office  in  the 
matter  of  appointments,  might  achieve  even  better 
results  than  those  hitherto  attained. 

We  ought  to  have  a  strong  navy,  a  navy  dominating 
the  Pacific.  Above  all,  our  navy  ought  to  show  itself  a 
great  deal  more  in  Chinese  harbours  than  it  does.  This 
would  be  another  great  asset  in  our  favour,  the  impor- 
tance of  which  can  only  be  appreciated  by  understand- 
ing on  the  one  side  Oriental,  and  in  this  case  Chinese, 
character,  and  on  the  other  by  taking  into  consideration 
the  future  importance  to  us  of  the  Pacific. 

The  Chinaman  is  powerfully  impressed  by  the  fre- 
quent visits  of  large  naval  vessels,  Russian,  French, 
and  German,  in  his  ports.  To  him  they  are  so  many 
evidences  of  material  superiority,  and  in  his  mind  he 
classes  the  importance  of  the  various  powers  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  number,  size,  and  more  or  less 
prolonged  stay  of  foreign  men-of-war  in  his  treaty 
harbours.  There  are  many  other  reasons  for  the  recent 
rapid  decline  of  English  influence  in  China,  but  one 
of  the  palpable  ones  is  the  infrequency  of  the  appear- 
ance in  Chinese  waters  of  British  naval  vessels. 

For  decades  to  come,  probably  all  through  this 
twentieth  century,  the  construction  of  railroads  in 
China  will  not  only  be  one  of  the  most  profitable  busi- 
ness ventures,  but  also  the  most  important  agent  in  the 
opening  up  of  the  country.  Therefore,  those  nations 
displaying  the  greatest  energy  in  this  direction,  and  in- 
vesting most  freely  in  the  task,  will  eventually  reap  the 
richest  harvest  in  China.  It  is  sad  to  say  that  in  this 
respect  America  has  even  been  lagging  behind  little 
Belgium.  Nay,  Italy,  poor  in  capital  as  she  is,  has 
already  invested  some  millions  in  Chinese  railroad 
projects.     Switzerland,  with  a  territory-  and  popula- 


120  The  Far  East 

tion  smaller  than  one  of  our  medium-sized  States,  has 
also  gone  into  railroad-building  in  China. 

As  for  the  four  chief  European  powers, — England, 
Russia,  Germany,  and  France, — they  have  given  freely 
of  their  abundance,  and  they  have  furthermore  pre- 
empted a  number  of  railroad  opportunities  in  China. 
Russia,  for  one,  has  not  only  built  (it  is  true,  wholly 
with  foreign  capital)  the  two  Manchurian  lines,  but 
she  has  a  similar  gigantic  project  on  foot  for  the 
opening-up  of  Mongolia,  a  Chinese  possession  whose 
natural  resources  are  great  and  whose  population  is 
very  sparse. 

France  has  built  railroads  in  her  Indo-China  ter- 
ritory, and  is  planning  others  in  Yuen  Nan  and 
Szech  Wan.  Those  in  Yuen  Nan  do  not  promise 
much ;  that  province  is  one  of  the  poorest  of  China. 
But  if  she  can  contrive — ^by  connecting  them  with 
another  line  into  Szech  Wan — to  tap  that  extensive 
and  wonderfully  rich  province,  she  will  get  abundant 
returns  for  her  outlay. 

Germany's  concession  in  Shan  Tung — her  colony  of 
Kiao  Chao — forms  the  starting  point  for  another 
Chinese  railroad  network.  She  has  lost  no  time  in 
utilising  her  opportunities.  In  1902  she  began  the  con- 
struction of  a  railroad  connecting  Kiao  Chao  (the 
town  of  that  name),  Tsing  Tao  (by  far  the  largest 
and  most  promising  harbour  town  within  her  colony), 
and  Tsi  Nan  Fu  (the  provincial  capital  of  Shan  Tung, 
still  under  Chinese  dominion),  and  a  few  months  ago 
she  had  completed  the  first  and  most  important  sec- 
tion of  this  road.  She  has  now  started  the  building 
of  the  second  half.  The  portion  of  the  road  finished 
gives  Germany  direct  access  by  rail  to  one  of  the  best 
coal  and  mineral  regions  within  the  coast  district  of 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation    121 

China.  The  coal  exists  in  thick  layers,  both  of  the 
bituminous  and  anthracite  varieties.  The  hard  coal 
mined  so  far  is  superior  to  that  of  Japan,  and  for  Ger- 
many's naval  station  of  Kiao  Chao,  as  well  as  for  the 
naval  vessels  of  other  nations,  this  is  a  most  important 
fact.  The  iron  ores  made  available  by  Germans  are 
also  of  very  fine  quality. 

Great  Britain,  whose  ambitions  in  the  Far  East  have 
been  dulled  in  a  most  strange  way  of  recent  years,  has 
not  shown  enterprise  in  the  matter  of  exploiting  the 
possibilities  of  Wei  Hai  Wei,  her  most  recent  acqui- 
sition. Indeed,  she  has  allowed  that  port,  most  favour- 
ably situated  on  a  promontory  of  the  coast  of  Shan 
Tung,  to  lie  fallow.  But  even  Great  Britain,  during  a 
momentary  revival  of  her  former  energy,  has  secured 
for  herself  a  most  valuable  concession  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway  into  Shan  Si,  and  the  working  of 
the  immense  mines  there.  To  some  extent,  French 
capital  has  joined  her  in  that  venture. 

The  railroad  schemes  present  another  great  ad- 
vantage, for  in  almost  every  instance  the  concession  by 
the  imperial  government  in  Peking  has  been  coupled 
with  a  monopoly  to  exploit  mines  or  erect  factories  in 
the  districts  which  will  be  opened  up. 

It  is  a  strange  spectacle,  indeed,  that  a  nation  as 
enterprising  as  ours  has  stood  by  and  allowed  nearly 
all  the  nations  of  Europe  to  forestall  her  in  the  matter 
of  railway  building  in  China.  If  American  capital 
does  not  bestir  itself,  there  is  grave  danger  that  the 
favourable  moment  will  slip  by.  So  far,  there  has 
been  only  one  American  railway  project  in  China, 
that  is,  one  which  matured  beyond  the  initial  stage. 
But  even  this  one.  after  the  American  promoters  had 
tired  of  Chinese  official  dilatoriness,  was  soon  snapped 


122  The  Far  East 

up  by  capitalists  of  other  nations,  Belgians  most  of 
them,  and  at  present  there  is  nothing  afoot  from  this 
side  of  the  water.  And  yet  it  is  hard  to  see  why  Ameri- 
can capital,  which  is  now  looking  abroad  for  good  op- 
portunities of  investment,  should  continue  to  overlook 
the  splendid  chances  which  China  offers  at  this  juncture 
in  railway  building.  We  have,  besides,  a  wider  and 
more  successful  experience  in  that  line,  and  possess  a 
larger  number  of  able  men  for  such  construction,  than 
any  competing  European  nation.  There  is  every 
reason  to  say  that  all  that  is  lacking  on  our  part  to 
get  our  full  share  of  these  vast  enterprises  is  the  will 
to  obtain  the  necessary  concessions.  Certainly,  Ameri- 
can influence  in  China,  whether  with  the  imperial 
court  or  the  various  provincial  governments,  is  quite 
sufficient  to  secure  the  necessary  permits. 

But,  of  course,  American  capitalists  must  show  in 
this  matter  the  same  amount  of  intelligent  interest  and 
push  which  they  have  displayed  in  other  countries 
where  conditions  were  not  nearly  so  promising.  Im- 
mense activity  is  now  being  displayed  in  Peking  by  a 
score  of  keen-witted  promoters  representing  other  na- 
tionalities. The  fear  is  entertained  by  clear-sighted 
Americans  in  the  Far  East  that  when  finally  this 
country  shall  be  waking  up  to  the  importance  of 
present  advantages  in  this  great  field  of  exploitation, 
it  may  be  too  late.  If  quick  American  resolve  was 
ever  called  for,  it  is  called  for  in  this  case.  Within 
the  next  five  years  a  score  or  more  of  railroads  will  be 
constructed  in  different  parts  of  China,  in  the  coast 
belt  of  provinces  as  well  as  in  the  more  interior  ones, 
particularly  those  traversed  by  the  Yang  Tse  and 
Hoang  Ho.  Two  or  three  of  these,  at  the  very  least, 
ought  to  be  built  and  owned  by  Americans.     That 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation     123 

would  furnish  us  with  as  many  all-important  radiators 
of  American  influence  and  commerce. 

American  missionaries  in  China  have  the  reputa- 
tion of  being  the  most  active  and  successful.  They 
form  a  corps  of  men,  not  very  numerous,  but  making 
up  for  that  by  a  thorough  knowledge  of  country  and 
people,  whose  alliance  and  assistance  would  prove  in- 
valuable. 

It  was  said  that  we  need  a  large  navy.  The  com- 
pletion of  the  Panama  Canal  will  practically  double 
our  naval  strength.  The  American  navy  ought  to  be 
large  enough  to  play  a  predominant  role  in  the  whole 
Pacific,  and  above  all  in  China.  It  must  be  commen- 
surate with  our  present  and  future  interests  in  those 
regions.  And  these  interests  can  scarcely  be  overesti- 
mated. 

But  we  must  not  wait  for  such  an  increase  in  our 
naval  strength.  Now  is  the  time  to  do  the  best  we 
can  with  our  present  naval  forces.  The  heaviest  part 
of  our  navy  should  be  kept  in  Asiatic  waters.  It  is 
there  that  the  conflicts  of  the  future  will  occur.  It  is 
also  there  that  our  visible  powers  as  an  expanding 
nation  should  be  manifest  to  all.  The  experience  of 
Germany  in  Chinese  seas  has  taught  her  the  great 
importance  of  such  visible  demonstration,  German 
merchants  in  China  say  that  German  trade  increases 
with  every  German  man-of-war  that  puts  in  at  Chinese 
harbours.  The  Chinaman  loves  and  reveres  concrete 
power.  That  is  a  part  of  his  very  nature.  And  the 
only  tangible  power  possessed  by  other  nations  with 
which  he  can  be  made  acquainted  in  his  ports  (at  least 
during  times  of  peace)  is  the  merchant  vessels  and 
men-of-war  of  those  foreign  "  barbarians."  Let  us 
get  this  lesson  by  heart  while  it  is  yet  time. 


124  The  Far  East 

The  best  way  to  get  the  Chinaman  to  buy  our  goods 
is  to  make  him  acquainted  with  them.  He  is  not  im- 
pressed by  flaring  advertisements,  booklets  explaining 
the  excellence  of  wares,  nor  by  any  other  of  the 
methods  used  in  this  country  in  pushing  sales,  save 
and  alone  by  the  one  method  of  making  him  taste, 
smell,  and  see  for  himself  what  the  goods  are  he  is 
expected  to  purchase.  But  to  such  demonstration  he 
is  readily  accessible.  Once  he  has  found  out  that 
American  tobacco  is  good  to  smoke,  American  flour 
good  to  eat  in  the  shape  of  bread  or  cake,  American 
cotton  fabrics  good  to  wear,  American  machinery 
strong  and  durable,  as  well  as  labour-saving,  he  is 
convinced.  He  will  thereafter  become  a  steady,  liberal, 
and  discriminating  purchaser  of  American  goods. 

To  drive  this  knowledge  home  to  him,  it  is,  how- 
ever, absolutely  necessary  for  American  manufacturers 
and  merchants  to  keep  reliable  and  able  agents  and 
salesmen  in  China,  men  who  are  willing  to  take 
trouble  in  getting  heart-to-heart  talks  with  the  Chinese 
consumer.  That  point  was  spoken  of  before,  but  it  is 
of  such  paramount  importance  that  it  is  here  em- 
phatically repeated. 

But  such  men  will  also  acquire  an  intimate  knowl- 
edge of  the  crooked  by-ways  of  the  Chinese  mind,  so 
dissimilar  from  ours.  Some  of  these  sinuosities  of 
Chinese  character  seem  to  us  absurd,  but  they  must  be 
taken  into  account  by  our  merchants.  The  German 
merchant  in  China  is  doing  so,  and  that  explains  in 
very  large  measure  the  phenomenal  rise  in  German 
trade  with  China  during  the  past  five  years. 

American  newspapers  and  students  of  foreign  af- 
fairs, after  Germany's  seizure  of  Kiao  Chao,  jumped 
to  the  conclusion  that  that  event  would  prove  harmful 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation    125 

to  German  trade  in  China.  The  exact  contrary  is  the 
truth.  Even  during  the  year  of  the  Boxer  uprising, 
German  exports  to  China  showed  a  decided  increase, 
and  that  increase  has  since  been  maintained. 

In  a  measure  it  is  due  to  the  rigidity  of  the  British 
merchant's  mind  that  he  has  been  losing  a  considerable 
fraction  of  his  Chinese  trade  to  his  German  competi- 
tor. With  the  same  lack  of  adapting  themselves  to 
the  tastes  of  their  foreign  consumer  which  the  British 
exporters  and  manufacturers  have  shown  in  their  deal- 
ings with  South  and  Central  American  countries,  and 
which  have  led  there  to  similar  results,  they  insist  in 
China  on  putting  up  their  goods  in  a  manner  perhaps 
eminently  satisfactory  to  the  British  public,  but  wholly 
unsatisfactory  to  the  Chinaman,  the  Corean,  the 
"  Jap,"  and  the  Siberian.  The  unwieldy  and  bulky 
size  of  many  British  goods  on  their  arrival  in  Chinese 
ports  makes  transportation  always  difficult  and  costly, 
often  impossible.  And  yet  the  Briton  clings  to  this 
habit  with  a  tenacity  worthy  of  a  better  cause.  Do 
not  let  us  fall  into  the  same  error. 

It  is  easily  within  the  truth  to  say  that  China,  as  a 
market  for  American  goods,  is  capable  of  fivefold,  nay, 
tenfold,  expansion  within  the  next  ten  years.  Our 
exports  to  China  are  now  roughly  computed  at  about 
$30,000,000  annually  (including  both  direct  and  in- 
direct ways),  and  that  is  a  figure  which,  even  now, 
beats  our  trade  with  Japan  by  a  considerable  margin. 
But  if  we  only  apply  the  right  methods,  this  Chinese 
trade  may  be  increased  indefinitely. 

One  fact  in  this  connection  must  especially  be 
dwelt  upon.  China  is  practically  a  virgin  market,  to 
be  had  by  us  without  the  ruinously  expensive  neces- 
sity of  first  driving  out  other  competitors.     This  is  a 


126  The  Far  East 

consideration  of  the  first  magnitude.  Our  manufac- 
turers have  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  firm  footing  in 
the  congested  markets  of  Europe ;  but  that  has  been 
done  by  dint  of  very  hard  and  patient  work,  and  at  an 
enormous  outlay  of  capital  spent  in  preparatory  la- 
bours. In  China  nothing  of  the  kind  is  called  for. 
And  it  furthermore  happens  that  the  very  manufac- 
tures in  which  we  are  strongest,  are  those  most  in  de- 
mand and  yielding  the  steadiest  profit  in  China.  Thus 
the  ground  is  prepared  and  the  field  is  favourable  for 
an  immense  American  trade  with  the  Celestial  Empire. 

It  is  the  neglected  populations  and  the  neglected 
markets  to  which  the  American  exporter  must  look  in 
the  future.  When  we  consider  that  Germany,  with  her 
57,000,000  of  population,  buys  of  us  a  matter  of  $200,- 
000,000  to  $250,000,000  worth  of  goods  yearly;  that 
Great  Britain,  with  her  40,000,000,  takes  between 
$500,000,000  and  $600,000,000  of  our  commodities, 
and  that  France,  with  40,000,000  also,  is  our  customer 
to  the  extent  of  about  $100,000,000,  it  must  seem  self- 
evident  to  every  careful  observer  that  China,  with  her 
more  than  400,000,000  of  population,  and  with  a  very 
rapid  natural  increase,  might  be  turned  into  a  market 
for  American  goods  of  greater  importance  than  any 
of  those  countries,  even  taking  into  consideration  the 
present  low  scale  of  earnings  of  the  Chinaman. 

It  is,  therefore,  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to 
prevent  the  partition  of  China  among  greedy  Euro- 
pean powers,  to  conserve  the  Chinese  market,  to  main- 
tain the  "  open  door,"  to  aid  energetically  in  opening 
up  the  country  and  in  exploiting  its  enormous  natural 
resources,  and  to  further,  by  all  means,  the  greater 
purchasing  and  earning  power  of  the  average  China- 
man.    To  raise  his  standard  of  living  by,  say,  50  or 


What  China  Means  for  This  Nation    1 27 

100  per  cent,  within  the  next  ten  or  twenty  years, 
would  mean  the  increase  by  just  that  percentage  of 
American  trading  opportunities  with  that  country. 
And  this  must  be  considered  quite  feasible  when  we 
remember  that  the  standard  of  living  in  Japan  has  in- 
creased, in  round  figures,  300  per  cent,  within  the 
past  thirty  years.  The  possibilities  of  such  a  market 
as  China  are  at  this  very  juncture  of  inestimable 
value  to  us,  as  its  full  exploitation  would,  in  large 
measure,  obviate  and  overcome  the  increasing  diffi- 
culties of  our  domestic  manufacturing  situation,  dif- 
ficulties which  were  brieiiy  pointed  out  elsewhere. 


CHAPTER  X 
SOME  LITTLE-KNOWN  FACTS  ABOUT  RUSSIA 

The  apologists  for  Russian  aggression  in  the  Far 
East  usually  advance  the  claim  that  in  this  ever-grow- 
ing easterly  expansion  that  nation  is  subserving  her 
most  vital  interests.  They  and  the  Russian  jingo 
press  make  the  statement  that  the  Muscovite  people  ab- 
solutely require  these  vast  Asian  territories  for  their 
further  spread,  that  the  density  of  the  home  population 
in  Europe  is  so  great  as  to  exert  a  ceaseless  pressure 
eastwardly. 

This  claim  is  entirely  devoid  of  foundation.  Let  us 
examine  the  facts. 

According  to  the  last  census  taken  in  Russia,  that  of 
1897,  the  European  part  of  it,  comprising  a  territory 
of  2,052,490  square  miles,  being,  therefore,  consider- 
ably larger  than  the  whole  remainder  of  Europe,  has 
a  population  of  105,396,634.  The  non-Russian  part  of 
Europe,  with  only  two-thirds  the  territory  of  European 
Russia,  has  about  283,000,000  inhabitants.  Compared 
with  some  of  the  more  densely  settled  countries  of 
Europe,  such  as  Belgium,  Holland,  England,  Germany, 
or  Italy,  Russia  proper  is  but  thinly  populated,  her 
density  being  only  from  one-third  to  one-tenth  that  of 
the  countries  named.  Nor  are  there  special  circum- 
stances, such  as  large  waste  lands,  great  desert  dis- 
tricts, or  infertility  of  soil  to  outweigh  this  considera- 
tion.    On  the  contrary,  the  heart  of  Russia,  the  50 

128 


Some  Little-known  Facts  about  Russia    129 

provinces  making  up  Russia  proper,  are  by  nature 
among  the  most  fruitful  lands  of  Europe.  With  an 
agricultural  system  as  rational  and  intensive  as  that 
of  the  main  countries  of  the  rest  of  Europe,  Russia 
proper  could  easily  support  treble  her  present  popu- 
lation. 

But  the  great  trouble  with  Russia  is  that  her  system 
of  agriculture  is  a  vicious  and  mistaken  one.  This  is 
not  the  place  to  discuss  this  topic  in  its  details,  but  it 
may  be  briefly  mentioned  that  at  the  root  of  the  evils 
from  which  agriculture  in  European  Russia  suffers 
lie  these  two  facts:  The  one-crop  system  (mainly 
wheat  or  rye),  forced  upon  the  Russian  peasant  and 
landholder  by  an  irrational  financial  economy,  and  the 
total  lack  of  even  the  most  elementary  principles  and 
practices  of  sound  agriculture.  As  to  this  last-named 
point,  one  fact  may  stand  for  many,  that  the  so-called 
"  black-soil  belt  "  of  Russia,  until  not  many  years  ago 
considered  the  most  fertile  in  Europe,  has  never  re- 
ceived any  manure  or  other  fertilising  ingredients  since 
the  emancipation  of  the  serfs,  forty-three  years  ago, 
and  in  consequence  at  present  shows  serious  signs  of 
exhaustion.  And  that  fact  again  is  responsible  for  the 
frequent  famines  in  that  region,  famines  which  have 
become  a  settled  feature  of  Russian  life,  and  which  will 
not  disappear  until  Russia's  agricultural  system  shall 
have  been  radically  changed. 

We  see,  then,  that  it  is  by  no  means  the  density  of 
her  population  which  impels  great  swarms  of  Russian 
peasants  to  seek  the  untilled  fields  of  Siberia,  but 
solely  a  vicious  agricultural  system,  and  for  this  system 
the  Russian  government  is  very  largely  to  blame. 
That  one  cause  leads  to  a  train  of  effects.  Among 
these  must  also  be  reckoned  the  steadily  proceeding 


130  The  Far  East 

impoverishment  of  the  Russian  peasants,  forming  95 
per  cent,  of  her  total  population. 

So  far  has  this  impoverishment  gone  that  the  num- 
ber of  farm  cattle  and  horses  is  diminishing  year  by 
year ;  government  investigation  has  shown  28  per  cent, 
of  all  Russian  peasant  holdings  to  be  entirely  without 
these  domestic  animals.  The  average  earnings  of  a 
Russian  peasant  and  his  family  (each  family  esti- 
mated at  seven  heads),  are  given  by  the  government 
at  $32  yearly,  while  noted  Russian  economists  place 
the  amount  considerably  lower.  But  taking  the 
government  figure,  the  average  Russian  earns  less 
than  either  the  "  Jap  "  or  the  Chinaman,  truly  a  sig- 
nificant fact. 

The  Asiatic  dominions  of  Russia  comprise  6,326,- 
554  square  miles.  If  we  exclude  Caucasia,  a  small 
province  just  beyond  the  border  of  Russia  proper  and 
very  densely  settled,  this  vast  region  has  a  population 
of  only  about  two  to  the  square  mile.  This  is  not  in- 
cluding Manchuria,  but  even  if  that  Chinese  province 
be  reckoned  under  the  head  of  Russian  possessions  in 
Asia,  the  figure  would  remain  substantially  the  same. 
It  is  idle,  therefore,  to  talk  of  the  need  of  Russia  for  a 
further  aggrandisement  of  her  territory.  Whatever 
rate  of  calculation  we  may  adopt,  the  present  size  of 
Russia's  Asiatic  dominions  would  amply  suffice  for  the 
expansion  of  European  Russia's  population  for  centu- 
ries to  come,  no  matter  how  rapid  the  increase  of  that 
population.  And  speaking  of  that  increase,  it  is  little 
known  that  in  the  case  of  a  very  large  portion  of  Euro- 
pean Russia,  namely,  precisely  the  afore-mentioned 
"  black-soil  belt,"  forming  the  very  heart  of  the  empire, 
the  population  is  almost  stationary.  To  be  exact,  the 
increase  in  that  region  is  only  0.26,  while  the  increase 


Some  Little-known  Facts  about  Russia     i  3 1 

for  the  entire  empire  is  a  trifle  over  one  per  cent,  per 
annum.  The  greatest  increase  in  population  in  Russia 
is  in  her  most  densely  settled  portions,  viz.,  the  ten 
provinces  constituting  Poland.  Together,  they  com- 
prise only  49,084  square  miles,  with  a  population  of 
9,401,097  souls,  and  the  annual  rate  of  increase  there 
and  in  the  small  Baltic  German  provinces  of  Livonia, 
Courland,  and  Esthonia,  is  about  2.2,  or  almost  ten 
times  the  rate  of  the  "  black-soil  belt." 

For  the  whole  empire,  the  density  of  population,  in 
1897,  was  15.3  to  the  square  mile,  while  that  of  Japan 
is  296  to  the  square  mile.  It  is  Japan,  therefore,  which 
with  justice  may  talk  of  the  need  of  expansion;  of  all 
lands  under  the  sun,  Russia  has  the  least  right  to  set 
up  this  plea  in  extenuation  of  her  aggressive  Asian 
policy. 

As  a  customer  of  ours,  Russia  has  not  played  much 
of  a  figure.  Indeed,  taking  into  consideration  the 
vastness  of  the  country  and  the  great  size  of  her  popu- 
lation, our  exports  to,  and  imports  from,  her  have  been 
pitifully  small.  In  1880,  we  exported  to  Russia  a 
trifle  over  $13,000,000,  and  in  1903,  something  in  ex- 
cess of  $17,000,000.  Even  such  a  small  country  as 
Belgium  bought  five  times  more  of  us. 

Nor  is  this  likely  to  change  in  the  near  future.  For 
one  reason,  the  exports  of  Russia  are  all  of  a  nature  of 
which  we  ourselves  have  abundance,  namely,  cereals 
and  other  agricultural  products.  She  is,  therefore, 
in  her  exports  one  of  our  chief  rivals.  As  to  American 
imports  in  Russia,  the  case  at  first  does  not  seem  so 
plain,  for  she  has  need  of  all  those  manufactures  in 
the  making  of  which  we  excel,  above  all,  machinery  of 
every  type,  railroad  building  material,  locomotives, 
freight  and  passenger  cars,  the  equipments  for  street 


132  The  Far  East 

railways,  hardware,  cotton  goods,  raw  cotton,  canned 
articles,  agricultural  implements,  and  all  sorts  of 
factory  gear.  She  does  buy  a  certain  amount  of  these 
things  of  us,  but  the  amount  is,  as  we  have  seen,  com- 
paratively very  small.  Russia  does  her  greatest  for- 
eign trade  with  Germany,  and  next  with  England. 

Russia's  whole  foreign  trade,  however,  is  insignifi- 
cant for  so  large  and  populous  a  country.  The  whole 
volume  of  her  exports  and  imports  is  no  larger  than  is 
our  export  to  Great  Britain.  This  fact  is  susceptible 
of  a  very  simple  explanation,  Russia  is  very  poor, 
not  in  natural  resources,  but  in  capital  and  enterprise 
to  exploit  them.  She  has  an  immense  national  debt, 
about  $4,250,000,000,  and  a  foreign  debt  of  about  $1,- 
900,000,000,  and  the  interest  charge  on  that,  payable 
in  gold,  is  a  constant  and  enormous  strain  on  her 
finances.  To  develop  her  natural  resources,  even  as 
far  as  she  has,  Russia  had  to  depend  on  foreign 
capital. 

To  bring  her  exports  and  imports  within  such 
figures  as  to  permit  Russia  to  pay  the  interest  on  her 
foreign  debt  without  draining  the  country  of  its  gold, 
her  financial  genius  during  the  past  decade,  Witte, 
adopted  and  carried  out  his  peculiar  system.  This 
system  produced  results  which,  on  their  face,  looked 
very  brilliant,  and  which  certainly  have  enabled  Russia 
fo  maintain  her  gold  standard  and  do  away  with  the 
former  curse  of  an  unsettled  and  fluctuating  currency. 
But  looking  at  the  facts  more  closely,  the  discovery  is 
made  that  Witte's  financial  policy  has  been  accom- 
plished at  the  expense  of  the  vital  element  of  her  pop- 
ulation, the  peasantry,  thus  in  the  long  run  steadily 
impoverishing  the  nation.  The  other  chief  creation  of 
Witte,  Russia's  newborn  industry,  is  a  sham  and  a  pre- 


Some  Little-known  Facts  about  Russia    133 

tence,  and  its  utter  collapse  three  years  ago  will  not  lead 
to  a  revival  under  existing  circumstances. 

Thus,  it  is  all  very  well  to  tell  us,  as  Senator  Bev- 
eridge  does  in  his  recent  book,  "  The  Russian  Ad- 
vance," that  Russia  is  a  "  virgin  market,"  and  to  invite 
us  to  conquer  it.  But  how  is  it  to  be  done?  Certainly 
not  under  the  present  tariff  and  revenue  system  of  the 
empire.  For  the  tariff  is  prohibitive  on  most  com- 
modities which  this  country  could  supply,  and  the 
present  Russian  revenue  system  makes  a  large  increase 
of  Russia's  imports  an  impossibility.  Besides,  the 
evils  which  have  led  to  Russia's  impoverishment  and 
which  have  left  her  barely  two  or  three  million  in- 
habitants of  moderately  affluent  circumstances,  out  of 
her  total  population  of  130,000,000,  have  been  of  slow 
growth  and  are  so  deeply  ingrained  in  the  character  of 
both  government  and  people  as  to  require  many  years 
of  gradual,  yet  radical  reform,  before  they  can  be  much 
mended. 

The  simple  truth  is  that  Russia,  at  the  present  day, 
is  one  of  the  poorest  markets  for  the  exporter.  It  is 
simply  ignoring  the  inherent  facts  of  the  case  to  deny 
this.  The  only  customer  worth  having  in  Russia  is 
the  Russian  government  itself,  for  that  is  the  con- 
structor of  her  railroads,  the  builder  of  her  factories 
and  workshops,  the  provider  of  her  armies  and  navy, 
and  the  feeder  of  her  starving  millions  during  times  of 
famine.  But  unfortunately,  even  this  customer  is  not 
available.  For  the  main  paragraph  of  Russia's  eco- 
nomic code,  as  framed  by  Witte,  is  a  policy  of  exclu- 
sion. In  other  words,  the  Russian  government  has  set 
out  to  create  all  those  things  on  home  soil  and  with 
home  material  which  it  needs  for  the  above  purposes. 

That  explains  why,  even  with  such  gigantic  under- 


134  The  Far  East 

takings  as  were  the  building  of  the  Transsiberian 
Railroad  and  its  two  Manchurian  branches,  but  a  tiny 
fragment  of  the  material  used  was  bought  of  this 
country.  It  further  explains  why  the  whole  Siberian 
market,  which,  by  reason  of  our  geographical  posi- 
tion, and  on  the  strength  of  other  grounds,  we  ought 
to  dominate,  has  proved  practically  inaccessible  to  us. 
Look  at  the  figures  of  our  foreign  trade,  and  you  will 
see  that  though  the  Siberian  coast  is  only  something 
over  4000  miles  away  from  us,  and  though  that  is 
much  nearer  than  are  the  Russian  supplies  in  Moscow 
or  St.  Petersburg,  we  yet  have  exported  thence  for  a 
number  of  years  past  but  a  paltry  million  dollars  or  so. 

In  any  event,  Siberia  is  even  a  poorer  market  for 
American  goods  than  is  Russia  proper.  The  small 
population  of  that  enormous  territory  is  made  up,  save 
a  very  small  fraction,  of  people  so  poor,  and  scarcely 
half-civilised,  that  their  wants  are  only  the  most  ele- 
mentary. And  these  wants  they  supply  by  the  labour  of 
their  hands.  The  cereal  production  in  Siberia  for  1902 
was :  wheat,  30,796,000  bushels ;  rye,  23,080,000 ;  oats 
34,078,000;  barley,  2,628,000.  But  though  the  popu- 
lation of  Siberia  is  only  about  6,000,000,  all  told,  the 
above  figures  show  that  her  cereal  production  is  rather 
meagre.  Indeed,  there  are  several  states  of  much 
smaller  populations  within  the  Union  which  greatly 
exceed  Siberia  in  their  cereal  output.  And  let  us  re- 
member that  the  figures  quoted  above  comprise  nearly 
all  that  Siberia  produces ;  there  is  scarcely  anything 
else  she  raises  or  manufactures.  Surely,  such  a 
country  does  not  offer  a  very  alluring  field  for 
American  enterprise. 

Russia's  determining  reasons  for  building  the 
Transsiberian  Railroad  were  twofold.     The  road  was 


Some  Little-known  Facts  about  Russia    135 

to  develop  Siberia  and  further  trade  between  her  and 
European  Russia,  But  the  more  potent  reason  was  of 
a  political  and  military  nature.  It  was  to  aid  Russian 
expansion  in  the  Far  East.  So  far,  it  has  proved  val- 
uable only  in  the  latter  direction.  As  a  commercial 
venture,  as  a  means  of  developing  Siberian  resources 
and  affording  a  large  transit  trade,  this  road  has 
proved  a  distinct  failure.  The  annual  deficit  in  the 
accounts  of  the  Transsiberian  Railroad  is  simply 
frightful.  The  receipts  are  small.  The  amount  of 
freight  it  carries  is  lower  than  on  any  of  our  own  more 
important  branch  lines.  The  hopes  entertained  by 
Witte  and  the  whole  Russian  government  in  this  con- 
nection have  not  been  fulfilled.  Probably  50  years  or 
more  will  be  required  before  this  railroad  shall  reach 
a  paying  basis,  and  meanwhile  Russia's  exchequer  will 
be  annually  charged  with  a  more  or  less  considerable 
balance  the  wrong  way.  For  last  year  the  deficit  of 
this  road  amounted  to  almost  $25,000,000. 

However,  the  Transsiberian  Railroad  was  a  neces- 
sity. Ultimately,  it  will  prove  of  great  economic 
advantage  to  the  whole  empire,  but  before  that  stage  is 
reached  the  road  will  not  only  have  to  be  practically  re- 
built, but  its  present  capacity  will  have  to  be  doubled 
or  trebled.  For,  at  this  writing,  it  is  but  a  poor  ram- 
shackle affair,  one-track  throughout,  rails  and  rolling- 
stock  of  the  lightest  description,  and  resting  on  a  bed 
which,  under  the  rigors  of  the  severe  Siberian  climate, 
is  wholly  insufficient.  And  yet  it  took,  in  round 
figures,  $500,000,000  to  build  it,  all  of  it  representing 
borrowed  capital.  It  took  another  $250,000,000  to 
construct  and  equip  the  two  Manchurian  branches. 

There  are  many  who  credit  Russia  with  great  states- 
manship and  economic  sagacity  in  building  these  roads 


136  The  Far  East 

in  Manchuria.  The  latter  traverse  a  sparsely  settled 
country,  and  only  connect  with  the  Transsiberian  Rail- 
road. It  is  quite  safe  to  say  that,  as  economic  enter- 
prises, these  Manchurian  roads  will  prove  even  more 
pronounced  failures  than  the  Transsiberian  has  so  far 
proved.  Viewing  them  merely  from  the  angle  of  Rus- 
sian aggressive  policy,  of  military  strategy,  and  as  a 
visible  sign  of  Russia's  expanding  political  power, 
they  may,  however,  prove  a  success.  On  the  other 
hand,  even  in  that  limited  sense,  they  may  eventually 
become  a  white  elephant  for  Russia.  The  final  issue 
of  this  present  war  will  largely  determine  that  ques- 
tion. For  a  country  so  poor  in  capital  as  Russia,  a 
country  with  a  home  population  whose  most  crying 
material  needs  are  insufficiently  supplied,  these  Man- 
churian roads  are,  economically  considered,  a  gigantic 
folly. 

It  is  quite  true  that  Siberia  (and,  possibly,  Man- 
churia hereafter)  is  becoming  the  home  of  larger  and 
larger  numbers  of  Russian  peasants,  drawn  mainly 
from  the  famine-visited  provinces  in  Europe.  This 
immigration  from  the  interior  of  Russia  has  become  a 
settled  feature.  It  varies  greatly  in  volume  during  suc- 
cessive years,  but  it  does  not  average  more  than  about 
80,000  per  year.  Every  spring  following  on  a  famine 
year  in  Russia  proper,  sees  shoals  of  half-starved  peas- 
ants, accompanied  by  their  whole  families,  slowly  mak- 
ing their  way  towards  Siberia.  Mostly  they  settle  in 
those  districts  of  western  Siberia  enjoying  a  compara- 
tively mild  climate.  There  are  districts  there  which 
are  already  rather  densely  settled  and  which  have 
begun  to  show,  under  the  same  unwise  system  of  agri- 
culture which  is  followed  in  Russia  proper,  signs  of 
soil  exhaustion.     So  much  so  that,  during  the  severe 


Some  Little-known  Facts  about  Russia    137 

famine  of  1901  which  ravaged  the  "black-soil  belt'* 
of  interior  Russia,  a  part  of  western  Siberia  was  sim- 
ilarly afflicted.  These  districts  at  that  time  received 
no  inconsiderable  share  of  the  government  assistance, 
paid  out  in  money  and  kind. 

The  Russian  government  encourages  immigration 
into  Siberia  by  every  possible  means.  It  furnishes 
Russian  peasant  families  going  there,  on  application, 
and  on  the  recommendation  of  their  village  communes, 
not  only  with  free  transportation,  but  also  with  money, 
seed,  often  building  material,  and  free  land.  Nat- 
urally, such  assisted  immigration  is  largely  directed 
to  the  more  inhospitable  regions  of  Siberia,  always  far 
to  the  east  and  frequently  a  long  distance  off  from 
railroads  and  other  signs  of  civilisation. 

This  settled  government  policy,  if  pursued  for  fifty 
years  or  longer,  will,  of  course,  in  the  end  produce 
great  results.  It  may  in  the  course  of  time,  say  within 
a  generation  or  two,  cover  the  more  undesirable  parts 
of  Siberia  with  a  chain  of  more  or  less  flourishing 
settlements,  villages,  and  rural  towns.  But  it  is  slow 
work,  and  the  hardships  for  the  settlers,  even  those 
coming  from  the  poverty-stricken  provinces  in  the 
heart  of  Russia,  are  immense.  For  all  that,  the  lot 
of  the  Siberian  peasant  is,  on  most  accounts,  prefer- 
able to  that  of  his  fellow  in  Russia  proper. 

It  would  be  going  too  far,  though,  to  expect  the 
Russian  peasant  settler  in  Siberia  to  attain  within  a 
measurable  space  of  time  to  anything  like  that  degree 
of  prosperity  which  awaits  the  first  or  the  second  gen- 
eration of  settlers  in  our  Prairie  states.  The  climate 
and  the  soil  of  Siberia  speak  against  that.  A  more  im- 
portant factor,  however,  than  these  unfavourable 
natural   conditions   is   the  peculiar   character  of   the 


138  The  Far  East 

Russian  peasant  himself.  He  is  the  reverse  of  inde- 
pendent, and  looks  forever  to  the  authorities  above 
him,  to  the  government,  to  help  him  out  of  all  his 
straits.  Physically,  he  is  generally  hardy  and  fit  to 
cope  with  the  difficult  climate.  But  he  lacks  entirely 
that  sturdy  virility  of  character  which  our  Western 
settlers  exhibit.  He  is  not  very  diligent  and  is  unused 
to  continuous  and  intense  labour.  The  enormous 
number  of  holidays  enjoined  on  him  by  the  Orthodox 
Church  of  Russia,  all  of  which  he  faithfully  keeps, 
and  which  take  about  150  days  out  of  the  365  of  the 
whole  year,  alone  unfit  him  for  competition  with 
western  producers.  He  has  the  village  commune  idea 
firmly  imbedded  in  his  mind,  and  that  idea  greatly 
impedes,  and  in  many  cases  renders  impossible,  indi- 
vidual enterprise  as  well  as  individual  prosperity.  He 
always  wants  to  work  en  masse,  in  what  the  Russian 
calls  the  artel  (an  association  of  workmen  on  the  com- 
munistic principle),  and  that  again  precludes  the 
growth  of  individualism.  In  a  word,  then,  the  Rus- 
sian settler  in  Siberia  takes  with  him  to  his  new  home 
and  his  new  conditions  nearly  all  that  heavy  load  of 
undesirable  qualities  and  ideas  which  have  prevented 
him  from  achieving  a  fair  measure  of  prosperity  in 
the  village  of  interior  Russia  whence  he  came. 

From  the  above  it  will  be  seen  that  to  draw  a  par- 
allel between  this  Slav  frontiersman  and  the  American 
one  in  the  Far  West  is  to  do  something  wide  of  the 
mark.  There  are  undoubtedly  a  number  of  admirable 
qualities  about  the  humble  Russian  peasant.  He  is  a 
happy-go-lucky  fellow,  seldom,  if  ever,  complaining 
of  his  hard  lot.  He  is  good-humoured  in  the  extreme, 
and  for  sole  diversion  quite  contented  with  an  occa- 
sional vodka  spree.    He  is  charitable,  and  always  ready 


Some  Little-known  Facts  about  Russia    139 

to  lend  a  helping  hand  to  his  fellows  or  a  stranger.  He 
is  pious  and  devout  after  his  own  fashion,  and  he  is 
intensely  loyal  to  Czar  and  Church. 

But  all  these  good  qualities  do  not  help  him  much 
in  his  fight  with  the  wilderness,  and  they  are  not  cal- 
culated to  make  out  of  him  the  material  with  which 
great  commonwealths  are  built.  Dumb  obedience  is 
not  a  characteristic  that  makes  for  sturdy  inde- 
pendence. 

Siberia  will  never  become  what  our  Far  West  was 
and  is,  the  cradle  and  the  home  of  a  pronouncedly 
manly  race. 


THE    PACIFIC    AND    THE    PANAMA 
CANAL 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

At  last,  then,  it  is  certain  that  the  Panama  Canal  will 
be  completed,  and  that  this  work  will  be  done  by  us 
and  without  further  loss  of  time.  The  completion  of 
this  task  will  mark  a  new  era  in  the  political  and  com- 
mercial conditions  of  the  world.  It  will  divert  one- 
half  the  trade-current  of  this  globe  into  new  channels. 
It  will  make  of  the  Pacific  the  Mediterranean  of  the 
twentieth  and  succeeding  centuries.  No  other  nation 
can  possibly  profit  half  as  much  from  the  Panama 
Canal  as  will  the  United  States.  True,  the  whole 
world  is  to  be  the  gainer,  but  to  us  will  fall  the  lion's 
share. 

To  dig  a  canal  across  the  isthmus  of  Panama,  a 
distance  of  only  36  miles  at  the  narrowest,  is  not  a 
new  idea.  In  fact,  it  has  been  mooted  ever  since  the 
discovery  of  this  hemisphere.  Columbus  set  out  to 
reach  the  Far  East  by  sailing  west.  A  continental 
wall,  nearly  9000  miles  in  length,  forbade  him  to 
realise  his  bold  vision.  And  for  400  years  men  have 
dreamed  of  piercing  this  wall,  thus  saving  a  third  of 
the  distance  in  circumnavigating  the  earth.  We  are 
told  by  a  Spanish  historian  that  Philip  II.,  in  155 1, 
conceived  the  importance  of  cutting  the  isthmus.  The 
long  rebellion  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  culminat- 
ing finally  in  the  independence  and  autonomy  of  the 
northern  provinces,  and  the  establishment  of  a  Dutch 

143 


144     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

nation,  drove  such  plans  from  the  tyrant's  head.  Since 
then,  this  idea  has  been  revived  at  intervals.  Nelson, 
England's  great  naval  hero,  in  1779,  urged  it  upon 
his  government.  Napoleon  I.  saw  the  future  impor- 
tance of  an  interoceanic  canal  through  the  isthmus,  and 
because  of  his  clear  perception  of  it,  the  American  nego- 
tiations for  the  Louisiana  Purchase  had  almost  failed. 

But  not  until  after  the  Suez  Canal  had  been  built, 
thus  showing  that  the  immense  engineering  difficul- 
ties of  such  an  undertaking  could  be  overcome,  did  the 
scheme  of  piercing  the  narrow  ribbon  of  rock  and 
morass  of  the  isthmus  assume  tangible  shape.  Again 
it  was  Lesseps  and  French  capital  that  approached  the 
task.  But  the  difficulties  in  this  case  were  far  greater 
in  every  way  than  those  that  had  been  vanquished  at 
Suez.  A  torrid  and  unhealthy  climate,  a  total  lack  of 
sanitary  measures,  much  greater  obstacles  in  excavat- 
ing, due  to  the  nature  of  the  territory,  and  expendi- 
tures far  exceeding  all  the  estimates  made  by  experts, — 
these  were  among  the  factors  that  led  to  ultimate 
French  failure.  With  that,  corruption  had  crept  in, 
soiling  even  the  skirts  of  that  extraordinary  man  who 
had  first  conceived  the  plan. 

French  pride  long  struggled  against  admission  of 
failure,  but  at  last  that  sentiment  yielded  to  stubborn 
facts.  Who  should  be  the  heir  to  take  up  his  work  at 
the  point  where  Lesseps  had  dropped  it? 

The  voice  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  de- 
clared almost  unanimously  that  it  must  be  they,  if  any- 
body. No  European  nation  dared  meddle  with  the 
great  task.  The  South  and  Central  American  peoples 
were  financially  not  potent,  and  commercially  not  de- 
veloped enough  to  engage  in  such  an  enterprise. 
Everything  conspired  to  thrust  the  task  on  our  shoul- 


The  Panama  Canal  145 

ders.  The  Monroe  doctrine,  as  at  present  widely  in- 
terpreted, would  not  permit  the  interference  of  Euro- 
pean nations  with  an  undertaking  that  concerned  pri- 
marily American  interests.  Any  attempt  of  that  kind 
would  have  been  interpreted  here  as  a  distinctly  un- 
friendly act,  and  thus  it  was  that  both  England  and 
Germany  kept  their  hands  off.  Besides,  all  Europe 
recognised  the  fact  that  the  fruits  of  the  canal  would 
largely  drop  into  the  lap  of  this  nation. 

But  the  United  States  was  in  no  hurry  to  become  the 
successor  of  the  French  Panama  Company.  There 
was  a  good  deal  about  the  idea  that  was  repugnant  to 
American  notions.  There  was  also  another  project 
afoot,  the  building  of  a  transoceanic  canal  in  Nica- 
ragua. In  fact,  for  some  time  the  latter  was  in  the 
ascendant.  There  were  reasons  for  this.  It  was  a 
purely  American  idea,  and  to  carry  it  out  would  not 
have  meant  to  complete  an  unfinished  French  job. 
Quite  a  deal  of  preliminary  work  had  been  done  in 
Nicaragua  by  American  capital  and  engineers.  The 
climate  there  was  not  nearly  so  trying,  and  though  the 
route  would  have  been  much  longer,  the  engineering 
task  itself,  by  taking  advantage  of  lakes  and  rivers 
along  the  projected  line,  was  the  easier  of  the  two. 
No  political  complications  were  to  be  expected  with 
Nicaragua.  American  commercial  interests  in  that 
country  were  already  considerable  and  rapidly  grow- 
ing. There  were  strong  advocates  for  this  route  in 
the  United  States  Senate  and  elsewhere.  Altogether, 
the  champions  of  the  Nicaragua  project  made  a  very 
formidable  showing,  so  much  so  that,  even  at  the  final 
passage  of  the  Panama  Canal  bill,  the  President  was 
empowered  to  revert  to  the  Nicaragua  project  if  the 
other  had  failed. 


146     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

Then  there  was  the  question  of  paying  the  Panama 
Company  in  France  for  the  work  accompHshed,  and  the 
property  left  by  them  along  the  line  of  the  proposed 
isthmian  canal.  That  question,  too,  was  settled  to 
mutual  satisfaction,  our  government  agreeing  to  pay 
$40,000,000  in  all.  But  a  greater  difficulty  arose. 
The  government  of  Colombia,  exercising  sovereign 
power  over  the  Panama  district,  thought  it  saw  a  good 
way  of  mulcting  the  people  of  the  United  States — 
rolling  in  wealth,  according  to  their  notion — of  dis- 
proportionate sums  in  payment  of  the  privilege  sought. 
On  our  side  it  was  recognised  that  the  new  canal  would 
immeasurably  enrich  the  province  of  Panama,  and,  in- 
cidentally, the  whole  of  Colombia.  Therefore,  while 
willing  to  pay  a  fair  price  for  the  right  to  build  the 
canal,  the  government  and  people  of  this  country  dis- 
liked intensely  being  made  the  object  of  a  "  bunco 
game." 

But  the  proverbial  good  luck  of  the  United  States 
suddenly  rid  us  of  this  dilemma.  The  people  of  the 
Panama  district,  who  had  been  unwilling  spectators  of 
these  questionable  machinations  of  their  central  gov- 
ernment, and  who  had  been  for  many  years  desirous 
of  forming  a  separate  political  entity,  rose  against 
Colombia.  Their  measures  had  been  taken  with  such 
sagacity  that  the  thing  was  done  in  a  twinkling. 
Within  twenty-four  hours  Colombia's  sovereignty  in 
Panama  was  at  an  end.  Our  government  in  Wash- 
ington promptly  recognised  the  independence  of  the 
new  state.  Much  bellicose  talk  was  indulged  in  by  the 
outwitted  Colombians,  but  that  was  froth,  and  nothing 
came  of  it. 

Naturally,  our  government  had  shrewdly  taken  ad- 
vantage of  the  new  situation  thus  created.    The  agree- 


The  Panama  Canal  147 

merit  made  between  it  and  Panama  relative  to  the 
construction  of  the  canal  was  still  on  a  liberal  basis, 
so  far  as  money  went,  $io,(X>o,ooo  being  paid  them  for 
the  privilege,  but  it  was  far  more  to  our  purpose  than 
had  been  the  proposed  agreement  with  Colombia,  It 
gave  us  practically  complete  control,  not  only  of  the 
canal  itself,  but  of  the  adjoining  territory.  Its  pro- 
visions are  such  that,  hereafter,  the  United  States  will 
be  master  of  the  canal  and  its  approaches,  both  in  time 
of  peace  and  war. 

The  importance  of  this  agreement  to  our  future  po- 
litical, commercial,  and  naval  expansion,  in  the  Pacific 
as  well  as  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  can  scarcely  be  over- 
estimated. It  will  be  the  main  pillar  of  our  future 
strength  in  those  all-important  regions. 

It  now  remains  for  us  to  finish  what  Lesseps  left 
unfinished.  This  is  a  task  of  considerable  magnitude. 
It  will  require  a  vast  outlay  of  money,  and  much  time ; 
Congress  has  appropriated  the  money,  and  the  canal 
commission  appointed  by  Mr.  Roosevelt  will  see  to  its 
wise  expenditure.  Possibly  the  canal  will  be  finished 
within  five  years,  but  it  is  more  likely  that  eight  or 
ten  years  will  be  required.  The  distance  dug  by  the 
Panama  Company  is  barely  one-third;  the  remaining 
two-thirds  may  not  cost  as  many  lives  as  did  the  first 
third  (notwithstanding  the  same  murderous  climate), 
but  from  an  engineering  point  of  view,  the  work  yet  to 
be  done  presents  extraordinary  difficulties.  However, 
these  are  considerations  which  do  not  weigh  heavily  in 
the  scale.  The  main  thing  is,  that  the  completion  of 
this  canal  within  a  few  years  is  now  an  assured  fact. 
The  results  accruing  from  it  may  at  this  writing  be 
fairly  discounted.  Five  or  ten  years  are  as  nothing 
in  the  life  of  a  nation,  and  after  their  lapse  we  shall  be 


148      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

confronted  by  a  chain  of  concrete  facts  which  can  be 
stated  to  a  nicety  to-day.  These  facts,  in  the  main, 
are  of  a  nature  geographical,  commercial,  and  polit- 
ical. 

The  theory  that  geographical  situation  has  much  to 
do  with  the  history  of  a  nation,  that,  in  fact,  this  one 
item  has  been  and  is  the  main  factor  in  the  develop- 
ment or  the  retarding  of  a  people,  is  of  comparatively 
recent  growth.  But  it  is  now  generally  accepted  by 
students  of  history.  Geographical  situation,  indeed, 
explains  nearly  all  of  the  apparent  enigmas  of  history. 
Geographical  conditions  influence  powerfully  the  evo- 
lution of  civilisation  and  the  shaping  of  national 
character  and  life.  They  determine  food,  dress,  oc- 
cupations, customs,  laws,  social  life,  and  even  religions. 
The  French  historian,  Victor  Cousin,  expressed  this: 
"  Tell  me  the  geography  of  a  country,  and  I  will  tell 
you  its  future." 

Modern  history  dates  from  the  discovery  of  Amer- 
ica. New  geographical  conditions,  or,  to  be  more 
precise,  new  knowledge  of  them,  have  been  among  the 
most  stimulating  or  disturbing  factors  in  the  world's 
history.  A  geographically  isolated  situation  has  in- 
variably been  accompanied  by  barbarism  or  gradual 
decay.  Our  time  has  seen  the  earth  growing  much 
smaller,  and  its  inhabitants  brought  closer  together, 
and  this  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  a  new  and  strong 
impetus  has  been  given  to  the  spread  of  civilisation  all 
over  the  habitable  globe,  and  to  the  furtherance  of 
friendly  intercourse. 

The  cutting  of  the  Panama  Canal  will  be  the  most 
important  geographical  event  since  the  discovery  of 
America.  It  will  outweigh,  by  far,  in  its  consequences 
the  discovery  of  the  sixth  continent,  Australia,  though 


The  Panama  Canal  149 

in  itself  it  will  add  nothing  either  to  our  knowledge  or 
to  the  resources  of  the  earth. 

Not  even  the  Suez  Canal  can  compare  with  this  new 
canal  in  saving  of  sailing  distances.  The  Suez  Canal 
makes  a  difference  of  3300  miles  between  London  and 
Canton,  4325  between  London  and  Bombay;  the 
Panama  Canal  will  save  from  5000  to  8000  miles  to 
most  ships  passing  through  it.  The  decrease  in  dis 
tance  between  London  and  San  Francisco  will  be  720c 
miles,  almost  one-half  of  the  whole ;  but  between  New 
York  and  San  Francisco  the  saving  effected  will  be 
10,080  miles,  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  whole  dis- 
tance. As  early  as  1879,  President  Hayes  said:  "An 
interoceanic  canal  across  the  American  isthmus  will 
essentially  change  the  geographic  relations  between 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  of  the  United  States, 
and  between  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the 
world." 

The  Mississippi  Valley,  with  its  area  of  1,244,000 
square  miles,  is  as  large  as  Europe  without  Russia, 
Commercially  and  politically,  this  is  the  most  impor- 
tant valley  in  the  world.  Its  size,  inexhaustible  fer- 
tility, great  variety  of  products,  the  energy  of  its 
people,  the  5000  miles  of  its  waterways  navigable  by 
steam,  and  the  southward  flow  of  its  great  river,  pre- 
sent together  features  of  potential  greatness  which  we 
see  unequalled  anywhere  else.  After  the  completion  of 
the  Panama  Canal,  this  valley  will  have  a  new  and  most 
important  opening  for  its  products  by  way  of  this 
canal.  It  will  no  longer  have  to  depend  on  expensive 
railway  freight  routes ;  the  low-priced  sea  route  will 
be  readily  accessible  to  it.  A  time  may  come  when 
sea-going  vessels  will  pass  from  Chicago  or  Duluth 
down  the  ^Mississippi  and  on  to  the  Pacific,     Within 


150     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

another  twenty  years  the  Mississippi  Valley  will  be 
peopled  by  60  or  70  millions,  and  the  volume  of  its  prod- 
ucts will  have  doubled.  These  products  can  then  go, 
as  they  now  do,  to  the  Atlantic  border  and  to  Europe ; 
but  they  will  have  the  additional  and  just  as  important 
outlet  towards  the  whole  Pacific,  the  western  coasts  of 
South  and  Central  America,  our  own  magnificent 
stretch  of  Pacific  coast,  and  the  populous  countries  be- 
yond the  sea — China,  Japan,  Asiatic  Russia,  Corea, 
the  Dutch  East  Indies,  and  even  British  India.  For, 
once  the  Panama  Canal  is  constructed,  a  cheap  and 
continuous  sea  route  will  make  interchange  of  com- 
modities with  those  countries  economically  feasible. 

And  here  we  touch  upon  the  commercial  significance 
of  the  canal.  Clear-sighted  Henry  Clay,  during  his 
term  as  secretary  of  state,  in  1825,  already  recognised 
the  commercial  importance  of  an  interoceanic  canal, 
saying:  "  The  execution  of  it  will  form  a  great  epoch 
in  the  commercial  affairs  of  the  whole  world." 

At  present  the  distance  from  New  York  to  San 
Francisco  (around  Cape  Horn)  is  14,840  miles.  The 
Panama  Canal  will  reduce  this  to  something  less  than 
5000.  A  saving  of  two-thirds  in  time  and  distance 
will  put  the  Atlantic-Pacific  trade  of  the  United  States 
on  an  entirely  new  basis,  and  its  immense  growth  can 
be  safely  predicted.  The  economic  advantages  which 
our  shippers,  merchants,  and  manufacturers  will  enjoy 
after  the  completion  of  the  canal,  will  soon  outdistance 
those  of  both  the  Briton  and  the  German.  It  will  un- 
questionably bring  about  the  revival  of  our  shipping, 
and  this  for  the  simple  reason  that  shipping  will  once 
more  become  a  well-paying  business.  It  has  been  com- 
puted that  on  a  single  voyage  of  a  1500-ton  sailing 
vessel  between  Port  Townsend,  Seattle,  or  San  Fran- 


The  Panama  Canal  151 

CISCO,  and  Boston,  New  York,  or  Philadelphia,  the 
saving  effected  in  wages,  repairs,  insurance,  provi- 
sions, and  freight  charges,  by  reason  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  will  aggregate  between  $8000  and  $9500. 
Such  an  illustration  speaks  for  itself. 

But  the  existence  of  the  Panama  Canal  will  also 
create  a  vast  amount  of  new  commerce.  Hitherto 
many  commodities,  especially  along  the  Pacific  slope, 
were  commercially  not  available,  by  reason  of  ex- 
cessive cost  of  transportation.  The  exports  of  our 
Pacific  coast  are,  for  the  most  part,  raw  stuffs.  Some 
of  the  chief  ones  will  not  bear  long  carriage,  as,  for 
instance,  lumber.  Yet  the  lumber  supply  of  our  At- 
lantic states  is  being  exhausted.  Cheap  transportation 
between  the  two  sections  of  the  country  will  be  a  great 
blessing  to  both.  Pacific  lumber,  for  building  pur- 
poses, will,  in  the  near  future,  become  an  exceedingly 
important  article  of  commerce  between  the  two  coasts, 
In  the  one  state  of  Washington  some  200,000,000,- 
000  feet  of  splendid  timber,  mostly  yellow  and  red  fir, 
are  awaiting  the  axe.  A  calculation  has  been  made 
that  the  Panama  Canal  will  mean  $2  added  to  the 
value  of  every  thousand  feet  of  lumber  in  forests 
skirting  the  Puget  Sound.  The  supply  of  splendid 
lumber  in  Oregon,  Alaska,  and  British  Columbia  is 
far  greater.  William  H.  Seward  once  said :  "  This 
region  seems  destined  to  become  a  gigantic  shipyard 
for  the  supply  of  all  nations." 

Wheat  and  other  cereals  are  also  important  products 
of  our  Pacific  coast  which  will  be  very  favourably  af- 
fected by  the  completion  of  the  Panama  Canal.  At 
present  these  products  must  take  the  long  route  around 
Cape  Horn  to  reach  the  European  market,  being  four 
months  or  more  in  transit,  and  thus  the  shipper  practi  • 


152     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

cally  indulges  in  a  game  of  chance  every  time  he  sends 
a  cargo.  He  can  never  tell  in  advance  about  the  fluctu- 
ations in  price,  and  the  whole  trade  is  thereby  not  only 
demoralised,  but  greatly  hampered.  The  canal  will 
reduce  this  to  a  twenty-five  days'  journey,  and  wheat 
export  from  California  will  thereafter  become  a  mer- 
cantile transaction  yielding  a  reasonable  profit. 

Again,  the  Pacific  coast  at  present  lies  nearer  to 
Liverpool  than  to  New  York,  and  the  great  trade  of 
the  western  coast  of  Central  and  South  America  goes, 
chiefly  for  that  reason,  largely  through  the  hands  of 
Great  Britain  and  Germany,  The  Panama  Canal  will 
change  all  this.  Distances  will  then  be  greatly  in 
favour  of  New  York,  in  fact,  by  as  much  as  2700  to 
3500  miles.  Add  to  this  advantage  our  facilities  for 
manufacture,  and  the  control  of  the  South  and  Central 
American  markets  will  be  the  natural  result. 

The  decay  of  our  southern  states  has  been  deplored 
by  all  good  Americans.  But  this  very  belt  of  former 
slave  states  will,  comparatively  speaking,  be  benefited 
in  a  larger  degree  by  the  Panama  Canal  than  almost 
any  other  region.  It  will  depend  on  them  whether  they 
avail  themselves  of  their  advantages  or  no.  New 
Orleans  will  be  700  miles  nearer  to  the  canal  than  New 
York,  and  Charleston,  Savannah,  Galveston,  and  other 
Southern  ports  in  proportion.  Alabama  possesses  great 
wealth  of  coal  and  ore,  but  this  has  up  to  the  present 
been  exploited  with  only  mediocre  success,  owing 
largely  to  competition  with  the  north.  This  fine  Ala- 
bama coal  can  be  put  on  shipboard  at  Mobile  for  $1.50 
per  ton.  The  Pacific  coast  is  poorly  supplied  with  coal 
and  iron  ore,  and  Alabama  will  be  enabled  to  do  a 
thriving  trade  to  those  regions.  For  thousands  of 
steamers    coming    from    or   going   to    the    Panama 


The  Panama  Canal  153 

Canal,  Alabama  coal  will  be  an  article  of  growing 
necessity. 

It  was  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter  that  Japan 
buys  most  of  her  cotton  of  India.  Though  of  short 
staple,  this  Indian  cotton  is  lower  in  price  than  ours. 
The  present  enormous  distance  between  the  American 
cotton  fields  and  the  nearest  Japanese  harbours  is 
largely  responsible  for  that  fact.  Yet,  raw  cotton  is 
the  chief  item  of  import  in  Japan,  amounting  to  nearly 
$60,000,000  last  year,  of  which  our  share  was  but 
$12,000,000.  China's  imports  in  cotton  are  also  very 
large;  they  form  a  rapidly  rising  part  of  her  whole 
foreign  trade.  When  the  canal  has  been  dug,  ocean 
steamers  can  load  with  cotton  on  the  Mississippi  River 
or  Gulf  docks,  and  sail  direct  for  Japan  and  China. 
The  enormous  saving  in  distance  and  freight  charges 
will  enable  us  to  compete  successfully  with  cotton  from 
British  India. 

In  a  word,  the  canal  will  give  our  Pacific  coast  in- 
creased access  to  European  markets,  while  it  will  give 
our  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts  command  of  the  Asiatic 
markets. 

Mr.  Colquhoun,  in  his  books  on  the  Pacific,  admits 
the  great  role  which  the  Panama  Canal  will  play  in 
our  future  development.  He  puts  it  in  this  way :  "  It 
will  bind  together  the  remote  sections  of  that  immense 
country,  assimilate  its  diverse  interests,  go  far  to- 
wards solving  many  difficult  problems,  and  make  the 
United  States  still  more  united.  ...  It  is  primarily 
an  American  affair,  and  therefore  need  not  be  regarded 
with  jealousy  by  the  Old  World.  .  .  .  The  canal  will 
complete  a  perfect  equatorial  belt  of  navigation  around 
the  world  through  the  gateways  of  Suez  and  Panama. 
No  greater  impulse  to  commerce  can  be  given  than 


154     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

this  complement  to  the  Suez  Canal.  It  will  benefit 
America  in  an  infinitely  greater  degree  than  Europe. 
...  It  will  bring  Japan,  Northern  China,  Australasia, 
and  part  of  Malaysia  nearer  to  the  Atlantic  cities  of 
the  United  States  than  they  are  now  to  England.  .  .  . 


0        200       400       000       £00 


It  will  give  an  immense  impetus  to  United  States  man- 
ufactures, especially  cotton  and  iron,  and  will  greatly 
stimulate  the  shipbuilding  industry  and  the  develop- 
ment of  the  naval  power  of  the  United  States  "  (from 
"Key  to  the  Pacific"). 

And  elsewhere  he  says :  "  One  of  the  greatest  draw- 
backs to  the  western  states  is  the  expense  and 
difficulty  with  which  produce  is  conveyed  to  the  great 
markets  of  the  world.  The  canal  will  change  this,  and 
besides  other  advantages  will  have  this  in  its  wake  of 
immensely  furthering  the  denser  settlement  of  the 
Pacific  slope.  It  will  enormously  increase  the  working 
agricultural  class  there,  at  present  only  able  to  make  a 


The  Panama  Canal  155 

bare  living  out  of  the  land,  due  to  the  poHcy  of  the 
railway  trusts  "  (from  "  The  Mastery  of  the  Pacific  "). 

Coming  from  the  pen  of  a  noted  British  writer,  these 
statements  may  well  be  looked  upon  as  untinged  with 
American  patriotic  fervour  and  optimism. 

Finally,  a  word  as  to  the  political  bearing  of  the 
Panama  Canal.  Its  most  obvious  advantage  in  this 
respect  will  be  in  uniting  our  coast  lines,  and  in  bring- 
ing the  most  remote  portions  of  our  territory  into 
much  closer  relations. 

Virtually  the  canal  will  be,  as  President  Hayes  said 
in  one  of  his  messages,  "  a  part  of  the  coast  line  of 
the  United  States."  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  which 
makes  it  imperative  for  us  to  control  and  protect  it. 
That  point  has  been  conceded  by  the  Eurof>ean  powers. 
It  is  eminently  a  requirement  of  self -protection  for  us 
to  dominate  the  canal.  Else,  during  any  future  politi- 
cal complications,  it  would  be  within  the  power  of  a 
belligerent  to  cleave  asunder  our  two  coasts  and  thus 
deprive  us  of  half  our  strength.  Captain  Mahan  in 
one  of  his  books  shows  very  clearly  this  strategic  ne- 
cessity. 

Some  European  writers  have  pointed  to  the  neutral- 
isation of  the  Suez  Canal  as  an  example  worthy  for  us 
to  follow.  But  the  two  cases  are  by  no  means  analo- 
gous. Great  Britain  commands,  at  the  most  important 
points  along  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Red  Sea,  the 
approaches  to  the  Suez  Canal — Gibraltar,  Malta, 
Cyprus,  and  Aden.  These  strongholds  and  England's 
naval  supremacy  make  the  Suez  Canal  practically 
British  property.  Their  effect  is  to  destroy,  for  all 
valid  purposes,  the  nominal  neutralisation  of  the  Suez 
Canal.  Besides,  the  Suez  Canal  only  joins  Britain 
with  her  Asiatic  possessions,  and  is  by  no  means  vital 


156     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

to  her  home  interests  in  the  sense  in  which  the  Panama 
Canal  will  be  vital  to  ours.  The  Suez  Canal  does  not 
cut  in  two  or  connect  the  two  halves  of  the  British 
island  kingdom,  and  to  close  it  at  any  time  to  Brit- 
ish men-of-war,  or  to  permit  the  vessels  of  her  foe 
to  make  use  of  it,  would  not  be  nearly  as  serious  a 
blow  to  her  chances  in  the  future  war  as  would  the 
closing  of  the  Panama  Canal  to  us  under  like  circum- 
stances. 

Secretary  Tracy,  who  first  began  to  create  our  new 
navy,  pointed  to  the  necessity  of  maintaining  two 
powerful  and  independent  navies — one  in  the  Atlantic, 
the  other  in  the  Pacific — if  the  Panama  Canal  were 
never  built  or  not  made  absolutely  available  for  our 
naval  purposes.  He  first  directed  attention  to  the 
fact  that  under  present  conditions  the  Asiatic  squad- 
ron of  a  foreign  power  could  cross  the  Pacific  and  de- 
stroy, successively,  San  Francisco,  Seattle,  Port  Town- 
send,  and  any  other  of  our  ports  along  that  coast,  be- 
fore a  fleet  sailing  from  our  Atlantic  seaboard  could 
meet  it.  And  the  able  chief  engineer  of  our  navy, 
George  W.  Melville,  has  made  similarly  cogent  re- 
marks. He  called  the  canal  an  element  in  the  utilisa- 
tion of  the  mobile  defences  of  the  United  States,  the 
importance  of  which  is  approached  by  none  other. 
"  Without  it,"  he  went  on,  "  the  fleet  of  one  coast  is 
unavailable  for  the  other;  with  it,  every  naval  gun 
may  be  turned  upon  the  foe,  whether  he  shall  come 
from  east  or  west." 

Not  quite  so  obvious,  but  more  far-reaching  and 
just  as  important  will  be  the  effect  which  the  canal 
will  have  in  rendering  the  population  of  this  country 
more  homogeneous,  politically  more  united,  and  more 
subject  to  the  same  material  and  social  influences.     It 


The  Panama  Canal  157 

will  be  a  destroyer  of  sectionalism ;  at  least  it  will 
make  in  that  direction.  In  short,  the  Panama  Canal 
will  incidentally  increase  American  community  of  in- 
terests and  thought.  That  alone  will  be  a  factor  of 
incalculable  value. 

One  weak  point  in  our  armament,  so  far  as  the 
Panama  Canal  is  concerned,  is  the  fact  that  Great 
Britain  exerts  dominating  naval  power  in  the  Carib- 
bean Sea.  In  the  possession  of  Jamaica,  Great 
Britain  holds  the  strongest  naval  position  there.  The 
Bahamas  complement  her  strategic  strength.  The 
proximity  of  Halifax  increases  it.  All  through  the 
West  Indies  she  is  overpoweringly  strong.  True,  she 
is  a  friendly  power,  at  present  probably  the  only  sin- 
cere well-wisher  we  have  among  the  great  powers. 
But  it  is  never  wise  for  statesmanship  to  build  great 
plans  on  the  transient  sentiments  of  another  nation. 
Keen  commercial  rivalry,  such  as  the  Briton  to-day 
still  bears  from  his  Transatlantic  cousin  without  much 
of  a  grudge,  may  in  the  end  ripen  into  a  positive  feel- 
ing of  animosity.  Certainly,  in  the  case  of  Germany 
that  was  the  determining  cause  which  estranged 
Briton  and  Teuton.  The  ill-feeling  between  the  two 
nations  began  in  a  small  way,  but  it  grew  apace  and 
has  since  assumed  the  form  of  settled  rancour. 

Now,  the  point  may  be  made  that  American  com- 
mercial interests  to-day  run  decidedly  more  counter  to 
British  ones  than  do  the  German ;  and  that  will  be  the 
case  in  a  greatly  heightened  degree  hereafter.  At  the 
worst,  Germany  is  Britain's  rival,  commercially  speak- 
ing, but  by  no  means  her  equal  in  wealth,  prestige,  or 
colonial  possessions.  The  American,  however,  is  even 
now  more  than  the  Briton's  equal  in  all  the  essentials 
of  power,  and  furthennore,  the  American  hereafter  will 


158      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

do  more  than  anybody  else  in  curtailing  British  profits 
and  British  influence  abroad. 

The  sturdy  Briton  is  beginning  to  see  that  point,  and 
it  may  be  shrewdly  suspected  that  it  will  be  made 
plainer  to  him  in  the  very  near  future.  Blood  is 
thicker  than  water,  but  in  an  age  ruled  by  material  in- 
terests such  sentiment  will  scarcely  outweigh,  for  long, 
tangible  reasons  of  the  kind  named.  The  day  may 
come  when  another  Williams  will  write  a  book  on 
"  Made  in  America,"  and  Parliament  may  pass  a 
law  such  as  that  body  aimed  at  all  German-made 
products. 

At  any  rate,  it  would  be  a  matter  of  sincere  congrat- 
ulation to  every  clear-eyed  American  if  England  could 
see  her  way  to  disposing  to  Uncle  Sam  of  her  West 
Indian  possessions,  including,  of  course,  her  fortified 
harbours  and  naval  stations  there.  That,  indeed,  would 
be  a  striking  proof  of  the  sincerity  and  potency  of  her 
cousinly  feelings.  She  might  do  this  all  the  more 
readily  as  her  West  Indian  possessions  no  longer 
"  pay."  The  proximity  of  the  United  States,  our  com- 
mercial supremacy,  the  acquisition  of  Porto  Rico  by 
us,  and  our  reciprocity  treaty  with  Cuba  are  all  factors 
which  make  towards  the  steady  impoverishment  of 
the  British  West  Indian  isles.  Once  a  source  of  great 
wealth  to  England,  these  isles  are  now  a  drain  on  her 
imperial  revenues.  Jamaica  has  become  a  sturdy 
beggar  at  the  door  of  Parliament.  The  Bermudas 
would  starve  if  they  could  not  sell  their  potatoes  and 
"  garden  truck "  to  New  York.  Altogether,  these 
British  dependencies  are  in  a  most  unhealthy  economic 
state.  It  is  probably  no  other  feeling  than  pride  which 
prevents  England,  while  she  may,  from  getting  rid  of 
the  West  Indies  on  liberal  terms.  It  will  be  of  interest  to 


The  Panama  Canal  159 

see  how  long  this  feehng  will  interfere  with  a  rational 
solution  of  the  problem. 

And  yet  to  us  the  West  Indies  would  be  of  para- 
mount importance.  To  quote  again  Captain  Mahan, 
regarded  by  many  as  the  keenest  living  writer  on 
naval  strategy,  he  says  in  his  book,  "  The  Interest  of 
America  in  Sea  Power  " :  "  In  the  cluster  of  island 
fortresses  of  the  Caribbean  is  one  of  the  greatest  of 
the  nerve  centres  of  the  whole  body  of  European  civil- 
isation," and  further  on  he  refers  to  this  archipelago 
as  "  the  very  domain  of  sea  power,  if  ever  region 
could  be  called  so."  "  Control  of  a  maritime  region  is 
insured  primarily  by  a  navy;  secondarily,  by  positions, 
suitably  chosen  and  spaced  one  from  the  other,  upon 
which  as  bases  the  navy  rests,  and  from  which  it  can 
exert  its  strength.  At  present  the  positions  of  the 
Caribbean  are  occupied  by  foreign  powers;  nor  may 
we,  however  disposed  to  acquisition,  obtain  them  by 
means  other  than  righteous.  But  a  distinct  advance 
will  have  been  made  when  public  opinion  is  convinced 
that  we  need  them,  and  should  not  exert  our  utmost 
ingenuity  to  dodge  them  when  flung  at  our  head." 

At  this  writing,  therefore,  it  cannot  be  said  truth- 
fully that  our  eastern  approaches  to  the  Panama  Canal 
are  quite  as  undisputed  as  might  be  wished.  But  our 
possession  of  Porto  Rico  and  our  virtual  suzerainty 
over  Cuba  count  for  much,  and  there  is  something  in 
the  air  which  seems  to  foretell  acquisition  by  this 
country  of  the  Danish  Antilles,  and  of  Santo  Domingo 
and  Hayti.  The  main  thing  is,  to  keep  wide  awake 
and  not  to  dodge,  as  Captain  Mahan  says,  any  of 
these  islands,  *'  when  flung  at  our  head." 

In  a  Senate  report,  some  years  ago,  it  was  estimated 
that  the  isthmian  canal,  in  the  second  year  of  its  use, 


i6o     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

would  probably  show  vessels,  aggregating  6,500,000 
in  tonnage,  passing  through  it,  and  that  this  figure 
could  be  expected  to  rise  rapidly  thereafter,  inasmuch 
as  nearly  12,000,000  tons  of  shipping  would  still  be 
left  within  the  zone  of  its  attraction  (after  deducting 
the  above  figure),  depending  for  its  choice  of  routes 
chiefly  on  the  canal  tolls  which  might  be  adopted. 
This  estimate  may  be  taken  to  be  rather  too  conserva- 
tive than  otherwise. 

The  tonnage  which  passed  through  the  Suez  Canal, 
in  1870,  the  first  year  of  its  use,  was  436,600;  in  1871, 
it  was  761,464,  and  in  1903,  it  had  reached  a  trifle  over 
9,700,000.  The  tolls  on  the  Suez  Canal  are  proverb- 
ially excessive,  so  much  so  that  it  does  not  pay 
vessels  of  smaller  or  medium  size  to  make  use 
of  it. 

A  better  standard  of  comparison  is  obtained  by 
quoting  figures  from  the  traffic  through  the  Baltic 
Canal,  connecting  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  River  with 
Germany's  chief  Baltic  port  of  Kiel.  This  waterway 
was  opened  in  1895,  and  it  affords  a  safer  and  shorter 
route  for  vessels  making  their  way  either  from  the 
Baltic  to  the  North  Sea  or  vice  versa.  The  amount  of 
Baltic-North  Sea  shipping,  however,  is  by  no  means  as 
considerable  as  that  passing  between  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  Far  Asia.  Furthermore,  the  old  sea  route, 
past  the  Skager  Rack,  still  lies  open  to  all  vessels. 
Nevertheless,  by  fixing  the  tolls  on  her  Baltic  Canal  at 
a  reasonable  figure,  Germany  has  contrived  to  attract 
the  great  bulk  of  all  seaward  traffic.  Five  years  after 
the  dedication  of  the  canal,  29,571  vessels,  with  an  ag- 
gregate tonnage  of  4,282,258,  passed  through  this 
canal.  The  yearly  increase  of  this  tonnage  has  been 
about  25  to  30  per  cent.    Last  year  the  tonnage  of  the 


The  Panama  Canal  i6i 

vessels  making  choice  of  this  canal  amounted  to  nearly 
6,000,000. 

From  all  of  which  the  lesson  may  be  drawn  that,  in 
the  matter  of  fixing  the  tolls,  we  had  better  use  great 
caution.  Excessive  rates  would  be  suicidal.  With  so 
large  a  portion  of  the  world's  traffic  passing  through 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  with  the  islands  under  other 
ownership  or  more  wisely  administered,  an  industrial 
and  commercial  revival  in  the  West  Indies  may  be 
confidently  looked  for. 


CHAPTER  XII 
SOUTH    AMERICA    OUR    NATURAL    MARKET 

With  a  map  before  our  eyes  it  will  be  noticed  that 
the  eastern  coast  of  North  America  and  the  western 
coast  of  South  America  are  directly  north  and  south 
of  each  other.  Both  are  situated  between  70  and  80 
degrees  west  of  Greenwich,  and  Valparaiso  lies  pre- 
cisely south  of  Boston.  This  simple  geographical  fact 
may  have  escaped  the  attention  of  some.  It  is  one 
which,  after  the  completion  of  the  Panama  Canal,  will 
become  much  more  conspicuous.  Hitherto  this  geo- 
graphical fact  has  been  of  no  benefit  to  us,  but  it  soon 
will  be.  South  America  has  seemed  to  us  very  much 
out  of  the  world,  but  the  canal  will  bring  our  Atlantic 
and  South  America's  Pacific  coast  into  close  relations. 
The  principal  ports  of  the  latter  will  be  between  50 
and  1800  miles  nearer  to  New  York  than  to  San  Fran- 
cisco. 

These  regions  of  South  America  have  great,  but  un- 
developed natural  resources,  together  with  a  sparse 
population.  The  canal  will  bring  them  in  intimate 
commercial  contact  with  the  richest  and  most  densely 
populated  portions  of  our  own  country.  For  South 
America  is  our  natural  market.  The  same  is  true  of 
Central  America  and  Mexico.  The  problem  for  us  to 
solve  is,  how  to  utilise  this  great  market.  The  time 
has  arrived  when  the  task  must  be  undertaken  in  good 
earnest.     It  is  one  of  the  neglected  markets,  and  we 

i6a 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    163 

have  seen  in  preceding  parts  of  this  book  that  our 
commercial  efforts  will  have  to  turn  hereafter  to  such 
markets,  for  they  are  not  alone  the  most  promising  in 
every  sense,  but  we  must  have  several  strings  to  our 
bow.  A  European  continental  tariff-union,  pointed 
chiefly  at  us,  can  scarcely  be  regarded  any  longer  as  a 
mere  phantom.  Such  ideas  are  necessarily  of  slow 
growth,  and  the  difficulties  standing  in  the  way  of 
realising  this  particular  one  are  very  great;  many 
deem  them  insurmountable.  To  bring  under  one  hat 
the  divergent  economic  and  commercial  interests  of  a 
group  of  countries  differing  from  each  other  so  much 
in  resources  and  politics,  seems  a  herculean  undertak- 
ing. But  the  idea  has  taken  firm  root  in  the  European 
mind. 

Germany  and  Austria  have  so  far  been  the  backbone 
of  this  movement.  The  Austrian  minister  of  foreign 
affairs.  Count  Golushovski,  has  for  years  been  advo- 
cating such  a  commercial  trust  against  the  United 
States.  In  Germany,  both  Count  Posadowsky,  the  im- 
perial home  secretary,  and  Count  Buelow,  the  chancel- 
lor of  the  empire,  have  followed  in  Golushovski's  foot- 
steps. But  in  Italy  and  in  France,  too,  this  idea  has 
found  lodgment  in  the  minds  of  many  public  men  and 
economists.  Most  significant  in  this  connection  was 
the  agricultural  congress  which  met,  some  time  ago,  in 
Rome.  Its  main  purpose  was  to  devise  concerted  ac- 
tion by  continental  Europe  to  avert  the  flood  of 
American  agricultural  imports.  True,  nothing  came 
of  it.  This  country  has  some  very  good  friends  in 
Italy,  and  one  of  them,  Prinetti,  sometime  financial 
minister  of  the  kingdom,  staunchly  opposed  all  pro- 
jected anti-American  measures.  The  disunion  of  the 
delegates,  and  their  inability  to  agree  on  steps  which 


164     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

would  have  been  of  equal  benefit  to  all  the  nations 
concerned,  did  the  rest. 

But  the  mere  fact  that  such  an  international  con- 
gress was  held  shows  what  strength  this  movement, 
detrimental  to  American  interests,  has  already  gained. 
We  may  look  for  increased  agitation  throughout 
Europe  in  this  direction,  and  the  seemingly  irrecon- 
cilable differences  which  now  divide  the  advocates  of 
the  exclusion  of  American  products  may  in  the  end  be 
overcome.  In  any  case,  serious  danger  threatens  us 
in  that  quarter. 

Glutted  American  markets  will,  therefore,  do  well 
to  turn  to  South  and  Central  America  as  one  of  the 
main  fields  of  American  expansion.  Roughly  speak- 
ing, Latin-Americans  number  60,000,000.  Their 
natural  increase  is  one  of  the  greatest  in  the  world, 
varying  between  1,5  and  2  per  cent,  annually.  In  ad- 
dition to  that  there  is  immigration — Italian,  German, 
Portuguese,  Spanish,  from  the  West  Indies,  and  from 
this  country  and  Great  Britain,  though  it  may  be  well 
to  note  that  these  last  two  items  have  so  far  been 
numerically  small.  For  some  parts  of  South  America, 
particularly  Argentina,  the  southern  part  of  Brazil, 
Uruguay,  Chile,  and  Venezuela,  the  immigration 
figure  is  quite  large.  For  Argentina,  for  instance,  it 
is  computed  at  600,000  within  the  past  ten  years. 

It  may  reasonably  be  expected  that  in  their  totality 
these  countries  will  soon  present  a  market  as  large 
and  far  more  profitable  than  any  one  of  the  chief 
countries  of  Europe.  After  the  completion  of  the 
Panama  Canal  a  large  part  of  the  rapidly  increasing 
energy  and  capital  of  the  United  States  can  hardly  fail 
to  be  applied  to  the  development  of  South  America. 

The  general  trend  of  migration  has  hitherto  largely 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    165 

been  on  lines  of  latitude.  There  were  good  reasons  for 
this.  There  has  been  abundant  unoccupied  land  to 
the  westward,  and  movement  east  to  west,  or  west  to 
east,  finds  less  variation  in  climate  and  general  con- 
ditions than  a  similar  movement  in  a  northerly  or 
southerly  direction.  There  is  now  exhaustion  of  free 
arable  land,  save  in  rather  inhospitable  districts,  such, 
as  Canada  and  Siberia.  We  may  look,  therefore, 
henceforth  to  an  increased  immigration  southward.  In 
this  connection  it  may  be  well  to  remember  that  the 
proximity  of  the  Andes  to  the  Pacific  coast  affords  a 
choice  of  altitude  which,  together  with  the  great  extent 
of  latitude,  should  make  it  possible  to  find  almost  any 
desired  climate  along  the  western  coast  of  South 
America,  matching  that  of  a  given  latitude  on  the 
Atlantic  coast  of  North  America.  Certainly,  Ameri- 
cans who  have  settled  in  Peru  and  Chile  find  the 
climate  quite  congenial. 

Together  with  American  commercial  expansion  in 
South  America  there  will  probably  be  intertwined  po- 
litical expansion,  though  as  to  the  precise  form  that 
may  take  opinions  will  differ.  Possibly,  indeed  very 
likely,  the  form  will  be  something  analogous  to  that 
taken  in  the  case  of  Cuba,  a  sort  of  political  protection 
extended  to  the  weaker  sisters,  involving  control  of 
their  foreign  affairs  and  a  more  or  less  close  tariff- 
union. 

Doubtless  a  number  of  facts  speak  at  present  against 
such  a  consummation.  As  yet,  the  Anglo-American  is 
not  sympathetic  to  the  Latin- American ;  the  term 
gringo  is  most  readily  applied  by  the  latter  to  their 
northern  brethren.  This  feeling  of  dislike  in  the 
bosom  of  the  Latin-American  is  compounded  of  va- 
rious elements.    There  is  a  good  deal  of  fear  in  it,  aside 


1 66     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

from  a  deep  racial  antipathy.  The  immense  superi- 
ority of  the  northern  American  in  material  respects,  as 
well  as  in  most  of  the  features  of  intellectual  life,  is 
grudgingly  acknowledged  by  the  people  of  South 
America.  The  adventurous  spirit  that  has  taken  hold 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  since  the  war  with 
Spain  fills  them  with  deep  dread  and  angry  forebod- 
ings. They  think,  and  perhaps  justly,  that  there  are  no 
bounds  to  our  ambition.  In  short,  they  darkly  antici- 
pate annexation  by  this  country. 

In  this  connection  it  is  curious  to  observe  that  even 
the  Monroe  doctrine,  though  largely  conceived,  in 
the  first  place,  to  safeguard  Latin-American  inde- 
pendence, has  now  become  a  perfect  bugaboo  to  these 
very  people.  They  scent  danger  to  their  liberties  from 
its  application. 

Let  us  mention  just  a  few  points  in  corroboration 
of  this.  Though  Cuba  had  enjoyed  in  her  long 
struggle  against  Spanish  tyranny  the  undivided  sym- 
pathies of  all  other  Latin-American  countries,  the 
latter  at  once  turned  flatly  around  and  showed  a  fel- 
low-feeling wondrous  kind  for  Spain  during  the 
course  of,  and  long  after,  our  war  with  her.  The  same 
"  Spanish  butcher,"  upon  whom  the  whole  Latin- 
American  press  had  for  years  heaped  maledictions, 
suddenly  became  an  outraged  and  injured  cousin. 
There  spoke  the  kinship  of  race,  of  course.  But  inter- 
mingled with  it  all  was  fear  and  hatred  of  the  Yankee. 
The  Acre  incident  will  be  remembered — in  itself  a 
petty  one.  But  at  once  Brazil  and  Bolivia  smelt 
smoke  and  fire.  To  them  the  incident  meant  another 
dark  scheme  of  the  cunning  Yankee  to  acquire  terri- 
tory and  set  up  the  starry  banner  right  in  the  heart  of 
South    America.      It   took    much    conciliatory    corre- 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    167 

spondence  from  Washington  to  smooth  the  ruffled 
feathers  of  those  two  peoples. 

Although  this  country  took  Venezuela  under  its 
wing,  in  1903,  when  Germany  and  Great  Britain  sent 
their  joint  punitive  expedition  to  her  harbours  with  an 
eye  to  enforce  payment  of  delinquent  debts,  it  was 
almost  amusing  to  notice  how  the  people  of  that  vast 
and  ambitious,  but  very  backward  and  financially  im- 
potent, republic  thanked  us  for  our  trouble.  The 
Venezuelan  press,  in  fact,  the  press  of  all  Latin- 
America,  went  from  one  extreme  to  the  other  during 
that  period.  One  day  they  spoke  of  us  as  their  arch- 
enemy, and  the  next  as  their  deliverer.  Gratitude  and 
abuse  formed  an  inextricable  jumble.  The  secret 
understanding  effected  of  late  between  Central  and 
South  American  countries,  with  this  country  as  ob- 
jective, is  another  illustration  of  their  unbounded  fears. 
Argentina  took  the  lead  in  this  matter,  though  she, 
surely,  seemed  least  in  danger  from  our  alleged 
Machiavellian  policy.  Practically,  this  understanding 
need  not  frighten  us,  for  it  died  a-borning.  In  the 
face  of  the  large  number  of  mutual  jealousies,  ques- 
tions of  disputed  frontier  and  all  sortb  of  other  quarrels 
which  form  so  interesting  and  unfathomable  a  part  of 
South  American  internal  politics,  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  between  the  various  republics  would 
not  hold  good  for  any  length  of  time. 

Our  latest  little  misunderstanding  with  Colombia, 
due  to  the  separation  of  Panama  from  that  federative 
republic,  again  illustrated  the  existence  of  latent 
Latin-American  animosities.  As  we  know,  it  all 
ended  in  smoke.  Colombia's  neighbours  helped  her 
with  an  ocean  of  printer's  ink  against  the  hated  gringo, 
but  that  was  as  far  as  they  went. 


1 68     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

Nevertheless,  these  are  all  straws  which  show  how 
the  wind  blows.  The  day  seems  still  far  distant  when 
the  South  American  will  love  us.  But  that  need  not 
seriously  trouble  us.  The  Latin-American  intensely 
dislikes  all  foreigners.  That  does  not  hinder  him  from 
doing  a  very  flourishing  trade  with  Great  Britain  and 
Germany.  This  trade,  or  at  least  a  very  large  portion 
of  it,  might  as  well  be  ours.  Let  us  look  at  the  amount 
of  Latin-American  foreign  trade. 

Mexico,  our  neighbour  to  the  south,  has  been  making 
rapid  progress  in  all  things  under  the  long  and  wise 
administration  of  President  Porfirio  Diaz.  Her  ex- 
ports now  amount  to  about  $98,900,000,  and  her 
imports  to  $75,900,000.  The  American  share  of  it 
amounts  to  $36,840,206  in  imports,  far  larger  than 
either  the  British  or  German.  She  takes  from  us  ma- 
chinery, manufactures,  both  textile  and  leather,  as  well' 
as  railroad-building  materials,  etc.  We  have  built  her 
railroads  and  we  exploit  a  good  share  of  her  mines. 
Mexico  forms  for  the  moment  the  best  American  field 
in  all  Latin-America.  This  is  very  largely  owing  to 
her  nearness  to  us.  But  Mexico  might,  when  our 
chances  are  properly  pushed,  take  up  treble  the 
amount  of  our  present  imports.  She  is  a  large  coun- 
try, with  some  14,500,000  population,  the  density 
equalling  that  of  our  own  country,  and  during  her 
long  internal  peace  she  has  shown  a  very  rapid 
increase. 

Nicaragua,  one  of  the  smaller  republics,  with  an 
export  of  only  about  $3,046,825,  and  an  import  of 
$1,273,185  (half  of  the  exports  being  coffee),  is, 
nevertheless,  another  promising  field  for  American  en- 
terprise. In  fact,  there  are  many  American  enter- 
prises flourishing  on  Nicaraguan  soil.     Her  climate  is 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    169 

salubrious,  and  we  may  expect  there  an  expanding 
trade. 

Honduras,  likewise  small,  and  with  less  than  half  a 
million  of  population,  offers  fair  chances  for  our  trade. 
Her  imports,  in  1902,  were  $1,667,440,  and  exports, 
$2,468,141,  whereof  65  per  cent,  of  the  imports  and 
66  per  cent,  of  the  exports  came  from  the  United 
States. 

Guatemala,  another  of  the  small  Central  American 
countries,  has  an  area  of  48,290  square  miles,  with  a 
population  of  1,647,300.  Its  foreign  commerce  is 
relatively  large,  exports  (nearly  all  coffee)  being  $9,- 
031,507,  and  imports,  $4,285,000.  Of  the  exports 
about  one-fourth  goes  to  the  United  States,  and  about 
one-eighth  of  the  imports  are  derived  from  there. 
Guatemala  has  no  industry.  That  country  has  been 
almost  entirely  neglected  by  us. 

Costa  Rica  measures  only  18,400  square  miles,  with 
316,738  inhabitants.  Nevertheless,  she  shows  rela- 
tively high  figures  for  foreign  commerce,  namely,  $4,- 
413,333  in  imports,  and  $5,659,695  in  exports,  the 
latter  being  chiefly  coffee  and  bananas.  Her  imports 
are  largely  dry  goods,  hardware,  and  foodstuffs.  Of 
these,  54  per  cent,  came  from  the  United  States. 

Colombia  stands  on  a  different  plane.  She  has  al- 
most 4,600,000  population,  with  a  territory  which  is 
as  large  as  our  Far  West,  and  which  presents  a  great 
variation  of  climatic  and  soil  conditions.  Relatively 
speaking,  her  foreign  trade  is  undeveloped.  Exports 
amount  to  about  $9,600,000,  and  imports  to  $5,500,- 
000.  Her  articles  of  export  are  coffee,  precious  metals, 
ores,  tobacco,  hides,  drugs,  ivory,  cocoa,  rubber,  cattle, 
and  dye  woods.  Imports  are  mostly  textile  tissues, 
iron  and  steel  products,  wool,  cotton,  and  "  notions." 


170     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

Her  main  trade  has  all  along  been  with  Great  Britain, 
the  United  States,  and  Germany.  The  United  States 
exported  to  Colombia,  in  1903,  $4,246,762  worth  of 
goods,  taking  $2,923,611  of  Colombia's  products. 
Considering  her  financial  resources,  Colombia's  for- 
eign debt  is  excessive,  being  more  than  $i3,50o,0(X). 
The  interest  charge  on  that  is  a  great  drain  on  her 
resources.    At  present  there  is  a  strong  anti-American 


^^_  ^,,^tJtaaSV«f*i,>*f-''^-;  ^'. 


SOUTH  AMERICA 

]         (Northern  Half) 

]  SCALE  OF   MILES 


feeling  prevailing,  due  to  the  Panama  imbroglio. 
Nevertheless,  Colombia  forms  an  inviting  field  for 
American  capital  and  trade.  She  is  very  rich  in 
natural  sources  of  wealth,  awaiting  only  capital  and 
technical  knowledge  to  exploit  them. 

Salvador  is  the  smallest  of  Central  American  re- 
publics, but  she  has  almost  a  million  of  inhabitants, 
and  both  her  exports  and  imports  show  respectable 
figures,  namely,  $4,110,260  (of  which  coffee,  about 
$3,000,000),  and  $2,647,385,  respectively.  This 
country  also  has  been  quite  neglected  by  us. 

The  larger  part  of  Colombia's  territory  is  in  South 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    171 

America  proper,  stretching  far  inland.  Venezuela  is 
one  of  her  neighbours.  That  country  has  nearly  the 
size  of  Colombia,  and  something  over  2,500,000  popu- 
lation. Her  foreign  trade  is  quite  large:  exports, 
$18,624,775,  largely  coffee;  imports,  $10,724,750. 
Her  imports  consist  in  cotton  goods,  woollen  stuffs, 
linen,  hardware,  and  manufactures  of  iron  and  steel. 
This  trade  has  been  largely  in  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain  and  Germany.  Of  Venezuela's  exports,  how- 
ever, the  United  States,  in  1903,  took  $5,312,954. 
The  railroads  built  there,  the  few  manufacturing  es- 
tablishments, the  street  railways,  etc.,  have  been 
creations  of  British  and  German  enterprise.  Vene- 
zuela's foreign  and  internal  debt  amounts  to  a  round 
$45,000,000.  It  is  almost  altogether  the  result  of 
governmental  wastefulness.  Due  to  the  arrangement 
effected  of  late  with  some  of  Venezuela's  chief  foreign 
creditors,  by  reason  of  which  a  large  part  of  her  cus- 
toms duties  ( forming  the  main  revenue  of  the  govern- 
ment) will  not  be  available  for  her  uses,  a  period  of 
financial  depression  has  set  in.  The  future  holds, 
however,  much  in  store  for  Venezuela.  She  is  excep- 
tionally rich  in  almost  every  form  of  natural  wealth, 
and  with  a  saner  government,  and  better  development 
of  her  material  resources,  she  could  soon  be  brought  to 
a  very  prosperous  condition.  Americans  have  so  far 
avoided  Venezuela.  Advantage  ought  to  be  taken  by 
us  of  the  prevailing  deep  dislike  of  European  nations, 
increased  as  it  was  by  the  events  of  1903. 

Bolivia  is  a  field  which  promises  good  returns  to 
American  enterprise.  After  the  completion  of  the 
Panama  Canal  it  will  be  readily  accessible  to  us,  and 
the  geographical  advantages  so  far  enjoyed  by  the 
European  nations  will  then  be  in  our  favour.    Her  area 


172     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

is  703,400  square  miles,  and  this  immense  territory  in 
1900  had  only  a  population  of  1,816,271.  Much  of 
Bolivia  is  mountainous,  and  possesses  a  climate  con- 
genial to  Americans  from  the  North.  Her  great 
natural  resources  are  almost  entirely  undeveloped. 
Her  revenue  is  derived  largely  from  customs  duties, 
silver  mining,  rubber  exports,  patent  and  stamp 
duties.  Her  foreign  debt  is  very  small,  barely  $3,000,- 
000.  Her  only  drawback  is  her  interior  position,  she 
having  no  seaport.  But  she  has  the  Amazon  and 
several  of  its  tributaries  as  navigable  arteries  for  her 
trade.  Bolivia's  foreign  trade  is  surprisingly  large. 
Her  exports  amount  to  $9,947,193,  being  very  largely 
silver  ($5,340,500),  tin  ($2,797,500).  bismuth, 
copper,  etc.  Her  imports  are  largely  manufactured 
articles;  they  figure  up  to  $5,114,444.  She  has  only 
640  miles  of  railroad. 

Of  greatest  importance  to  our  prospective  South 
American  trade  is  Brazil.  In  territory,  she  exceeds 
the  United  States  (leaving  out  Alaska)  by  some  200,- 
000  square  miles.  In  fertility  of  soil  and  variety  of 
products  she  fully  equals  us.  Her  climatic  conditions 
range  from  the  torrid  and  tropical  to  the  temperate  and 
bracing  zone.  With  an  enormous  coast  line  along  the 
Atlantic,  she  possesses  the  mighty  Amazon  and  a 
number  of  its  chief  tributaries.  Her  population,  how- 
ever, is  still  quite  sparse,  for  her  18,000,000  mean  only 
a  density  per  square  mile  of  4.5. 

The  revenues  of  the  Brazilian  federal  government, 
in  1903,  amounted  to  $40,967,000  (from  customs  du- 
ties), and  248,018,000  milreis  in  paper,  the  latter  from 
internal  taxes,  etc.  The  expenditures  were  just  within 
the  mark.  Brazil  has  a  very  large  foreign  and  internal 
debt.    The  latter  has  been  partly  consolidated,  this  por- 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    173 

tion  amounting  to  570,362,000  milreis,  while  the  float- 
ing debt  is  still  187,949,000  milreis. 

While  the  foreign  trade  of  Brazil  is  very  large,  it  is 
matter  of  regret  that  this  nation  has  so  far  secured  but 
about  14  to  16  per  cent,  of  the  import  trade.  For 
1 90 1,  the  total  exports  and  imports  of  the  country  were 
almost  1,300,000,000  milreis,  the  latter  coin  being  at 
present  worth  about  24  cents.     Of  this  total  amount. 


SODIH  AMEBICA 

(.Southern  Half) 

aCALE_OFMiLE» 
A  400        800 


lORHAY  le  Ce., 


the  United  States  exported  to  Brazil  in  the  same  year 
$11,663,119  worth,  and  it  imported  from  there  $70,- 
643,574.  In  the  year  following,  1902,  our  exports  had 
declined  to  $10,391,130,  while  our  imports  from  there 
had  risen  to  $79,391,130.  Of  our  Brazilian  imports, 
in  1901,  the  most  important  was  coffee,  $45,015,836; 
rubber,  $16,919,707;  sugar,  $5,347.503;  hides  and 
skins,  $2,061,779.  Of  our  exports  in  that  year,  wheat 
flour  figured  with  $2,687,786,  and  petroleum,  $2,- 
136,982. 


174      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

It  will,  therefore,  be  seen  that  while  the  tropical 
commodities  we  import  from  Brazil  are  a  direct  com- 
plement to  our  own  products,  we  have  so  far  neglected 
to  induce  Brazil  to  purchase  of  us  the  many  things  in 
which  we  excel,  and  which  she  absolutely  needs. 
These  things  she  now  takes  almost  altogether  from 
European  nations,  particularly  Great  Britain,  Germany, 
and  France.  These  countries  supply  her  with  steel 
and  iron  manufactures,  cotton  goods  and  other  stuffs 
for  wear,  and  the  other  innumerable  articles  turned 
out  by  a  highly  developed  industry.  There  are,  of 
course,  special  reasons  for  this,  the  chief  one  being 
the  greater  proximity  of  Brazilian  harbours  to  Europe, 
;  the  far  older  commercial  relations  with  those  countries, 
•:  and  the  presence  in  Brazil  of  large  numbers  of  British, 
J  German,  and  French  trading  firms.  Another  reason  is 
to  t)e  found  in  the  German  and  British  steamer  lines 
regularly  visiting  Brazilian  ports.  The  last  two  points 
mentioned  are  susceptible  of  change. 

The  Brazilian  merchant  marine  is  not  very  con- 
siderable. It  consists  at  present  of  228  steamers,  with 
a  tonnage  of  91,465,  and  of  343  sailing  vessels,  their 
tonnage  being  76,992.  In  1901,  the  principal  Bra- 
zilian ports  were  visited  by  14,360  vessels,  of  an  ag- 
gregate tonnage  of  11,107,480. 

The  unfavourable  geographic  position,  so  far  as 
Brazilian  harbours  are  concerned,  will,  of  course,  not 
be  affected  by  the  Panama  Canal.  That  fact  will  con- 
tinue to  vex  us.  But  the  land  route  into  Brazil  will 
hereafter  be  open  to  us.  The  western  half  of  Brazil 
lies  not  far  removed  from  the  Pacific.  It  is  now  being 
opened  up  by  railroads.  So  far,  Brazil  has  9718  miles 
of  railroad  in  operation,  and  4989  miles  building. 
Another  71 10  miles  is  projected,  and  within  five  years 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    175 

from  now  several  main  lines  will  traverse  this  western 
domain  of  Brazil,  while  a  number  of  branch  lines  will 
tap  them.  American  capital  at  this  juncture  could  be 
very  profitably  employed  in  constructing  a  number  of 
additional  railroads,  especially  lines  which  would  give 
more  ready  access  to  the  western  portion  of  Brazil, 
furthering  immigration  there,  and  developing  the  im- 
mense resources  of  that  country,  now  lying  almost 
completely  fallow.  These  lines  ought  to  connect  with 
Bolivia,  Peru,  and  Chile,  and  would  thus  supply  reg- 
ular lines  of  steam  and  sailing  vessels,  doing  traffic  be- 
tween cur  ports  and  those  on  the  western  coast  of 
South  America,  with  paying  freight  and  cargoes. 

Indeed,  when  the  Panama  Canal  has  once  been 
built,  Brazil  will  become  probably  the  finest  field  in  all 
South  America  for  American  commercial  expansion. 
Her  population,  too,  is  less  hostile  to  us.  For  many 
years  our  diplomatic  and  political  relations  with  Brazil 
have  been  extremely  friendly.  There  is  no  reason 
under  the  sun  why  we  should  not  capture  one-half  of 
the  entire  Brazilian  foreign  trade.  As  it  is,  we  are 
her  best  customer,  outdistancing  even  Britain.  With 
proper  encouragement  shown  to  Brazilians,  and 
with  vastly  increased  facilities  of  communication  for 
our  trade,  she  in  her  turn  ought  to  become — and  prob- 
ably would  become — one  of  our  own  best  customers, 
for  she  has  great  and  growing  need  of  all  our  manu- 
factures. 

Chile  is  generally  considered  the  most  progressive  of 
the  South  American  countries.  She  has  a  population 
of  3,500,000,  and  her  territory  forms  a  long  and  nar- 
row strip  along  the  Pacific.  In  density  of  population 
she  leads  all  her  neighbours.  Indeed,  she  leads  in  other 
respects.    Her  government  is  stable  and  sagacious,  and 


176     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

in  her  various  wars  she  has  been  successful.  For  so 
small  a  country,  both  her  army  and  navy  are  large  and 
efficient.  Her  foreign  trade  is,  per  head  of  population, 
the  largest  in  South  America.  She  exported,  in  1902, 
saltpetre,  copper,  guano,  precious  metals,  coal,  and 
cereals  to  the  amount  of  $68,309,965,  and  she  imported 
(machinery,  hardware,  petroleum,  textiles,  etc.)  al- 
together, $47,143,204.  Her  finances  are  settled,  and 
her  revenues  and  expenditures  maintain  a  balance.  If 
our  Pacific  coast  were  better  developed,  we  should 
probably  be  doing  a  thriving  trade  with  Chile.  As  it 
is,  we  sell  to  and  buy  from  her  very  little.  It  is  again 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  which  are  far  in  the  lead 
of  us.  In  1902,  we  sold  Chile  $4,764,000  worth  of 
goods,  and  bought  of  her  $9,280,405.  The  present 
sea  route  around  Cape  Horn  being  shorter  by  several 
thousand  miles  for  German  and  British  vessels,  our 
Atlantic  emporiums  are  at  a  great  disadvantage.  The 
Panama  Canal  will  bring  Chile  very  close  to  us.  Her 
commercial  wants,  as  we  have  seen,  are  precisely  those 
which  we  can  best  fill  when  the  opportunities  are 
equal. 

The  sway  of  Peru  extends  over  a  territory  nearly 
double  the  size  of  Chile's,  and  her  population  exceeds 
that  of  the  latter  by  over  1,000,000.  Though  she  has  a 
fine  coast  line,  she  is  not  distinctly  a  maritime  nation 
like  Chile,  and  her  harbours  are  few.  Her  trade  rela- 
tions are  far  greater  with  the  interior  of  South 
America,  particularly  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Venezuela,  and 
Ecuador,  than  with  foreign  countries.  However,  her 
exports  exceed  $19,313,335,  and  her  imports,  $16,- 
517,295.  Her  main  exports  are  minerals  and  sugar, 
the  climate  in  a  large  portion  of  her  territory  being 
tropical,  though  tempered  by  sea  winds.     Her  trade 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    177 

with  the  United  States  is  third  on  the  hst,  and  the 
reasons  cited  for  Chile  apply  also  to  her.  The  canal 
will  put  us  on  a  more  than  equal  footing  with  England 
and  Germany  in  commercially  exploiting  Peru.  Her 
present  imports  are  largely  cotton  goods  and  woollens, 
machinery,  etc.,  in  all  of  which  we  can  compete. 

The  Argentine  Republic  runs  Chile  a  close  second  in 
the  matter  of  progress  and  development  of  natural  re- 
sources. Next  to  Brazil  she  owns  the  largest  terri- 
tory in  South  America,  one-third  that  of  the  United 
States.  With  a  population  of  over  5,ooo,ckdo,  with  a 
large  coast  line  and  a  fine  river  system,  with  an 
equable  and  temperate  climate,  and  a  virgin  soil  sur- 
passing in  fertility  that  of  our  Prairie  states,  the 
country  could  support  at  least  five  or  six  times  the 
actual  number  of  inhabitants.  Her  rise  to  prosperity  is 
of  very  recent  date.  For  several  generations,  internal 
strife  ravaged  her  and  hampered  prosperity. 

Argentina  and  Brazil  have  both  pursued  for  some 
time  the  same  policy  of  encouragement  to  foreign  im- 
migration. In  Brazil  it  is  the  three  southern  provinces 
which  have  attracted  most  of  these  European  settlers; 
in  Argentina  it  is  the  whole  country  that  is  being 
rapidly  covered  with  a  network  of  farms  worked  by 
immigrants,  very  largely  Italians  and  men  from 
Northern  Spain.  This  immigration  proceeds  at  a 
rather  rapid  rate.  Within  twenty  years  the  total  pop- 
ulation of  Argentina  has  doubled. 

The  capital  of  Argentina,  Buenos  Ayres,  is  the 
largest  city  in  South  America,  having  a  population  of 
840,000.  In  1850,  it  had  20,000,  and  in  1880, 
250,000. 

The  immense  prairie  lands  of  Argentina,  together 
with  a  mild  climate  and  abundance  of  water,  make  her 


178      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

the  paradise  of  cattle-raising.  Within  her  borders 
are  grazing  22,000,000  head  of  cattle,  a  larger  number 
than  the  whole  immense  Russian  Empire  can  boast  of, 
and  there  are  5,000,000  horses,  and  77,000,000  goats. 
In  consequence  of  this,  her  exports  (amounting  to 
$187,487,000)  are  largely  derived  from  the  cattle  in- 
dustry,— wool,  hides,  live  stock,  canned  meats,  tallow, 
etc.,  amounting  together  to  over  $70,000,000  of  her 
annual  exports.  Cereals  are,  however,  the  largest 
single  item,  exports  in  them  figuring  up  to  $73,045,- 
000.  The  imports  are  almost  wholly  products  of  in- 
dustry, cotton  goods,  iron  and  steel  wares,  machinery, 
cloths,  drugs,  coal,  wine,  etc.,  altogether,  some  $113,- 
485,000.  In  exports  and  imports  the  United  States,  in 
1902,  occupied  only  fifth  place,  with  $13,303,504,  and 
$10,037,576,  respectively. 

After  sundry  financial  depressions,  the  economic 
condition  of  Argentina  is  to-day  satisfactory.  She  has 
about  10,000  miles  of  railroads  in  operation  or  in 
process  of  construction.  In  1902,  12,917  vessels,  with 
altogether  6,913,783  tons,  cleared  from  Argentine 
harbours.  The  Argentine  navy  is  next  in  size  to  the 
Brazilian. 

The  foreign  debt  of  Argentina  is,  however,  very 
large,  though  now  funded.  It  amounts  to  $321,732,- 
720.  The  revenues  for  1902  were  $71,991,000,  while 
the  expenditures  were  $3,000,000  less,  including  the  in- 
terest charge  on  the  national  debt. 

Argentina's  geographical  position  will  continue  to 
be  rather  unfavourable  to  us,  even  after  the  completion 
of  the  Panama  Canal.  She  lies  far  to  the  south  and 
east.  But  there  are  several  railroad  projects  in  the 
making,  and  after  they  have  been  realised,  the  vast 
western    territory    of    Argentina    will    enjoy    much 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    179 

greater  facilities  of  communication  with  the  Pacific 
coast,  and  her  products  will  thus  become  more  readily 
available  to  us.  In  any  case,  Argentina's  trade  with  us 
does  not  offer  great  prospects.  It  is  otherwise  as  to 
the  question  of  internal  exploitation  of  her  resources. 
This,  as  well  as  her  foreign  trade,  has  so  far  been 
largely  in  the  hands  of  Britain,  France,  and  Germany. 
There  is  good  opportunity  in  Argentina  for  the  in- 
vestment of  American  capital  in  all  sorts  of  industrial 
enterprises,  more  particularly  railroads,  street  railways, 
stockyards,  and  slaughter  houses. 

The  best  of  land  in  Argentina  is  still  to  be  had  at 
very  low  prices,  even  when  comparing  them  with  our 
Far  West.  This  fact  indicates  another  chance  for 
American  enterprise. 

Uruguay  is  a  relatively  small  state,  but  it  has  a 
million  of  population,  and  very  great  natural  advan- 
tages. Revenue  and  expenditures  amount  to  $16,123,- 
921  and  $16,124,324,  respectively.  It  has  a  relatively 
large  national  debt.  Her  exports  and  imports  figure 
up  $29,400,000  and  $24,000,000,  respectively,  exports 
being  almost  exclusively  products  cf  the  cattle  in- 
dustry, while  imports  are  manufactured  articles, 
largely  derived  from  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 
The  United  States  (with  about  $4,000,000  exports 
and  imports)  is  seventh  on  the  trade  list.  Her  internal 
development  is  in  a  state  of  rapid  advance,  and  in  that 
respect,  similarly  to  Argentina,  she  offers  a  promising 
field  to  American  capital.  In  1902,  3915  vessels  of 
altogether  4,139,320  tons  cleared  from  Montevideo, 
her  capital  city.  This  city,  like  Buenos  Ayres,  is  sit- 
uate at  the  mouth  of  the  great  La  Plata  River. 

Paraguay,  with  a  larger  territory  than  Uruguay, 
has  a  smaller  population,  and  the  prospects  of  her  in- 


i8o     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

ternal  development  are  not  nearly  so  good.  She  has 
no  ocean  front,  lying  far  inland,  and  hardly  any  navi- 
gable rivers.  Her  foreign  trade,  therefore,  her  rev- 
enues and  expenditures,  and  everything  else  by  which 
the  wealth  of  the  country  is  gauged,  are  small. 

Ecuador  suffers  likewise  from  a  rather  unfavourable 
geographical  position,  having  only  a  very  short  ocean 
front,  a  torrid  climate,  and  scarcely  any  railroads  or 
other  means  of  communication.  With  a  territory  of 
about  120,000  square  miles,  she  has  1,500,000  in- 
habitants, and  a  fine  capital  city,  Quito.  Her  revenues 
and  expenditures  are  very  small,  and  she  has  a  national 
debt  of  $3,500,000.  Her  imports  amount  to  $7,221,- 
492,  and  her  exports  to  $9,053,019.  Her  principal 
article  of  export  is  cocoa.  The  trade  relations  be- 
tween Ecuador  and  the  United  States  are  scarcely 
worth  mentioning.  This,  however,  is  likely  to  be 
changed  by  the  completion  of  the  canal,  as  Quito  will 
then  afford  us  easy  access. 

It  was  pointed  out  before  that  the  Panama  Canal 
will  once  more  give  to  the  West  Indies  a  commercial 
importance  which  is  almost  certain  to  involve  politi- 
cal consequences. 

For  several  centuries,  and  until  a  comparatively  re- 
cent time,  this  island  world  formed  the  principal 
source  of  tropical  products.  During  the  Napoleonic 
era,  when  England  was  shut  out,  by  a  ceaseless  suc- 
cession of  wars,  from  a  large  part  of  her  continental 
trade,  the  West  Indies  furnished  her  with  one-fourth 
of  all  her  commerce.  But  misrule,  about  as  vicious  as 
ignorant  tyranny  could  devise,  rebellions  and  constant 
political  changes,  as  well  as  the  economic  development 
of  the  Dutch  East  Indies  and  of  British  India,  the  rise 
of  the  beet-sugar  industry,  and  other  causes  thrust  the 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    i8i 

West  Indies  from  their  former  prominent  place.  West 
Indian  commerce  during  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century  steadily  declined,  until  now  it  is  insignificant. 

The  canal,  however,  will  again  focus  a  large  part  of 
the  world's  commerce  in  the  Caribbean  Sea.  Towards 
its  waters  empty  the  mouths  of  the  Amazon  and  the 
Mississippi.  As  natural  tributaries  to  the  canal,  these 
two  great  rivers  will  pour  their  commerce  and  shipping 
through  the  Caribbean  Sea.  The  islands  in  it  will  be- 
come once  more  important  ports  of  call,  and  far  up 
along  these  rivers  trade  will  expand,  towns  will  assume 
new  commercial  importance,  and  the  horn  of  plenty 
will  empty  itself  over  this  whole  region. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  will  become  all-im- 
portant for  us  to  secure  political  and  commercial  pre- 
ponderance in  the  West  Indies.  It  will  be  necessary, 
for  one  thing,  to  put  a  final  stop  to  outrageous  mis- 
government  that  has  been  wasting  and  neglecting  the 
rich  resources  of  the  second  largest  isle,  at  present 
divided  under  the  name  of  Hayti  and  Santo  Domingo. 
This  island,  under  American  rule,  would  become  of 
immense  importance,  both  economic  and  political. 

The  whole  island  comprises  a  territory  of  about 
two-thirds  the  size  of  Cuba,  and  of  about  as  large  a 
population,  namely,  1,500,000.  Hayti  is  a  French- 
speaking  negro  republic,  while  Santo  Domingo  has  the 
same  nominal  form  of  government  (but  in  reality 
nothing  better  than  a  military  despotism),  being  set- 
tled by  Spanish-speaking  negroes.  These  two  so- 
called  republics  have  been  a  political  anomaly  for  many 
years,  and  the  establishment  of  American  rule  there 
would  be  warmly  welcomed  by  the  whole  civilised 
world.  The  island  is  fertile  in  all  tropical  products, 
in  a  higher  degree  than  Cuba.     Under  the  prevailing 


1 82     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

political  conditions  imports  and  exports  are  less  than 
one-tenth  of  what  they  might  be.  The  main  products 
of  the  island  are  coffee,  tobacco,  cocoa,  and  sugar. 

The  matter  of  immigration  to  South  America  was 
briefly  touched  on  before.  The  southern  provinces  of 
Brazil  (enjoying  a  moderate  and  very  healthy  climate, 
adapted  to  European  settlers),  the  whole  of  Argen- 
tina and  Uruguay  have  thus  far  been  the  main  fields 
to  which  this  European  immigration  has  been  directed. 
Without  question  it  will  do  much  to  further  a  more 
rapid  development  of  these  neglected  countries.  The 
Pacific  coast  of  South  America,  for  a  variety  of 
reasons,  seems,  however,  best  adapted  to  draw  here- 
after the  surplus  of  our  own  population.  With  two 
score  of  thousands  annually  migrating  from  our  Prairie 
states  across  the  Canadian  border  in  search  of  free, 
fruitful  arable  land,  and  with  the  practical  exhaustion 
of  tillable  government  lands  in  our  Far  West,  we  may 
look  hereafter  for  American  emigration  to  suitable  dis- 
tricts along  the  southern  slope  of  the  Pacific.  Such 
emigration  will  probably  set  in  even  before  the  com- 
pletion of  the  Panama  Canal,  but  after  that  event  it  is 
likely  to  proceed  at  accelerated  pace  and  in  greater 
volume.  In  those  countries — Chile,  Peru,  Bolivia, 
etc. — there  is  still  abundance  of  the  finest  land  to  be 
had,  as  a  gift  or  for  a  song,  and  once  sturdy  Anglo- 
Saxon  immigration  has  turned  that  way,  we  may  look 
for  most  important  results,  economic  as  well  as 
political. 

Uneasiness  has  occasionally  been  felt  in  this  country 
at  the  large  German  immigration  in  South  America, 
more  particularly  in  Brazil  and  Argentina.  This  dis- 
quiet has  been  due  less  to  the  fact  in  itself  than  to  its 
possible  ultimate  consequences.     The  belief  has  been 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    183 

promulgated,  now  and  then,  both  by  American  writers 
and  officials,  and  by  those  of  the  Latin-American  coun- 
tries spoken  of,  that  it  is  Germany's  final  design 
to  gain  a  political  foothold  in  South  America ;  in  other 
words,  to  found  there  a  new  colonial  empire.  Against 
this  the  Monroe  doctrine  has  been  invoked  in  advance. 

There  can  be  small  question  that  to  establish  such  a 
colonial  empire  on  South  American  soil  is  the  ardent 
desire  of  a  great  portion  of  the  German  people.  The 
German  press  frequently  recurs  to  this  idea,  pointing 
out  the  great  need  of  German  colonial  expansion — 
their  population  increasing  at  the  rate  of  almost  a 
million  annually — and  the  great  commercial  advan- 
tages to  be  derived  from  the  carrying  out  of  such  a 
project.  The  German  government,  however,  has  al- 
ways disclaimed  any  such  ulterior  designs  in  promot- 
ing the  current  of  German  emigration  towards  Brazil. 

Certainly,  next  to  this  country,  South  America  holds 
the  largest  percentage  of  people  of  German  blood.  To 
confine  our  point  to  only  one  Brazilian  province,  that 
of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  the  facts  appear  to  be  these: 
there  is  a  German  population  numbering  600,000; 
that  means  40  per. cent,  of  the  total  population  of  the 
province.  They  live  there  in  colonies,  forming,  prac- 
tically, autonomous  commonwealths,  and  neither  inter- 
marry nor  mingle  with  the  native  Brazilian  element. 
They  preserve  their  language  and  customs  intact.  The 
schools  and  churches  they  found  use  German  as  the 
chief  vehicle  of  expression,  although  Portuguese  (the 
language  of  the  country)  is  also  taught.  A  number  of 
German  consuls  reside  at  the  chief  centres  of  popula- 
tion within  this  German-settled  province,  and  they 
naturally  assist  in  keeping  the  purely  German  idea 
alive.     The  German-Brazilian  press  is  influential  and 


184     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

ably  edited.  There  are  several  societies  in  Germany 
whose  sole  purpose  it  is  to  direct  German  emigrants  to 
these  settlements  in  Brazil.  One  of  these  societies  has 
as  president  the  brother  of  the  German  empress,  Duke 
Guenther  of  Schleswig-Holstein.  Several  other  so- 
cieties exist  in  Germany,  which,  both  as  a  patriotic  and 
commercial  enterprise,  have  purchased  immense  tracts 
of  land  in  the  province  spoken  of — Rio  Grande  do 
Sul — as  well  as  in  the  neighbouring  one  of  Santa  Cata- 
rina.  These  societies,  too,  have  made  special  agree- 
ments for  cheap  transportation  with  German  steamer 
lines,  and  with  the  Brazilian  government  and  local 
authorities,  for  the  parcelling  out  of  these  lands  to  new 
settlers  from  Germany. 

This  must  be  a  paying  business,  for  last  year  the 
older  societies  of  this  nature  handled  some  qcxdo  of 
such  settlers.  But  a  new  society  of  this  kind,  the  Rio 
Grande  Settlement  Association,  came  into  being  in 
Berlin  a  few  months  ago.  This  new  society  has  pur- 
chased 1,700,000  acres  of  fine  farm  lands  in  that  prov- 
ince, and  proposes  to  settle  there  17,000  German 
farmers  and  peasants,  taking  payment  in  instalments, 
and  fitting  out  each  family  with  the  necessary  imple- 
ments, building  material,  seed  corn,  etc.  This  same 
concern,  under  a  concession  from  the  provincial 
government,  means  to  build  a  railroad,  160  miles  in 
length,  along  the  Taquary  River  for  the  wants  of  its 
settlers. 

The  natural  rate  of  increase  of  these  Germans  set- 
tled in  Brazil  is  phenomenal.  Families  of  twelve  or 
fifteen  are  nothing  exceptional,  and  about  eight  or  nine 
seems  to  be  the  average.  The  death  rate  is  extremely 
low.  Within  the  space  of  five  years  or  less,  a  fair  de- 
gree of  prosperity  is  achieved  by  the  newly  arriving 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    185 

settler.  In  the  provincial  chambers  of  the  three  Bra- 
ziHan  provinces  containing  the  largest  percentage  of 
Germans,  namely,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Santa  Cata- 
rina,  and  Sao  Paulo,  German  delegates  exert  con- 
siderable influence. 

This  is  a  mere  statement  of  the  facts  in  the  case; 
inferences  may  be  drawn  by  the  reader.  But  in  any 
event,  the  Germans  in  Brazil  are  not  likely  of  their 
own  accord  to  aim  at  the  creation  of  a  state  within  a 
state,  or  at  complete  political  severance  from  Brazil. 
It  would  be  another  question,  of  course,  if,  at  some 
future  time,  on  one  pretext  or  another,  Germany  her- 
self should  think  it  worth  while  to  take  a  hand  in 
the  matter.  There  have  been  signs  of  late  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  disruption  within  the  present  federative 
republic  of  Brazil.  The  bond  holding  it  together 
is  much  more  loosely  tied  than  is  the  case  in  this 
country.  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  on  several  occasions  has 
broken  away  from  Brazil,  and  for  some  length  of  time 
maintained  her  political  independence.  Her  economic 
needs  differ  from  those  of  the  remainder  of  Brazil,  and 
a  strong  separatist  sentiment  is  alive  there.  Taking 
all  these  considerations  into  account,  there  is  the  strong 
possibility  that  political  complications  between  Brazil 
and  Germany  may  at  some  time  arise  on  the  subject  of 
safeguarding  the  interests  of  the  large  and  constantly 
growing  German  settlements  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul. 
But.  after  all,  this  is  only  a  possibility. 

Here  we  have,  then,  a  South  and  Central  American 
foreign  trade,  amounting  altogether,  according  to  the 
latest  available  statistics,  to  something  over  $1,800,- 
000,000,  exports  and  imports.  This  is  not  taking  into 
account  Cuba  or  any  of  the  possessions  of  foreign 
powers,  ourselves  included   (Porto   Rico).    And  yet 


1 86     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

even  this  last  unconsidered  fragment  of  trade,  the 
one  with  the  Antilles  and  with  Guyana,  attains  a  con- 
siderable figure.  The  aggregate  foreign  trade  of  the 
countries  and  islands  to  the  south  of  us  can  be  com- 
puted, roughly  speaking,  at  considerably  more  than 
$2,000,000,000.  Of  this  trade  we  have,  in  exports  to 
Central  America,  $49,234,650;  Mexico,  $36,840,206; 
South  America,  $40,728,432;  altogether,  $126,803,- 
288,  which  is  but  $10,000,000,  more  than  our  exports 
to  Canada  alone.  This  is  one-half  of  Britain's  entire 
foreign  trade;  about  two-thirds  of  Germany's  foreign 
trade ;  two-thirds  of  our  own  foreign  trade,  and  more 
than  the  entire  foreign  trade  of  France. 

What  have  we  done  to  secure  this  trade?  Or,  if  not 
the  whole,  at  least  our  fair  share  of  it?  Practically, 
we  have  none  nothing.  And,  as  markets  do  not  come, 
but  have  to  be  sought  out  and  conquered  by  hard  work, 
wisely  directed  energy,  much  patience,  and  the  previous 
expenditure  of  capital,  the  consequence  has  been  that 
our  portion  of  the  trade  with  this  immense  and  fa- 
voured region  is  ridiculously  small. 

Some  of  the  disadvantages  we  have  been  labouring 
under  are  of  our  own  doing  or  spring  from  our  own 
omissions.  Consular  reports  have  enlightened  us  on 
this  subject.  Latin-Americans  have  a  good  deal  of 
pride.  They  expect  to  be  addressed  in  their  own 
tongues,  Spanish  or  Portuguese,  by  those  who  wish 
to  sell  them  their  goods.  The  Germans  do  it,  their 
commercial  export  schools  in  Hamburg  and  elsewhere, 
as  well  as  their  trade  high  schools,  teaching  them  these 
languages  thoroughly ;  Englishmen,  as  a  rule,  are  still 
ignorant  of  any  tongue  but  their  own.  This  accounts, 
in  part,  for  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  has  lost  to 
Germany    much    of    her    trade    in    those    countries. 


South  America  Our  Natural  Market    187 

Americans,  too,  to  do  a  profitable  trade  with  Spanish- 
Americans,  must  learn  Spanish.  Another  point:  we 
must  learn  to  accommodate  ourselves  better  to  these 
people  when  dealing  with  them.  They  have  their  pe- 
culiarities of  race  and  custom,  and  they  need  to  be 
humoured.  The  English  disregard  that,  and  as  long  as 
they  were  the  sole  masters  of  Latin-American  com- 
merce, their  customers  had  to  put  up  with  it.  But 
this  is  another  reason  why  the  Germans,  more  recent 
arrivals  on  the  field,  have  cut  so  much  into  British 
trade.  We  are  inclined  to  commit  the  same  error;  let 
us  avoid  it.  Goods  ought  to  be  put  up,  shipped,  trans- 
ported, and  delivered,  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
local  conditions.  In  that  respect  again  the  Briton  has 
consistently  sinned,  and  is  sinning  to-day.  So  is  the 
American.  Accompanying  circulars  ought  to  be  in 
Spanish  or  Portuguese,  and  weights,  measures,  coins, 
and  distances  quoted  ought  to  be  those  of  the  country 
to  which  the  circulars  are  addressed.  Goods  ought  not 
to  be  so  bulky  as  to  render  transportation  on  the  backs 
of  mules,  perhaps  over  steep  mountain  paths,  impos- 
sible or  very  difficult.  In  many  cases  British  or 
American  goods,  on  their  arrival  in  port,  have  to  be 
repacked  at  great  inconvenience  and  expense,  before 
they  are  fit  for  transportation  inland. 

At  present,  all  through  Latin-America,  means  of 
communication  are  still  very  insufficient,  either  by 
rail  or  water.  The  roads  of  these  countries,  too,  are 
for  the  most  part  in  wretched  condition.  The  Ameri- 
can exporter  must  make  allowance  for  these  deficien- 
cies. We  need  more  American  steamer  lines  to  South 
and  Central  America ;  also,  a  far  larger  sailing  fleet. 
Greater  facilities  in  this  respect  create  trade  where  it 
does  not  yet  exist.    We  have  by  no  means  recognised 


1 88     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

the  intrinsic  possibilities  of  this  great  market ;  else,  we 
should  probably  have  bestirred  ourselves. 

The  greatest  of  our  present  disadvantages,  though, 
is  a  geographical  one.  South  America  lying  far  to  the 
east,  so  that  its  whole  eastern  coast,  and  even  its 
western  are  nearer  to  European  nations  than  to  us. 
We  have  seen  that  this  disadvantage  at  least,  the  de- 
cisive one  in  close  competition  between  well-equipped 
nations,  will  disappear  forever  with  the  completion 
of  the  Panama  Canal.  Let  us  hope  that  thereafter  a 
great  volume  of  American  export  trade  to  South 
America  being  assured,  the  slighter  disadvantages 
spoken  of  before  will  likewise  disappear. 

After  all,  the  Latin- American  is  a  man  with  whom 
it  is  more  easy  to  deal  than  with  many  foreigners.  He 
has,  as  a  rule,  a  fair  share  of  commercial  uprightness, 
though  he  is  "  slow  pay."  It  will  not  do  to  hurry  him, 
and  that  is  one  more  point  which  American  mer- 
chants must  take  into  account.  He  demands,  and  re- 
ceives from  our  competitors,  rather  long  credit.  Ul- 
timately, he  pays  his  score.  He  is  fond  of  the  good 
things  of  this  life,  which  is  a  very  important  point  in 
the  case  of  a  prospective  customer.  Altogether,  there 
is  no  valid  reason  why  we  should  not  secure,  after  the 
completion  of  the  canal,  the  great  bulk  of  his  import 
trade.  The  canal  once  dug,  our  advantage  in  a  com- 
petitive race  with  Europe  will  be  immense  from  the 
start,  and  it  will  grow  with  every  day.  The  canal  will 
open  up  to  our  rapidly  growing  coast  navigation  the 
whole  of  the  western  shore  of  America,  south  of  Cali- 
fornia, and  this  vast  territory,  including  the  coast  of 
Mexico  and  Central  America,  is  largely  unexploited  in 
the  commercial  sense,  to  this  day.  It  is,  in  brief,  an- 
other virgin  market  awaiting  us. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  PAN-AMERICAN  RAILWAY 

Meanwhile^  Uncle  Sam  is  not  to  be  caught  nap- 
ping. The  most  important  advance  work  for  the  expan- 
sion of  our  trade  in  Central  and  South  America  that  is 
being  done  now  is  the  building  of  the  Pan-American 
Railway.  From  the  rate  at  which  this  great  work  is 
proceeding  it  seems  certain  that  it  will  be  completed 
several  years  before  the  Panama  Canal  is  to  be  thrown 
open  to  the  commerce  of  the  world.  This  railway, 
connecting  with  the  various  railway  systems  of  the 
United  States,  will  run,  in  almost  a  straight  line, 
through  Mexico,  Guatemala,  Salvador,  Honduras, 
Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  Panama,  Ecuador,  Brazil, 
Peru,  Bolivia,  Chile,  Argentina,  and  Uruguay,  thus 
affording  a  grand  trunk  line  anywhere  from  the  border 
of  Canada  to  the  southernmost  end  of  South  America. 

This  project,  of  course,  is  not  of  very  recent  date. 
It  was  mapped  out  and  strenuously  advocated  as  long 
ago  as  the  days  when  Blaine  was  secretary  of  state, 
early  in  the  eighties.  It  was  an  integral  part  of  his 
Pan-American  policy,  and  the  Pan-American  congress 
which  at  that  time  met  in  Washington  indorsed  the 
plan  in  principle.  But  from  theory  to  practice  is  often 
a  long  way,  and  it  proved  so  in  this  case.  Practically, 
nothing  was  done  until  1900.  Then  the  Inter-Conti- 
nental Railway  Commission  surveyed  the  entire  route. 
Next,    at    the    second    International    Conference    of 

189 


190      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

American  States,  held  at  the  City  of  Mexico,  during 
the  winter  of  1901-02,  a  resolution  was  adopted  by  the 
delegates  from  the  various  states  represented,  indors- 
ing the  plan  outlined  by  the  railway  commission.  This 
resolution  was  preceded  by  a  very  thorough  discus- 
sion and  by  a  minute  statement  of  facts  showing,  ( i ) 
the  existing  lines  or  spurs  of  railroad  that  would  fit  in 
with  the  general  plan  of  the  Pan-American  Railway, 
and  (2)  the  lines  to  be  built  to  fill  up  the  gaps,  the 
length  of  these  gaps,  the  cost  and  engineering  diffi- 
culties to  be  met,  and  the  amount  of  appropriations, 
available  or  prospective,  which  would  fall  to  the  share 
of  each  South  or  Central  American  government.  A 
binding  agreement  was  then  reached  for  the  construc- 
tion (or,  in  a  sense,  the  completion)  of  a  continuous 
line  of  railroad,  fairly  homogeneous  in  character,  and 
of  equal  width  of  track,  that  will  permit,  within  the 
space  of  a  few  years  hence,  uninterrupted  passenger 
and  freight  traffic  along  the  line  of  the  two  con- 
tinents. 

Within  the  past  two  years  much  work  has  been  done, 
both  in  Central  and  South  America,  in  the  line  indi- 
cated. President  Roosevelt  appointed  Charles  M. 
Pepper,  an  able  and  energetic  man,  as  commissioner  to 
supervise  the  carrying  out  of  the  resolution  adopted  at 
the  City  of  Mexico  conference,  and  this  official  has  been 
greatly  instrumental  in  helping  the  task  along. 

At  this  writing  the  actual  status  of  the  whole  work 
is  as  follows : 

Actual  construction  work  is  being  done  on  railroads 
in  Mexico  as  far  as  the  border  of  Guatemala,  and  from 
the  terminus  of  the  present  system  of  railroads  in 
Argentina  north  to  the  frontier  of  Bolivia  and  beyond, 
thus  closing  the  sections  which  were  open  at  the  time 


The  Pan-American  Railway  191 

the  survey  of  the  Inter-Continental  Railway  Commis- 
sion was  made. 

There  is  a  marked  advance  among  the  various  coun- 
tries in  settling  boundary  disputes  and  other  questions 
at  issue,  thus  eliminating  causes  of  friction  which  re- 
tarded railway  communication  between  them. 

A  law  was  passed  by  Chile  providing  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  Transandean  line,  by  means  of  which 
there  will  be  direct  railway  communication  between  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  in  the  southern  triangle  of 
the  continent. 

There  has  been  legislation  in  Peru  and  in  several 
other  republics,  while  in  the  majority  of  the  remaining 
states  such  legislation  is  under  way,  establishing 
guarantee  funds  and  other  elements  of  permanent  rail- 
way policy. 

All  this  has  received  a  strong  impetus  by  the  defi- 
nite settlement  of  the  question  of  the  construction  of 
the  Panama  Canal,  and  by  the  taking  of  steps  on  our 
part  insuring  the  rapid  completion  of  this  interoceanic 
waterway.  There  are  signs  that  hereafter  energy  will 
be  displayed  in  a  far  higher  degree  by  the  Central  and 
South  American  republics  in  doing,  each  of  them,  their 
share  in  the  completion  of  this  Pan-American  Railway. 

At  present  the  mileage  of  railroads  within  the  whole 
territory  of  South  and  Central  America  is :  Argen- 
tina, 9126;  Bolivia,  671;  Brazil,  9718;  Chile,  3254; 
Colombia,  457;  Costa  Rica,  178;  Ecuador,  215;  Gua- 
temala, 430;  Honduras,  60;  Mexico,  12,076;  Nicara- 
gua, 400;  Paraguay,  217;  Peru,  1300;  Salvador,  80; 
Uruguay,  1400;  Venezuela,  800.  Altogether,  then, 
there  are  at  present  39,582  miles  of  railroad  in  South 
and  Central  America,  or,  roundly,  one-sixth  of  the 
mileage  of  the  United   States  alone.     This  in  itself 


192      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

shows  what  a  promising  field  for  railroad  construc- 
tion is  offered  in  that  vast  territory. 

Concerning  the  whole  inter-continental  route,  the 
estimate  of  Colonel  E.  Z.  Steever,  a  member  of  the 
engineering  corps  that  made  the  survey,  was  that  in 
1896  the  distance  over  the  general  location  from  New 
York  to  Buenos  Ayres  was  10,471  miles.  Of  this  he 
ascertained  that  5186  miles  were  then  in  operation, 
leaving  an  interval  of  5285  miles  to  be  covered.  From 
the  time  this  report  was  made  until  the  meeting  of  the 
conference  at  the  City  of  Mexico,  substantially  nothing 
was  done  in  closing  up  the  links.  But  since  then  about 
450  miles  have  been  filled  in  on  the  main  locations, 
leaving  4835  miles  to  be  constructed,  if  the  route 
marked  out  by  the  inter-continental  survey  should  not 
be  varied.  The  probability  of  shortening  the  distance, 
to  which  the  engineering  corps  called  attention  at  the 
time  of  survey,  seems  to  be  verified  by  later  surveys 
and  locations  in  the  interest  of  private  enterprises. 
Thus,  the  distance  over  the  Pan-American  Railway 
from  New  York  to  Buenos  Ayres,  at  first  fixed  at  10,- 
471  miles,  may  be  reduced  by  500  miles  or  more. 

Commissioner  Pepper,  in  his  latest  report  to  Secre- 
tary Hay,  gives  a  number  of  interesting  details  about 
the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  in  completing  the  Pan- 
American  Railway.  Incidentally  he  dwells  on  the 
growth  of  a  feeling  of  reliance  and  confidence  placed 
by  the  larger  number  of  South  and  Central  American 
republics  in  the  good  will  of  this  country. 

Mexico,  as  the  real  junction  point  of  the  inter-conti- 
nental extensions  with  those  railway  systems  which  are 
already  connected  with  the  United  States,  is  of  pecu- 
liar interest  in  this  matter.  The  Pan-American  Rail- 
way, properly  speaking,  starts  from  a  point  on  the 


The  Pan-American  Railway  193 

Mexican  Tehuantepec  Railroad,  that  point  being  San 
Geronimo,  and  thence  runs  northeast  to  the  border  of 
Guatemala,  260  miles.  Of  this  distance,  172  miles  are 
still  to  be  built.  The  Mexican  government  pays  a  sub- 
sidy to  the  company  constructing  this  road  of  $12,000 
(in  Mexican  silver),  for  each  kilometre  built,  or  $3,- 
816,000  for  the  whole  length.  By  the  terms  of  the  con- 
cession the  road  must  be  finished  on  September  11, 
1907,  but  the  probability  is  that  this  date  will  be  anti- 
cipated. 

Most  of  the  countries  of  Central  America  have  made 
the  building  of  interoceanic  or  transverse  lines  the 
cardinal  principle  of  their  policy.  This  plan  supple- 
ments the  inter-continental  project,  because  north  and 
south  lines  form  the  backbone  of  the  interoceanic 
system,  and  the  greater  progress  that  is  made  in  con- 
structing railways  from  the  Atlantic  ports  to  those  of 
the  Pacific,  the  greater  will  be  the  encouragement  to 
north  and  south  roads,  for  which  they  will  serve  as 
feeders. 

The  Panama  Canal  promises  to  help  much  in  the 
construction  of  both  longitudinal  and  transverse  lines. 
The  probability  that  the  Panama  railroad,  in  meeting 
the  demands  for  supplying  material  and  other  con- 
struction work  on  the  waterway,  will  be  unable  fully  to 
provide  for  the  international  traffic  which  now  fol- 
lows that  route,  indicates  the  utility  of  other  lines  be- 
tween the  two  oceans,  while  the  food  supplies  that  will 
be  required  show  the  necessity  of  increasing  the  present 
limited  means  of  transportation  from  the  interior  of  the 
region  adjoining  the  isthmus.  So  far,  however,  the 
Central  American  states  have  been  rather  slow  in 
availing  themselves  of  the  opportunities  thus  offered 
to  their  internal  development.     Several  of  their  legis- 


194     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

lative  bodies  are  now  bestirring  themselves  to  make  up 
for  lost  time. 

As  to  South  America,  conditions  are  in  a  more  ad- 
vanced state.  Beginning  at  the  far  south,  the  lines 
of  Argentina  stretching  northward  furnish  the  most 
essential  element  of  further  extension.  The  present 
system  of  Argentina  has  been  prolonged  to  Jujuy, 
about  looo  miles  distant  from  Buenos  Ayres.  Under 
a  treaty  negotiated  in  December,  1902,  the  Argentine 
government  is  now  building  the  Bolivian  section  of  the 
Central  Northern  Railroad,  from  Jujuy  to  Tupiza. 
The  same  government  will  operate  this  whole  line. 
The  connecting  link,  Jujuy  to  Tupiza,  a  distance  of  230 
miles,  will  meet  there  the  Pan-American  Railway. 
Once  this  section  is  completed,  it  is  certain  that  the 
further  extensions  will  be  made  through  Bolivia,  so 
that  within  a  few  years  this  section  of  the  inter-con- 
tinental route,  from  the  Argentine  frontier  on  the 
south  to  Lake  Titicaca  and  the  border  of  Peru  on  the 
north,  will  be  completed. 

The  railway  system  of  Chile  is  considerable  for  a 
country  of  relatively  small  size.  Between  1840  and 
1850  this  enterprising  country  already  began  building 
a  railroad  between  Valparaiso  and  Santiago.  Within 
the  last  year  measures  have  been  adopted  which  insure 
the  union  of  Valparaiso  on  the  Pacific,  with  Buenos 
Ayres  on  the  Atlantic,  by  a  tunnel  piercing  the  Andes, 
known  as  the  route  of  the  Uspallata  pass.  This  is  the 
extension  of  the  original  system.  When  completed, 
Chile  will  be  united  with  the  Argentine  railway  direct, 
and  will  thus  have  the  benefit  of  through  connection 
with  the  lines  extending  northward.  This  will  be  the 
first  railroad  to  cross  the  entire  continent  of  South 
America  in  a  direct  line.    The  Argentine  lines  already 


The  Pan- American  Railway  195 

have  been  extended  west,  via  Mendoza,  to  the  boun- 
dary limit  of  Chile  at  the  summit  of  the  Cordilleras, 
passing  through  Puente  del  Inca  to  Las  Cuevas.  On 
the  Chilean  side  this  summit  has  yet  to  be  pierced. 
The  actual  gap  is  only  29  miles,  but  the  engineering 
difficulties  are  numerous  and  great.  The  summit 
there  is  12,800  feet,  but  the  railway  will  cross  it  by 
tunnels  below  the  highest  elevation. 

Bolivia  has  clearly  recognised  the  importance  to  her 
development  of  the  Pan-American  Railway.  The  sec- 
tions to  be  formed  in  this  line  are  now,  some  of  them, 
surveyed,  while  others  are  already  under  construction. 
In  this  connection  the  settlement  of  the  long-standing 
quarrel  between  Bolivia  and  Brazil  over  the  Acre  ter- 
ritory has  greatly  favoured  Bolivia's  ambition  for 
wider  railroad  intercourse.  The  treaty  between  those 
two  countries  provides  for  a  cash  payment,  within  two 
years,  of  $10,000,000  by  Brazil  to  Bolivia.  The  latter 
country  will  expend  this  sum  for  railroad  purposes. 
By  this  means  a  through  system  will  be  provided  from 
the  Argentine  border  on  the  south  to  the  Peruvian 
boundary  on  the  north,  thus  forming  the  great  midway 
artery  of  through  railway  communication  between 
Buenos  Ayres  and  Lima,  as  well  as  enlarging  the 
means  of  commercial  intercourse  with  the  Amazon 
region  of  Brazil. 

The  most  significant  railway  movement  that  has 
taken  place  in  many  years  is  now  in  progress  in  Peru. 
The  railroad  extension  from  Oroya,  the  terminus  of 
the  line  built  by  Henry  Meiggs  for  the  Peruvian  gov- 
ernment, has  been  carried  on  to  Cerro  de  Pasco,  and 
the  line  was  opened  for  traffic  this  present  year.  The 
route  followed  is  almost  precisely  the  one  designated  in 
the  inter-continental  survey.     Primarily,  this  railroad 


196     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

was  built  to  foster  the  development  of  the  great  copper 
deposits  of  the  Cerro  de  Pasco  region. 

In  Ecuador  the  least  progress  of  all  has  been  made 
in  railroad-building  of  late.  But  at  present  the  project 
for  connecting  the  capital,  Quito,  with  the  coast  of 
Guayaquil  has  been  advanced,  and  the  road  is  now  in 
operation  as  far  as  Guamote.  Some  165  miles  are 
still  to  be  built  before  Quito  is  reached. 

In  Colombia,  not  much  more  progress  has  been  made. 
A  general  railroad  law  has  been  passed,  however, 
which  is  in  sympathy  with  the  Pan-American  project, 
and  the  surveys  of  the  latter  have  been  used.  Cauca, 
the  province  bordering  on  the  Pacific,  is  the  one  which 
will  be  traversed  by  the  main  trunk  of  the  inter-conti- 
nental line.  So  far,  only  a  short  spur  is  in  operation, 
between  Buenaventura  and  Cali,  a  distance  of  80 
miles.  Its  extension  to  Bogota  in  the  near  future  is 
anticipated.  There  are  large  anthracite  coal  deposits 
in  the  Cali  district,  and  a  profitable  traffic  is  assured 
from  the  outset. 

Brazil  has  a  progressive  railway  policy,  which  looks 
forward  to  communication  with  the  Andes  when  immi- 
gration and  colonisation  have  advanced  sufficiently  in 
that  direction  to  insure  the  rational  exploitation  of 
those  vast  and  rich  tropical  regions.  The  plans  for 
reaching  the  slopes  of  the  Cordilleras,  which  would  in- 
sure a  junction  with  the  main  transcontinental  line, 
are  well  matured.  One  means  will  be  the  joining  to- 
gether of  links  to  give  through  communication  for 
northern  Brazil  to  the  navigable  streams.  In  the 
growth  of  Brazilian  railways  the  policies  of  the  Federal 
government  of  that  republic  and  of  the  various  states 
composing  it  have  been  in  harmony.  This  has  helped 
in  a  closer   union   of   the   various   railway   systems, 


The  Pan-American  Railway  197 

though  in  so  enormous  a  country  there  is  necessarily 
disconnection. 

In  proportion  to  population,  Uruguay  has  the 
largest  railway  mileage  of  any  of  the  South  American 
republics.  The  relation  of  this  country  to  the  Pan- 
American  railway  and  the  South  American  railway 
systems  is  apparent  by  its  geographical  position  with 
reference  to  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Paraguay.  Under 
the  railroad  law  of  1884,  one  Uruguayan  road  runs 
from  Montevideo  toward  the  Uruguay  River  to  join 
the  Argentine  lines,  and  on  its  completion  through 
communication  will  be  established  with  Bolivia  and 
Peru.  Another  road  ends  at  Asuncion,  in  Paraguay, 
and  a  junction  with  the  inter-continental  trunk  line  is 
thus  established.  There  are  two  other  lines,  partially 
completed,  which  will  shorten  the  time  to  points  in 
Brazil,  and  which  would  form  a  section  of  the  ultimate 
Atlantic-Pacific  line  between  Pernambuco  and  Valpa- 
raiso. In  the  network  of  Uruguayan  and  Argentine 
railways  there  is  lacking  only  a  section  of  22  miles  to 
connect  Uruguay  with  the  Pan-American  railway. 
When  this  section  is  built,  there  will  be  direct  com- 
munication all  the  way  from  Montevideo  to  Jujuy,  in 
northern  Argentina. 

The  situation  of  Paraguay  in  the  heart  of  the  South 
American  continent  makes  it  especially  desirable  for 
that  country  to  be  connected  by  railroads  with  its 
neighbours.  The  only  railway  in  operation  so  far  is 
from  Asuncion  to  Villa  Encarnacion,  a  distance  of 
217  miles.  An  extension  to  Posadas  is  on  the  point  of 
completion,  and  then  Paraguay  will  have  quick  com- 
munication between  the  Plata  and  the  Paraguay 
rivers.  This  will  add  greatly  to  the  internal  devel- 
opment of  the  country.     This  region  will  also  be  the 


198     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

location  for  a  junction  for  the  inter-continental  trunk 
system  and  establishing  communication  between  Uru- 
guay, the  southern  states  of  Brazil,  part  of  Ar- 
gentina, Bolivia,  and  Peru. 

In  his  report  to  Mr.  Hay,  Commissioner  Pepper 
makes  this  observation :  "  It  is  the  opportunity  for 
the  United  States  to  extend  its  commerce  by  encourag- 
ing railroad  building  in  the  republics  which  are  its 
neighbours  and  friends,  and  which  look  to  it  for 
guidance.  The  benefits  of  this  extended  commerce 
will  be  enjoyed  by  all  the  nations  of  the  three  Amer- 
icas. The  attitude  of  the  respective  governments,  and 
their  earnest  desire  for  the  increase  of  United  States 
investments,  have  been  declared  with  frankness  and 
sincerity.  They  cannot  be  expected  to  bar  them- 
selves completely  from  European  capital,  yet  their  pref- 
erence for  North  American  investments  and  enter- 
prises is  significant.  Their  policy,  as  the  result  of  ex- 
perience, is  to  treat  with  reputable  and  legitimate  com- 
panies or  individuals.  For  capital  of  this  character 
there  is  every  encouragement,  not  only  in  the  growing 
stability  of  the  governments,  but  also  in  their  ability  to 
carry  out  their  guarantees,  and  in  their  disposition  to 
enact  legislation  which  will  meet  reasonable  re- 
quirements." 


CHAPTER  XIV 
THE  PACIFIC  HEREAFTER 

The  Pacific  during  the  twentieth  century  will  as- 
sume the  importance  which  the  Mediterranean  had  for 
the  leading  commercial  nations  of  ancient  times. 
Mediterranean  means  "  midland."  There,  it  meant 
Asia  and  Europe;  here,  it  will  mean  Asia  and 
America.  From  the  Mediterranean  the  sceptre  passed 
to  the  Atlantic,  and  now  the  time  is  ripe  for  the 
supremacy  of  that  immense  ocean  of  which  the  an- 
cients knew  nothing,  and  of  which  we  modem  people 
as  yet  know  so  little. 

In  the  chain  of  events  leading  up  to  our  own  time, 
the  exploitation  of  the  Pacific  stands  for  the  culminat- 
ing one.  It  means  the  intimate  joining  of  the  youngest 
with  the  oldest  nations,  the  union  of  the  lusty  West 
with  the  decrepit  East.  Whatever  changes  future 
cycles  will  bring  about,  the  retracing  of  our  road  from 
east  to  west  cannot  be  one  of  them. 

The  cutting  of  the  Panama  Canal  will  be  the  last 
geographical  event  of  the  first  magnitude.  There  are 
no  more  isthmuses  the  severing  of  which  could  shift 
the  commerce  of  the  world.  Looking  westward  over 
the  broad  expanse  of  the  Pacific, — from  San  Francisco, 
Seattle,  Port  Townsend,  and  Portland,  across  the 
waste  of  water  to  China  and  the  intervening  island 
world, — imperial  possibilities  lie  before  us.  We  believe 
that  in  that  direction  is  to  be  found  our  heritage  of 


200     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

expansion.  The  strong  hand  of  the  younger  branch 
of  the  Germanic  family  of  nations  is  about  to  stretch 
forth  and  grasp  those  wonderful  regions  of  the  earth, 
firmly,  though  kindly.  That,  indeed,  is  the  last  chapter 
in  the  gospel  of  expansion.  Through  the  Golden  Gate 
we  look  out  upon  the  Orient.  The  ruling  power  has 
ever  passed  to  younger  hands,  to  a  race  unspent  and 
with  the  wine  of  enthusiasm  in  its  veins. 

England  reaped  an  immense  advantage  from  the 
digging  of  the  Suez  Canal,  far  more  than  France,  al- 
though French  hands  had  done  the  work.  The 
Panama  Canal  will  transfer  that  advantage  to  the 
United  States,  with  the  all-important  certainty  that 
this  advantage  cannot  again  be  transferred  by  any 
geographical  cause.  Therefore,  the  commercial  su- 
premacy of  the  Pacific  will  be  final.  The  nation  hold- 
ing that  supremacy  will,  so  far  as  human  foresight  can 
discern,  hold  the  supreme  power  on  this  globe. 

When  the  commercial  and  maritime  drama  of 
Europe  was  shifted  from  its  stage  of  the  Mediterra- 
nean to  the  Atlantic,  those  nations  who  had  the  front 
seats,  got  most  out  of  it.  They  furnished  the  best-trained 
actors  in  the  stirring  scenes  of  exploration,  colonisa- 
tion, and  trade,  and  reaped  the  largest  rewards.  This 
was  fundamentally  brought  about  by  the  one  fact  of 
geographic  location.  The  same  principle  must  hold  on 
the  "  ocean  of  the  future."  But  in  this  case  the  de- 
velopment will  come  by  means  of  exploiting  the 
Pacific  from  the  basis  of  the  Atlantic.  Therefore, 
those  countries  which  have  a  foothold  on  both  these 
oceans  possess  the  vantage-ground;  their  potential 
strength  will  be  in  proportion  to  the  length  and  prox- 
imity of  their  two  ocean  frontages  and  the  resource- 
fulness of  the  interior  regions  dominated  by  them. 


The  Pacific  Hereafter  201 

In  some  respects  the  Pacific  affords  by  no  means 
such  fine  opportunities  for  commercial  development  as 
did  either  the  Mediterranean  or  the  Atlantic.  Except 
in  its  remote  parts  the  Pacific  is  not  studded  with 
islands,  as  is  the  Mediterranean.  From  the  whole  west 
coast  of  America  there  are  no  stepping-stones  invit- 
ing to  a  conquest  of  the  Pacific.  The  nearest  islands 
lie  in  midocean,  2000  miles  off.  In  other  respects,  too, 
the  natural  conditions  are  not  so  inviting  as  in  the  case 
of  the  Atlantic.  A  narrow  ocean,  near-lying  continents, 
remote  watersheds,  long  navigable  river  systems,  ac- 
cessible inland  regions,  a  large  back  country  to  draw 
upon — that  is  the  Atlantic  field.  A  vast  ocean,  remote 
continents,  a  few  unnavigable  rivers,  walls  of  moun- 
tain hugging  the  coast,  an  inaccessible  interior,  limited 
back  country — that,  as  to  its  general  features,  is  the  Pa- 
cific field.  That  ocean,  though  thrice  the  size  of  the 
Atlantic,  has  a  drainage  basin  less  than  half  as  large. 
In  Australia  and  South  America  the  mountains  rise 
directly  from  the  sea,  and  only  short,  plunging  tor- 
rents erode  their  slopes,  while  all  the  extensive  drain- 
age is  in  another  direction.  In  the  northern  continents 
the  watershed  is  1000  miles  or  more  inland,  and 
thereby  furnishes  almost  the  whole  drainage  area  of 
the  Pacific.  But  this  location  of  the  divides  does  not 
mean  navigable  streams  to  the  coast.  Indeed,  the 
character  of  our  American  Pacific  rivers  is  most  un- 
favourable for  navigation.  Those  of  Canada  are 
scarcely  better.  We  find  on  the  whole  Pacific  coast  of 
our  continent  but  the  Colorado,  the  Sacramento,  the 
Columbia,  the  Fraser,  and  the  Yukon  rivers.  Of  them 
the  Yukon  alone,  by  sweeping  around  to  the  north  of 
the  coast  range,  affords  a  navigable  course  for  steamers 
of  light  draught  for  1370  miles  to  Forty  Mile  Creek; 


202     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

there  the  international  boundary  Hne  of  Canada  and 
Alaska  crosses  the  river.  The  nature  of  the  country, 
however,  together  with  the  ice-bound  conditions  for 
most  of  the  year,  renders  the  Yukon  of  httle  commer- 
cial importance. 

Of  far  greater  importance  are  the  Asiatic  rivers  of 
the  Pacific.  The  Amoor  with  its  tributaries  (especially 
the  Shilka  and  Ussuri)  furnishes  hundreds  of  miles  of 
navigable  watei'ways.  Owing  to  the  northward  bend 
which  the  Amoor  makes  before  reaching  the  ocean, 
it  discharges  its  waters  into  the  Okhotsk  Sea,  however, 
and  its  port  is  frozen  six  months  of  the  year.  We 
know  Russia's  complaint  on  that  score.  The  next 
great  river,  the  Hoang  Ho,  though  watering  for  hun- 
dreds of  miles  the  great  plain  of  eastern  China,  is 
shifting  in  its  course  and  cannot  be  relied  upon  for 
navigation. 

The  lordly  Yang  Tse  alone  is  comparable  to  the 
great  rivers  of  the  Atlantic.  It  can  be  navigated  by 
steamers  and  barges  for  looo  miles  upwards,  and  it 
admits  ocean-going  vessels  up  to  Han  Kow,  630  miles 
from  its  mouth,  where  cargoes  of  tea  and  silk  may  be 
laden  for  America  and  Europe.  Of  the  other  Chinese 
rivers  of  importance,  the  Si  Kiang  and  Me  Kong  are 
rendered  practically  useless  for  navigation  by  rapids. 

Therefore,  of  all  the  rivers  flowing  east  and  west 
into  the  Pacific,  only  the  Yang  Tse  gives  a  good 
route  of  communication  between  the  interior  and  the 
coast.  That  is  why  we  find  it  lined  with  free  ports  all 
the  way  up  from  Shanghai  and  Chin  Kiang  to 
I  Chang,  1000  miles  inland.  The  Yang  Tse,  in  fact, 
is  the  one  valuable  river  adjunct  of  sea  power  in  the 
whole  Orient.  It  was  because  of  this  that  the  Briton 
early  claimed  it  as  his  specific  sphere  of  influence,  a 


The  Pacific  Hereafter  203 

claim  which  has  since  been  disallowed,  not  by  Grer- 
many  alone,  but  by  the  United  States,  and  Russia  as 
well.  Both  Germany  and  Russia  have  now  important 
commercial  interests  along  the  whole  navigable  course 
of  the  Yang  Tse.  Both  of  them  have  consuls  in  the 
chief  cities  along  this  river,  and  German  firms  particu- 
larly are  now  more  numerous  and  do  apparently  a 
larger  trade  than  the  British.  The  proceedings  be- 
tween Germany  and  England  during  1901  and  1902, 
and  the  compromise  finally  effected  between  them, 
show  beyond  doubt  that  England  has  relinquished  her 
former  pretension  to  absolute  commercial  supremacy 
along  the  Yang  Tse.  This  feature  of  the  case,  how- 
ever, can  only  be  advantageous  to  American  interests, 
since  practically  it  means  the  preservation  of  the 
"  open  door,"  and  equal  chances  with  the  other  powers 
for  our  future  trade  along  that  river. 

By  reason  of  its  long  irregular  coast  line  stretching 
through  twenty-one  degrees  of  latitude,  the  possession 
of  the  one  really  navigable  river  of  the  whole  Pacific, 
its  central  geographic  location  within  the  temperate 
zone,  and  its  large  territory  of  enormous  latent  re- 
sources, China  has  a  strong  position  on  the  Pacific. 
We  have  seen  in  another  chapter  that  she,  cut  off  for 
many  hundreds  of  years  from  the  quickening  influ- 
ences of  Western  civilisation,  has  not  profited  by  these 
great  natural  advantages.  On  the  other  hand,  Russia's 
frontage  on  the  Pacific  is  much  reduced  in  value  by  its 
far-northern  situation.  Japan  has  central  location,  a 
long  island  base,  and  is  possessed  of  the  spirit  of 
progress  which  makes  her  develop  the  maritime  ac- 
tivity of  her  people  at  a  wonderful  rate.  But  Japan 
has  a  small  area,  and  the  base  of  her  operations  does 
not  show  great  natural  resources.     She  is,  in  fact,  like 


204     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

England,  forced  to  expand  outwardly,  and  we  find  her 
to-day  on  a  keen  hunt  for  colonies  and  commercial 
strongholds  outside  her  own  home  sphere.  The  British 
possessions  in  India,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  North 
Borneo,  New  Guinea,  Hong  Kong,  Malacca,  and  nu- 
merous islands  give  to  the  home  country  a  wide  base  in 
the  Pacific.  But  the  scattered  location  of  these  pos- 
sessions, their  remoteness  from  the  national  centre  of 
strength  in  the  Atlantic,  and  also  from  the  storm- 
centre — the  northern  part  of  Far  Asia — together  re- 
duce the  value  of  her  maritime  strength  in  the  Pacific. 

Australia,  full  of  ambition,  is  nevertheless  debarred 
from  a  great  share  of  the  Pacific  hereafter,  and  this  by 
reason  of  her  lack  of  navigable  rivers  (the  Murray 
being  the  only  one,  and  even  that  being  of  slight  im- 
portance), the  sparseness  of  her  population,  her  torrid 
climate,  and  a  lack  of  sufficient  rainfall. 

China,  then,  is  the  only  power  on  the  Asiatic  shore 
of  the  Pacific  which,  by  reason  of  her  geographic  con- 
ditions, might  have  attained  political  and  commercial 
predominance  there.  But  aside  from  the  peculiar  po- 
litical conditions  which  have  prevented  her  from  doing 
so,  she  lacks  one  essential,  namely,  contact  with  the 
Atlantic. 

The  United  States,  everything  considered,  presents 
all  the  features  requisite  to  achieve  supremacy  in  the 
Pacific.    This  will  be  shown  under  a  separate  head. 

However,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  natural  conditions 
in  several  aspects  seem  less  promising  on  the  Pacific 
than  on  the  Atlantic,  the  former  is  the  "  coming 
ocean."  Let  us  cite  some  of  the  reasons  for  this 
claim. 

Commerce  depends,  first,  on  population.  Other 
things    being   equal,    the  greater   the   population   the 


The  Pacific  Hereafter  205 

greater  will  be  the  commerce.  Now,  the  present  popu- 
lation of  the  lands  bordering  on  the  new  Mediterra- 
nean is  considerably  in  excess  of  500,000,000,  one- 
third  of  the  population  of  this  globe.  If  we  include 
India,  to  which  the  commerce  of  the  Pacific  hereafter 
will  have  easy  access,  the  above  figure  rises  to  more 
than  800,000,000,  or  one-half  the  entire  human  family. 

But  this  is  the  present  population.  In  these  lands  on 
the  Pacific  there  is  room  for  an  enormous  expansion  of 
the  race.  Indeed,  though  it  is  a  fact  easily  explained, 
it  seems  singular  at  first  sight  that,  with  the  single  ex- 
ception of  China,  all  the  Pacific  lands  are  but  sparsely 
inhabited.  Europe  has  a  population  of  109.2  to  the 
square  mile;  Asia,  58.9;  Africa,  15.7;  North  America, 
only  13.8;  South  America,  5.3;  and  Australasia,  only 
1.4;  Siberia  is  just  about  as  sparsely  peopled  as 
Australasia.  If  the  population  of  North  and  South 
America  and  of  Australasia  were  one-half  as  dense  as 
that  of  Europe,  it  would  aggregate  923,000,000. 

The  rain  supply  of  the  Old  World  is  but  scant,  while 
there  is  an  abundance  of  it  on  our  hemisphere.  As  a 
consequence,  the  greatest  river  systems  are  here,  and 
the  greatest  deserts  there.  Geographers  find  as  much 
arable  land  in  America  as  in  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa 
combined,  namely,  about  10,000,000  square  miles. 
This  statement  has  been  endorsed  by  as  great  an  au- 
thority as  the  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,"  and  the 
same  authority  says :  "  If  the  natural  resources  of  the 
American  continent  were  fully  developed,  it  would  af- 
ford sustenance  to  3,600,000,000  of  inhabitants." 

In  the  above  estimate  of  arable  land  in  America  is 
not  included  the  vast  region  north  of  the  53d  degree. 
And  yet  it  is  there  that  resources  almost  limitless  have 
been  discovered.    James  W.  Taylor,  considered  an  au- 


2o6     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

thority  on  this  topic,  claims  that  in  the  western  half  of 
Canada  there  are  still  200,000,000  acres  of  land  well 
adapted  to  wheat  culture,  but  now  lying  fallow.  This 
would  be  equal  to  the  larger  part  of  Europe,  with  a 
population  of  215,000,000. 

Alaska  likewise  has  resources  which  are  not  com- 
prised in  the  above  estimate.  Its  cod-banks  are  the 
greatest  in  the  world,  with  an  extent  of  about  2600 
miles,  and  its  grazing  resources  will  sustain  millions 
of  head  of  cattle. 

Therefore,  whatever  the  population  of  the  American 
continent  may  finally  be,  a  time  will  come  when  it  will 
support  more  people  than  the  Old  World,  and  this  for 
the  simple  reason  that  it  is  capable  of  supporting  more. 

A  glance  at  Australasia  shows  similar  conditions, 
though  by  no  means  on  the  same  scale.  New  Zealand, 
the  inhabitants  of  which  are  the  antipodes  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  is  very  rich  in  natural  resources, 
and  is  suited  eminently  to  agriculture  and  grazing. 
Some  20,000,000  acres  are  still  under  forest.  In  1901, 
there  were  reported  in  New  Zealand  21,305,000  sheep. 
The  climate  of  this  island  is  delightful,  admirably 
adapted  to  Europeans  or  Americans.  In  time  it  will 
become  very  wealthy  and  populous.  There  are  pro- 
ductive mines  of  coal,  gold,  silver,  and  other  precious 
or  useful  minerals  on  the  island,  and  the  annual  output 
of  these  is  now  between  $9,000,000  and  $11,000,000. 

Australia  is  much  less  favoured  by  nature.  A  hint 
of  that  was  given  before.  Still,  in  the  possession  of 
sturdy  Anglo-Saxon  stock,  of  late  formed  into  a  feder- 
ation of  states,  much  may  be  expected  from  it.  The 
mineral  wealth  of  Australia  is  amazing.  Since  the 
discovery  of  gold,  almost  $2,000,000,000  of  it  have 
there  been  brought  to  the  surface.     Silver  exists  in 


The  Pacific  Hereafter  207 

considerable  strata,  and  tin,  copper,  lead,  and  iron  are 
also  profitably  mined.  New  South  Wales  alone,  up  to 
1900,  had  produced  coal  to  the  value  of  $187,357,000. 
There  are  grazing  on  Australian  land  over  110,000,- 
000  sheep,  and  together  with  those  of  New  Zealand, 
furnished  (in  1901)  567,000,000  pounds  of  wool. 
Her  exports  of  frozen  meats,  leather,  tallow,  hides, 
furs,  and  other  agricultural  products  are  very  large. 

There  are  barely  3,600,000  in  the  Australian  colo- 
nies, but  this  small  population  has  accumulated  $7,- 
000,000,000  of  wealth,  or  almost  $2000  per  head. 
This  is  a  figure  which  exceeds  that  of  our  own  wealth 
per  head  of  population.  Australia's  foreign  trade  has 
attained  to  the  enormous  sum  of  nearly  $1,000,000,- 
000  per  year,  thrice  as  much  as  that  of  China  with  a 
population  more  than  a  hundredfold  greater.  Evi- 
dently, Australia  will  play  a  figure  in  Pacific  trade,  and 
will  be  capable  of  supporting  a  much  larger  population. 

Of  the  South  American  continent  and  its  almost 
limitless  potentialities  we  have  spoken  before.  It  is 
but  reasonable  to  conjecture  that  by  the  middle  of  the 
present  century  its  population  will  have  trebled,  and 
its  wealth  quadrupled. 

The  tropical  wealth  of  the  Dutch  East  Indies  will  be 
spoken  of  more  in  detail  elsewhere.  It  may  suffice  to 
say  here  that  this  archipelago,  having  an  area  of  783,- 
000  square  miles,  and  with  a  population  of  about  36,- 
000,000,  that  is,  less  than  one-eighth  the  density  of 
population  of  England,  will  support  in  the  near  future 
twice  that  number. 

The  Malay  Peninsula  and  Siam,  Indo-China  and 
French  India,  Formosa  and  Corea,  lastly  China,  all 
have  populations  which  under  more  favourable  condi- 
tions may  be  doubled  and  trebled,  and  have  natural  re- 


2o8      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

sources  of  the  first  magnitude.  Quickened  by  Western 
influences,  these  regions  will  hereafter  play  a  great 
part. 

The  population  of  Japan  is  very  dense,  and  her  scale 
of  living  is  low,  at  least  when  compared  with  ours. 
But  Japan  has  willingly  submitted  to  western  civilisa- 
tion. She  has  become  a  manufacturing  nation  of  some 
account,  and  her  foreign  commerce  flourishes,  rising 
by  leaps  and  bounds.  Thus,  we  may  expect  the  con- 
sumptive powers  of  her  people  to  increase  at  something 
of  the  same  rate  it  has  already  increased,  namely, 
threefold  since  1870.  And  this  means,  commercially 
speaking,  an  equivalent  to  a  large  increase  in  popu- 
lation. 

China's  resources,  as  was  shown  before,  are  almost 
limitless.  The  introduction  of  western  civilisation 
will  necessarily  have  in  its  wake  the  raising  of  her 
standard  of  living.  At  present,  the  Chinaman  of  the 
lower  classes  earns  in  money  about  5  per  cent,  of  what 
our  labouring  men  or  mechanics  earn.  Even  admitting 
the  improbability  of  such  a  rapid  advancement  in 
China  as  occurred  in  Japan,  and  putting  the  increase 
in  purchasing  power  of  the  Chinese  people  at  one-half 
or  one-third  the  increase  of  the  Japanese  during  a 
given  time,  that  would  mean,  nevertheless,  speaking 
in  a  commercial  sense,  the  doubling  and  trebling  of 
our  trade  with  her. 

It  was  shown  in  another  chapter  that  China's  popu- 
lation, speaking  of  the  empire  as  a  whole,  has  by  no 
means  reached  the  limits  of  density.  There  are  very 
thickly  settled  portions  of  China,  but  even  that  province 
which  shows  the  greatest  density  of  population,  that 
is,  Shan  Tung,  exceeds  but  slightly  England's  density. 
For  the  whole  of  China  we  find  a  density  per  square 


The  Pacific  Hereafter  209 

mile  of  only  95,  as  against  188  in  France,  209  in 
Germany,  315  in  Great  Britain,  and  536  in  England. 
If  China  were  as  densely  peopled  as  Japan,  she  would 
have  thrice  her  present  population.  Under  favouring 
circumstances,  we  may  look  in  China  for  such  an  in- 
crease within  this  present  century,  simply  because  she 
is  vastly  richer  in  natural  resources  than  any  of  her 
neighbours,  and  has  a  climate  mild    and  yet  bracing. 

There  is  Siberia,  an  enormous  expanse  of  country, 
and  though  her  natural  conditions  are  far  inferior  to 
those  of  China,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  the 
six  millions  of  her  present  inhabitants  within  this 
twentieth  century  will  increase  to  twenty  or  thirty  mil- 
lions. For,  after  all  is  said  and  done,  she  has  the 
immense  Russian  hinterland  with  its  teeming  millions, 
ever  seeking  an  outlet  and  better  opportunities  east- 
wardly.  Siberia  is  a  country  of  magnificent  distances, 
and  she  is  rich  in  gold,  platinum,  iron,  and  copper,  in 
valuable  forests  and  fur-bearing  animals,  in  arable 
and  grazing  lands,  at  least  in  her  southern  fringe.  The 
Czar  offers  great  bounties  to  the  Siberian  immigrant. 
To  each  Russian  family  intending  to  settle  in  Siberia 
he  gives  some  300  acres  of  land,  a  loan  of  $300  for 
thirty-two  years  without  interest,  agricultural  imple- 
ments at  cost,  and  exemption  from  military  service, 
while  free  transportation  is  furnished  to  families  with- 
out means.  To  the  starving  peasant  of  European 
Russia  such  an  offer  seems  almost  the  millennium. 

The  Philippines,  too,  within  a  short  time  will  be  on 
the  highroad  to  prosperity.  Even  under  the  paralys- 
ing reign  of  Spain,  this  large  group  of  islands  had  a 
foreign  trade  of  v$32, 000,000  per  year.  What  may  be 
expected  under  American  rule !  John  Barrett,  one-time 
minister  of  this  country  to  Siam,  says :    "  Even  Java, 


210     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

the  garden  of  the  East,  with  a  foreign  trade  of  $250,- 
000,000  annually,  has  no  such  large  extent  of  fertile 
areas  as  the  Philippines."  We  may  confidently  look 
to  a  vast  increase  of  her  present  population  of  9,000,- 
000  and  of  her  foreign  trade. 

Summarising,  then,  this  hasty  survey  of  the  lands 
which  border  on  the  Pacific,  we  find  three  conditions : 
First,  the  countries  on  the  north,  east,  and  southwest 
are  vast  continents,  sparsely  settled  at  present,  but  by 
reason  of  their  intrinsic  potentialities  capable  of  an 
enormous  increase  of  population.  Second,  scattered 
over  the  more  remote  portions  of  the  Pacific  are  thou- 
sands of  islands,  lying  mostly  in  the  tropics,  and  with 
great  natural  resources.  Of  these  many,  such  as  Su- 
matra and  Borneo,  are  tenanted  by  savages,  but  may 
be  brought  under  the  influence  of  civilisation,  which 
means  trade.  Third,  on  the  mainland  of  Asia  we  dis- 
cover millions  upon  millions  of  people  who,  under  the 
vitalising  influence  of  Occidental  civilisation,  will  be 
able  to  increase  their  earning  and  purchasing  powers 
immensely.  In  fine,  we  have  ascertained  conditions 
presaging  an  almost  boundless  increase  in  the  trade  of 
the  Pacific. 

But  this  trade,  even  at  present,  is  no  small  matter, 
John  Barrett  in  this  connection  says  that  "  the  foreign 
trade  of  this  wonderful  Pacific-Asiatic  coast  line,  that 
winds  in  and  out  for  4000  miles  from  Singapore  to 
Vladivostok,  is  valued  at  the  mighty  sum  of  $1,000,- 
000,000,  and  yet  is  only  in  the  earliest  stages  of  its 
development." 

This,  it  must  be  remembered,  leaves  aside  the  foreign 
trade  of  Australia  and  Oceanica,  itself  amounting  to 
considerably  over  $1,000,000,000,  the  export  and  im- 
port trade  of  the   Dutch   East   Indies,   which  means 


The  Pacific  Hereafter  211 

another  $250,000,000,  and  also  that  of  the  British 
Indies,  Siam  and  the  French  possessions,  and  some 
other  hitherto  neglected  regions.  If  all  this  were  in- 
cluded, the  total  annual  figure  for  the  Pacific  trade 
would  rise  to  the  gigantic  total  of  $5,000,000,000. 
With  all  that,  it  must  be  conceded  that  this  trade  is 
still  in  its  infantile  stage,  capable  of  great  development. 

Let  us  analyse,  however,  a  little  more  closely  the 
present  main  items  of  trade  in  this  region,  and  some 
of  its  natural  resources. 

In  1902,  these  countries  together  produced  1,207,- 
000,000  pounds  of  wool  out  of  the  world's  total  of 
2,752,000,000  pounds.  A  few  of  these  new  lands,  con- 
taining only  6  per  cent,  of  the  world's  population,  pro- 
duced of  late  years  30  per  cent,  of  the  world's  wheat. 
In  1902,  Pacific  countries  gave  up  some  $176,900,000 
in  gold,  while  all  other  lands  together  yielded  but 
$121,560,000.  The  proportion  of  the  world's  silver 
produced  by  these  lands  was  still  greater,  namely, 
$203,653,000,  against  $22,439,000  from  the  remainder 
of  the  world.  Indeed,  the  borderlands  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean  are  amazingly  rich  in  precious  metals.  They 
are  to  be  found  in  abundance  in  Australia,  New  Zea- 
land, the  Philippines,  China,  Corea,  Alaska,  California, 
British  Columbia,  and  all  along  the  western  coast  of 
South  and  Central  America,  even  to  Patagonia.  In 
that  inhospitable  region  at  the  southernmost  end  of 
South  America,  Tierra  del  Fuego,  it  is  estimated  that 
mineral  wealth  awaits  the  enterprising  miner  which 
may  equal  or  exceed  that  of  the  Klondike. 

Hereafter,  we  must  look  for  a  much  keener  compe- 
tition in  the  whole  Pacific  than  obtains  now.  The 
Panama  Canal,  while  furnishing  vastly  increased  op- 
portunities for  a  larger  and  more  profitable  trade  with 


212     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

all  the  Pacific  countries,  will  necessarily  have  also  this 
effect  of  putting  each  of  the  leading  trading  nations  on 
its  mettle.  The  race  for  wealth  and  power  will  be  a 
spirited,  a  pitiless  one,  and  each  must  put  his  best  foot 
foremost.  Enterprise  is  considered,  the  world  over, 
a  distinctly  American  characteristic.  This  is  the  time 
to  prove  it.  The  China  market  during  the  next  twenty 
years  will  be  the  great  bone  of  contention. 

The  enormous  size  of  the  Pacific,  and  the  great  dis- 
tances to  be  traversed  between  ports  located  on  either 
shore,  has  told  so  far  against  rapid  expansion  in  the 
Pacific.  The  Pacific  at  the  equator  has  a  width  of 
10,000  miles,  8500  at  the  Tropic  of  Cancer  between 
Hong  Kong  and  Mazatlan  on  the  Mexican  coast,  and 
4750  between  Yokohama  and  San  Francisco.  This 
means  more  than  double  the  average  width  of  the  At- 
lantic, and  the  entire  absence  of  islands,  except 
midway,  emphasises  this  fact  still  more.  But  we  must 
not  forget  the  fast-increasing  average  rapidity  of 
ocean  communication.  The  present  Pacific  steamer 
lines  do  not  come  up  in  this  respect  to  requirements 
that  will  be  made  hereafter.  A  twenty-one-knot  vessel 
would  cross  the  Pacific  between  San  Francisco  and 
Yokohama  in  ten  days,  between  Valparaiso  and  Vladi- 
vostok in  seventeen  days,  and  between  the  two  remotest 
points,  lying  10,000  miles  apart,  in  twenty-two  days. 
Such  vessels  will  plough  the  Pacific  as  soon  as  the  pres- 
sure of  new  conditions,  precipitated  by  the  digging  of 
the  Panama  Canal,  will  have  begun  to  be  seriously  felt. 
Indeed,  with  the  speed-rate  on  the  Atlantic  steamer 
lines  constantly  increasing,  even  faster  time  than  the 
above  may  be  looked  for. 

In  the  foregoing  it  has  probably  become  sufficiently 
evident  to  the  reader  that  the  greater  portion  of  man- 


The  Pacific  Hereafter  2 1  3 

kind  will  soon  be  gathered  around  the  New  Mediter- 
ranean, because  there  is  plenty  of  elbow-room,  and  also 
because  there  are  the  resources  capable  of  sustaining 
and  enriching  the  world.  Becoming  the  centre  of  the 
world's  population  and  commerce,  the  Pacific  will  be- 
come likewise  the  centre  of  the  world's  wealth  and 
power.  At  the  close  of  this  century  San  Francisco 
will  probably  have  succeeded  New  York  as  the  im- 
perial city  of  America. 

There  have  been  some  few^  far-sighted  men  in  the 
long  ago  who  predicted  such  a  turn  in  man's  affairs. 
One  of  them  was  Alexander  von  Humboldt,  that  saga- 
cious scientist  and  cosmopolitan  traveller  who,  in  his 
chief  work,  more  than  half  a  century  ago,  predicted  the 
ultimate  supremacy  of  the  Pacific.  Several  of  our 
American  statesmen,  William  H.  Seward  and  Thomas 
H,  Benton  among  them,  had  a  similarly  acute  pre- 
vision. 

Surveying  to-day  soberly  all  the  inherent  facts,  any 
man  possessing  the  ability  of  correlating  facts  and 
drawing  a  conclusion  may  well  say:  It  is  the  Pacific, 
its  shores,  its  islands,  and  the  vast  inland  regions 
which  will  become  the  chief  theatre  of  events  in  the 
world's  great  hereafter. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  DUTCH  EAST  INDIES 

There  is  one  colonial  empire  within  the  Pacific 
sphere  of  influence  which,  curiously  enough,  has  so 
far  escaped  the  attention  of  Americans.  That  is  the 
Dutch  East  Indies.  It  is  a  curious  fact  in  more  ways 
than  one,  because  the  untold  riches  of  this  matchless 
group  of  islands  under  Dutch  sway  have  formed  the 
burden  of  many  a  song  and  story  for  centuries  past, 
and  still  more  because  this  archipelago,  since  our  ac- 
quisition of  the  Philippines,  has  become  our  close 
neighbour.  Every  vessel  coming  from  the  west  has  to 
thread  its  way  cautiously  through  this  maze  of  islands 
before  it  can  reach  the  Philippines  or  the  countries 
beyond,  China  and  Japan.  And  yet,  after  all,  it  is  not 
so  curious,  this  ignoring  of  the  Dutch  East  Indies  on 
our  part.  For,  from  the  start,  it  has  been  the  owner's 
shrewd  policy  to  brag  as  little  as  possible  about  his 
property,  to  keep  everything  close,  and  to  prevent,  as 
far  as  practicable,  the  outside  world  from  discussing 
the  modes  and  methods  by  which  the  tiny  Netherlands 
have  clung,  ever  since  1600,  so  tenaciously  to  this 
tropical  mine  of  wealth.  Theirs  has  been  a  policy  of 
addition,  division,  and  silence,  and  they  have  thrived 
wonderfully  well  under  it.  But  new  conditions  have 
arisen  of  late,  to  the  great  dismay  of  the  honest  and 
long-headed  burgher  of  Amsterdam,  and  it  is  well  to 
take  note  of  that. 

214 


The  Dutch  East  Indies 


215 


2i6     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  what  a  vast  posses- 
sion is  that  of  Netherlands-India.  It  nearly  equals  in 
size  British  India  itself,  covering  an  area  of  783,000 
square  miles,  and  lying  altogether  within  the  luxuriant 
tropics.  But  though  for  three  hundred  years  past  the 
thrifty  Dutchman  has  drawn  immense  wealth  into  his 
coffers  from  these  colonies,  they  have  not  cost  him 
(until  the  very  recent  past)  much  blood  or  treasure. 
No  Clive  or  Hastings  had  to  fight  warlike  hosts,  in 
order  to  establish  the  supremacy  of  the  Hollander  over 
the  Malay.  With  Holland,  in  fact,  rule  over  that  rich 
island  world  began  quite  modestly,  purely  as  a  matter 
of  barter  and  sale  with  the  dusky  native,  the  precious 
spices  of  the  Moluccas  being  the  objective  point. 
These  beginnings  were  about  1600,  very  soon  after  the 
little  country  had  fought  her  way  to  recognised  inde- 
pendence from  the  Spanish  yoke.  A  trading  company, 
something  like  the  British  East  India  Company,  but 
more  grasping  and  monopolistic  in  character,  ex- 
ploited the  riches  of  the  Malayan  archipelago  for  fully 
two  hundred  years  before  Holland  ever  thought  of 
exerting  any  real  political  rule  over  the  scattered 
islands.  This  company  poured  million  after  million 
into  the  lap  of  the  privileged  few  at  home,  and  its 
ships  plied  the  southern  seas  with  the  one  end  in  view 
of  getting  cargoes  of  precious  wares  for  next  to 
nothing,  and  selling  them  on  the  Amsterdam  bourse 
for  their  weight  in  gold. 

The  nineteenth  century  came,  and  during  the  Na- 
poleonic wars  the  Dutch  Indies  became  the  good  prize 
of  Britain.  But  the  Congress  of  Vienna  restored  to 
the  Netherlands  their  treasured  possessions.  For 
another  half-century  and  more  the  old  policy  of 
"  squeeze  "  was  pursued  by  Holland  in  managing  her 


I 


The  Dutch  East  Indies  217 

East  Indian  isles,  and  the  subject  population  of  Java, 
Celebes,  Madura,  and — as  far  as  circumstances  per- 
mitted— of  Sumatra  and  Borneo  as  well,  was  kept  at 
hard  and  ceaseless  labour  to  enrich  the  Dutch  spoils- 
men. Dr.  Clive  Day  of  Yale  has  lately  told  the 
English-speaking  world  all  about  the  horribly  inhu- 
man governmental  methods  persisted  in  by  the  Nether- 
lands in  Java.  A  change  for  the  better  has  been 
wrought  within  the  past  thirty  years.  The  present 
system  of  administration  in  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  par- 
ticularly Java,  the  "  Pearl  of  the  Tropics,"  may  be 
termed  one  of  "  credit  bondage."  This  means  that 
the  native,  by  nature  lazy,  is  forced  to  work  for  his 
creditor  until  his  debt  is  extinguished.  Almost  every 
native  is  actually  under  debt,  and  he  lives  and  dies  a 
debtor.  Not  only  so,  but  the  debt  descends  to  his  chil- 
dren and  children's  children.  It  is,  therefore,  some- 
thing worse  than  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  "  coolie 
labour  "  system.  However,  this  present  system  is  a 
vast  improvement  over  former  ones.  It  is  defended 
not  only  by  the  Dutch  themselves,  but  by  many  for- 
eign observers,  as  being  the  only  method  possible  in 
Java  and  the  whole  Dutch  East  Indies  under  given  cir- 
cumstances. Count  Joachim  Pf  eil,  a  German  authority, 
in  his  recent  book,  likewise  approves  of  it  and  recom- 
mends its  adoption  for  Germany's  African  colonies  as 
the  only  means  to  induce  the  natives  there  to  work. 

A  striking  contrast  is  thus  presented  between  the 
Dutch  East  Indies,  under  the  rule  of  Holland,  and  the 
Philippines,  under  American  sway. 

The  determining  idea  with  the  Dutch  is  to  compel 
the  native  to  work,  and  to  work  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Dutch  people  and  government,  leaving  the  labourer 
himself  just  enough  for  the  bare  necessities  of  life. 


21 8      The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

The  main  staple  in  Java  is  coffee,  and  the  cuhure, 
purchase,  and  sale  of  that  are  a  government  mo- 
nopoly. 

The  American  idea  is  to  raise  the  native  Filipino,  by 
stages,  to  a  higher  level  of  mentality,  morals,  and  eco- 
nomic efficiency,  thus  gradually  making  a  responsible 
political  being  of  him. 

Which  of  the  tw^o  ideas  is  the  correct  one  is  a  riddle 
time  alone  can  solve.  But  on  the  face  of  it,  nothing 
could  well  be  more  repugnant  to  American  conceptions 
of  the  rights  and  ends  of  man  than  the  Dutch  way  of 
treating  a  subject  population,  one,  too,  showing  a 
close  race  affinity  with,  and  standing  at  present  just 
about  on  the  same  level  as,  the  bulk  of  the  population  in 
our  Philippines.  What  incarnate  cruelty  these  Dutch 
masters  have  been  guilty  of  in  their  treatment  of  the 
Malay  natives  may  be  judged  by  a  single  illustration. 
A  famine  broke  out  in  central  Java,  one  of  the 
naturally  richest  parts  of  the  world,  and  over  300,000 
natives  died  of  hunger.  This  was  solely  due  to  the 
fact  that  by  the  so-called  "  culture  system  "  in  vogue, 
the  Dutch  administration  in  Java,  compelling  each 
person  to  labour  in  the  coffee  fields  at  a  per  diem  al- 
lowance of  about  one  cent,  made  it  impossible  for  the 
starving  natives  to  till  their  fruitful  fields  for  the  pur- 
pose of  supplying  their  own  crying  needs. 

It  has  been  stated  that  there  is  to  be  seen  improve- 
ment, relatively  speaking,  in  administrative  methods 
in  the  Dutch  East  Indies.  To-day  such  wholesale 
waste  of  human  lives  no  longer  occurs.  Under  the 
new  civil  service  rules,  natives  of  Java,  after  passing 
an  examination,  may  be  appointed  to  minor  offices  in 
the  local  and  provincial  governments.  But  "  credit 
bondage  "  survives,  and  altogether  the  same  brutally 


The  Dutch  East  Indies  219 

selfish  and  grasping  methods  still  prevail,  making  out 
of  the  native  a  beast  of  burden. 

With  all  that,  these  Dutch  administrative  methods 
in  Java  and,  more  or  less,  in  the  other  islands,  are  sig- 
nally failing.  For  a  period  of  thirty-five  years  Java 
alone  had  yielded  the  home  government  a  large  and 
regular  surplus,  computed  to  have  been  some  $350,- 
000,000  within  that  period.  Of  late  years  there  has 
been  a  regular  deficit,  steadily  rising.  In  1902,  it 
amounted  to  $3,821,226,  and  in  1903,  to  $6,017,170. 
For  1904,  the  budget  is  likely  to  show  a  still  larger 
shortage. 

Let  us  look  a  little  more  closely  at  the  resources  and 
prevaling  material  conditions  in  this  archipelago  under 
Dutch  rule.    We  find  the  following : 

Java  and  Madura,  50,554  square  miles,  population, 
28,745,698;  Sumatra  (east  coast),  31,649  square 
miles,  population,  1,527,297;  Sumatra  (west  coast), 
35,312  square  miles,  population,  421,088;  Sumatra 
(Lampongs),  11,284  square  miles,  population,  142,- 
426;  Sumatra  (Palembang),  53,497  square  miles, 
population,  692,317;  Sumatra  (Atjeh),  20,471  square 
miles,  population,  110,804;  Island  of  Benkulen,  9399 
square  miles,  population,  158,767;  Borneo  (west  coast), 
55,825  square  miles,  population,  370,775 ;  Borneo 
(south  and  east),  156,912  square  miles,  popula- 
tion, 716,822  ;  Celebes,  49,390  square  miles,  population, 
1,448,700;  Celebes  (Menado),  22,080  square  miles, 
population,  293,947;  Dutch  New  Guinea,  151,789 
square  miles,  population,  200,000;  Molucca  Islands, 
43,864  square  miles,  population,  430,855;  Bali  and 
Lombok,  4065  square  miles,  population,  431,696; 
Timor  archipelago,  17,698  square  miles,  population, 
119,239;  and  a  number  of  smaller  or  larger  islands,  of 


220     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

which  Banca  (with  famed  tin  mines)  and  BilHton 
are  the  most  important,  giving  a  total  of  something 
over  36,000,000  (census  of  1900)  in  population,  and 
an  area  of  783,400  square  miles. 

The  revenues  for  Java,  in  1901,  amounted  to  149,- 
255,766  Dutch  guilders  (the  guilder  equals  42  cents), 
and  the  expenditures  to  148,279,953,  leaving  a  surplus 
of  975,823.  For  1902,  the  figures  were  152,186,414 
and  159,728,866,  respectively,  making  a  shortage  of 
7,542,452  guilders.  Last  year,  as  stated  before,  the  de- 
ficit had  grown  to  double  the  last-named  figure. 

By  examining  somewhat  closely  the  budget  figures 
of  1903,  we  find  that  out  of  the  total  expenditures  of 
165,383,599  guilders,  the  home  government  spent  34,- 
662,974  guilders,  leaving  to  Java  itself  a  sum  of  130,- 
720,725  guilders.  About  one-third  of  the  general  ex- 
penditure of  Java  is  for  army  and  navy  purposes,  an- 
other third  for  general  administration  of  the  colonial 
offices,  and  one-third  is  used  in  helping  to  pay  the  in- 
terest on  the  national  debt  and  for  railroads  and  other 
internal  improvements. 

As  was  briefly  mentioned  before,  the  main  source 
of  revenue,  both  for  the  government  and  for  the 
Dutch  planters  and  residents  of  this  imperial  island,  is 
cofifee.  In  quality  and  price,  Java  coffee  enjoys  practi- 
cally a  monopoly  the  world  over.  There  are,  however, 
a  variety  of  other  means  of  revenue,  such  as  the  salt 
monopoly,  railway  incomes,  taxes  on  trades,  the  opium 
tax,  customs  duties,  and  taxes  on  mining  privileges. 
A  clear  distinction  is  made  in  the  official  account  of  im- 
ports and  exports  in  Java  between  "  government  mer- 
chandise "  and  "  private  merchandise."  For  1900,  the 
imports  of  Java  amounted  to  195,923,522  guilders, 
whereof  9,370,149  "government  merchandise."     The 


The  Dutch  East  Indies  221 

exports  were  259,033,606  guilders,  whereof  "  govern- 
ment merchandise,"  26,954,304.  Altogether,  then,  ex- 
ports and  imports  for  that  year  amounted  in  American 
money  to  about  $186,000,000. 

The  principal  articles  of  export  are :  coffee,  sugar, 
rice  (of  which  one-half  goes  to  Borneo  and  China), 
tea,  indigo,  cinchona,  tobacco,  and  tin.  More  than 
four-fifths  of  the  whole  export  goes  to  the  Netherlands. 
The  imports  of  Java,  in  even  a  larger  proportion,  are 
from  the  Netherlands.  The  remaining  small  fragment 
of  the  import  trade  is  almost  altogether  in  the  hands  of 
Britain  and  British  colonies.  This  country  has,  prac- 
tically, no  direct  trade  with  Java. 

In  1900,  there  entered  the  principal  ports  of  Java 
3445  steamers,  with  a  tonnage  of  1,638,666,  and  sail- 
ing vessels,  1842,  with  a  tonnage  of  588,868.  In  1901, 
the  total  length  of  railways  in  the  island  was  1348 
miles,  the  revenues  of  which  amounted  to  18,447,000 
guilders.  Within  the  Dutch  Indies  in  the  same  year 
there  were  7003  miles  of  telegraph  in  operation. 

The  Chinese  question  in  Java  is  a  very  interesting 
one,  although  quite  different  in  character  from  our 
own.  The  Chinaman  there  is  not  the  "  hewer  of  wood 
and  drawer  of  water."  He  is  the  merchant  and  capi- 
talist, the  shrewd  and  unscrupulous  trader,  going  the 
canny  Dutchman  always  "  one  better." 

From  the  above  birds-eye  view  it  will  have  been  no- 
ticed that  Java,  economically  considered,  forms  the 
very  backbone  of  the  Dutch  empire  in  the  Indies.  Out- 
side of  that  island  population  is  sparse  and  largely  in 
a  barbarous  condition.  For  thirty  years  past,  Su- 
matra, a  large  island  of  boundless  intrinsic  possibili- 
ties, but  with  very  small  population  and  very  little  de- 
veloped, has  cost  Holland  a  pretty  penny.    The  Atchi- 


222     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

nese,  a  sturdy  and  bellicose  tribe  inhabiting  the  north 
end  of  the  island,  have  been  in  a  state  of  constant  re- 
bellion. To  subdue  them,  Holland  has  spent  within 
that  time  a  sum  aggregating  several  hundred  million 
dollars,  and  her  loss  in  troops  and  civilian  population 
due  to  these  "  murthering  villians,"  has  amounted  to 
over  60,000.  This  fact  forms  a  curious  feature  of  Dutch 
colonial  history,  for  it  stands  out  alone.  Nor  is  that 
part  of  Sumatra  very  valuable.  It  must  be  the  inborn 
stubbornness  of  the  Dutch  character  that  is  responsible 
for  such  an  enormous  and  disproportionate  outlay  in 
money  and  men.  The  Atchinese  war  is  still  on,  nor  is 
there  apparently  any  prospect  of  a  speedy  end  of  it. 
During  March  last,  in  a  single  engagement  between  the 
Dutch  colonial  troops  and  the  rebellious  Atchinese, 
677  of  the  latter  were  left  dead  on  the  field.  The  Dutch 
East  Indian  army  is  maintained  at  about  38,000,  and 
nowadays  it  is  almost  altogether  used  to  keep  these 
savage  Atchinese  in  a  more  or  less  complete  state  of 
subjection. 

And  that  brings  us  to  the  question :  what  is  to  be- 
come of  the  Dutch  East  Indies?  The  question  may 
well  be  asked  in  view  of  all  the  attendant  circumstances. 
Let  us  examine  them. 

Holland's  hold  on  her  East  Indian  possessions  is 
steadily  relaxing.  In  Mr.  Colquhoun's  "  Mastery  of 
the  Pacific  "  there  occurs  the  following  passage : 

"  Up  to  the  present  time  Holland  has  been  singu- 
larly successful  in  preserving  her  colonial  empire  from 
outside  influences,  but  with  the  recent  developments  in 
the  Pacific  a  change  must  inevitably  come.  The  po- 
sition of  Netherlands-India  between  two  go-ahead  and 
flourishing  democracies — Australia  and  the  United 
States  in  the  Philippines — will  make  it  difficult  to  pre- 


The  Dutch  East  Indies  223 

serve  the  isolation  and  monopoly  hitherto  maintained 
by  the  Dutch,  and  the  revolutionary  methods  adopted 
by  the  United  States  cannot  be  without  great  influence 
on  all  the  other  islands  of  the  Malay  archipelago.  To 
educate  8,000,000  Malays  in  the  English  tongue  is  in 
itself  a  step  fraught  with  the  most  far-reaching  con- 
sequences, and  it  seems  impossible  that  the  Javanese, 
Celebeans,  Borneans,  and  the  many  semi-independent 
tribes  of  other  islands  should  not  be  swept  up  by  the 
wave  of  civilisation  which,  for  good  or  evil,  has  at 
length  caught  a  great  part  of  their  race  on  its  crest 
and  is  bearing  them  on  towards  an  unknown  future. 
...  Is  Netherlands-India  to  be  exempt — to  lie  like  a 
log  in  the  middle  of  the  great  Pacific  trade  routes  and 
not  be  absorbed  into  the  busy,  bustling,  wide-awake 
whole?  The  colonial  Dutch — who  form  seven-eighths 
of  the  white  population — are  rapidly  becoming  alienated 
from  their  native  land,'and  a  population  is  springing  up 
which  is  as  little  Dutch  as  the  Spanish  Mestizos  of  the 
Philippines  are  Spaniards,  and  these  cannot  be  said  to 
see  eye  to  eye  with  their  rulers.  Nevertheless,  Dutch 
phlegm,  combined  with  an  indolence  born  of  the  tropical 
climate,  would  prevent  any  very  strong  colonial  spirit 
from  growing  up  unless  pressure  occurs  from  outside. 
Such  pressure  is  likely  to  occur  in  the  immediate  future. 
Not  only  will  Britain,  the  United  States,  Japan,  and 
Australasia  enter  into  the  keenest  competition  in  the 
new  fields  of  enterprise  in  the  Pacific,  and  so  cut  away 
the  ground  under  Holland's  feet  and  render  her  slack 
tenure  of  many  islands  precarious,  but  the  ambitions 
of  France  and  Germany  will  further  complicate  the 
situation.  If  the  prosperity  of  the  Javanese  planter 
were  to  decline,  who  knows  that  he  might  not 
prefer  to  be  under  the  flag  of  an  enterprising  power, 


224     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

rather  than  one  whose  creed  is  '  As  it  was  and 
ever  shall  be ! '  That  Germany  casts  longing  eyes 
in  the  direction  of  the  East  Indies  has  long  been  an 
open  secret,  and  that  she  intends,  sooner  or  later,  to 
swallow  up  her  little  neighbour  in  Europe  everyone 
knows,  but  the  Hollanders  will  take  a  good  deal  of 
swallowing,  despite  the  German  alliance  of  their  queen 
and  other  circumstances.  The  colonies  are  another 
thing,  and  we  may  yet  live  to  see  a  Greater  Germany 
in  the  Pacific." 

This  is  all  very  true,  as  far  as  it  goes,  but  there  are  a 
good  many  other  things  that  enter  into  this  problem. 
Here  are  a  few  of  them : 

The  Hollanders  are  a  small  nation  of  5,000,000, 
numerically  too  small  to  colonise  their  colonies  in  the 
full  sense.  That  is  why  we  find  in  the  hundreds  of 
islands  making  up  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  with  the 
single  exception  of  Java,  so  few  Dutchmen,  even  in- 
cluding officials  and  soldiers.  Their  colonial  anny  is 
made  up,  to  the  extent  of  nine-tenths,  of  foreigners  and 
hirelings.  The  officials,  at  least  those  holding  minor 
offices,  are  largely  natives  or  foreigners.  Excepting  in 
Java,  Dutch  rule  in  this  whole  archipelago  is  usually 
represented  only  by  a  "  resident,"  and  would  crumble 
to  pieces  at  the  first  attack  by  a  vigorous  outside 
power. 

For  Holland,  the  days  of  profitably  administering 
her  colonies  are  over.  The  regular  and  increasing 
deficit  in  her  colonial  budgets  shows  this.  Even  the  mo- 
nopolistic system  and  the  serfdom  in  which  she  has 
held  the  Javanese — forming  over  three-fourths  of  her 
entire  subject  population — for  three  hundred  years  past, 
have  not  been  able  to  prevent  this.  The  Atchinese  war 
has  been  a  curse  under  which  the  small  Dutch  nation 


The  Dutch  East  Indies  225 

has  been  groaning  for  over  thirty  years  past,  encum- 
bering her  budgets  and  decimating  her  colonial  army. 

The  Dutch  do  not  care,  and  never  did  care,  for  colo- 
nies per  sc,  but  only  in  so  far  as  they  bring  treasure  to 
her  coffers.  For  a  number  of  years  the  Dutch  have 
seen  the  writing  on  the  wall.  It  is  but  necessary  to 
study  with  attention  their  newspapers  and  magazines 
to  become  convinced  of  that. 

Since  1898,  when  Dewey's  guns  reverberated 
throughout  Far  Asia,  the  Dutch  have  felt  that  their 
nile  in  the  East  Indies  is  doomed.  Since  that  time,  the 
question  has  been  ventilated  by  them,  not  so  much 
whether  they  shall  relinquish  their  dominion  in  Asiatic 
waters,  as  rather  to  whom.  This  topic  of  discussion  has 
more  than  once  been  transferred  to  their  national  par- 
liament, and  with  every  airing  of  the  subject  the  number 
of  those  advocating  the  sale  or  cession  of  their  colonies 
has  increased.  Of  course,  the  one  fact  that  their  colo- 
nies have  ceased  to  be  profitable  to  them  has  been  the 
chief  factor  in  this  growing  desire,  although  the  fur- 
ther consideration  that  sooner  or  later  some  larger  and 
more  ambitious  power  will  deprive  her  of  these  pos- 
sessions has  also  had  much  to  do  with  it. 

In  other  words,  stripped  of  all  verbiage,  the  ques- 
tion for  the  Dutch  people  has  narrowed  down  to  this  : 
Who  is  to  be  our  successor  in  the  Far  East?  That 
question,  of  course,  may  be  answered  in  various  ways. 
Germany  answers  it  in  one  way. 

That  Germany  has  had  her  eye  on  the  Dutch  pos- 
sessions in  Asia  during  the  last  thirty  years  is  a  fact 
which  cannot  well  be  denied.  The  German  press  has 
often  discussed  it,  advocated,  or  advised  against,  their 
acquisition.  All  the  driving  forces  of  German  public 
opinion  have  been  in  favour  of  acquisition  in  one  form 


226     The  Pacific  and  the  Panama  Canal 

or  another.  The  question  has  popped  up  in  the  Reichs- 
tag again  and  again.  In  fact,  it  may  be  asserted  with- 
out any  reserve  that  the  overwhelming  portion  of  the 
German  people  would  be  willing  to  submit  to  almost  any 
sacrifice  for  the  control,  direct  or  indirect,  of  the  Dutch 
East  Indies.  Nothing  could  be  more  natural  for  the 
Germans  than  such  a  wish  and  purpose.  For  Germany 
is  overcrowded  and  needs  new  fields  of  expansion. 
Within  the  Dutch  press,  a  few  of  the  leading  organs 
have  favoured  German  acquisition  of  these  East  In- 
dian possessions,  or  else  condominion,  Germany  guar- 
anteeing possession.  But  as  a  matter  of  pure  choice, 
the  Dutch  people  would  prefer  France  for  their  suc- 
cessor in  Asia.  They  do  not  fear  annexation  by 
France,  but  they  do  fear  it  from  Germany,  and  they 
do  not  wish  to  hasten  the  process.  Still,  if  France,  for 
some  reason  or  other,  should  not  desire  to  take  over  the 
Dutch  inheritance,  the  people  of  the  Netherlands  would 
rather  see  Uncle  Sam  become  the  happy  heir  than  their 
German  neighbour,  and  this  for  similar  reasons  to 
those  actuating  them  as  regards  France. 

It  is,  then,  broadly  speaking,  a  choice  for  the  Dutch 
people — and  perhaps  not  for  them  alone — between  the 
three  nations  of  Germany,  France,  and  the  United 
States,  as  to  who  is  to  be  the  future  owner  of  the  Dutch 
East  Indies.  The  moment  when  such  transfer  or  pur- 
chase is  to  take  place  may  still  be  years  off.  On  the 
other  hand,  events  in  the  Pacific  may  proceed  here- 
after at  such  an  accelerated  pace  that  the  decision  must 
come  between  one  day  and  the  next.  In  any  event,  it 
will  be  the  part  of  wisdom  and  of  legitimate  national 
egotism  for  Americans  to  acquaint  themselves  now 
with  the  leading  facts  underlying  this  most  interesting 
problem,  so  that  events  hereafter  may  not  take  them 


The  Dutch  East  Indies  227 

unprepared.  It  is  well  to  face  this  matter  boldly  and 
with  eyes  open,  for  the  Dutch  East  Indies  may  well  be 
compared  with  an  overripe  plum  which  will  drop  at 
the  first  shaking  of  the  tree  into  some  enterprising  na- 
tion's lap.  The  Dutch  cannot  hold  it  much  longer; 
everything  points  that  way. 

That  being  so,  the  question  crops  up:  Who  is  to 
have  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  Germany  or  the  United 
States?  Let  us  keep  in  mind  that  this  Dutch  island 
empire  is  our  next-door  neighbour  in  the  Philippines, 
the  latter  being  our  base  and  lever  for  the  whole  Amer- 
ican policy  in  Far  Asia,  and  that  German  acquisition 
of  that  wonderful  region  would  no  more  be  palatable 
than  her  acquisition  of  the  Danish  Antilles  in  the 
Caribbean  Sea,  and  this  because  of  the  same  attendant 
circumstances. 


THE    RACE   IS    TO   THE  WISE 


CHAPTER  XVI 
OUR  EQUIPMENT  FOR  THE  RACE 

Throughout  this  book  the  assertion  has  been  met 
with,  here  and  there,  that  this  nation  is  destined  to  be 
the  supreme  factor  in  the  future  development  of  the 
Pacific.  We  are  now  concerned  with  proving  this 
contention. 

The  most  momentous  advantage  of  the  United  States 
is  her  interoceanic  location,  giving  two  great  bases  of 
action.  The  location  itself  we  share  with  Mexico,  the 
Central  American  republics,  Colombia,  and  Chile; 
this  last-named  country  owns  a  narrow  tape  of  terri- 
tory extending  around  the  southern  extremity  of  the 
continent  to  the  Atlantic  entrance  of  the  Straits  of 
Magellan.  But  all  these  countries,  for  practical  pur- 
poses, can  be  left  out  of  the  reckoning;  they  possess 
neither  size  nor  political  and  commercial  development 
sufficient  to  enable  them  to  become  competitors,  and 
this  even  if  we  ignore  the  economic  inferiority  of  their 
Latin-American  populations. 

To  the  north  of  us,  a  young  and  ambitious  neigh- 
bour, of  the  same  blood  and  aspirations  as  ourselves, 
has  also  a  broad  frontage  on  both  oceans,  enjoying, 
moreover,  as  part  of  the  British  Empire,  the  great  ad- 
vantages to  be  derived  from  the  possession  of  British 
mid-ocean  islands  in  the  Pacific,  to  serve  as  way-sta- 
tions to  the  opposite  coasts.  British  Columbia,  with 
its  looo  miles  of  seaboard  and  its  excellent  harbours, 

231 


232  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

occupies  a  fine  position  in  relation  to  trade  with  China 
and  Japan,  Siberia  and  Manchuria.  This  colony 
enjoys  other  natural  advantages,  such,  for  instance,  as 
large  coal  mines  yielding  an  article  of  excellent  quality, 
a  point  of  particular  importance  because  of  the  scarcity 
of  coal  along  the  whole  United  States  littoral.  Again, 
British  Columbia  has  all  of  Canada's  resources  back  of 
her — another  item  of  strength  on  her  ledger.  But 
allowing  for  all  this,  the  disadvantage  of  a  location  too 
far  north  and  west,  a  sparse  population,  an  undeveloped 
hinterland,  and  the  immense  distance  which  severs  her 
from  the  mother  country,  when  taken  together,  min- 
imise the  natural  advantages  enumerated  before. 

Since  the  middle  of  the  last  century  the  fact  defined 
itself  that  the  United  States  was  to  be  a  Pacific  power. 
It  was  clearly  recognised  at  the  outset  by  American 
statesmen,  and  our  national  policy  has  been  consistently 
shaped  accordingly.  The  conquest  of  California  and 
the  acquisition  of  Oregon,  together  with  the  rapid 
settlement  of  these  promising  territories,  were  chief 
stepping-stones  in  this  direction. 

The  mere  presence  of  the  United  States  on  the 
Pacific  sufficed  for  a  long  time  to  fix  the  idea  firmly 
in  the  minds  of  Europe's  statesmen  that  we  had  come 
to  stay  there  and  that  our  role,  with  every  new  year, 
must  necessarily  gain  in  importance.  This,  too,  was  the 
guiding  reason  which  induced  Russia,  in  1867,  to  press 
upon  us  Alaska,  thus  strengthening  our  base  on  the 
Pacific  and  weakening  that  of  her  hereditary  enemy — 
England.  For,  with  Alaska  in  our  hands,  British 
Columbia  was  placed  between  the  fires  of  American 
enterprise  on  both  its  northern  and  southern  borders. 
The  "  ten  marine  leagues,"  moreover,  which  fix  the 
width  of  the  long  "  panhandle  "  of  southern  Alaska, 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         233 

cut  off  1000  miles  of  the  natural  Pacific  frontage  of 
British  Columbia.  Again,  the  possession  of  the  penin- 
sula and  the  Aleutian  Islands  gives  our  Pacific  base 
a  reach  of  over  4000  miles,  from  San  Diego  to  Attn, 
300  miles  beyond  the  international  date-line  of  the 
1 80th  meridian,  and  only  600  miles  from  the  nearest 
Japanese  islands.  Alaska  has  made  us  a  near  neigh- 
bour of  Russia,  the  Bering  Strait  alone  separating  us 
from  her  Asiatic  dominions. 

Americans  have  been  slow,  overslow,  in  recognising 
the  immense  value  of  Alaska,  not  alone  in  material 
resources,  but  as  a  strategic  base  in  our  Pacific  policy, 
and  as  a  means  of  curtailing  British  influence  which 
otherwise  would  be  overweening.  It  is  only  since  the 
acquisition  of  the  Philippines  that  this  truth,  plain 
and  easily  grasped  as  it  is,  has  been  slowly  gaining 
headway  in  the  mind  of  the  nation.  Indeed,  in  the 
approaching  struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  Pacific,  our 
possession  of  Alaska  will  be  an  all-important  factor. 
With  it  we  are  invincible ;  without  it  we  should  be  de- 
prived of  one  of  our  best  weapons. 

Take  the  item  of  coal  and  mineral  mines  as  an  illus- 
tration. Coal  and  iron  abound  in  many  parts  of 
Alaska.  On  the  Chilkat  River  the  supply  is  appar- 
ently inexhaustible.  Professor  Davidson,  of  the  Coast 
Geodetic  Survey,  relates  that  while  at  Chilkat  he 
noticed  the  marked  aberration  of  the  needle  of  his 
compass,  and  discovered  that  it  was  caused  by  a  moun- 
tain of  iron  ore  some  2000  feet  high.  On  further 
investigation  this  mountain  proved  to  be  only  one  of 
a  range  of  similar  character  extending  30  miles.  This 
authority  adds:  "As  if  nature  had  anticipated  its  use 
to  man,  a  coal  mine  was  found  nearby."  The  greatest 
copper  ledge  in  the  United  States  and  a  lake  of  oil  are 


234 


The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 


reported  from  Alaska.  The  timber  wealth  of  Alaska 
is  perhaps  unequalled,  and  it  is  peculiarly  rich  in  yellow- 
cedar,  so  remarkable  for  its  durability  both  on  land 
and  sea. 

It  is,  however,  the  coal  wealth  of  Alaska,  above  all, 
which  commands  our  attention,  and  this  both  for  the 


Alaskan  Coal  Fields 

Conrtesy  of  Engineering  Magazine 

reason  that  coal  of  good  quality  is  scarce  along  the 
whole  borders  of  the  Pacific  in  America  and  Asia,  and 
because  this  coal  exists  in  profusion  and  in  unexcelled 
quality.  The  first  field  with  promises  of  real  com- 
mercial importance  was  found  pretty  far  north  along 
the  coast,  just  east  of  the  mouth  of  Copper  River. 
This  coal  is  the  best  found  on  the  whole  Pacific  sea- 
board, equal  to  the  standard  Albion  Cardiff  coal  of 
Wales.  The  seams  are  thick  and  extensive.  The  coal 
found  just  off  Cook  Inlet,  at  the  extremity  of  the  Kenai 
Peninsula,  is  likewise  commercially  exploitable.  How- 
ever, the  most  important  of  Alaskan  coal  fields  lies 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         235 

still  farther  west  towards  the  extremity  of  the  long, 
slender  Alaskan  Peninsula  and  on  Unga  Island,  crop- 
ping out  in  many  seams  at  Portage  Bay  on  the  Pacific, 
as  well  as  Herendeen  Bay  on  Bering  Sea.  This  coal 
ranks  next  in  quality  to  that  discovered  near  the  mouth 
of  Copper  River,  and  is  equal  to  any  mined  farther 
south.  Because  of  the  situation  of  the  field  near  pro- 
tected harbours — an  important  matter  in  the  wide 
sweep  of  the  Pacific — and  its  location  on  the  great 
circle  of  navigation,  constituting  the  shortest  route  for 
steamer  lines  between  the  United  States  and  any  part 
of  Asia,  it  assumes  paramount  importance.  Portage 
Bay  will  be  a  coaling  station  three  degrees  of  longi- 
tude farther  west  than  Honolulu  and  one  equipped 
with  its  own  mines,  from  which  coal  will  be  delivered 
to  deep-sea  vessels  at  low  cost.  Situated  in  the  lati- 
tude of  Glasgow,  and  like  it  exposed  to  mild  ocean 
winds,  the  Portage  Bay  mines  have  a  winter  not  more 
severe  than  that  of  New  York ;  thus,  climate  will  inter- 
pose no  obstacles  in  their  development.  The  above 
facts  are  largely  taken  from  a  minute  report,  based 
on  surveys  on  the  spot,  made  by  H.  Emerson,  an 
American  civil  engineer  of  note.  His  report  has 
since  been  verified  abundantly,  and  the  national  gov- 
ernment has  based  its  calculations  for  the  future 
upon  it. 

Following  close  on  Dewey's  victory  in  Manila  Bay 
and  the  subsequent  acquisition  of  the  Philippines,  came 
the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  certain  other  advan- 
tages, hitherto  overlooked,  had  to  be  made  speedy  use 
of  to  strengthen  our  strategic  and  commercial  position 
in  the  Pacific.  The  annexation  of  Hawaii  was  the 
first  step  taken,  and,  of  course,  the  most  important.  It 
was  supplemented  by  the  practical  assertion  of  our 


236  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

rights  of  possession  of  Wake  Island  and  Guam,  the  lat- 
ter being  the  southernmost  isle  of  the  Ladrones  group. 
In  this  way  a  direct  mid-ocean  line  of  communication 
between  the  home  shore  and  the  Philippines  was 
assured.  Looking  at  this  achievement  from  any  point 
of  view — commercial,  political,  or  military — it  must 
be  considered  a  master-stroke  of  prompt  politics. 

The  annexation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  in- 
evitable. They  had  sought  refuge  under  the  starry 
banner  a  half-century  before,  and  many  times  after. 
They  had  been  successively  under  British,  French, 
and  American  protection,  but  the  logic  of  events,  as 
well  as  their  geographic  location  and  the  economic 
conditions  depending  on  the  latter,  again  and  again 
brought  them  into  the  maelstrom  of  American  affairs. 
This  country  had  at  no  time  been  indift'erent  to  the 
ultimate  fate  of  Hawaii,  and  had  twice  interfered  in 
her  behalf  with  England;  and  once,  in  1850,  with 
France.  Daniel  Webster  already  declared,  in  1843, 
that  no  other  power  must  get  possession  of  these 
islands.  Economically,  since  1876,  Hawaii  had  been 
brought  entirely  under  American  influence.  Her  chief 
crop — indeed  almost  her  only  one,  namely,  sugar — 
was,  under  the  compromise  of  1876,  entirely  absorbed 
in  this  country,  being  admitted  free  of  duty.  Ameri- 
can capital  was  almost  exclusively  exploiting  the  isl- 
ands many  years  before  formal  annexation  took  place. 
In  fact,  Hawaii,  for  all  her  beautiful  clime  and  tropical 
fertility,  would  have  starved  or  run  to  seed  if  she  had 
not  been  able  to  sell  her  sugar  to  this  country,  for  such 
is  her  geographic  location  that  the  only  consumer  to 
whom  she  can  profitably  dispose  of  her  products  is  the 
United  States. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  Hawaii  means  much  to  us. 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         237 

Look  at  Hawaii  on  the  map.  Midway  between 
Unalaska  and  the  Society  Islands,  midway  between 
Sitka  and  Samoa,  midway  between  Port  Townsend 
and  the  Fiji  Islands,  midway  between  San  Francisco 
and  the  Carolines,  midway  between  the  Panama  Canal 
and  Hong  Kong,  and  on  the  direct  route  from  South 


To  »««ilf .  JWSjmH;  _  - 


Nil 
KAULA 


ilH*u4rH«n»pepe,^^  y,^  „  ^  ^  ■ 

^C'tL  I  Tithtital 

;  ,850  ~1"         .--'       rfl*   //    VK»iin»k»k»i        /©.<;* 


■*?«. 
«*() 


Fi>oi.  p<j^Koh»l»  C«Bt|« 


Hawaii 

American  ports  to  Japan,  the  central  location  of  these 
islands  makes  their  commercial  importance  evident. 

But  vastly  greater  is  their  strategic  value  to  the 
United  States.  Captain  Mahan  says :  "  Too  much 
stress  cannot  be  laid  upon  the  immense  disadvantage 
to  us  of  any  maritime  enemy  having  a  coaling  station 
well  within  2500  miles  of  every  point  of  our  coast  line 
from  Puget  Sound  to  Mexico.  Were  there  many 
others  available,  we  might  find  it  difficult  to  exclude 
from  all.  There  is,  however,  but  the  one.  Shut  out 
from  the  Sandwich  Islands  as  a  coal  base,  an  enemy 
is  thrown  back  for  supplies  of  fuel  to  distances  of  3500 
or  4000  miles — or  between  7000  and  8000  going  and 


238  The  Race  U  to  the  Wise 

coming — an  impediment  to  sustained  maritime  opera- 
tions well-nigh  prohibitive.  It  is  rarely  that  so  im- 
portant a  factor  in  the  attack  or  defence  of  a  coast  line 
— of  a  sea-frontier — is  concentrated  in  a  single  posi- 
tion, and  the  circumstance  renders  it  doubly  impera- 
tive upon  us  to  secure  it,  if  we  righteously  can." 

This  was  written  in  1893,  and  the  final  annexation 
of  Hawaii  shows  that  the  lesson  and  warning  con- 
veyed in  the  above  were  minded  at  the  right  moment. 

With  the  Sandwich  Islands  we  have  acquired  Pearl 
Harbour,  of  which  Admiral  Walker  said :  "  It  should 
not  be  forgotten  that  Pearl  Harbour  offers,  strategi- 
cally and  otherwise,  the  finest  site  for  a  naval  and  coal- 
ing station  to  be  found  in  the  whole  Pacific." 

In  1899,  by  virtue  of  the  tripartite  agreement  be- 
tween the  United  States,  Germany,  and  England,  we 
obtained  absolute  ownership  of  Tutuila  and  Manua, 
part  of  the  Samoan  Islands.  The  superior  harbour 
situated  on  Tutuila,  namely,  Pango-Pango,  had  been 
ceded  to  us  as  early  as  1872,  but  never  actively  occu- 
pied until  after  Dewey's  achievement  in  Manila,  again 
showing  a  prompt  recognition  of  our  widened  sphere 
of  influence.  These  two  islands  and  the  splendid  har- 
bour mentioned  are  likewise  of  great  strategic  value. 
They  lie  at  about  14  degrees  south  latitude  and  170 
degrees  west  longitude,  on  the  direct  path  from  Puget 
Sound  to  Sydney,  Australia,  and  on  a  line  from 
Panama  to  east  Australian  ports.  That  describes  their 
significance  for  the  United  States. 

Let  us  now  turn  for  a  moment  to  the  Philippines. 
They  are  in  the  immediate  proximity  of  the  southern 
coast  of  China,  and  in  the  pathway  of  Far  Asian  com- 
merce. Manila  is  only  628  miles  from  Hong  Kong, 
and  812  miles  nearer  than  Singapore.     It  is  400  miles 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         239 


nearer  China  than  Yokohama.  It  lies  directly  on  the 
route  between  Hong  Kong  and  Australasia.  The  chief 
distributing  centres   of   China,   Japan,    Corea,    Siam, 


240  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

Annam,  and  the  East  Indies  are  as  near  to  Manila  as 
Havana  is  to  New  York,  and  the  distributing  centres 
of  British  India  and  Australasia  are  nearer  to  Manila 
than  to  any  other  great  emporium.  When  we  consider 
that  the  imports  of  all  these  countries  chiefly  consist 
of  goods  which  we  can  furnish  cheaper  and  better  than 
any  other  country,  we  get  a  suggestion  of  the  possible 
commercial  future  of  Manila  under  energetic  American 
domination.  Besides,  our  possession  of  the  Philip- 
pines has  enormously  increased  American  prestige  in 
China  and  throughout  the  East. 

The  Hawaiian  Islands,  Wake  Island,  and  Guam 
form  a  line  of  communication  to  Manila  lying  between 
the  narrow  limits  of  the  13th  and  21st  parallels.  The 
American  terminal  points  of  this  line  are  located  at  San 
Francisco,  Los  Angeles,  and  Panama,  and  to  all  three 
of  these  Honolulu  holds  a  central  position.  The  pre- 
eminence which  it  now  enjoys  as  the  radiating  point 
of  the  great  commercial  routes  of  the  Pacific  will  only 
be  enhanced  with  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
because  it  will  lie  in  the  path  of  an  increasing  file  of 
vessels  moving  along  from  Panama  to  China,  Japan, 
or  Asiatic  Russia.  At  the  western  end  of  this  island 
chain  of  communications  are  the  Philippines.  This 
large  group,  scattered  over  an  area  measuring  1000 
miles  north  to  south  and  half  as  much  east  to  west,  is 
located  wholly  within  the  tropics,  and  distributed 
around  it  in  a  wide-sweeping  semicircle  are  the  Far 
Asian  countries  whose  vast  populations  make  the  mar- 
kets of  the  East. 

At  present  we  supply  this  whole  market  with  only 
about  1 1  per  cent,  of  its  imports,  while  the  commercial 
countries  of  Europe  have  a  share  of  50  per  cent,  of  this 
import   trade.     The   total   commerce   of   the   United 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         241 

States  with  Asia  and  Australasia  has  risen  from  $138,- 
000,000  in  1892  to  $287,000,000  in  1902,  having  more 
than  doubled  within  a  single  decade.  Under  the  new 
conditions  which  we  are  now  facing,  these  figures  will 
rapidly  rise  to  double  and  treble  the  amount. 

Considering,  therefore,  the  problem  of  the  future 
Pacific  supremacy  from  the  three  points  of  geograph- 
ical location,  commercial  advantages  and  facilities  for 
iiianufacture,  and,  lastly,  of  strategic  strength,  we  find 
the  United  States  impregnable.  No  other  nation  or 
group  of  nations  possesses  anything  approximating  our 
combined  advantages.  Two  other  points  remain  for 
consideration.  One  is  population,  and  the  other  is 
naval  strength. 

As  to  the  former,  the  facts  are  well  within  our  ken. 
We  shall  soon  have  passed  the  100,000,000  point,  and 
the  middle  of  this  century  will  probably  see  this  nation 
fairly  under  way  towards  the  second  hundred  million. 
Our  immigration,  far  from  diminishing,  has  of  late 
years  risen  to  heights  equalled  only  during  a  few  ex- 
ceptional years  before,  and  the  annual  a\^erage  is  now 
higher  than  ever.  With  that,  while  in  the  older  East- 
ern States  (due  to  a  variety  of  causes)  the  rate  of 
natural  increase  has  been  diminishing,  it  is  steadily  on 
the  increase  in  the  West  and  South.  We  may  easily 
look  forward,  therefore,  to  the  time  when,  with  the 
single  possible  exception  of  Russia,  our  mere  numerical 
superiority  will  exert  an  unparallelled  influence  in  a 
policy  of  expansion  in  the  Far  East  and  in  South 
America. 

The  same  amount  of  confidence  can  hardly  be  felt 
when  it  comes  to  discussing  the  question  of  naval  su- 
periority. With  the  close  friendship  now  existing  be- 
tween this  country  and  Great  Britain,  it  has  become 


242  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

a  habit  of  speech  and  thought  with  many  Americans 
to  group  the  two  navies,  the  British  and  the  American, 
under  one  head.  But  this  is  scarcely  in  accordance 
with  the  underlying  facts.  For  in  the  matter  of 
supremacy  in  the  Pacific  we  cannot  expect  Great 
Britain  to  forego  her  own  hopes  and  ambitions.  To 
do  so  would  be  folly.  There  can  be  only  one  su- 
premacy, be  it  British  or  American,  and  no  joint  action 
in  such  a  mat.er  is  possible.  The  Briton  in  the  Pacific 
hereafter  will  be  one  of  our  most  formidable  foes,  just 
as  much  as  the  German — in  fact,  almost  as  much  as  the 
Russian.  And  the  present  British  naval  superiority — 
if  it  should  remain — will  give  that  nation  at  least  one 
great  advantage  over  us.  There  is  no  way  out  of  this 
dilemma  but  the  one — to  make  our  navy  the  strongest 
in  the  Pacific.  Let  us  cast  a  glance  at  the  present 
naval  conditions  of  the  world,  and  thus  arrive  at  an 
approximately  correct  idea  regarding  what  is  required 
of  us. 

There  are  at  present  six  large  naval  powers,  these 
being:  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Germany,  the 
United  States,  and  Japan.  Their  exact  respective 
naval  strength  can  be  determined  from  several  points 
of  view.  The  ordinary  way,  of  course,  is  to  state  the 
number  of  vessels,  their  armaments,  and  tonnage. 
This  does  give  a  sort  of  approximate  idea,  and,  meas- 
ured in  this  way,  Great  Britain  is  to-day  stronger  than 
France  and  Russia  combined,  and  almost  as  strong  as 
Russia,  France,  and  Germany  together.  This  mode 
of  reckoning  is,  however,  deceptive,  and  not  adopted 
by  naval  experts.  From  the  total  naval  strength  of 
each  power  must  be  eliminated,  in  order  to  arrive  at 
practical  results,  all  those  vessels  antedating  a  certain 
period,  say,  fifteen  years,  because  after  that  time  the 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         243 

usefulness  of  any  war-vessel  is  doubtful.  Applying, 
then,  this  measurement,  we  nevertheless  arrive  at  a 
similar  result.  Again,  the  total  tonnage  of  British 
men-of-war,  cruisers,  and  torpedo  boats  is  larger  than 
that  of  France  and  Russia  jointly.  But  even  this 
mode  of  measuring  naval  strength  and  sea-power  is 
discarded  by  competent  judges.  The  battleships  alone 
are  considered  the  determining  factors,  and  of  these 
again  only  those  of  modern  construction  and  of  a  prac- 
tically uniform  type.  On  this  principle  was  built  up 
the  youngest  of  the  big  navies — the  Japanese — and  on 
the  same  principle  we  are  now  making  a  powerful 
American  navy.  Germany,  too,  has  made  her  navy  on 
this  plan.  The  naval  events  of  this  present  war,  how- 
ever, cast  some  doubt  on  this  principle.  It  is  true,  on  the 
one  hand,  that  the  much  smaller,  but  homogeneous, 
Japanese  navy  has  proved  superior  in  efficiency  to  the 
larger  Russian  navy  (larger  even  in  her  Pacific  squad- 
ron), lacking  in  the  element  of  homogeneity.  But 
torpedo  boats  and  armoured  cruisers  are  also  important 
factors ;  of  how  much  avail  these  would  be  in  a  pitched 
naval  battle  remains  to  be  seen.  The  promptness  of 
the  Japanese  disabled  the  Russian  navy  in  the  Pacific 
before  the  latter's  vessels  could  be  concentrated  and 
give  the  enemy  battle. 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  during 
a  Senate  debate,  late  in  April  last.  Senator  Hale  very 
tersely  said :  "  I  may  say  that  if  I  were  secretary  of 
the  navy,  in  the  present  condition,  I  should  not  dare  to 
go  and  commit  the  Government  to  the  building  of  an- 
other immense  battleship  costing  $8,000,000.  The 
lessons  of  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  thus  far  go 
to  show  the  vulnerability  and  the  unsafety  of  those 
immense  and  lofty  battleships,  and  the  undesirability 


244  'r^^  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

at  present  of  committing  ourselves  to  the  further  con- 
struction of  them.  The  great  and  sahent  events  of  the 
war  show  how  incomplete  as  an  engine  of  war  one  of 
these  enormous,  high-turreted  battleships  is.  If  she 
is  struck  below  the  water-line,  and  the  centre  of  gravity 
is  disturbed,  she  turns  over  like  a  turtle,  and  everybody 
on  board  is  drowned," 

Now,  we  have  at  present  a  capital  of  $150,000,000 
invested  in  the  building  of  enormous  battleships  and 
heavily  plated  cruisers,  and  the  growing  belief  among 
naval  experts  that  the  availability  of  the  torpedo  boats 
has  been  greatly  underrated  and  that  of  the  battleships 
overrated  gives  much  point  to  Senator  Hale's  remarks. 
But  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  this  we  are  "  in  the 
same  boat  "  with  all  the  other  naval  powers.  They, 
too,  have  all  along  believed  in  the  surpassing  strength 
of  the  battleship  as  the  chief  fighting  factor  in  war, 
and  our  own  experience  at  Santiago  did  much  to  fix 
this  belief.  In  that  battle  we  certainly  won  with  our 
battleships,  more  powerful  than  those  of  Cervera. 
England's  naval  strength  consists  in  her  29  first-class 
battleships  of  recent  make.  She,  too,  has  enormous 
sums  invested  in  the  construction  of  new  ones — about 
$250,000,000.  The  same  is  true  of  Germany,  France, 
and  Russia.  The  new  situation — if  it  should  prove  a 
new  one — does  not  vitiate,  therefore,  our  general  argu- 
ment. 

Whichever  way  we  measure  the  effective  fighting 
force,  England  is  enormously  in  the  lead — able  to 
beat  France  and  Russia,  and  perhaps  able  to  hold  her 
own  against  the  three  powers  of  France,  Russia,  and 
Germany.  True,  her  fleet  of  battleships  of  recent  date 
— that  is.  launched  and  completed  since  1889 — is  34, 
against  the  33  of  France  and  Russia,  and  against  the 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         245 

52  of  those  three  powers  together.  But  only  14  of  the 
19  German  battleships  are  really  available,  and  of  the 
33  battleships  of  Russia  and  France,  17  are  of  a  size 
too  small  to  compare  with  the  British  leviathans.  So 
that,  on  this  computation.  Great  Britain  again  has  the 
best  of  it. 

Japan  is  a  poor  country,  and  her  navy  is  about  half 
the  size  of  the  present  American  one,  one-third  the  size 
of  that  of  France,  and  less  than  one-sixth  of  that  of 
Great  Britain. 

Now  let  us  turn  to  the  United  States.  At  this  writ- 
ing, she  is  still  inferior  in  naval  strength  to  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  Germany.  That  is,  if 
mere  tonnage  of  battleships  is  to  decide  that  question. 
The  tonnage  of  our  effective  battleships  is  only  125,- 
900,  as  against  Germany's  144,000,  Russia's  221,000, 
France's  306,900,  and  Great  Britain's  627,800. 

But,  of  course,  the  disparity  is  in  reality  not  quite 
so  great  as  that.  The  finishing  touches  are  now  being 
put  to  no  less  than  seven  American  battleships  and 
first-class  iron-clad  cruisers.  All  of  these  will  be  of 
tremendous  fighting  strength,  in  size  from  16,200  tons 
down  to  14,000,  therefore  among  the  largest  war- ves- 
sels now  afloat,  fitted  out  with  the  latest  improvements, 
and  called  by  our  naval  experts  "  perfect  wonders." 
By  1905,  therefore,  in  tonnage  of  battleships  alone  we 
shall  outclass  Germany  and  Russia  both,  and  in  real, 
effective  fighting  strength  shall  be  superior  to  France. 
But  this  is  not  all.  The  British  blue-book  published, 
in  April  last,  a  comparative  table  showing  the  rate  of 
naval  increase  to  be  greatest  in  this  country,  the  figures 
being  223,000  tons  per  annum  for  America,  185,000 
for  Great  Britain,  127,000  for  Russia,  and  110,000  for 
Germany.     If   Congress   persists   in   this   policy   and 


246  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

maintains  this  rate  of  increase  for,  say,  ten  years,  we 
shall,  in  191 5,  be  second  to  Great  Britain  alone — that 
is,  about  the  time  of  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

The  French  navy  is  admittedly  in  a  bad  way,  both 
in  ships  and  men.  Quite  a  number  of  her  war-vessels 
are  antiquated,  worn  out,  and  practically  worthless. 
The  Russian  navy  has  suffered  such  severe  losses 
during  this  present  war  that  it  practically  now  ranks 
below  either  Germany's  or  this  country's.  Great 
Britain,  too,  has  on  her  naval  lists  large  numbers  of 
vessels  that  have  no  real  fighting  value.  Germany's 
navy  is  new,  well  officered  and  well  manned,  but  prob- 
ably in  all  these  respects  behfnd  ours. 

If  we  accept  the  authority  of  the  Statesman's  Year- 
Book  for  1904,  we  find  the  present  effective  fighting 
strength  of  the  main  navies  to  be:  British,  29  first- 
class  battleships,  11  second-class,  and  13  of  the  third, 
fourth,  and  fifth  classes — altogether,  53;  French,  i 
single  first-class  battleship,  10  second-class,  and  20  of 
the  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  classes;  German,  5  first- 
class,  5  second-class,  and  17  of  the  three  lower  classes; 
Russian,  3  first-class,  4  second-class,  and  13  of  the 
three  lower  classes  (Russia,  therefore,  distinctly  below 
Germany  in  real  naval  fighting  strength)  ;  United 
States,  6  first-class,  6  second-class,  and  1 1  of  the  three 
lower  classes ;  Japanese,  4  first-class,  2  second-class, 
and  2  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  classes.  In  torpedo  boats 
and  destroyers,  the  ratio  is  the  following  (the  coun- 
tries in  the  same  order  as  above)  :  238,  218,  95,  136, 

52,  75. 

According  to  these  figures,  then,  the  actual  naval 
strength  of  Great  Britain  is  even  greater,  compara- 
tively speaking,  than  by  adopting  the  scale  of  com- 
parison mentioned  before.     Furthermore,  we  find  (in 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         247 

the  same  comparative  list)  10  first-class  battleships 
building  for  Great  Britain,  7  each  for  the  United 
States  and  Germany,  6  for  France,  10  for  Russia,  and 
2  for  Japan. 

If  by  the  close  of  the  present  Russo-Japanese  war 
the  torpedo  and  destroyer  should  have  been  proved 
superior  in  achievement  to  the  battleship,  why,  that, 
of  course,  would  upset  all  the  present  standards  of 
comparison  and  would  put  France  almost  on  the  same 
footing  with  Great  Britain.  But  that  is  a  very  large 
"  if." 

Let  us  look  the  facts  in  the  face.  We  see,  in  any 
event,  that  it  will  take  a  great  deal  more  than  our 
present  rate  of  naval  increase  to  own  the  largest  and 
most  powerful  navy  in  the  world.  And  there  are  great 
difficulties  in  the  way.  To  build  up  such  a  navy  re- 
quires, above  all,  three  things :  much  time,  much 
money,  and  many  able  and  trained  men.  The  Ameri- 
can people — that  is,  the  broad  masses — must  first  be- 
come convinced  of  the  absolute  necessity  of  having 
such  a  navy  before  they  can  possibly  be  willing  to  incur 
the  sacrifices  that  it  would  entail.  Look  at  the  British 
budget,  and  you  will  see  how  enormous  are  these  sac- 
rifices in  men  and  money.  The  British  budget  for 
1903-04  shows  $172,285,000  appropriated  for  the 
navy,  with  127,100  men.  If  the  American  navy  is  to 
be  the  largest  and  most  powerful  of  all,  it  would  swal- 
low up  an  annual  outlay  of  $200,000,000,  and  would 
need  between  120,000  and  150,000 — men  and  officers 
— to  man  it.  That  would  be  a  great  burden,  and  the 
mere  mention  of  such  figures  to-day  would  scare  the 
average  American.  No  Congressman  on  the  floor  of 
the  House  to-day  would  be  bold  enough  to  advocate 
such  a  naval  programme. 


248  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

Yet  the  day  will  come  when  the  American  people 
will  clearly  see  that  to  win  and  hold  the  place  fate  has 
in  store  for  us,  such  enormous  sacrifices  are  absolutely 
required.  Great  Britain  with  her  40,000,000  of  in- 
habitants willingly  bears  this  burden,  and  her  Parlia- 
ment every  year  makes  the  necessary  appropriations. 
Shall  a  nation  of  85,000,000,  growing  at  the  rate  of 
2,000,000  a  year,  and  with  natural  resources  far 
superior  to  those  of  her  cousin  across  the  sea,  shirk 
its  responsibilities?  If  England  is  able  to  pay  for  her 
navy,  we  are  doubly  and  trebly  able  to  do  so.  It  is 
only  a  question  of  driving  this  conviction  home  to  the 
soul  of  the  average  American. 

A  navy  of  inadequate  size — that  is  the  one  great 
weak  spot  in  our  armour  at  present.  Fortune  has  been 
kind  enough  to  give  us  a  geographical  position  which 
enables  us  to  dispense  with  a  gigantic  army,  an  army 
that  would  have  to  be  far  more  costly  in  blood  and 
treasure  than  a  navy  of  the  first  magnitude.  Poverty- 
stricken  Russia,  a  country  at  present  on  the  very  brink 
of  national  bankruptcy,  is  not  so  situated.  She  has 
to  spend  untold  millions,  wrung  from  her  starving 
peasantry,  to  maintain  both  a  huge  army  and  a  great 
navy.  Germany,  another  one  of  our  chief  rivals  in 
the  Pacific  hereafter,  must  likewise  pay  for  two  enor- 
mous fighting  machines,  one  on  land  and  the  other  on 
water. 

A  matchless  navy,  powerful  enough  to  enforce  our 
policy  in  the  Pacific,  is  an  indispensable  requisite  to 
mastery  there. 

It  may  be  quite  possible,  in  the  years  to  come,  to 
join  our  navy  to  that  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Pacific, 
in  order  to  solve  certain  questions  or  to  decide  some 
specific  and  permanent  issue  of  vital  interest  to  both 


Our  Equipment  for  the  Race         249 

powers.  That  is  quite  possible,  and,  for  instance, 
when  the  point  should  come  to  be  determined  whether 
Anglo-Saxon  or  Slav  is  to  be  the  master  in  the  Pacific, 
it  might  be  that  Great  Britain  would  join  hands  with 
us.  And  then  again,  it  mightn't.  British  statesman- 
ship of  late  years  has  played  strange  tricks,  and  the 
strangest  of  all,  perhaps,  we  are  witnessing  at  present. 
Great  Britain  and  Japan,  in  1902,  made  a  formal  alli- 
ance for  the  purpose  of  holding  in  check  Russian 
power  in  Far  Asia.  In  1904,  Russian  aggression 
became  so  unbearable  as  to  force  small  Japan  into  a 
life-and-death  struggle  with  Russia.  Then  what  does 
England  do?  She  approaches  Russia  in  a  friendly 
way  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  making  her  per- 
manent peace  with  that  power.  Comment  is  super- 
fluous. 

To  broach  the  subject  of  such  a  naval  increase  as 
contemplated  in  the  foregoing  would  doubtless  raise 
at  once  the  old  cry  of  "  Militarism."  But  that  is  an 
idle  cry  where  the  navy  is  concerned.  Armies  and 
generals  have  often  proved  dangerous  to  liberty;  navies 
and  admirals  never.  In  all  the  world's  history  we  find 
no  instance  of  a  navy  overturning  government  and 
usurping  power.  For  Monk,  who  might  be  cited 
against  this  contention,  was  a  soldier,  not  a  seaman. 
Navies  may  defend  a  land;  they  cannot  conquer  it. 
Vast  standing  armies,  such  as  Russia's  and  Germany's, 
are  perfectly  in  accord  with  the  spirit  of  absolutism, 
and  will  serve  to  strengthen  and  perpetuate  that  spirit. 
But  Anglo-Saxon  civilisation,  it  was  decreed,  has  been 
and  is  free  from  that  curse.  A  navy  stands  on  a  dif- 
ferent plane,  and  we  must  have  a  much  more  powerful 
one  in  order  to  hold  what  we  have  and  to  acquire  new 
power.     Our  two  long  sea  frontages,  while  conferring 


250  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

on  us  great  blessings  and  limitless  potentialities,  make 
it  also  incumbent  to  protect  them  by  walls  of  steel, 
walls  better  adapted  for  defence  than  the  Great  Wall 
of  China,  walls  movable  upon  an  enemy  thousands  of 
miles  away  at  the  mere  pressure  of  an  electric  button. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
RIVALS  IN  THE  PACIFIC— BRITISH 

Political  and  commercial  sagacity  usually  go  to- 
gether. Great  Britain  reached  the  zenith  of  her  polit- 
ical power  about  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  pre- 
cisely at  the  time  she  ruled  supreme  in  trade  and  manu- 
facture. Since  then  she  has  virtually  lived  on  her 
prestige.  Comparatively  speaking,  she  has  retro- 
graded. In  1850  she  held  in  the  hollow  of  her  hand 
the  fate  of  all  Europe,  and  nothing  was  done  without 
her  full  consent.  The  United  States  was  then  a  sec- 
ond-class power,  lying  a  long  way  off,  with  slow 
steamer  communication,  with  a  small  population  dis- 
tracted by  internal  issues,  and  having  only  just  set  out 
on  conquering  the  vast  continent,  having  no  concern 
and  taking  no  interest  in  European  affairs.  Russia 
had  only  one-third  its  present  population.  Germany 
was  split  up  into  small  fragments,  each  working  at 
cross-purposes  with  the  other.  France  had  just  seen 
another  revolution  drowned  in  blood.  Proud  Albion, 
secure  behind  her  white  cliffs,  and  with  the  whole 
world  tributary  to  her  solid  merchants  in  the  City, 
looked  on  with  a  somewhat  scornful  smile  and  felt 
herself  the  paramount  power  on  the  globe. 

But  the  world  "  do  move."  The  year  1904  wit- 
nesses a  very  different  spectacle.  Across  the  ocean  a 
lusty  young  giant  has  grasped  the  sceptre  which  has 
fallen  from  inept  hands.     Our  population  is  almost 

251 


252  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

threefold  that  of  England,  and  it  will  soon  be  treble 
that  of  Great  Britain.  Our  wealth  far  exceeds  that  of 
the  older  nation.  In  trade  and  industry  we  have  be- 
come more  than  England's  rival — her  master.  In  her 
own  home  market  she  can  no  longer  compete  with  us 
in  a  number  of  those  essential  products  in  which  Eng- 
land, a  decade  or  two  ago,  enjoyed  practical  monopoly. 
In  fine,  the  day  of  British  trade  supremacy  is  over. 
She  is  now  bending  all  her  efforts  to  retain  as  much 
as  she  may  of  what  she  holds. 

Across  the  Channel,  another  great  power  has  arisen, 
also  a  keen  rival,  and  in  this  case  the  Briton  has  not 
even  the  poor  satisfaction  of  acknowledging  defeat  by 
men  who  have  sprung  from  his  own  loins.  England 
saw  the  achievement  of  German  unity  and  the  found- 
ing of  a  young  and  vigorous  empire  with  mingled 
feelings.  But  these  feelings  turned  to  venom  and 
hatred  when  she  began  to  observe  that  the  growth  and 
further  consolidation  of  this  young  empire  meant  the 
loss  of  much  profitable  trade  to  her. 

In  volume  of  foreign  trade,  it  is  true.  Great  Britain 
is  still  far  ahead  of  the  United  States  (the  figure  for 
Great  Britain  being  $3,559,076,200,  and  for  the  United 
States  $2,417,950,539),  but  in  exports  we  already 
equal  her.  Another  few  years,  and  our  foreign  trade, 
too,  will  have  attained  such  heights  as  to  leave  her  far 
behind  us  in  the  whole  race.  Besides,  so  far,  our 
foreign  trade  has  been  but  small  compared  with  our 
domestic. 

There  are  observable  plain  signs  of  British  material 
decadence,  and  this  decadence  seems  to  have  unfavour- 
ably influenced  British  character  as  well.  Witness  the 
dog-in-the-manger  policy  which  England  has  persist- 
ently followed  towards  Germany.     Instead  of  giving 


Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British         253 

her  poorer  Teuton  cousin — whom  she  had  looked  down 
upon  for  centuries — a  Hft,  she  put  all  the  stones  in  his 
way  she  could.  She  has  never  found  it  in  her  heart 
to  forgive  her  one-time  humble  relative  on  the  conti- 
nent his  new  prosperity.  His  colonial  ambitions  she 
hindered  wherever  possible.  For  successful  German 
competition  in  trade  she  sought  to  account  by  crying 
down  the  quality  of  German  wares — "  muck-and- 
tuck  "  trade  the  English  called  it — and  said  that  Ger- 
many was  turning  out  merely  cheap  imitations  of  Eng- 
lish goods  and  selling  them  under  a  piratical  flag.  To 
remedy  this  alleged  grievance,  Mr.  Williams  published 
his  much-advertised  book,  and  Parliament  passed  a 
law  on  "  Made  in  Germany."  But  the  cure  was  worse 
than  the  disease.  "  Made  in  Germany  "  became  a 
trademark  all  the  more  valuable  to  England's  com- 
petitor, and  Germany  continued  to  forge  ahead. 

The  German  steamer  lines  made  better  time  and 
gave  greater  comfort  to  their  passengers ;  therefore, 
thy  did  a  better  business.  The  disgruntled  Briton  put 
it  all  on  the  score  of  imaginary  and  heavy  government 
subsidies.     But  that  did  not  help  the  matter. 

All  these  are  plain  signs  of  decadence.  Where  now 
are  that  sturdy  British  manliness  and  independence, 
that  much-vaunted  fairness  to  an  opponent? 

In  the  Orient,  this  British  decadence  is  seen  most 
conspicuously.  England  has  been  busy  undoing  the 
work  of  a  century  in  upbuilding  commercial  and  polit- 
ical supremacy  in  the  Orient.  Senator  Beveridge,  in 
his  recent  interesting  book,  speaks  of  "  a  drugged  and 
cocained  slumber,"  a  "  sinful  inactivity  "  of  the  Briton 
in  the  whole  of  Far  Asia.  And  as  in  Far  Asia  it  is 
in  Central  Asia  and  in  Turkey.  Persia,  Afghanistan, 
Turkestan,  Khiva,  and  Bokhara — one  by  one  England 


254  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

has  stood  by,  and  without  a  murmur  allowed  Russia  to 
incorporate  or  overawe  these  countries.  Since  the 
Pamir  commission,  of  unsavoury  memory,  England 
has  done  nothing  to  impede  Russian  advance.  She  has 
allowed  everything  English  in  the  East  to  go  to  rack 
and  ruin.  Towards  France,  her  old-time  foe,  she  has 
become  modest — almost  humble.  Fashoda  marked  a 
last  flickering  of  her  old  energy.  In  Africa,  she  is  now 
trying  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  aggressive 
Gaul ;  but  Tonkin,  Annam,  Indo-China,  and  Madagas- 
car, besides  a  number  of  valuable  islands  in  Oceanica, 
she  let  the  Frenchman  swallow  without  lifting  a  hand. 

But  it  is  worst  of  all  in  China.  After  selling  to  the 
Germans  line  after  line  of  steamers  plying  in  Far 
Asian  waters,  and  seeing  the  trade  go  with  the  flag, 
she  has  lost  her  last  fastness  in  the  Celestial  Empire. 
To-day,  English  supremacy  in  the  whole  Yang  Tse 
valley  is  gone.  But  a  few  years  ago  that  was  still 
held  to  be  an  English  sphere  of  influence.  Now,  more 
German  trade  goes  up  and  down  the  Yang  Tse,  that 
main  artery  of  China,  than  English  and  French  com- 
bined. 

The  clear  eye  of  the  British  statesman  seems  to  be 
obscured,  seeing,  as  through  a  glass,  darkly.  Look 
at  this  present  war.  It  gave  England  for  the  first  time 
a  splendid  chance  to  balk,  for  good  and  all,  Russian 
advance  in  Asia.  Does  she  improve  it?  On  the  con- 
trary. King  Edward  offers  Russia,  a  power  whose 
statecraft  and  diplomacy  are  proverbially  tainted  with 
duplicity,  to  adjust  all  pending  differences.  She 
leaves  her  ally,  Japan,  in  the  lurch  and  tries  to  make 
a  compact  with  her  ally's  enemy  at  a  time  when  the 
latter  is  fighting  for  his  very  life.  Moreover,  Eng- 
land declares  her  willingness  to  take  Russia's  word  in 


Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British         255 

such  an  understanding  only  a  couple  of  months  after 
that  same  Russia  had  broken  her  solemn  pledge  to 
England  and  the  United  States  to  withdraw  from 
Manchuria.     Can  political  folly  go  further? 

This  same  England,  then,  will  be  one  of  our  chief 
rivals,  perhaps  the  chief  one,  in  the  Pacific.  It  would 
be  an  immense  task,  and  one  requiring  a  big  book  by 
itself,  to  go  here  into  statistical  details,  giving  a  com- 
parison between  British  and  American  material  re- 
sources, trade,  and  prospects  of  future  trade.  Nor  is 
this  necessary  for  our  purpose.  It  will  be  admitted  at 
the  outset  that  to  compete  successfully  hereafter  with 
the  Briton  in  the  Pacific  will  be  no  easy  matter,  even 
after  due  allowance  be  made  for  that  strange  drowsi- 
ness and  lack  of  energy  which  have  of  late  years  seized 
the  Englishman  in  the  East.  With  a  merchant  marine 
of  16,006,374  in  aggregate  tonnage,  exceeding  by  far 
that  of  all  the  other  nations  of  the  globe  combined, 
with  banking  institutions  everywhere,  and  many  mil- 
lions of  capital  invested  in  every  country,  with  old-es- 
tablished firms  in  every  port  and  in  every  inland  town 
of  any  importance,  and  with  the  immense  prestige  still 
clinging  to  her  name,  England,  on  the  face  of  it,  has 
even  an  immense  advantage  over  us  in  the  coming 
struggle  for  commercial  predominance.  This  initial 
advantage  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the  fact  that 
England  has  spun  over  the  earth  a  network  of  colonial 
possessions,  large  and  small,  and  planted  with  unerring 
instinct  at  those  points  where  trade  moves  most  rapidly 
and  navigation  is  most  profitably  followed. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  several  elements  of  great  im- 
portance which  make  for  England's  ultimate  defeat. 

One  of  these  is  the  evident  disheartenment  and  loss 
of  virile  aggressiveness  which  have  come  over  the 


256  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

British  merchant.  To-day,  he  is  a  creature  moving 
slowly  and  cautiously,  wedded  to  habits  and  methods 
of  the  past,  taking  his  ease  and  sticking  to  his  fatalistic 
shibboleth :  "In  the  long  run  Old  England  can't  be 
beaten !  Old  England  will  always  remain  Old  Eng- 
land !  "  And  though  the  fact  stares  him  in  the  face 
that  this  is  a  fallacy,  he  still  believes  in  this  worn-out 
creed.  Such  a  man  is  no  match  for  the  American  of 
to-day. 

Another  British  disadvantage  is  remoteness  from 
the  home  market,  that  market  which  must  remain  his 
chief  base  of  supply  and  distribution.  That  point  has 
been  dwelt  on  in  a  previous  chapter.  The  completion 
of  the  Panama  Canal  will  turn  the  geographical  advati- 
tage  which  the  Englishman  has  so  far  enjoyed,  as 
against  the  American,  in  trading  with  the  East  and  the 
whole  of  South  America,  into  the  reverse.  There- 
after, we  shall  have  the  start  of  him  by  thousands  of 
miles,  meaning,  of  course,  cheaper  transportation  and 
lower  cost  for  American  goods.  As  between  New 
York  and  Liverpool,  the  distance  to  Shanghai  (when 
the  Panama  Canal  shall  have  been  finished)  will  be 
150  miles  to  the  advantage  of  New  York,  almost  2000 
miles  less  for  New  York  to  Yokohama,  1000  miles  less 
to  Manila,  3000  less  to  Honolulu,  almost  3000  less  to 
Auckland,  and  1000  miles  less  to  Melbourne.  From 
our  ports  on  the  Pacific  these  differences  in  our  favour 
will  be  much  greater,  and  this  is  true  in  even  a  higher 
degree  regarding  trade  in  South  and  Central  America. 
Moreover,  the  Philippines  will  soon  serve  us  as  a  dis- 
tributing centre  for  the  whole  of  Far  Asia. 

Another  point  in  our  favour — and  one  which  can  be 
scarcely  overestimated — is  our  manufacturing  suprem- 
acy,   now   firmly   established.     The   articles    most   in 


Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British         257 

demand  hereafter  in  the  Pacific  are  precisely  those 
which  we  can  furnish  more  cheaply  and  of  better 
quality  than  England  can. 

In  one  of  these  chief  commodities,  namely,  cotton 
goods,  England  is  still  in  the  lead.  In  1903  there 
were  counted  in  Great  Britain  48,000,000  spindles,  as 
against  23,000,000  in  this  country,  34,000,000  on  the 
whole  continent  of  Europe,  5,000,000  in  British  India, 
1,500,000  in  Japan,  and  about  2,000,000  in  the  re- 
mainder of  the  world.  In  this  particular,  therefore, 
there  is  still  distinct  British  predominance.  Cotton- 
spinning  is  the  last  important  phase  of  her  industrial 
supremacy.  But  let  us  examine  the  facts  a  little  more 
closely.  In  1895,  there  were  counted  in  the  whole 
world,  93,500,000  spindles,  and  of  this  Britain  had 
45,400,000,  almost  one-half.  The  United  States  had 
but  16,100,000.  Four  years  later  Britain  showed  still 
the  same  figure,  while  the  United  States  showed  an 
increase  of  2,200,000  and  the  continent  one  of  4,300,- 
000.  There  is,  then,  a  rapid  increase  in  the  cotton 
industry  of  the  other  leading  commercial  nations,  and 
this  increase  is  most  pronounced  and  greatest  in  this 
country,  amounting  to  45  per  cent,  within  eight  years. 
England,  in  other  words,  sees  her  supremacy  in  the 
cotton  industry  swiftly  waning.  Another  decade,  and 
this  last  remaining  pillar  of  her  industrial  strength 
will  also  have  fallen. 

But  by  the  term,  "  British  rivals  in  the  Pacific,"  was 
not  meant  the  native  Briton  alone;  under  that  caption 
must  be  included  the  men  of  the  British  colonies  as 
well.  With  them  the  case  stands  differently.  Let 
us  examine  this  point  more  in  detail. 

The  Dominion  of  Canada,  or,  more  precisely  speak- 
ing, the  far  western  part  of  it,  will  be  one  of  our  most 


258  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

active  rivals  in  the  Pacific.  To-day,  the  foreign  trade 
of  Canada  amounts  to  $400,000,000.  A  great  manu- 
facturing industry  is  increasing  rapidly,  agriculture 
expands  steadily,  and  large  quantities  of  timber  and 
foodstuffs  are  yearly  exported,  chiefly  to  Great  Britain, 
with  the  United  States  a  good  second.  If  the  United 
States  had  not  been  short-sighted  enough  to  hinder 
trade  with  Canada  by  unfavourable  tariff  conditions, 
and  if  the  reciprocity  treaty  had  been  agreed  to,  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  to-day  Canada's  exports  and  imports 
with  this  country  would  have  been  doubled.  More- 
over, the  annexation  movement  had  gained  consider- 
able headway  in  Canada,  and  if  it  had  not  been  for 
our  unfortunate  tariff  policy  as  regards  that  neigh- 
bour, it  is  very  likely  that  this  movement  would  have 
gone  on  increasing,  instead  of  diminishing.  What- 
ever the  ultimate  political  fate  of  Canada  may  be,  for 
the  time  at  least  nearly  all  Canadians  have  shelved  the 
idea  of  amalgamation  with  this  country.  Increasing 
American  immigration  to  Canada,  as  well  as  the  con- 
stantly growing  investments  of  American  capital  there, 
and  the  decrease  in  political  power  and  prestige  of  the 
mother  country,  are  factors,  however,  which  in  the 
long  run  must  tell  in  favour  of  such  amalgamation. 
As  it  is,  Canada  is  one  of  the  most  important  countries, 
commercially  speaking,  we  have  dealings  with.  For 
the  purposes  of  this  book,  though,  it  is  that  portion 
of  the  Dominion  called  British  Columbia  which  is  of 
interest  to  us. 

It  has  been  more  neglected  by  the  home  government 
than  almost  any  other  portion  of  the  British  colonial 
empire.  And  yet  British  Columbia  is  a  land  of  great 
possibilities.  In  wealth  of  natural  resources  it  is  not 
exceeded  by  any  portion  of  the  United  States.     Its 


Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British         259 

population  shows  the  true  Yankee  spirit — indomitable 
enterprise,  tireless  energy,  and  great  shrewdness.  In 
the  course  of  time,  British  Columbia  is  almost  certain 
to  become  one  of  our  most  dreaded  rivals  in  the  Pacific 
trade. 

Even  as  it  is,  her  various  undertakings  in  that  line 
are  not  to  be  undervalued.  Victoria  shows  itself 
a  wide-awake  competitor  of  Seattle  and  San  Fran- 
cisco, and  both  the  splendid  steamer  line  plying  be- 
tween that  port  and  the  Far  East,  and  the  Canadian 
Pacific  Railroad,  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in  all 
future  reckonings  made  by  this  nation  in  the  Pacific 
commerce  of  the  near  future.  An  idea  of  the  natural 
wealth  of  British  Columbia  awaiting  exploitation  may 
be  gained  when  the  fact  is  mentioned  that,  of  its  382,- 
000  square  miles,  fully  three-fourths  are  covered  with 
forests.  The  density  of  these  forests  is  extraordinary. 
As  much  as  500,000  cubic  feet  of  wood  have  been 
taken  from  a  single  acre.  The  lumber  industry  is 
bound  to  become  an  immense  source  of  wealth,  once 
the  canal  is  opened.  The  Douglas  fir  abounds  every- 
where, with  hemlock  in  the  north,  and  there  is  abun- 
dant water  power.  The  total  mineral  production  of 
British  Columbia  for  1900  was  slightly  in  excess  of 
$16,000,000,  being  gold,  silver,  lead,  copper,  and  coal. 
Coal  beds  of  fine  quality  and  immense  capacity  only 
await  the  miner  and  a  profitable  market.  In  the 
future  Pacific  trade  this  fine  coal  will  be  an  important 
item. 

The  only  serious  handicap  at  present  for  British 
Columbia  in  a  race  with  this  country  is  the  sparseness 
of  its  population.  With  an  area  double  that  of  France ; 
with  1000  miles  of  seaboard  and  many  fine  harbours; 
witb  marvellous  resources  in  its  soil ;  with  great  treas- 


26o  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

ures  in  its  waters;  with  wonderful  forests;  with  great 
mineral  wealth  awaiting  development,  and  with  a  cli- 
mate which  produces  a  race  as  sturdy  and  bold  as  the 
American,  it  can  boast  of  but  a  few  hundred  thousand 
of  inhabitants.  Like  our  own  Pacific  slope,  British 
Columbia  as  yet  is  suffering  from  "  distance."  It  lies 
thousands  of  miles  away  from  the  Atlantic  coast,  and 
thousands  more  from  the  island  kingdom  whence  it 
draws  its  settlers  and  its  modest  measure  of  political 
influence. 

Of  all  British  possessions,  British  Columbia  will  be 
most  benefited  by  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
In  almost  like  measure  as  for  our  own  Far  West,  her 
people  will  be  brought  nearer  to  Eastern  and  Western 
markets.  There  is  no  reason  why  British  Columbia 
should  not  compete  on  favourable  terms  with  the 
United  States  in  the  great  Asiatic  markets,  which  are 
on  the  eve  of  an  era  of  development.  What  she  lacks 
is  men  and  money;  but  even  under  present  condi- 
tions she  will  grasp  and  hold  her  share  of  the  future 
trade. 

Another  and  more  important  competitor  of  ours  in 
the  Pacific  will  be  Australia.  Australia  is  nearly  the 
size  of  the  United  States  proper.  Her  climate  presents 
great  varieties.  The  north  is  tropical — almost  unin- 
habitable for  white  men — while  the  coasts  of  the  east, 
south,  and  west  enjoy  a  fine  and  healthy  climate,  hot 
summers,  but  bracing  winters.  The  great  trouble  is 
the  alternation  of  droughts  and  floods,  the  former 
being  the  more  prevalent.  The  arid  part  of  Australia 
covers  the  whole  interior,  amounting  to  five-sixths  of 
the  continent,  while  the  region  with  an  annual  rainfall 
of  but  ten  to  twenty  inches  makes  another  large  belt. 
3ufficient  rain  for  agriculture  falls  in  only  about  one- 


Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British         261 

tenth  of  the  whole  territory.  The  following  map  is 
taken  from  Mr.  A.  R.  Colquhoun's  "  Mastery  of  the 
Pacific  " : 


Rainfall  Map  of  Australia 

Copyright,  1908,  by  The  MacmlUan  Company 

It  is  thus  certain  that  Australia  can  never  become 
either  a  very  prosperous  or  a  very  populous  country, 
measuring-  her  prospects  with  ours.  Nature  has  inter- 
posed insurmountable  obstacles  not  to  be  overcome  by 
man.  Irrigation  is  sure  to  be  introduced  on  a  larger 
scale  than  at  present.     But  in  such  a  riverless  country 


262  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

as  Australia,  given,  besides,  the  geological  formation 
of  the  continent,  even  that  stratagem  will  never  accom- 
plish much.  There  is  only  one  navigable  river,  the 
Murray,  in  all  Australia. 

The  new  Australian  Commonwealth,  unifying  for 
political  and  partly  for  economic  purposes  all  the  col- 
onies, seems  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  Neverthe- 
less, the  present  population — 3,600,000 — does  not  grow 
rapidly.  The  rate  of  natural  increase  is  small;  in  the 
second  and  third  generations  it  rapidly  declines.  And, 
as  a  curious  feature  of  a  country  of  such  enormous  size, 
with  a  very  sparse  population,  it  deserves  mention  that 
in  all  the  colonies,  but  particularly  in  the  most  pro- 
ductive parts  of  Australia,  and  in  the  fertile  fringe 
skirting  the  eastern  coast,  emigration  is  going  on  and 
immigration  is  discouraged  in  every  possible  way.  In 
several  of  the  colonies  emigration  actually  exceeds  im- 
migration. As  a  future  rival  of  the  United  States — 
a  bright  day-dream  which  fanciful  Australians  indulge 
in — this  youngest  of  the  continents  does  no't  come  into 
serious  consideration. 

Far  more  natural  advantages  are  enjoyed  by  New 
Zealand  than  by  the  continent  proper.  As  yet,  how- 
ever, this  double  island  is  very  thinly  settled,  and  its 
great  natural  resources  are  largely  undeveloped.  New 
Zealand  is,  therefore,  a  very  promising  field  for  the 
immigrant,  but  in  Pacific  trade,  as  our  rival,  she  can- 
not possibly  play  an  important  figure  in  the  near 
future. 

In  Australia  there  are  railroads  with  a  mileage  of 
15,000,  and  with  very  small  traffic.  In  New  Zealand 
this  mileage  is  2300. 

As  an  exporting  and  importing  region  Australasia 
is,  however,  of  considerable  importance.     It  will  afford 


Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British         263 

a  fine  market  for  American  goods.  Her  total  foreign 
trade,  in  1903,  amounted  to  $891,000,000.  Of  this 
the  most  important  of  the  colonies.  New  South  Wales, 
claimed  $272,000,000,  with  Victoria  next,  with  $191,- 
000,000,  and  New  Zealand,  with  $105,000,000. 

From  the  present  trend  it  can  be  clearly  discerned 
that  Australia  will  develop  on  political  and  economic 
lines  of  her  own,  distinct  from  the  British.  Her  tariff 
policy,  aiming  at  more  varied  sources  of  supply  and 
greater  markets  for  her  own  products,  shows  this.  An 
Australian  species  of  Monroe  doctrine,  claiming  "  Aus- 
tralia for  the  Australians,"  and  also  directed  against 
German  and  French  power  in  the  Pacific,  is  developing 
rapidly. 

Australia's  main  product  is  still  wool,  cereals  being 
next  in  importance.  In  this  way  she  does  not  compete- 
with  us  as  an  exporting  country,  and  while  she  is  ac- 
tively trying  for  Far  Eastern  markets,  that  need  not 
trouble  us  seriously.  On  the  other  hand,  Australia 
imports  chiefly  articles  of  industry.  The  mother  coun- 
try still  sells  her  the  great  bulk  of  these,  but  the  Ameri- 
can share  of  the  remainder  of  her  foreign  trade  has 
already  risen  to  34  per  cent.  Hereafter,  we  may  look 
for  a  far  larger  share,  under  the  more  favourable  con- 
ditions opened  up  for  us  by  the  Panama  Canal. 

The  two  great  British  trade-distributing  centres  of 
the  Far  East,  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong,  occupy  alto- 
gether unique  positions.  Nowhere  else  in  the  world 
under  similar  conditions  can  be  found  commercial  and 
strategic  posts  of  equal  value.  Both  are  situated  on 
islands,  but  whereas  Hong  Kong  is  steep  and  rocky, 
Singapore  lies  low.  Both  are  important  as  shipping 
centres,  but  Hong  Kong,  although  the  medium  for  a 
considerable  Chinese  trade,  is  to  a  great  extent  cut  off 


264  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

from  its  natural  hinterland,  the  great  southern  trading 
centres  of  China.  Singapore  is  the  outlet  for  the 
flourishing  trade  of  the  greater  portion  of  the  Malay- 
peninsula.  Hong  Kong  lies  next  to  a  great  undevel- 
oped estate  in  Chinese  hands,  while  Singapore  is  sit- 
uated close  by  a  territory  which,  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, is  British. 

These  two  important  trading  centres,  jointly  and 
singly,  will  prove  a  thorn  in  the  flesh  to  the  American 
trader  in  the  Pacific.  Their  merchants  have  shown 
hitherto  much  enterprise,  and  a  very  large  percentage 
of  the  Chinese  trade  is  in  the  hands  of  Hong  Kong, 
while  Singapore  taps  the  whole  wealth  of  the  Malay- 
world  at  a  very  convenient  point,  and  hence  holds  a 
goodly  portion  of  it  in  its  grasp. 

The  prosperity  of  Singapore,  however,  is  in  very 
large  measure  due  to  the  lack  of  enterprise  of  the  Dutch 
merchants  of  Java  and  the  surrounding  islands,  as  well 
as  to  the  worse  than  unenterprising  economic  policy 
of  the  Netherlands  government.  The  Dutch  East 
Indies,  under  the  sway  of  another  nationality  of  more 
energy,  such,  for  instance,  as  the  German  or  American, 
would  very  soon  cut  the  ground  from  under  the  feet 
of  the  Singapore  trader.  Indeed,  during  the  last  five 
years,  since  Americans  and  Germans  have  seriously 
begun  to  exploit  commercially  the  Far  East,  the  trade 
of  Singapore,  or  at  least  the  British  portion  of  it,  has 
not  only  shown  no  increase,  but  an  absolute  decline, 
small  though  it  be. 

The  case  is  similar  with  Hong  Kong.  There  it  is 
the  German  that  has  cut  in  very  uncomfortably  into 
the  big  British  pudding.  At  first,  the  English  mer- 
chant of  Hong  Kong  smiled  derisively  at  the  advent 
Qi  his  new  rival.     He  pointed  with  satisfaction  to  the 


Rivals  in  the  Pacific — British         265 

small  bulk  and  the  smaller  profits  of  the  trade  which 
the  newly  arriving  German  was  able  to  secure.  But 
he  has  changed  his  tune  somewhat  of  late,  for  the 
German  is  now  firmly  established  in  Hong  Kong,  and 
he  obtains  an  ever-increasing  share  of  the  Hong  Kong 
commerce.  There  is  no  reason  why  hereafter  the 
American  should  not  join  the  pair  and  make  a  happy 
third.  There  is  plenty  of  room  for  him,  and  Hong 
Kong  in  a  short  while  will  be  nearer  to  the  New 
Yorker  and  a  great  deal  nearer  to  the  San  Franciscan 
than  to  the  men  of  Liverpool  and  London. 

Summarising,  therefore,  all  the  available  facts  tend- 
ing to  show  the  relative  chances  which  the  British  mer- 
chant (both  of  the  home  and  colonial  varieties)  and 
his  American  compeer  will  enjoy  in  the  trade  of  this 
whole  promising  region,  the  scale  seems  to  tip  in  favour 
of  the  latter,  though  it  will  take  much  hard  work, 
capital,  and  persistence  to  win  and  hold  predominance. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

RIVALS  IN  THE  PACIFIC— GERMAN,  FRENCH, 
AND  JAPANESE 

Of  all  our  future  rivals  in  the  Pacific,  Germany  will 
be,  perhaps,  the  most  dangerous.  With  the  Briton 
our  fight  will  be  to  wrest  a  slice  more  or  less  large 
from  his  present  trade.  The  Briton,  in  other  words, 
will  be  on  the  defensive ;  Germany,  like  ourselves,  will 
be  on  the  offensive.  Her  people  are  straining  every 
nerve  and  sinew  to  conquer  new  fields  of  commerce. 
An  exact  parallel  of  our  own  case,  she  must  increase 
her  export  trade  in  order  to  live,  and  in  order  to  avoid 
industrial  and  labour  catastrophes  of  frightful  effect. 
Her  ambitions  are  young,  like  ours;  she  is  not  sated 
with  power  and  spoils;  her  enterprise,  like  ours,  must 
be  directed  to  virgin  markets  and  neglected  fields ;  the 
ever-growing  pressure  of  her  dense  population  impels 
her  in  all  directions  where  the  right  of  pre-emption  is 
not  exercised  in  prohibitive  fashion.  Her  men  belong 
to  a  virile,  unspent  race.  Her  monarch,  the  Kaiser, 
furnishes  enormous  forces  of  propulsion;  nothing 
escapes  him,  and  in  one  of  his  speeches,  a  couple  of 
years  ago,  he  said  that  it  was  the  duty  of  every  Ger- 
man "  to  find  spots  and  crannies  on  the  whole  globe 
where  the  German  could  drive  in  a  nail,  and  on  it  sus- 
pend his  armour  of  commercial  enterprise." 

We  must  look,  therefore,  to  a  bitter  and  determined 
Struggle  with  the  German  for  supremacy  in  the  East 

266 


German,  French,  and  Japanese        267 

and  extreme  West.  Let  us  examine  this  German 
armour  a  bit  more  closely. 

The  commercial  and  political  rise  of  Germany  has 
been  one  of  the  marvels  of  the  closing  decades  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Since  the  conclusion  of  her  peace 
with  France,  in  1871,  and  the  establishment  of  a  united 
fatherland  and  a  vigorous  empire  under  Hohenzollern 
leadership,  Germany  has  doubled  and  trebled  her  re- 
sources and  powers.     Just  a  few  points  in  illustration. 

In  1870  Germany  was  mainly  an  agricultural  coun- 
try, and  her  commerce  was  relatively  unimportant. 
Her  industries  were  in  an  undeveloped  state,  and  were 
carried  on  with  extreme  caution  and  on  small  capital. 
From  this,  within  thirty  years,  she  had  become  Eng- 
land's chief  rival.  Between  1890  and  1900  the  volume 
of  her  import  and  export  trade  rose  from  $i,8oo,ck)0,- 
000  to  $2,650,000,000,  an  increase  of  50  per  cent. 
Since  1870,  her  population  rose  50  per  cent.,  to  57,- 
000,000. 

As  to  capital,  the  growth  of  Germany  has  been  even 
more  surprising.  In  1900,  British  capital  invested  in 
foreign  countries  amounted,  in  round  figures,  to  $10,- 
000,000,000,  and  the  interest  drawn  from  it  to  $450,- 
000,000.  Of  this,  $800,000,000  was  invested  in  this 
country,  about  $3,000,000,000  in  foreign  railroads, 
and  $200,000,000  in  foreign  mines. 

For  Germany  there  are  precise  figures  at  hand. 
These  show  total  German  foreign  investments,  in  1900, 
of  $5,200,000,000.  Of  this  sum,  $3,400,000,000  were 
held  in  foreign  securities  and  $1,800,000,000  engaged 
in  foreign  industrial  enterprises,  such  as  railroads, 
mines,  factories,  street-car  lines,  etc. ;  and  of  this  sum 
$500,000,000  alone  in  South  America,  $250,000,000 
each  in  North  America  and  Africa.     This,  then,  shows 


268  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

Germany  with  more  than  one-half  the  total  foreign 
investments  of  Great  Britain.  And  let  us  keep  in 
mind  that  the  accumulation  of  this  enormous  super- 
abundance of  capital  was  the  result  of  thirty  years' 
efforts,  or,  more  properly  speaking,  of  fifteen  years', 
for  only  since  1885  has  Germany  launched  out  seriously 
on  her  new  industrial  and  commercial  career.  Truly, 
there  is  only  one  parallel  in  modern  history  to  this  phe- 
nomenal growth — Japan. 

The  most  illuminating  illustration  of  this  growth  is 
found  in  the  rise  and  progress  of  her  chief  private 
bank,  the  Deutsche  Bank,  in  Berlin.  In  1870,  this  insti- 
tution started  out  with  a  modest  capital  of  $3,750,000. 
In  190 1,  its  capital  had  increased  to  $50,000,000,  the 
volume  of  its  business  to  almost  $13,000,000,000,  and 
its  dividends  to  1 1  per  cent.  This  bank  has  issued  loans 
for  Austria,  Russia,  Chile,  Italy,  Mexico,  the  United 
States,  Sweden,  Egypt,  Roumania,  and  other  coun- 
tries. It  has  founded  several  hundred  industrial  enter- 
prises, many  of  them  in  far-away  countries,  such  as 
South  America,  Central  America,  China,  etc.,  and 
financed  other  enterprises,  like  the  German-Atlantic 
Bank,  the  German-Asiatic  Bank,  the  largest  German 
electric  and  mining  societies,  the  Anatolian  and  Mace- 
donian railroads,  and,  to  a  large  extent,  the  Northern 
Pacific  Railroad  as  well.  The  leading  position  of  Ger- 
many in  electric  enterprises  of  every  description  is 
largely  due  to  it.  In  a  word,  it  is  an  epitome  of  Ger- 
man industrial  and  commercial  progress  during  recent 
years. 

A  faithful  thermometer  of  this  growth  is  furnished 
by  Germany's  commercial  relations  with  this  country. 
In  1882,  she  bought  but  $28,000,000  worth  of  us,  and 
in  1900  she  took  $250,000,000  of  American  goods. 


German,  French,  and  Japanese        269 

The  above  facts  are  taken  from  the  author's  book, 
"Germany:  the  Welding  of  a  World  Power,"  pub- 
lished late  in  1902.  But  the  facts  and  figures  for  the 
time  since  elapsed  emphasise  the  contention  made  still 
more  strongly.  Despite  a  financial  depression  in  Ger- 
many, her  foreign  trade  has  grown  instead  of  dimin- 
ishing. In  1903,  it  amounted  to  almost  $2,800,- 
000,000. 

In  this  present  instance  we  are  mainly  concerned 
with  the  future  possibilities  of  German  trade  in  the 
Pacific.     A  few  figures  will  show  them. 

German  export  to  China  has  risen  at  a  more  rapid 
rate  even  than  has  American  export  to  that  country, 
from  $7,500,000,  in  1892,  to  $14,500,000  in  1900, 
$16,300,000  in  1 90 1,  and  $17,400,000  in  1903.  To 
Japan  her  trade,  in  1892,  was  only  $3,890,000;  in  1900 
it  was  $17,600,000,  and  in  1903,  $18,470,000.  To 
the  British  East  Indies  she  exported,  in  1892,  not  quite 
$8,000,000  worth;  in  1900,  something  in  excess  of 
$17,000,000,  and,  in  1903,  a  round  $18,000,000.  To 
the  Dutch  East  Indies,  Germany  exported,  in  1892, 
$3,700,000;  in  1900,  $6,780,000,  and,  in  1903,  $7,- 
100,000.  As  to  Australia,  next  to  this  country,  Ger- 
many has  become  the  largest  of  the  foreign  importers. 
In  1892,  her  imports  there  were  computed  at  $5,120,- 
000;  in  1900,  at  $12,050,000,  and,  in  1903,  at  $14,- 
500,000.  To  the  Philippines  Germany  exported,  in 
1892,  but  $700,000  worth;  in  1900,  $1,600,000,  and, 
in  1903,  $1,720,000. 

We  see,  then,  that  all  through  the  Far  East,  Ger- 
many has  made  very  rapid  advance  in  her  export  trade, 
exceeding  ours  in  not  a  few  instances.  Let  us  ex- 
amine how  the  case  stands  in  South  and  Central 
America. 


270  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

To  Argentina  Germany  exported,  in  1892,  $9,500,- 
000  worth  of  goods ;  in  1900,  $16,000,000,  and,  in  1903, 
$18,200,000.  To  Brazil,  in  1892,  $12,750,000;  in 
1900  (owing  to  financial  depression  in  Brazil),  $11,- 
500,000,  but  in  1903,  $13,850,000.  To  Chile,  in  1892, 
she  exported  $4,900,000;  in  1900,  $10,100,000,  and, 
in  1903,  $11,400,000.  To  Mexico,  in  1892,  $2,950,- 
000;  in  1900,  $7,050,000,  and,  in  1903,  $8,060,000. 
To  Uruguay,  in  1892,  $1,500,000;  in  1900,  $3,000,- 
000,  and,  in  1903,  $3,650,000.  To  Peru  Germany 
exported,  in  1892,  $1,450,000;  in  1900,  $2,500,000, 
and,  in  1903,  $3,100,000.  To  Central  America,  all 
told,  in  1892,  $1,400,000;  in  1900,  $1,670,000.  To 
Ecuador,  in  1892,  $300,000;  in  1900,  $1,450,000,  and, 
in  1903,  $1,720,000.  To  Venezuela,  in  1892,  $1,200,- 
000;  in  1900,  the  same  amount,  and,  in  1903  (despite 
hostile  feeling  because  of  German  armed  intervention), 
$1,650,000. 

The  above  figures,  however,  do  not  tell  the  whole 
tale.  Under  the  statistical  system  adopted  by  the  Ger- 
man foreign  office  in  computing  exports  and  imports, 
those  leaving  port  from  non-German  parts,  such,  for 
instance,  as  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp,  do  not  figure  in 
these  lists.  The  omissions  thus  made  are  quite  con- 
siderable, as  a  very  large  portion  of  both  exports  from, 
and  imports  into,  the  western  industrial  provinces  of 
Germany  (particularly  Westphalia  and  the  Rhenish 
districts)  go  largely  by  way  of  the  nearest  ports  on 
the  North  Sea,  these  being  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam. 
That  class  of  goods,  therefore,  appears  under  the  head 
of  Belgian  and  Dutch  imports  from,  and  exports  to, 
Germany.  It  can  only  be  estimated  how  large  a  propor- 
tion of  the  whole  thus  escapes  the  proper  heading,  but 
presumably  it  is  fully  20  per  cent.   However,  taking  the 


German,  French,  and  Japanese        271 

figures  as  they  stand,  the  total  volume  of  German  ex- 
ports to  South  and  Central  America  exceeds  the  figures 
for  the  United  States. 

To  this  country  Germany's  exports  have  steadily 
increased.  In  1892  they  amounted  to  $85,790,000;  in 
1900,  to  $109,880,000,  and,  in  1903,  to  $121,790,000. 
They  are  almost  altogether  industrial  products.  True, 
there  has  been  and  is  a  considerable  balance  of  trade 
in  our  favour,  but  by  no  means  proportionately  as 
large  as  in  the  case  of  Great  Britain.  Furthermore, 
German  industry  still  advances  by  leaps  and  bounds, 
and,  on  the  whole,  is  proving  itself  superior  to  the 
British  of  these  days.  Besides,  Germany,  like  this 
country,  has  drawn  a  wall  of  protection  around  her 
industry,  while  Great  Britain  is  still  adhering — and 
despite  Mr.  Chamberlain's  protective  tariff  campaign 
will  probably  continue  to  adhere — to  free  trade. 

Another  point.  In  a  number  of  her  chief  exports 
Germany  is  competing  in  the  markets  of  the  Pacific 
with  our  own  chief  exports  to  those  regions.  In  cotton 
goods,  for  instance,  she  was  exporting,  in  1892,  $38,- 
000,000  worth;  in  1900,  $61,100,000  worth,  and  in 
1903,  $66,300,000.  In  woollen  goods,  in  1892,  she 
sent  to  foreign  parts  $53,860,000;  in  1900,  $59,050,- 
000,  and,  in  1903,  $61,070,000.  Machinery  of  every 
kind  she  sent  out,  in  1892,  $15,500,000;  in  1900,  $58,- 
300,000,  an  increase  of  almost  400  per  cent,  within  ten 
years.  Of  coal,  she  exported,  in  1892,  $24,950,000; 
in  1900,  $53,970,000,  and,  in  1903,  $55,300,000.  Of 
hardware,  Germany  exported,  in  1892,  $15,150,000; 
in  1900,  $34,507,000,  and,  in  1903,  $36,785,000.  Of 
the  finer  grades  of  steel  and  ironware,  Germany  ex- 
ported, in  1892,  $6,090,000;  in  1900,  $17,650,000, 
and,  in  1903,  $18,350,000.     She  is  also  doing  a  trade 


272  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

of  some  importance  in  the  following  articles :  iron  and 
steel  billets,  cement,  steamers,  and  vessels  of  iron  or 
steel, — whole  or  in  parts, — rubber  goods,  cables  for  tele- 
graph, etc.,  rails,  copper  wire,  cotton  yarn,  ironware, 
plates  of  malleable  iron,  brass  and  copper  ware,  leather 
goods  and  prepared  leather,  technical  instruments  and 
machine  tools,  etc.,  in  all  of  which  she  is  our  direct 
competitor.  In  addition  to  all  this,  Germany  of  late 
is  making  systematic  efforts  to  emancipate  herself  from 
the  American  monopoly  in  cotton.  This  is  up-hill 
work,  of  course,  and  results  of  any  magnitude  may  not 
be  looked  for  for  years  to  come. 

But  in  her  own  way,  with  much  patience,  fore- 
thought, and  system,  she  has  entered  on  this  task. 
Within  the  last  two  years  this  is  what  has  come  of 
her  endeavours  in  this  line : 

In  three  of  her  African  colonies,  namely,  German 
East  Africa,  Togo,  and  Kameroons,  she  has  introduced 
cotton  culture  in  a  manner  both  practical  and  scientific. 
Her  colonial  department  in  Berlin  first  studied  soil 
and  climatic  conditions,  in  order  to  determine  the  most 
suitable  districts  and  methods  for  this  culture.  Next, 
she  studied  the  labour  question  in  these  colonies,  and 
decided  on  a  number  of  steps  to  cure  unfavourable  con- 
ditions in  this  respect.  The  department  followed  this 
up  by  obtaining  American  experts  in  cotton  culture. 
In  all  three  of  the  colonies  named  she  set  to  work,  as 
overseers  and  superintendents,  graduates  from  Booker 
T.  Washington's  practical  and  theoretical  institutions 
in  Alabama.  These  men,  all  of  them  of  the  coloured 
race  and  able  to  withstand  the  hot  climate,  were  secured 
under  ironclad  contracts  for  a  number  of  years.  Then, 
with  the  help  and  instruction  of  these  men,  natives 
were  trained   in   the  raising  of  cotton,   good  results 


German,  French,  and  Japanese       273 

being  accpmplished.  Next,  the  same  colonial  .depart- 
ment made  sure  of  the  services  of  three  or  four  white 
cotton  planters  from  America.  One  of  them,  J.  H.  G. 
Becker,  from  Hockley,  Texas,  was  put  at  the  head  of 
the  whole  enterprise  in  German  East  Africa,  and  has 
advanced  cotton  culture  in  that  large  colony  in  a  re- 
markable degree.  An  additional  step  taken  in  this 
direction  was  the  sending  of  young  German  farmers 
to  the  Agricultural  and  Mechanical  College  of  Texas, 
to  study  there,  practically  and  theoretically,  the  prob- 
lem of  profitable  cotton  culture ;  these  men  had  all  their 
expenses  paid  by  the  German  government. 

In  this  whole  matter  the  German  government  has 
had  the  active  support  of  the  various  German  chambers 
of  commerce,  as  well  as  that  of  the  colonial  societies 
and  individual  promoters  of  the  colonial  policy  of  the 
empire. 

The  cotton  grown  in  the  German  colonies  in  Africa 
has  so  far  been  nearly  altogether  from  Sea  Island  seed, 
the  best  for  the  desired  long  staple,  and  it  has  been 
found  well  adapted  to  soil  conditions  there. 

The  cotton  crop  of  1903,  raised  in  the  three  German 
colonies  named,  has  aggregated  about  175,000  pounds. 
Some  50,000  of  this  were  grown  in  German  East 
Africa,  while  the  remaining  125,000  were  produced  in 
Togo  and  Kameroons.  Experiments  have  been  made  in 
German  East  Africa  with  White  Egyptian  cotton  seed, 
and,  largely  due  to  the  dry  climate  of  that  colony,  have 
proved  more  successful  than  like  attempts  with  Sea 
Island  seed.  For  this  year  much  new  land  has  been 
put  to  cotton  in  all  these  three  colonies,  and  it  is  sur- 
mised that  the  crop  of  1904  will  be  at  least  400,000 
pounds.  All  the  cotton  produced  has  been  readily 
sold  at  a  good  profit  in  the  German  home  market,  and 


274  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

it  is  said  that  this  German  colonial  cotton  is  fully  the 
equal  of  our  own  best  varieties. 

These,  of  course,  are  only  beginnings,  and  for  years 
to  come  the  German  colonial  output  of  cotton  will  not 
measurably  influence  the  world's  market  or  compete 
with  our  own.  But  everything  must  have  a  begin- 
ning, and  this  one  looks,  indeed,  very  promising  from 
the  German  point  of  view. 

Next,  let  us  look  at  the  German  colonies.  Alto- 
gether, they  are  about  1,000,000  square  miles  in  area. 
They  are,  therefore,  five  times  as  large  as  the  empire 
itself.  Germany  needs  lands  of  her  own  to  which 
to  divert  the  stream  of  her  emigration.  For  fifty 
years  that  has  flowed  primarily  to  the  United  States; 
and  then  (leaving  out  of  account  southern  Brazil  and 
Argentina)  to  other  English-speaking  countries, 
chiefly  Canada  and  Australia.  In  that  way,  millions 
of  these  German  emigrants  have  been  absorbed  into 
the  economic  and  political  life  of  Germany's  main 
rivals, — Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, — and 
have  strengthened  the  latter.  Since  1870  German 
emigration  has  footed  up  almost  4,000,000. 

The  objective  point  of  an  emigrant  depends  on  a 
number  of  considerations,  and  it  cannot  be  altered  in  a 
mechanical  way,  at  the  mere  dictum  of  a  government. 
The  German  colonies  are  all  located  within  the  tropical 
or  subtropical  belt,  and  they  offer  obstacles  not  to  be 
overcome;  above  all,  climatic  ones.  Thus,  in  spite  of 
persistent  urgings,  the  tide  of  German  emigration  runs 
on  in  its  old  course.  Altogether,  within  that  million 
of  square  miles,  there  are  less  than  60,000  Germans, 
all  told;  and  that  includes  the  colonial  troops  and  offi- 
cials. The  one  German  colony  which  seemed  suitable, 
at  least  on  a  limited  scale,  for  the  German  immigrant 


German,  French,  and  Japanese        275 

— German  Southwest  Africa  to  wit — is  just  now  the 
scene  of  the  first  serious  colonial  war  the  empire  has 
had  on  its  hands.  It  will  hereafter  be  shunned  by 
the  German  emigrant  in  his  quest  for  a  new  home. 

But  Kiao  Chao,  Germany's  colony  in  China,  must  be 
excepted  from  the  above  remarks.  Properly  speaking, 
this  colony  is  not  a  field  for  German  immigration, 
either.  Its  territory  is  too  small  for  that,  being  only 
about  300  square  miles.  But  in  other  respects  it  is 
very  important.  For  Kiao  Chao  has  as  vast  hinter- 
land the  whole  province  of  Shan  Tung,  with  its  38,- 
000,000  of  inhabitants  and  its  enormous  mineral  re- 
sources. Of  these  we  spoke  before.  If  Germany  is 
allowed  to  carry  out  her  plans,  Kiao  Chao  will  become 
— after  the  manner  of  our  programme  in  regard  to 
the  Philippines — the  centre  of  Germany's  political  and 
economic  expansion  policy  in  the  Far  East.  She 
means  to  exploit,  for  her  own  use  exclusively,  this 
province  of  Shan  Tung.  She  uses  now  Kiao  Chao  as 
a  base  for  her  naval  and  military  forces  in  the  Far 
East.  The  chief  city  of  the  colony,  Tsing  Tao,  far 
more  accessible  for  navigation  than  the  town  of  Kiao 
Chao  itself,  and  with  a  splendid  harbour,  Germany  has 
transformed,  since  1902,  from  a  miserable  Chinese 
town  of  mud  hovels  into  a  modern  city  equipped  with 
every  improvement,  public  and  private. 

The  Reichstag  is  appropriating  every  year  a  sum 
of  $5,000,000  or  more  for  the  enlargement  and  im- 
provement of  this  new  city  and  its  harbour.  The  latter 
has  one  of  the  safest  and  largest  roadsteads  on  that 
part  of  the  China  coast  for  a  hundred  miles  or  so  either 
way.  But  this  harbour  is  being  deepened  and  im- 
proved still  further.  The  intention  is  to  make  of 
Tsing  Tao  a  second  Hong  Kong.     It  is  meant  to  be- 


276  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

come  the  second  most  important,  or,  if  possible,  the 
first,  distributing  centre  for  China.  In  one  respect 
Tsing  Tao  offers  better  facihties  for  this  than  Hong 
Kong.  It  lies  on  the  mainland,  and  not,  like  Hong 
Kong,  on  an  island  separated  from  China  proper  by 
the  sea.  It  has  a  densely  populated  hinterland,  offer- 
ing every  opportunity  for  enormous  industrial  devel- 
opment. This  development,  in  fact,  has  already  begun. 
The  Shan  Tung  Railroad  Company  is  now  completing 
the  first  of  the  large  railroads  connecting  Tsing  Tao 


PLAN  OF  TSING  TAO 

woposto    Chief  Harbor  of  Kiao-Chau  Colony 
From  FUne  fumbhed  bj  Gennwi  Narj  D«pf. 


witfi  the  interior.  This  company  is  made  up  of  about 
a  score  of  Germany's  leading  financiers,  although  quite 
a  number  of  small  capitalists  are  among  the  share- 
holders. By  June,  1904,  this  railroad  wrill  have 
reached  its  terminal  point,  Tsi  Nan  Fu,  the  provincial 
capital  of  Shan  Tung,  about  350  miles  inland.  Several 
railroad  projects  are  afoot  in  Germany,  the  purpose 
being  to  construct  a  network  of  railroads  for  the  com- 
plete industrial  and  commercial  exploitation  of  the 
province.  The  Shan  Tung  Mining  Company  has 
begun,  under  a  concession  granted  by  the  imperial  gov- 
ernment in  Peking,  to  work  the  big  coal  and  iron 


German,  French,  and  Japanese        277 

deposits  in  the  district  of  Wei  Hsien,  as  well  as  those 
of  I  Tshou  Fu  and  Po  Shan,  and  with  all  these  points 
the  railroad  has  already  direct  connection. 

Three  other  large  German  companies  have  been  or- 
ganised within  a  year,  these  being  the  Kiao  Chao  So- 
ciety, the  German-Chinese  Silk  Industrial  Company, 
and  the  German  Society  for  Mining  and  Industry.  All 
three  of  them  purpose  to  assist  in  the  exploitation  of 
the  province.  Among  its  members  are  also  some  of 
the  large  German  merchants  and  bankers  resident  in 
China,  above  all  the  firm  of  Arnhold,  Karberg  &  Com- 
pany, of  Shanghai,  Tien  Tsin,  and  Foo  Chow.  Some 
six  or  seven  other  companies,  made  up  of  German  cap- 
italists, are  now  forming  for  the  same  purpose. 

Secretary  Hay  seems  to  be  watching  this  rapid  de- 
velopment of  German  commercial  and  industrial  in- 
fluence in  China  with  a  wary  eye.  It  is  possible  that 
at  the  close  of  this  present  war,  when  a  sort  of  settle- 
ment of  Chinese  affairs  is  to  be  made  on  a  new  basis, 
this  German  colony  of  Kiao  Chao  will  form  one  of  the 
points  of  international  discussion  and  adjustment. 

As  to  other  vantage-points  of  Germany  in  Pacific 
W'aters,  she  possesses  some  which  will  help  her  very 
materially  in  realising  her  ambitions.  She  owns  a  part 
of  New  Guinea,  that  facing  in  the  direction  of  China 
and  Japan.  This  colony,  large  and  of  fine  natural  re- 
sources as  it  is,  has  so  far  been  left  almost  completely 
undeveloped,  but  hereafter  it  will  afford  the  German 
policy  in  Far  Asia  another  base.  The  Carolines  and 
Marianes  will  likewise  become  of  importance  to  her, 
both  as  coaling  stations  for  her  navy  and  in  a  com- 
mercial sense.  The  same  remark  applies  to  the  so- 
called  Bismarck  Archipelago,  a  large  group  of  fertile 
islands  within  the  sphere  of  influence  of  Australia. 


2/8  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

The  groups  of  islands  known  as  the  Marshall,  Brown, 
and  Providence  isles,  belong  administratively  within  the 
sphere  of  Samoa.  Of  this  last-named  group  of  islands 
— Samoa — Germany  obtained  the  lion's  share  in  virtue 
of  the  tripartite  agreement  in  1899.  The  larger 
islands  of  this  group,  Upolu  and  Savaii,  she  is  now 
industrially  developing  at  a  fair  rate  of  speed.  Both 
for  naval  and  merchant  marine  purposes  Samoa  is  of 
great  importance  to  Germany. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  Germany  has  a  number  of 
workable  bases  of  operation  for  her  commercial  and 
political  ambitions  in  the  Pacific.  It  must  be  admitted, 
however,  that  these  are  far  inferior  in  every  respect 
both  to  the  American  and  British  ones. 

And  now  a  word  about  the  other  points  that  tell  in 
the  equipment  of  Germany  for  the  coming  strenuous 
race  in  the  Pacific. 

First,  the  merchant.  The  German  merchant  is  more 
of  a  cosmopolitan,  and  more  ready  to  make  allowances 
for  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  other  nations,  than 
either  the  Briton  or  the  American.  That  much  the 
geographical  location  of  Germany  has  done  for  him. 
It  has  saved  him  from  isolation  of  thought  and  insular 
habits.  He  is  scientific  and  thorough  in  his  methods, 
usually  a  polyglot ;  he  has  a  great  fund  of  patience,  in- 
tense application,  and  methodical  habit.  He  is  content 
with  small  profits  and  long  credit  whenever  he  cannot 
do  better.  As  the  phrase  goes,  he  "  studies  to  please  " 
his  customer.  He  does  not  insist  on  speaking  German 
with  a  Spanish  or  English-speaking  purchaser. 
Neither  does  he  try  to  force  his  likes  and  dislikes  on 
his  customer.  He  sends  his  wares  to  foreign  markets, 
South  America,  or  China,  exactly  as  his  customer  likes 
to  have  them.     He  puts  them  up  in  parcels,  packages, 


German,  French,  and  Japanese        279 

or  boxes  of  the  size  and  weight  most  convenient,  and 
if  instructions  or  explanations  accompany  his  goods  he 
has  them  printed  in  the  language  of  the  country. 

As  an  amusing  illustration  of  this,  it  may  be  men- 
tioned that  all  the  Latin- American  countries  get  their 
flags  and  bunting  in  the  national  colours  from  Ger- 
many, and  when,  some  years  ago,  memorial  medals 
celebrating  the  anniversary  of  certain  patriotic  events 
in  South  America  made  their  appearance,  on  their  rim 
could  be  read :  "  Made  in  Germany." 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  no  wonder  that  Ger- 
many has  made  such  enormous  advance  in  Latin- 
American  trade.  But  relatively  speaking,  the  advance 
has  been  much  greater  in  the  Far  East,  more  particu- 
larly in  China.  To  conquer  that  country  commercially, 
a  mixed  commission  was  sent  out  by  the  Kaiser  in 
1897.  It  was  made  up  of  practical  merchants,  as  well 
as  economists,  writers,  and  government  officials.  After 
an  extensive  tour  this  commission  returned  home,  and 
each  member  of  it  wrote  out  his  own  report  as  to  which 
plan  seemed  most  feasible  to  him  to  enlarge  present 
German  trade  in  China  and  introduce  new  branches 
of  it.  The  German  consular  service  in  China  is  by  all 
odds  the  best,  barring  the  American.  A  few  years 
ago  several  existing  British  steamer  lines  that  had 
ceased  to  do  a  paying  business  were  purchased  by  the 
North  German  Lloyd.  These  lines  plied  between  ports 
of  minor  importance  in  Malaysia.  They  immediately 
began  to  pay  under  their  new  owners.  Next,  the 
North  German  Lloyd  and  the  big  Hamburg-America 
line  reorganised  steamer  communication  between  Eu- 
rope and  Far  Asia,  and  did  it  so  well  as  to  beat  at 
every  point — speed,  comfort,  and  price — the  old  famed 
British  P.  &.  O.  line,  although  the  latter  had  virtually 


28o  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

had  a  monopoly  of  this  traffic  for  several  generations. 
Several  new  steamer  lines  were  also  started  by  German 
companies,  these  attending  to  a  goodly  fraction  of  the 
coastwise  traffic  between  Shanghai  and  north  and  south 
of  that  main  Chinese  emporium.  Thus  it  has  hap- 
pened that  the  German  flag  at  present  is  the  one 
most  frequently  and  numerously  seen  in  Chinese 
waters. 

By  similar  methods  Germany  has  not  precisely  con- 
quered, but  obtained  a  very  large  share  of  the  trade 
along  the  whole  Yang  Tse.  On  that  lordly  river,  too, 
the  rule  of  the  Briton  was  broken.  Two  German 
steamer  lines  now  make  regular  and  frequent  runs  be- 
tween Shanghai  and  Han  Kow,  650  miles  up.  They 
touch  at  every  more  important  point,  and  have  suc- 
ceeded within  a  few  years  in  capturing  the  good  half 
of  the  former  British  trade. 

Banking  facilities  are  another  point  which  the  Ger- 
man has  very  well  attended  to  in  China.  The  Deutsche 
Bank  made  a  start  in  that  direction  in  1895.  Since 
then  this  institution  alone  has  founded  twelve  branch 
houses  in  Far  Asian  ports.  Of  late  its  directors  have 
added  to  these  one  in  Tien  Tsin  and  another  in  New 
Chwang.  A  group  of  Berlin  banks,  of  which  the  Dis- 
conto  Society  is  the  leading  one,  have  since  followed 
the  lead  of  the  Deutsche  Bank. 

The  same  methods  as  those  outlined  above  have  been 
employed  by  Germany  in  securing  a  good  slice  of  the 
foreign  trade  of  Australia  and  that  of  Japan.  The 
number  of  German  firms  in  both  these  countries  is 
steadily  on  the  increase.  The  German  consuls  keep 
people  at  home  well  informed  about  every  new  opening 
for  trade  that  offers.  In  Australia  the  considerable 
German  element  among  the  immigrants  is  another  help 


German,  French,  and  Japanese       281 

in  the  same  direction,  particularly  as  there  also  exists 
a  well-edited  German  press. 

After  all  these  advantages  and  achievements  of  Ger- 
many it  remains  to  mention  the  disadvantages.  These 
are  few,  but  very  serious.  First,  the  great  distance 
that  separates  Germany  from  these  regions.  The 
Panama  Canal,  as  was  pointed  out  before,  will  render 
this  difficulty  much  more  pronounced,  and  turn  it  to 
a  distinct  American  advantage.  Next,  Germany's  nat- 
ural resources  do  not  begin  to  compare  with  ours.  All 
her  skill  and  brains,  all  her  energy  and  enterprise,  can- 
not make  up  for  this  deficiency.  Again,  Germany  is 
inferior  to  this  country  in  manufacturing  methods. 
Another  point:  the  adequate  development  of  her 
colonies  is  seriously  retarded,  perhaps  rendered  impos- 
sible, by  that  system  of  bureaucratic  interference  and 
supervision  which  has  become  a  second  nature  to  Ger- 
many's government,  and  which  hampers  at  every  step 
the  initiative  of  the  individual  German.  Lastly  must 
be  mentioned  the  fact  that,  in  the  matter  of  a  navy, 
Germany  cannot  possibly  keep  step  with  this  nation. 
Her  home  territory  is  surrounded  by  foes — or  at  least 
rivals.  At  our  present  rate  of  naval  increase,  Germany 
will  be  left  far  in  the  rear  within  another  ten  years. 
And,  even  if  this  were  not  so,  Germany  at  no  time 
would  dare  to  deprive  her  coasts  of  the  protection  of 
her  war  vessels,  both  on  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic. 
Only  one-half  of  her  navy,  at  best,  will  be  available 
for  purposes  of  her  foreign  policy.  And  if  it  ever 
should  come  to  a  trial  of  strength  between  Germany 
and  this  country,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  her 
navy  would  give  a  very  good  account  of  itself,  but 
that,  nevertheless,  she  would  not  have  the  ghost  of  a 
chance  from  the  outset.     In  the  Pacific  we  hold  the 


282  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

only  mid-ocean  bulwark,  Honolulu,  and  without  that 
Germany  could  not  even  approach  our  western  coast 
because  of  lack  of  fuel. 

The  clear-eyed  men  of  Germany  are  recognising 
these  points,  and  an  almost  ludicrous  illustration  of  the 
spirit  bred  by  this  knowledge  was  given  at  the  Reichs- 
tag session,  on  April  19  last.  One  of  the  leading 
delegates  wound  up  his  tale  of  woe  by  saying :  "  Our 
business  people  will  soon  have  nothing  to  do  but  emi- 
grate to  America  and  utilise  their  intelligence  there  to 
the  detriment  of  their  own  countrymen." 

Of  French  ambitions  in  the  Pacific  it  is  hardly  worth 
while  to  say  much.  All  unbiassed  judges  of  the  French 
of  to-day  agree  in  calling  them  a  decadent  nation.  A 
people  which  has  made  the  "  two-children  system  " 
part  of  its  accepted  sociologic  code ;  the  population  of 
which,  despite  a  considerable  immigration,  is  practi- 
cally stationary,  and  which  has  neither  genius  nor 
liking  for  all  those  tasks  which  fall  on  the  shoulders 
of  an  expanding  nation,  cannot  be  seriously  reckoned 
a  future  rival  in  the  Pacific  or  anywhere  else. 

It  may  be  admitted  at  once  that  if  these  self-imposed 
obstacles  did  not  stand  in  the  way,  France  would  have 
very  fine  opportunities  for  competition  in  the  Pacific. 
She  has  a  number  of  colonies  there,  giving  her  stra- 
tegic and  economic  bases.  She  has  much  idle  capital 
at  home  waiting  for  chances  of  safe  and  profitable  in- 
vestment, and  she  has  also  a  highly  developed  industry, 
one  which  is  leading  the  world  in  a  number  of  features. 

But  when  all  this  is  admitted,  it  will  not  vitiate  our 
contention.  Besides,  the  national  ambition  of  France 
of  late  years  has  turned  to  Africa  as  a  field  to  engross 
what  adventurous  spirit  she  has  left. 

Lastly,   there  is  Japan.     Doubtless,   she  will  play 


German,  French,  and  Japanese        283 

quite  a  respectable  figure  in  the  Pacific  hereafter.  She 
has  a  number  of  the  elements  necessary  to  win  success 
— intelligence,  adaptability,  patience,  and  diligence, 
and  the  true  mettle  for  a  commercial  and  expanding 
nation.  But  these  advantages  are  partially  ofTset  by 
points  which  tell  against  her.  The  decisive  one  is 
geographical  in  nature.  Her  island  empire  is  too 
small  in  size.  Her  population  must  seek,  and  will 
doubtless  find,  new  outlets.  Corea  she  may  acquire. 
The  chances  are  against  her  acquisition  of  Manchuria. 
If  that  large  Chinese  province  should,  however,  come 
into  her  possession,  it  would  solve  the  population  prob- 
lem for  her,  for  Manchuria  has  space  for  five  times 
the  present  population  of  Japan.  The  probability 
is  that  Japan,  like  Germany,  will  have  to  send  mil- 
lions of  her  emigrants  to  other  countries,  there  to  be 
absorbed. 

Besides,  even  after  her  wonderful  industrial  rise, 
Japan  is  still  a  very  poor  country,  with  a  scarcity  of 
capital,  small  natural  resources,  and  a  very  low  scale 
of  living,  when  comparing  her  with  western  countries. 
To  change  all  this  would  in  any  event  require  another 
fifty  years  or  more.  Meanwhile,  the  United  States, 
Germany,  and  Great  Britain  have  the  start  of  her,  and 
later  it  will  be  almost  impossible  for  Japan  to  make 
up  for  lost  time. 

Nevertheless,  the  race  aflfinities  that  bind  the  Jap  to 
the  Chinaman  and  the  other  denizens  of  Far  Asia  are 
something  in  his  favour.  He  may  find  it  very  profitable 
to  drive  a  growing  trade  with  China.  As  a  case  in 
point,  it  deserves  mention  that  Japan,  since  1895,  ^^^ 
come  to  monopolise  more  and  more  the  cotton-goods 
trade  with  China.  Her  manufactures  in  that  line  are 
just  cheap  and  rough  enough  to  suit  the  purse  and 


284  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

the  taste  of  the  Chinese  labouring  masses,  and  that 
means  eventually  a  gigantic  trade. 

Whichever  way  we  look  at  it,  though,  as  a  serious 
rival  for  supremacy — commercial  supremacy — Japan 
need  not  be  taken  into  serious  account.  There  is  a 
field  for  her,  certainly,  but  it  is  rather  limited.  Her 
export  in  rice  to  Asian  countries  may  grow  consider- 
ably. So  may  her  exports  of  beer,  textiles,  coal,  cop- 
per, sake,  the  cheaper  grades  of  hardware,  and,  pos- 
sibly, later  on,  machinery.  Her  trade  in  tea  is  scarcely 
susceptible  of  great  expansion,  because  it  is  relished 
nowhere  except  in  Japan  itself  and  in  this  country. 
Still,  both  as  a  merchant  and  manufacturer,  the  Jap 
appears  to  have  at  least  a  fair  chance  in  the  future 
Pacific  trade.  Nobody  will  be  more  glad  of  this 
chance  (outside  of  Japan)  than  the  people  of  this 
country. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
AMERICAN   SUPREMACY  AND   THE   SLAV 

On  the  border  of  the  Pacific,  on  his  own  soil,  stands 
the  Slav,  brawny  and  overbearing.  The  American's 
struggle  with  him  for  supremacy  in  the  Pacific  will  be 
the  hardest  of  all.  It  will  not  be  of  the  same  nature 
as  that  with  the  other  nations.  For  with  the  latter 
it  will  primarily  be  commercial;  not  so  with  the  Rus- 
sian. It  will  not  even  be  so  much  a  question  of  fight- 
ing for  the  possession  of  material  things.  No,  the 
strife  will  be  of  a  different  character. 

First,  politically.  The  Russian's  hegemony  over 
Asia  must  be  broken.  The  Russian  article  of  faith — 
that  the  whole  of  the  immense  continent  by  right  be- 
longs to  him  and  must  come  under  his  sway — is  to  be 
destroyed.  His  pretension  to  exclude  from  Far  Asia 
all  influence  and  all  trade  but  his  own  must  be  resisted 
and  overcome.  His  type  of  civilisation  must  be  made 
to  yield  to  ours,  or  at  least  confined  to  his  own  do- 
minions. His  dogma — that  the  Orthodox  Church  of 
Russia  is  to  have  spiritual  rule  throughout  Asia — 
must  be  crushed.  In  fine,  the  chief  issue  hereafter  be- 
tween the  Russian  and  the  American  in  Asia  will  be 
for  the  predominance  of  Western  or  Eastern  civilisa- 
tion. We  have  already  seen  in  what  consists  the 
American  equipment  for  the  winning  of  the  suprem- 
acy in  the  Pacific.  Now  let  us  examine  the  Russian 
armour. 

385 


286  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

It  is  a  fact  that  between  the  Slav  and  the  American 
there  are  certain  striking  resemblances.  The  Ameri- 
can nation  is  numerically  one  of  the  strongest  in  the 
world.  Russia  exceeds  us  in  numbers,  but  we  have 
the  greater  rate  of  increase,  and  within  a  generation 
both  nations  will  be  equal  in  population.  Since  i860 
Russia's  population  has  doubled,  ours  has  trebled.  The 
natural  resources  of  Russia,  like  those  of  the  United 
States,  are  practically  limitless.  We  have  had  enor- 
mous territorial  growth;  the  Russian  likewise.  Dur- 
ing the  nineteenth  century  w^e  have  added  more  than 
2,000,000  square  miles  to  our  domain;  the  Russian  has 
added  a  territory  of  almost  precisely  the  same  circum- 
ference to  his  country.  The  American  as  well  as  the 
Russian  nation  has  remarkable  powers  of  assimilation, 
a  fact  which  goes  far  to  account  for  unequalled  growth 
on  both  sides.  Here  in  the  United  States  alien  peoples, 
within  one,  or  at  most,  two,  generations,  have  been 
absorbed  into  the  current  of  life,  sunk,  and  disappeared 
like  snowflakes  in  the  ocean.  Russia  on  her  part  has 
swallowed  up  and  digested  more  than  one  hundred 
nations  and  tribes.  Again,  both  the  American  and 
the  Russian  exhibit  a  genius  for  organisation  and  gov- 
ernment. Without  much  bloodshed  Russia  has  intro- 
duced new  forms  of  administration  in  her  conquered 
territory  of  central  and  northern  Asia.  In  our  own 
country,  without  disorder,  new  territories  have  been 
formed  and  become  in  a  short  while  self-governing 
states.  Lastly,  the  American  as  well  as  the  Russian 
possesses  vast  territory,  capable  of  an  enormous  in- 
crease in  population.  The  new  and  unsettled  lands 
of  the  north  temperate  zone — and  that  means  the  zone 
of  power — have  been  divided  between  them.  And 
now,  having  reached  the  uttermost  limit,  they  face 


American  Supremacy  and  the  Slav      287 

each  other  from  both  shores  of  the  Pacific.  It  is  these 
points  of  resemblance  which  made  a  keen-eyed  French- 
man, Lavelaye,  say :  "  A  hundred  years  hence,  leaving 
China  out  of  the  question,  there  will  be  two  colossal 
powers  in  the  world,  beside  which  Germany,  England, 
France,  and  Italy  will  be  as  pigmies — the  United 
States  and  Russia." 

But  the  contrasts  between  the  two  nations  are  even 
more  striking  and  numerous.  The  decisive  one  is  the 
difference  between  their  conceptions  of  the  best  form 
of  government,  involving  as  it  does  individual  ideals  of 
life.  The  American  is  the  supreme  representative  of 
civil  and  religious  liberty;  the  Russian  is  the  supreme 
representative  of  absolutism,  both  in  State  and  Church. 
American  civilisation,  erected  on  the  foundations  of 
Anglo-Saxon  ideals,  is  the  product  of  the  development 
of  the  individual.  It  means  individual  responsibility 
and  individual  effort.  Russian  civilisation  is  based  on 
the  suppression  of  the  individual.  Once  the  American 
individual  should  cease  to  assume  his  share  of  effort, 
responsibility,  and  government,  the  fabric  of  our  in- 
stitutions would  crumble.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if 
the  average  Russian  should  rise  politically  to  the  level 
of  the  average  American,  Russian  institutions  could 
no  longer  exist. 

The  Russian  form  of  government,  in  fundamental 
principles,  in  ideals  and  in  methods,  is  diametrically 
opposed  to  our  own.  The  two  systems  do  not  repre- 
sent two  different  stages  of  development  upon  the  same 
foundations.  They  spring  from  radically  different 
conceptions,  and  they  aim  at  radically  different  ends. 
Russian  and  American  development  on  present  lines 
will  drive  the  two  nations  further  and  further  apart, 
and  finally  must  bring  on  a  conflict.     The  Russian, 


288  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

too,  is  a  bearer  of  civilisation,  but  it  is  of  a  different 
type.  To  make  room  for  our  own  mission  of  civilisa- 
tion in  Asia,  we  must  first  curtail  or  neutralise  that  of 
the  Russian.  There  is  no  possibility  of  the  two  factors 
working  side  by  side. 

What  does  the  Russian  expect  to  accomplish  in 
Asia?  He  expects  to  win  and  to  hold  the  whole  con- 
tinent. That  is  part  of  the  creed  of  every  normal 
Muscovite.  The  whole  of  Russian  literature  is  per- 
meated with  this  idea.  The  whole  Russian  nation  is 
deeply  imbued  with  the  notion  that  Providence  spe- 
cially favours  "  Holy  Russia,"  and  specially  despises 
all  the  rest  of  the  world. 

To  summarise  the  Russian  doctrine :  the  future  of 
the  world  is  with  the  Slav ;  Russia  is  The  Inevitable ; 
the  Russians  are  the  only  remaining  organised  people 
on  earth ;  only  in  Holy  Russia  is  religious  faith  per- 
manent; only  in  the  Czar's  empire  are  perpetuated 
order,  form,  and  authority;  it  is  the  mission  of  Holy 
Russia  to  give  back  to  the  peoples  of  the  earth  these 
blessings;  Holy  Russia  must  advance  with  the  Cross 
for  the  regeneration  of  the  world,  and  make  the  Ortho- 
dox Church  paramount  throughout  the  whole  of 
Asia. 

These  ideas — amounting  probably  with  the  Russian 
masses  to  a  powerful  instinct — lie  at  the  root  of  her 
advance  in  Asia.  This  advance  has  been  like  that  of 
a  glacier — slow,  but  resistless.  It  has  reached  China. 
Unless  prevented  by  Russia,  this  nation,  backed  up, 
let  us  hope,  by  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  will  give 
China  and  the  whole  Far  East  the  priceless  boon  of 
western  civilisation,  making  her  population  free, 
prosperous,  and  intelligent.  But  if  Russia  gains 
control   of   China   and    Asia,   these   populations   will 


American  Supremacy  and  the  Slav      289 

remain  Asiatic,  and  their  hands,  groping  for  the 
light,  will  only  meet  the  mailed  fist  of  the  Russian 
conqueror. 

True,  Russia  has  stood  our  friend  once  or  twice. 
During  the  Civil  War  she  made  a  naval  counter- 
manoeuvre  to  offset  the  designs  of  England  and  France. 
A  few  years  later,  in  1867,  she  prevailed  upon  us  to 
purchase  Alaska,  thus  strengthening  our  base  on  the 
Pacific  and  curtailing  that  of  Great  Britain.  Alaska 
at  that  time  was  absolutely  useless  to  Russia;  but  it 
was  also  useless  to  us,  and  it  is  only  since  1898,  since 
our  acquisition  of  the  Philippines,  that  this  outlying 
territory  has  assumed  value  for  us.  However,  leaving 
that  aside,  what  has  been  Russia's  motive  in  these  two 
friendly  acts  ?  That  motive  was  purely  and  singly  her 
hostility  to  England.  She  wished  to  weaken  England, 
to  checkmate  her,  and  to  perpetuate  the  ill-feeling  ex- 
isting at  that  time  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain. 

This  is  the  place  to  say  a  word  about  England's 
present  and  future  attitude  towards  Russia.  Strangely 
enough,  very  many  Americans  take  it  for  granted  that 
Great  Britain  will  make  common  cause  with  us  here- 
after in  neutralising  or  limiting  the  overweening  in- 
fluence of  Russia  in  northern  and  central  Asia.  On 
the  face  of  it,  there  seems  to  be  good  ground  for  such 
an  assumption,  for,  surely,  it  would  appear  to  be  to 
Great  Britain's  own  vital  interest  to  do  so.  But  Eng- 
land's statesmanship  has  become  quite  hysterical  of 
late,  and  there  is  no  telling  what  she  may  do.  With 
England's  waning  prestige  in  Asia  has  come  a  waning 
ability  to  see  things  as  they  really  are.  Russia's 
frankly  avowed  policy  has  been,  and  still  is,  to  seize 
India.     The  former  generation  of  British  statesmen, 


290  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

the  Palmerstons,  Disraelis,  Gladstones,  Salisburys,  for 
forty  years  past  endeavoured  to  prevent  Russia's 
steady,  if  slow,  advance  towards  Hindostan;  they  did 
this  with  varying  success.  The  Russian  advance 
guards  are  now  separated  from  the  northern  border  of 
Great  Britain's  chief  possession  by  a  narrow  strip  of 
land.  The  war  broke  out  between  Japan  and  Russia, 
affording  England  a  golden  opportunity  to  balk  Rus- 
sian advance  in  Asia  once  and  forever.  With  Japan 
England  has  a  formal  treaty  of  alliance.  With  all 
these  circumstances  so  favourable  to  England,  she  has 
not  improved  her  present  opportunities. 

What  does  England  mean  by  that?  Are  Russia's 
legions  to  be  stopped  hereafter,  if  England  misses  so 
signally  her  present  opportunity?  Are  Russia's 
promises  to  be  relied  upon?  Manchuria  proves  the 
contrary;  it  has  been  proved  before  on  innumerable 
occasions.  Is  Russia  to  forego  the  dream  of  centuries  ? 
Is  she  to  content  herself  with  a  modus  vivendi  with 
England?  If  she  wished  that,  there  would  have  been 
peace — deep  and  lasting  peace — between  England  and 
Russia  before  now.  Is  Russia  to  gainsay  the  heart's 
desire  of  her  government  and  people,  the  desire  to 
bring  the  Asiatic  peoples  under  her  sway  and  that  of 
the  Greek  Cross?  And  yet  England  thinks  the  Lion 
and  the  Bear  can  become  friends. 

This  is  not  the  age  for  sentimental  politics.  Facts 
rule,  interests  rule — tangible  interests — nothing  else. 
And  will  then  Russia  allow  her  policy  to  become  a  sen- 
timental one?  Hundreds  of  penny-a-liners  in  England 
assure  us  that  she  will;  but  will  she?  Nicholas  II., 
personally  amiable,  well-meaning,  and  peace-loving 
though  he  be,  is  a  puppet  in  the  hands  of  his  strong 
advisers,  and  they  all  wish  anything  rather  than  a  per- 


American  Supremacy  and  the  Slav      291 

manent  compromise  with  England,  even  if  political 
blindness  should  go  so  far  in  England  as  to  sanction 
Russia's  acquisition  of  an  approach  to,  and  a  harbour 
on,  the  Persian  Gulf. 

No,  the  differences  between  England  and  Russia 
are  too  real,  too  manifold,  to  yield  to  sentimental  treat- 
ment. They  are  irreconcilable,  just  as  much  as  are 
the  Russian  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  points  of  view  in 
life  and  politics.  This  Gordian  knot  can  only  be  cut 
in  one  way — with  the  sword.  The  present  course  of 
double-dealing,  of  carrying  water  on  both  shoulders, 
will  not  avail  England  much.  It  is  doubtless  to  the 
detriment  of  Japan,  England's  ally,  but  in  the  end  far 
more  to  England's  own  detriment. 

So,  then,  from  the  vacillating  course  which  England 
has  pursued  in  her  foreign  policy  during  the  last  few 
years  Americans  must  not  look  forward  with  confidence 
to  active  and  able  British  co-operation  in  our  coming 
struggle  for  supremacy  with  the  Russian.  Moreover, 
England's  position  in  such  a  struggle  will  be  far  more 
vulnerable  and  difficult  than  our  own.  Her  Indian 
empire  forms  a  tremendous  strategic  disadvantage  to 
her  in  this  matter.  But  let  us  state  right  here  that  in 
this  coming  struggle  for  commercial  and  political  pre- 
dominance in  the  Pacific,  this  country  is  large  and 
powerful  enough  to  do  without  much  active  assistance 
on  the  part  of  the  British  cousin.  Examination  of  the 
main  facts  will  reveal  this. 

Russia  has  no  islands  and  no  colonies  to  serve  her 
as  bases  in  a  possible  war  in  the  Pacific.  She  must 
confine  her  operations  to  the  mainland.  We  have  seen 
that  the  Philippines  give  us  a  tremendous  advantage, 
and  that  we  are  the  nation  owning  the  chief  inter- 
mediate stations  of  strategic  importance  between  the 


292  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

west  coasts  of  America  and  Far  Asia.  Russia's  navy 
is  small,  much  smaller  now  since  the  Japs  have  crippled 
it.  She  has  to  defend  three  coast  lines,  the  Baltic,  the 
Black  Sea,  and  the  Pacific,  each  separated  from  the 
other  by  thousands  of  miles.  Russia's  finances  are  in 
such  a  bad  state  that  she  may  fairly  be  spoken  of  as 
on  the  brink  of  national  bankruptcy.  She  has  to  strain 
her  resources  to  the  utmost  to  maintain  at  the  present 
size  her  army  (unavailable  against  us  in  the  event 
of  a  war)  and  her  navy.  We  shall  increase  our 
navy  to  five  or  six  times  the  size  of  that  portion  of 
the  Russian  navy  which  the  empire  can  spare  for  the 
Pacific. 

The  Russian  is  no  navigator.  On  January  i,  1901, 
Russia's  merchant  marine  consisted  of  745  steamers, 
of  364,360  tons,  and  2293  sailing  vessels,  of  269,459 
tons;  altogether,  therefore,  3038  vessels,  with  a  ton- 
nage of  633,819.  This  is  one-fifth  the  size  of  the 
German  merchant  marine,  one-eighth  the  size  of  our 
own,  and  one  twenty-fifth  that  of  the  British  merchant 
marine.  The  Pacific  portion  of  this  is  entirely  insig- 
nificant. The  two  Russian  ports  of  Vladivostok  and 
Nikolayevsk  in  the  year  mentioned  were  visited  by  only 
93  vessels.  Her  Pacific  merchant  fleet  has  increased 
since,  but  it  is  trifling  in  comparison  with  the  number 
of  vessels  to  be  seen  in  that  ocean  belonging  to  other 
sea-faring  nations. 

Russia's  industry  is  small  and  poorly  developed. 
She  cannot  for  a  moment  hope  to  compete  with  us  in 
this  respect.  The  only  system  under  which  Russia 
can  expect  to  reap  any  considerable  portion  of  the  Far 
Asian  trade  is  by  first  conquering  those  countries  and 
then  rigidly  excluding  the  goods  of  foreign  nations, 
the  same  system  which  she  pursues  in  her  home  mar- 


American  Supremacy  and  the  Slav      293 

ket.  But,  as  pointed  out  before,  the  coming  strug- 
gle between  the  American  and  the  Russian  will  be 
not  so  much  a  commercial  as  a  political  and  ethical 
one. 

In  his  book,  "  The  Problem  of  Asia,"  Captain 
Mahan,  several  years  ago,  made  this  point  very  clear. 

In  the  foregoing  pages  we  dwelt  for  a  moment  on 
the  contradictory  and  irrational  Asiatic  policy  pursued 
of  late  by  Great  Britain,  a  policy  so  disastrous  to  Brit- 
ish interests  in  that  part  of  the  world  that  it  must  have 
raised  many  a  derisive  smile  in  Russia.  But  it  cannot 
be  supposed  that  this  is  to  be  the  end  of  it.  The  public 
mind  of  Great  Britain  during  the  last  decade  has  be- 
come demoralised  by  a  succession  of  unfortunate  or 
disturbing  events.  The  removal  from  the  scene  of 
some  of  her  greatest  statesmen,  the  present  lack  of 
sagacious  and  safe  political  leaders,  the  enormous 
blunder  of  the  South  African  war,  the  overpoweringly 
strong  commercial  competition  of  the  Americans  and 
Germans,  and  the  greatly  disturbed  condition  of  her 
tariff  policy — these  are  all  things  that  have  made  for 
England's  weak  and  exhausted  condition  at  this  hour. 
She  will  and  must  recover  from  these  blows.  Then 
she  may  prove  indeed  our  valuable  ally  in  Far  Asia, 
so  far  at  least  as  successful  opposition  to  Russian  ag- 
gression is  concerned. 

There  is  another  contingency  worth  mention.  The 
prospect  of  a  confederation,  more  or  less  close,  of  the 
English-speaking  countries  of  the  world  appeals  to  a 
growing  number,  not  only  in  this  country  and  Eng- 
land, but  in  the  British  colonies.  W.  T.  Stead,  the 
enthusiastic  advocate  of  this  idea,  commands  a  follow- 
ing steadily  rising  in  numbers  and  influence.  Mr. 
Carnegie's  views  are  well  known.     Many  of  the  fore- 


294  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise  . 

most  minds,  both  in  England  and  this  country,  are  in 
agreement  on  this  point.  To  be  sure,  there  are  enor- 
mous difficulties  in  the  way.  But  the  younger  brothers 
in  the  Anglo-Saxon  family  unmistakably  have  the  ad- 
vantage over  the  eldest.  Australians  are  no  longer 
English,  though  they  remain  Anglo-Saxon.  The  cli- 
mate of  Australia  has  made  of  that  people  something 
very  much  like  ourselves,  even  including  the  similarity 
with  the  American  temperament — optimistic  and  dar- 
ing. The  same  remark  applies  to  British  America. 
The  Canuck  is  a  good  deal  more  of  an  American  than 
a  Briton. 

We  find  at  present  six  Anglo-Saxon  branches,  all 
of  which  are  to  be  numerous  and  strong — the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  Canada,  Australia,  South  Africa, 
and  New  Zealand.  Four  of  the  six  are  ranged 
around  the  Pacific,  on  the  northeast  and  southwest, 
while  on  the  northwest,  the  west,  at  the  centre,  and 
scattered  over  its  broad  surface  at  strategic  points  are 
many  hundreds  of  islands  under  the  American  or  Brit- 
ish flag.  Surely  this  New  Mediterranean,  which  in 
this  present  century  is  to  become  the  centre  of  the 
world's  population  and  the  seat  of  its  power,  is  to  be 
an  Anglo-Saxon  sea.  A  navy,  so  large  and  efficient  as 
to  deter  all  evil  intentions,  will  keep  it  so.  The  Eng- 
lish-speaking countries  are  nearly  all  girt  by  the  sea, 
and  hence  can  dispense  with  huge  standing  armies, 
but  absolutely  need  large  and  powerful  navies.  It 
may  be  that  Canada  will  of  her  own  free  will  join  us. 
In  any  event,  it  is  quite  within  the  bounds  of  possi- 
bility that,  by  the  middle  of  this  century,  a  confedera- 
tion of  English-speaking  countries  mutually  safe- 
guarding each  other's  colonial  and  commercial  inter- 
ests and  possessions  will  confront  the  aggressive  Slav 


American  Supremacy  and  the  Slav     295 

in  Asia.  Such  a  confederation,  comprising  a  popula- 
tion which  then  will  have  risen  to  200,000,000  and 
will  overtop  Russia  in  every  essential  element  of 
strength,  would  be  victorious  and  resistless  by  its  mere 
weight. 

Meanwhile,  whatever  the  outcome  of  this  present 
war,  Russia  will  issue  from  it  in  a  sadly  weakened  con- 
dition. And  that  will  be  a  telling  fact  in  our  coming 
struggle  with  her  in  the  Pacific. 

There  is,  however,  another  possibility,  though  a 
remote  one,  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  Mr. 
Colquhoun,  in  a  recent  book,  calls  attention  to  it.  He 
says :  "  Will  the  United  States,  abandoning  the  policy 
by  which  her  foreign  relations  have  hitherto  been 
guided,  follow  the  example  of  Britain,  or  will  she  con- 
sider what  may  be  termed  her  immediate  material  in- 
terest and  give  the  supjxirt  of  her  countenance  to 
Russia,  by  following  out  to  a  logical  conclusion  the 
Monroe  doctrine?  That  Russia  desires  to  apply  such 
a  doctrine  to  all  northern  Asia  is  not  to  be  doubted, 
and  if  the  United  States  in  her  new  sphere  should  take 
a  similar  view  of  her  own  interests,  we  may  yet  see 
the  two  Great  Powers  of  the  Future,  the  Great  Autoc- 
racy and  the  Great  Democracy,  Slav  and  Teuton,  dom- 
inating the  Far  and  Farthest  East  as  two  gigantic 
Trusts." 

That,  then,  expresses  a  semi-belief  on  the  part  of 
the  distinguished  writer  that  the  United  States  will 
make  common  cause  with  Russia  in  dominating  the 
Pacific.  We  may  probably  dismiss  such  a  thought. 
The  temper  and  the  political  convictions  of  this  nation 
would  never  sanction  such  an  unholy  and  unnatural 
alliance.  Neither  would  it  be  advantageous  to  us, 
looking  at  the  matter  from  a  baldly  material  point  of 


296  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

view.  Russia  has  nothing  to  offer  us  for  our  friend- 
ship and  support  in  that  region.  She  can  only  with- 
hold, not  give.  And  yet  Mr.  Colquhoun's  idea  seems 
to  be  shared  by  a  good  many  of  the  instructed  minds 
of  Great  Britain. 


CHAPTER  XX 
LIFE   UNDER   NEW  CONDITIONS 

It  is  a  truism  that  we  are  living  in  a  transition  era. 
Nevertheless,  its  full  bearing  does  not  seem  to  have 
entered  the  minds  of  many.  These  are  apt  to  forget 
that  the  old  is  making  place  for  the  new;  that  there 
is  not  only  a  regrouping  of  powers  all  over  the  world, 
but  a  creating  of  new  ones ;  that  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic commonplaces  of  the  past  are,  some  of  them, 
no  longer  applicable,  and  that  in  the  range  of  thought 
and  sentiment  there  is  noticeable  even  more  change 
than  in  material  things. 

A  striking  case  in  point  is  the  complete  transforma- 
tion of  diplomatic  habits  and  methods  wrought  by  the 
example  of  the  United  States.  On  the  continent  of  Eu- 
rope it  is  still  the  fashion  to  speak,  in  a  vein  of  pitying 
irony,  of  American  "  shirt-sleeve  statesmanship,"  mean- 
ing by  that  term  the  frank  and  straightforward  methods 
adopted  and  persisted  in  by  this  country  in  its  dealings 
with  foreign  nations.  But  that  does  not  alter  the  fact 
that  these  "  shirt-sleeve "  methods  have  proved  tri- 
umphant, and,  furthermore,  that  they  have  first  been 
imitated  by  the  scented  and  laced  diplomats  of  Europe, 
and  finally  made  their  own. 

Let  us  look  at  some  of  these  new  conditions  under 
which  we  live. 

The  one  great  necessity  of  life  is,  of  course,  some- 
thing to  eat.     Other  things  being  equal,  plenty  to  eat 

297 


298  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

means  plenty  of  power,  plenty  of  prosperity,  plenty  of 
energy  and  progress,  and,  finally,  plenty  of  culture. 
Whoever  holds  a  great  surplus  of  the  foodstuffs  of  the 
world,  free  to  give  or  to  withhold,  is  the  master  of  the 
world.  A  simple  fact,  but  fraught  with  deep  meaning 
and  generally  overlooked.  The  same  remark,  though 
in  a  smaller  measure,  holds  true  of  a  superabundance 
of  manufactures. 

In  both  these  essentials  the  English-speaking  nations 
are  pre-eminent.  Mastery  of  steam  and  electricity  in 
their  applied  forms  is  likewise  an  Anglo-Saxon  pos- 
session. 

The  new  industrial  civilisation  has  developed  a  new 
national  life,  highly  organised  and  highly  sensitive, 
with  new  conditions,  new  needs,  and  new  possibilities 
for  good  or  evil.  The  British  Empire  is  the  most 
striking  exponent  of  this.  It  forms  an  impressive  con- 
trast with  the  Roman  Empire  of  old.  Commerce  is 
more  powerful  than  British  arms  to  hold  the  Greater 
Britain  together.  Oneness  of  civilisation  is  the  closest 
bond  of  all.  To-day,  the  differences  between  life  in 
the  United  States  and  life  in  the  British  Empire  are 
but  slight.  They  will  steadily  diminish.  This  makes 
in  the  direction  of  eventual  amalgamation,  confedera- 
tion, or  alliance.  The  great  stream  of  life  for  all  the 
English-speaking  countries  will  show  a  wonderful 
oneness  in  essentials  and  chief  ideals  within  the  com- 
pass of  the  twentieth  century. 

The  sovereign  power  to-day  in  all  English-speaking 
countries  is  public  opinion;  this  power  has  steadily 
gathered  momentum  during  the  past  fifty  years.  It 
has  overridden  formal  power  of  sovereigns  and  rulers. 
The  President  of  the  United  States,  just  as  much  as 
the  crowned  head  of  the  British  Empire,  is  powerful 


Life  under  New  Conditions  299 

only  in  representing  a  strong  public  opinion.  There 
is  no  swimming  against  that  tide.  He  who  attempts  it 
fails.  And  this  public  opinion,  as  the  term  is  under- 
stood in  English-speaking  countries,  has  imposed  itself 
even  upon  the  non-English-speaking  world.  Russia 
herself,  autocratic  as  she  certainly  is,  has  not  escaped 
the  overwhelming  force  of  this  factor.  Of  late  years 
she  has  stood  more  than  once  before  the  world,  her 
head  bowed  in  shame.  A  year  ago,  after  the  horrible 
Kishineff  massacre,  the  very  man  who  had  instigated 
these  atrocities.  Minister  of  the  Interior  de  Plehve, 
tried  to  escape  the  opprobrium  he  had  earned,  and  it 
was  the  sheer  force  of  western  public  opinion  which 
compelled  Russia  to  order  an  official  investigation,  and, 
subsequently,  a  series  of  criminal  trials. 

Every  ruler,  every  nation,  to-day  tries  to  justify 
action  at  a  particular  crisis.  It  was  so  with  us  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  with  Spain,  and  it  was  so  with 
Great  Britain  during  her  recent  war  in  South  Africa. 
The  Venezuela  incident  was  another  case  in  point. 
Each  of  the  nations  principally  interested  in  that 
"  creditor  war  "  made  out  as  good  a  case  as  it  could  to 
satisfy  the  public  opinion  of  the  world.  The  inter- 
national tribunal  at  The  Hague  owes  its  existence  not 
so  much  to  a  whim  of  the  Czar  as  rather  to  the  organ- 
ised public  opinion  of  all  the  civilised  countries,  to 
the  aroused  public  conscience. 

The  press  is  another  name  for  public  opinion. 
To-day  the  press  has  to  follow,  not  lead,  public  opinion. 
One-man  opinion  in  the  press  to-day  is  futile  and 
powerless.  For  weal  or  woe,  public  opinion  has  be- 
come our  chief,  almost  our  sole,  master.  And  this 
public  opinion  is  best  organised  in  the  English-speak- 
ing countries.     To  this  fact  is  due  a  large  portion  of 


300  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

the  supremacy  of  the  EngHsh-speaking  race,  and  this 
truth  at  present  is  beginning  to  be  dimly  felt  by  the 
non-English-speaking  world.  By  reason  of  the  wide 
circulation  of  the  daily  press,  and  of  the  immensely  im- 
proved methods  of  news-gathering,  the  important  events 
happening  anywhere  on  the  globe  are  read  simulta- 
neously, a  few  hours  later,  by  millions  upon  millions,  by 
all  the  nations  that  lay  claim  to  the  term  "  civilised." 
News  is  now  the  swell  of  a  great  tide,  moving  the 
hearts  and  minds  on  the  whole  earth  at  one  and  the 
same  time.  The  press  of  to-day  is  a  factor  in  our 
civilisation  second  in  importance  to  none.  And  who- 
ever has  this  world-wide  public  opinion  on  his  side  is 
invincible.  Governments  and  kings  alike  seek  to 
square  themselves  with  it.  Secretary  Hay,  at  that 
critical  time  when  the  ambassadors  of  all  the  foreign 
nations  were  imprisoned  in  Peking  and  momentarily 
expecting  death,  fought  his  battle  to  a  finish  on  the 
mere  strength  of  the  public  opinion  of  the  world.  Ten 
years  before  such  a  thing  would  have  been  impossible ; 
nay,  it  would  not  even  have  been  attempted. 

We  now  speak  of  world  sympathies,  and  to-day  they 
form  a  most  important  item  in  the  stock-in-trade  of 
every  diplomat  and  statesman,  of  every  ruler  and  of 
every  nation.  Each  tries  to  capture  this  impalpable 
and  yet  so  potent  force.  The  present  war  strikingly 
illustrates  it.  Everywhere,  in  all  capitals  of  the  world, 
Japan  and  Russia,  through  their  accredited  representa- 
tives, do  their  utmost  to  enlist  this  world  sympathy. 

We  speak  of  world  calamities,  such  as  the  Indian 
and  Russian  famines,  the  Armenian  massacres,  the 
eruption  of  Mont  Pelee  in  Martinique,  the  Spanish 
atrocities  in  Cuba,  our  own  blunders  in  the  Philip- 
pines and  their  rectification  by  means  of  American 


Life  under  New  Conditions  301 

public  opinion.  All  such  catastrophes,  all  saddening 
events,  all  heroic  conduct  or  proof  of  singular  nobility 
of  feeling,  nowadays  are  immediately  commented  upon 
and  become  the  common  topic  of  conversation  the  world 
over.  At  Santiago,  when  a  victory  had  been  achieved 
that  electrified  the  world,  pity  tempered  triumph,  and 
Admiral  Philip  exclaimed :  '*  Don't  cheer,  boys ;  the 
poor  fellows  are  dying!  "  And  the  humane  sentiment 
fluttered  around  the  world  along  the  electric  wire. 

It  is  this  community  of  feeling,  this  final  arbitra- 
ment of  the  good  and  the  wise,  which  is  one  of  the 
most  hopeful  signs  of  our  age.  Its  tendency  is  to  make 
the  brutal  less  brutal,  and  to  make  the  good  better. 

There  has  grown  up  a  system  of  international  law, 
incomplete  and  not  always  adhered  to,  but  furnishing 
a  common  ethical  standard,  and  to  this  all  civilised 
nations  are  held  by  the  force  of  public  opinion.  There 
is  a  world's  postal  union — another  bond  of  fraternity 
binding  the  nations  together — and  an  enormous  step 
forward  in  eliminating  international  misunderstand- 
ings and  ill  will.  There  are  regulations  for  naviga- 
tion which  have  the  force  of  law  all  over  the  world. 

As  a  correlative  there  is  a  growing  interdependence 
among  the  nations.  A  pathetic  illustration  of  that 
was  the  opinion  spread  among  the  Boers  during  their 
long  struggle  with  Great  Britain,  that  if  they  only 
could  hold  out  until  after  the  presidential  election  in 
the  United  States,  a  turn  in  the  political  tide  would 
come  and  favourably  affect  the  peace  negotiations  with 
Great  Britain. 

The  belief  is  no  longer  held  that  a  great  nation  must 
be  altogether  sufficient  unto  itself.  Indeed,  this  is  no 
longer  possible.  The  interests  of  the  various  nations 
intertwine  and  touch  at  too  many  points.     In  Mecca 


302  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

the  cholera  breaks  out,  and  at  once  quarantine  is  de- 
clared at  all  the  ports,  and  every  nation  takes  sanitary- 
measures  to  prevent  its  spread.  Russian  peasants  are 
laid  low  by  the  million,  hunger,  typhus,  and  the  grippe 
having  seized  them;  this  means  a  curse  to  millions  in 
every  neighbouring  land,  and  precautions  are  at  once 
adopted.  Germany's  beet-sugar  industry  rapidly  rises 
to  great  heights,  and  German  sugar  is  exported  by 
millions  of  tons  to  America  and  elsewhere.  This  leads 
to  frightful  losses  of  the  sugar-cane  planters,  and  it 
entails  distress  for  the  whole  West  Indies.  We  hear 
that  Great  Britain  has  harvested  so  small  a  wheat  crop 
that  it  would  suffice  her  island  population  for  barely 
three  months.  At  once  the  cable  is  set  in  motion,  and 
a  few  hours  later  millions  of  bushels  are  on  the  way 
to  save  Britons  from  starving.  Indeed,  it  is  computed 
that  2,000,000  of  our  farmers  get  their  living  by  feed- 
ing 40,000,000  Europeans  every  year.  Europe  never 
raises  enough  to  supply  her  own  needs.  The  farmer 
of  North  and  South  America,  Australia,  and  Siberia 
tills  his  soil  for  the  European  consumer.  The  price  of 
bread  in  London  depends  on  the  wheat  crop  in  this 
country,  Argentina,  India,  and  Russia. 

The  slightest  hitch  in  the  economic  mechanism  of 
the  world  is  felt  at  once  everywhere.  When  the 
McKinley  tariff  bill  was  passed,  one  of  its  items  pro- 
vided for  a  practically  prohibitive  duty  on  pearl  but- 
tons. The  next  day,  several  thousands  of  workmen  in 
a  single  Austrian  city  were  thrown  out  of  employ- 
ment, for  their  occupation  was  gone. 

A  great  crisis  is  now  approaching  for  this  life  under 
new  world  conditions — severe  international  competi- 
tion. And  this  coming  comp>etition  will  mean  the 
sharpest  struggle  for  existence  which  the  world  has 


Life  under  New  Conditions  303 

yet  seen.  It  may  retard  temporarily  the  higher  and 
better  Hfe  to  come,  but  out  of  it  will  evolve  the  saner 
and  more  abundant  life  of  the  future.  The  question  of 
mastery  must  first  be  solved  before  an  apportionment 
of  wealth  and  influence  in  accordance  with  the  new 
conditions  can  take  place.  This  preliminary  struggle, 
strictly  on  Darwinian  principles,  will  in  a  sense  be  piti- 
less, as  it  will  be  in  consonance  with  natural  law — the 
ultimate  rule  of  the  fittest.  It  will  weed  out  the  unfit 
nations,  and  will  discipline  and  develop  the  fittest. 
Survival  will  depend  more  on  social  efficiency  than  on 
mere  strength.  The  race  will  be,  not  to  the  strong,  but 
to  the  wise. 

The  tendency  to  absorb  small  i>eoples,  peoples  unable 
to  grapple  successfully  with  the  new  conditions  of 
life,  unable  to  compete  on  even  terms  with  those  better 
equipped,  is  in  accordance  with  the  trend  of  the  times. 
We  see  the  workings  of  this  new  principle  in  the 
trust,  the  syndicate,  the  "  combine,"  the  consolidation 
of  every  form  of  industrial  life  into  great  systems, 
merging  the  smaller  railway  and  the  smaller  factory 
into  the  larger  body,  and  thus  effecting  a  huge  saving 
of  time,  labour,  and  money.  In  its  essence  this  tendency 
is  the  sign-manual  of  the  new  civilisation,  the  most 
important  and  far-reaching  economical  fact. 

It  is  now  recognised  that  nations  have  both  the  right 
and  are  in  duty  bound  to  safeguard  common  vital  in- 
terests, even  if  by  so  doing  they  invade  the  independ- 
ence of  other  nations.  On  this  ground,  for  instance, 
rests  the  right  of  international  interference  in  China. 
Suppose  Russia  wins  in  this  war,  and  administers  a 
crushing  defeat  to  Japan.  Russia  would  not  be  per- 
mitted to  taste  the  sweets  of  triumph  to  the  full.  The 
civilised  nations  would  interpose  if  Russia  wanted  to 


304  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

wipe  Japan  out  of  political  existence.  But  there  are 
many  other  cases  at  hand  illustrating  the  fact  that  in- 
terference by  joint  action  of  the  powers,  in  other 
words,  world  action,  has  become  an  established  fact. 
Conditions  existing  in  more  or  less  backward  coun- 
tries, conditions  threatening  the  common  welfare  of 
the  world,  will  no  longer  be  permitted  to  continue. 
There  is  a  consensus  of  opinion  on  that  point  wher- 
ever printer's  ink  is  abundant.  Contagious  diseases 
can  no  longer  be  allowed  to  find  permanent  breeding- 
places  in  certain  countries,  starting  thence  on  a  crusade 
of  death  around  the  world.  The  yellow-fever  centre  of 
Cuba  was  done  away  with  by  the  friendly  action  of  the 
United  States,  and  millions  of  lives  have  been  thus 
saved.  The  bubonic  plague,  arising  in  the  tropics  (tlie 
''black  death"  of  the  Middle  Ages),  will  similarly 
have  to  be  eradicated.  At  present,  this  scourge  still 
inflicts  untold  misery  and  loss  of  life,  even  after  trav- 
elling thousands  of  miles  away  from  the  sources  of 
its  origin.  The  last  epidemic  of  this  sort  arose  in 
eastern  Persia,  among  the  dense  crowds  of  pilgrims  to 
the  shrine  of  a  Sheeite  saint,  and  filtered  thence,  first, 
to  the  filthy  hovels  of  densely  packed  Chinese  towns, 
and  from  there  proceeded  on  its  course  of  devastation  all 
over  the  East  and  West,  completing  the  circuit  of  the 
world  within  a  couple  of  years,  and  leaving  in  its  wake 
hecatombs  of  corpses.  Joint  steps  have  since  been 
taken  by  the  civilised  powers  to  prevent  the  recurrence 
of  such  a  catastrophe. 

Again,  life  under  these  new  conditions  demands 
the  protection  of  property  everywhere.  This  principle 
is  now  acknowledged  very  generally.  To  cite  a  case  in 
point,  hundreds  of  big  corporations,  having  far-spread- 
ing interests  in  scores  of  countries,  would  have  to  go 


Life  under  New  Conditions  305 

out  of  business  if  their  home  governments  did  not  pro- 
tect their  legitimate  proprietary  rights.  It  may  be  re- 
membered that  three  of  our  largest  insurance  compa- 
nies, doing  business  in  both  hemispheres  (and,  indeed, 
one  of  them  has  branch  establishments  in  no  fewer  than 
48  countries),  for  a  number  of  years  were  the  object  of 
important  diplomatic  negotiations  with  the  German 
government,  the  latter  having  interfered  with  their 
field  of  usefulness.  But  present  conditions  also  de- 
mand the  safeguarding  of  legal  rights  of  sojourners  in 
foreign  countries.  The  pending  negotiations  between 
the  United  States  and  Russia,  aiming  at  a  fair  stand- 
ing in  Russian  courts  for  citizens  and  corporations  of 
this  country,  are  a  case  in  point. 

The  enormous  investments  of  capital  in  other  coun- 
tries call  for,  and  receive,  the  protection  of  the  home 
government.  That  this  is  one  of  the  legitimate  func- 
tions of  government  is  now  recognised  in  international 
law.  Indeed,  it  was  one  of  the  first  stages  that  marked 
the  advent  of  an  industrial  age.  As  long  ago  as  1863, 
Napoleon  III.  made  the  unsatisfied  claims  of  a  French 
banker,  Jecker,  his  pretext  for  invading  Mexico.  And 
it  was  on  the  same  plea  that  a  number  of  creditor  na- 
tions of  Europe,  with  England  and  Germany  at  the 
head,  intervened  last  year  in  Venezuela. 

Since  this  country  became  a  creditor  on  a  large  scale 
in  foreign  parts,  dating  since  1897,  American  moneyed 
interests  abroad  have  begun  to  play  a  more  and  more 
conspicuous  figure  in  our  foreign  policy.  Vast  sums 
are  now  flowing  out  of  American  coffers  into  every 
corner  of  the  world,  fertilising  existing  industries  or 
creating  new  ones.  South  and  Central  America  will, 
hereafter,  be  special  fields  in  this  direction.  China, 
too,  will  probably  get  a  fair  share  of  this  fructifying 


3o6  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

gold.  But  the  more  American  gold  will  go  to  China 
and  Far  Asia,  the  more  our  statecraft  will  have  to  in- 
sist on  the  maintenance  of  the  "  open  door." 

A  material  age,  you  will  say.  And  truly  it  is.  If 
ever  the  dollar  ruled,  it  does  now.  But  this  material 
age  will  lead  onward  and  upward  to  one  when  the 
leading  nations  of  the  globe  will  be  able  to  afford  a 
policy  based  on  higher  motives.  Without  material 
prosperity,  without  well-assured  supremacy  in  trade 
and  manufactures,  progress  and  the  ultimate  posses- 
sion of  higher  blessings  would  not  be  possible.  Let 
that  be  our  consolation. 

The  vast  majority  of  Americans  have  come  to  recog- 
nise the  fact  that  the  United  States  is  now  a  world 
power,  with  all  that  this  rather  recently  coined  term 
implies.  It  is  useless  longer  to  inveigh  against  "  ex- 
pansion," for  the  widening  of  our  territory  and  of  our 
influence  is  an  established  fact.  The  cry  of  "  imperial- 
ism "  is  heard  more  and  more  rarely.  It  would  be 
unjust  to  the  motives  of  a  large  body  of  men,  counting 
in  their  number  many  of  our  purest  and  best,  to  deride 
them  as  "  idealists  "  and  unpractical  dreamers.  These 
men  perform  a  very  beneficial  function  in  our  political 
life — they  serve  as  a  ballast  to  save  the  ship  of  state 
from  toppling  over.  They  help  to  quicken  the  public 
conscience  and  to  keep  it  from  becoming  callous. 

But,  making  all  due  allowance  for  this,  and  leaving 
entirely  aside  the  question  whether  it  has  been  "  a  good 
thing "  for  us  to  become  a  world  power,  we  must, 
nevertheless,  look  the  facts  in  the  face.  We  are  a 
world  power;  expansion  is  here — we  are  right  in  the 
midst  of  it ;  we  can  no  more  undo  the  recent  past  than 
we  can  return  to  the  days  of  our  childhood.  It  is  idle 
to  deplore  this.     If  it  could  not  be  prevented  at  the 


Life  under  New  Conditions  307 

outset,  it  must  now  be  accepted  as  an  unalterable  fact. 
We  have  outgrown  the  garb  of  youth.  Since  1898  we 
have  been  in  the  prime  of  manhood,  and  we  must  ac- 
cept, without  whimpering,  our  new  responsibilities. 

And,  really,  much,  very  much,  of  this  opposition  to 
our  new  policy,  our  "  world  policy,"  is  due  to  misapn 
prehension.  For  one  thing,  the  very  generally  accepted 
interpretation  of  Washington's  farewell  advice,  defin- 
ing it  as  a  warning  to  keep  forever  our  hands  off 
foreign  affairs,  has  been  responsible  for  a  good  deal  of 
it.  This  interpretation  was  certainly  not  warranted  by 
the  facts.  Washington's  parting  counsel  amounted 
merely  to  this :  "  Let  us  mind  our  own  business." 
Advice  good  enough  for  any  age,  and  quite  applicable 
to  present  American  conditions.  But  that  advice  did 
not  mean — in  fact,  could  not  mean — the  abandonment 
of  American  interests  abroad. 

This  is  the  twentieth  century,  not  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth.  And  consider  what  changes  have  been 
wrought  within  the  space  of  one  single  century!  On 
certain  lines  more  progress  was  made  between  1800 
and  1900  than  during  the  preceding  2000  years. 
When  Washington  turned  his  eyes  for  the  last  time 
towards  Mount  Vernon,  it  took  him  longer  to  reach 
home  from  New  York  than  it  would  now  for  any 
American  to  reach  one  of  the  European  capitals.  The 
world  is  now  much  smaller,  and  our  interests  of  every 
kind  touch  and  interlace  at  many  p>oints  with  those  of 
almost  every  country  under  the  sun.  We  cannot,  like 
the  ostrich,  bury  our  heads  in  the  sand,  and  pretend  not 
to  see  approaching  dangers. 

The  attitude  of  mind  bred  by  this  long-continued 
misapplication  of  Washington's  advice,  has  done  us 
untold  harm.    It  led  to  a  studied  neglect  of  golden  op- 


308  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

portunities.  Of  course,  there  was  a  time  when  it  was 
necessary  for  this  young  and  struggling  nation  to  re- 
frain from  interference  abroad.  We  had  our  hands 
full  at  home,  conquering  this  vast  continent.  Numeri- 
cally we  were  too  weak,  and  financially  too  poor,  to  do 
anything  but  develop  our  own  resources.  But  since 
the  eighties  we  have  been  strong  enough  to  make  our 
voice  heard  anywhere,  if  only  we  had  been  minded 
that  way.  We  stood  by  and  saw  England,  France,  and 
Germany  seize,  one  by  one,  the  finest  tracts  of  Africa, 
Asia,  and  Oceanica.  The  process  even  of  partitioning 
China  was  fairly  under  way,  when  we  bethought  us, 
late  in  the  day,  that  this  must  not  be  done  against  our 
wishes. 

Consider  the  humiliating  position  of  Americans 
abroad  all  through  the  nineteenth  century!  At  home, 
the  phrase  was :  Who  cares  for  Europe  ?  And  for  this 
indifference  shown  to  Old  World  opinion  they  re- 
venged themselves  across  the  water  by  showing  the 
same  degree  of  indifference  toward  American  opinion, 
sympathies,  or  antipathies.  Americans  travelling  or 
residing  abroad,  until  a  very  few  years  ago,  were, 
practically,  defenceless.  Numberless  outrages  were 
perpetrated  on  them ;  in  their  standing  with  foreign 
authorities,  courts,  and  private  individuals,  they  were 
not  even  on  a  par  with  the  subjects  of  petty  states. 
And  through  it  all,  the  Starry  Banner,  of  which,  at 
home,  the  American  tourist  had  felt  so  proud,  and 
under  the  shadows  of  which  he  had  deemed  himself 
safe  anywhere,  meant  no  protection  to  him.  The  in- 
tervention of  our  consuls  achieved  nothing;  the 
remonstrances  of  our  diplomatic  representatives  were 
calmly  ignored.  The  author,  during  his  long  stay  at 
one  of  the  great  European  capitals,  saw  frequent  in- 


Life  under  New  Conditions         309 

stances  of  this  offensive  and  contemptuous  disregard 
of  American  rights,  even  of  rights  secured  by  interna- 
tional treaty.  Thank  God,  conditions  in  this  respect 
have  changed  since. 

American  failure  to  profit  by  the  experience  of  other 
countries  was  another  evil  due  to  our  former  bent  of 
mind.  This  has  not  yet  been  cured,  but  under  our  new 
conditions  there  is  steady  improvement  in  this  line. 
One  of  the  greatest  of  our  public  curses,  municipal 
misgovernment,  would  never  have  attained  to  such 
heights  if  we  had  been  willing  to  mind  the  lessons 
taught  by  the  successful  or  unsuccessful  administra- 
tion of  European  towns.  And  that  is  but  one  of  the 
many  cases  in  illustration. 

The  United  States,  up  to  1898,  was,  practically,  a 
hermit  nation,  something  like  Corea.  Richard  Olney, 
Cleveland's  secretary  of  state,  was  the  first  to  change 
this.  The  time  was  ripe,  overripe.  The  cry  of 
'*  jingo  "  did  not  disturb  him.  It  need  not  disturb  us 
to-day.  A  great  nation  must  pay  the  penalty  of  its 
greatness  in  money,  bother,  and  men.  Olney,  in  his 
writings,  first  called  attention  to  the  unpalatable  fact 
that  while  we  expected  to  reap  all  the  advantages  of 
our  geographical  position  and  of  our  great  strength 
in  population  and  natural  resources,  we  studiously 
avoided  the  assumption  of  the  responsibilities  that  go 
with  such  a  favoured  place  among  the  nations  of  the 
world. 

We  are  to-day  the  most  forceful  and  resourceful 
nation  on  the  globe,  and  is  it  to  be  believed  that  such  a 
nation  will  play  the  part  of  a  weakling  or  utter  egotist 
by  supinely  sitting  down  in  its  backyard,  and  letting 
the  world  drift  by?  Of  course  not.  American  young 
men  in  increasing  numbers  will  hereafter  go  abroad  to 


310  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

seek  wealth,  fame,  and  distinction,  as  the  British  cousin 
has  been  doing  for  several  centuries,  and  as  the  German 
cousin,  with  increasing  success,  has  done  for  thirty 
years  past. 

Even  if  we  would,  it  is  no  longer  possible  for  the 
United  States  to  maintain  a  policy  of  political  isola- 
tion. This  is  a  commercial  age,  and  commercial  con- 
siderations are  to-day  the  mainspring  of  national 
policies.  Questions  of  finance,  of  tariff,  of  expansion, 
of  colonial  policy,  of  the  "  open  door  "  dominate  poli- 
tics, national  and  international,  because  they  pro- 
foundly affect  industry  and  the  whole  material  life. 

Bismarck's  dictum — made  during  a  tariff  war  be- 
tween Germany  and  Russia — that  close  political  rela- 
tions, and  even  friendships  or  alliances,  with  other 
nations  are  quite  feasible,  although  a  state  of  economic 
war  should  exist,  holds  true  no  longer.  The  interlac- 
ing of  politics  with  commerce  is  too  intimate  for  that. 
The  Far  Eastern  problem,  on  a  satisfactory  solution  of 
which  the  civilised  nations  have  now  fairly  embarked, 
is  in  the  main  an  industrial  and  commercial  one.  Great 
Britain  acquired  her  East  Indian  empire  because  she 
once  had  an  East  Indian  trading  company.  England 
rules  Egypt  to-day  because,  in  the  first  place,  a  mass 
of  English  capital  had  been  invested  there. 

Six  years  only  have  gone  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  with  Spain.  But  casting  a  look  backwards  upon 
that  short  period,  what  do  we  find?  We  find  that 
since  then,  at  every  critical  stage  of  the  international 
game  of  politics,  the  United  States  has  not  only  been 
one  of  the  players,  but  indeed,  on  several  momentous 
occasions,  the  chief  player.  In  China,  during  the  Boxer 
troubles,  Americans  marched  shoulder  to  shoulder  with 
the  soldiers  of  the  other  great  powers.    The  American 


Life  under  New  Conditions         311 

flag  to-day  floats  over  Hawaii,  Porto  Rico,  and  the 
Philippines,  a  part  of  Samoa,  and  a  number  of  other 
islands,  small  in  circumference,  but  of  enormous  value 
for  future  expansion.  Our  insularity  is  irretrievably 
gone,  deplore  it  who  may. 

Although  in  this  war  between  Japan  and  Russia  we 
are  not  one  of  the  belligerents,  the  world  recognises 
that  in  the  problems  bound  up  in  this  struggle  the 
United  States  is  to  be  the  greatest  factor.  To  vigorous 
American  statesmanship  the  world  is  indebted  for  the 
narrowing  down  of  the  theatre  of  war,  and  to  the 
elimination  of  some  of  the  dangerous  features  that 
threatened  its  spread.  But  would  Mr.  Hay's  wisdom 
have  accomplished  this  if  it  had  not  been  felt,  nay 
known  abroad,  that  back  of  him  there  was  an  ambi- 
tious, powerful,  and  yet  fair-minded  nation? 

The  most  dangerous  thing  this  nation  could  do 
would  be  to  allow  itself  to  drift  on  its  course  of  world 
politics.  The  only  safety  for  us  is  to  recognise  clearly 
the  fact  that  we  are  "  in  for  it,"  and  that  it  behooves 
us,  as  a  manly  and  energetic  nation,  to  play  our  part 
well  and  to  the  full. 

The  division  of  mankind  into  nations  seems  to  be 
part  of  an  all-wise  plan.  There  must  be  national  self- 
ishness, national  push,  and,  occasionally,  even  the  over- 
riding of  other  men's  formal  rights,  if  there  is  to  be 
permanent  progress  in  this  world.  Despite  the  British 
statesman's  pithy  saw,  patriotism  has  not  yet  become 
the  last  refuge  of  a  scoundrel.  Nay,  there  has  been  no 
time  in  the  world's  history  when  patriotism  was  a 
virtue  so  much  needed  by  all  the  leading  nations  of 
the  globe. 

Righteousness  in  international  afifairs — that  will  be- 
come the  chief  motto  of  world  policy  hereafter.    This 


312  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

principle  will  be  seen  to  "  pay  "  in  the  best  sense  of  that 
word.  And  world-consciousness  is  already  felt  a  factor 
in  world  politics  which  cannot  be  neglected.  Con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  every  ruler  to-day,  whether 
owing  his  mantle  of  authority  to  the  mere  accident  of 
birth  or  to  the  deliberate  choice  of  his  fellow-citizens, 
must  and  does  reckon  with  this  element  of  strength  or 
weakness  in  his  calculations  and  course  of  action. 

World-consciousness  means,  therefore,  world-con- 
science as  well.  As  such  it  will  make  an  element  of 
immeasurable  force  in  the  weary  way  upwards  pur- 
sued, with  many  backslidings,  by  humanity.  A  world 
policy,  therefore,  necessarily  means  progress.  The 
narrow  selfishness  of  nationalism  will  hereafter,  not 
indeed  be  replaced  entirely,  but  controlled  and  guided, 
by  the  broader  and  saner  feeling  of  race  responsibility 
and  race  solidarity.  And  to  that  happier  and  less 
bloody  age  we  may  be  permitted  to  look  forward  with 
joyful  anticipation.  It  may  be,  as  military  men  tell 
us,  that  war  will  never  disappear  from  this  globe  of 
ours,  and  that,  the  dread  of  war  gone,  mankind  would 
be  deprived  of  a  most  salutary  restraint.  But  if  so, 
let  us  hope  that  unrighteous  war  at  least  will  become 
less  and  less  frequent. 


CONCLUSION 

Within  a  century  the  world  has  seen  the  United 
States  growing  from  a  tiny  acorn  to  a  tall  and  sturdy 
oak;  from  a  small  and  widely  scattered  people,  hold- 
ing the  fringe  of  the  Atlantic  border,  into  the  most 
powerful  and  one  of  the  most  populous  of  nations. 
This  is  a  trite  statement,  one  which  has  formed  the 
main  topic  for  innumerable  stump  speeches  and 
Fourth-of-July  orations.  It  is,  nevertheless,  so  won- 
derful a  thing  in  itself,  so  wholly  unparallelled  in  the 
entire  range  of  history,  that  only  familiarity  with  the 
fact  has  dulled  our  minds  to  its  true  meaning. 

Indeed,  we  have  drifted  away  from  the  days  of 
small  things — drifted  in  more  senses  than  one.  To-day, 
it  is  not  this  nation  that  is  afraid  of  European  med- 
dling with  things  American ;  it  is  Europe  that  dreads 
American  interference  with  her  affairs,  dreads  hourly 
American  intervention  in  this  present  war,  dreads 
American  push  and  resourcefulness  in  the  coming  bit- 
ter struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  Pacific. 

However  buttressed  by  logic  may  be  the  claim  of 
our  Anti-Imperialists  that  we  would  have  done  better 
not  to  launch  our  vessel  of  state  on  the  troubled  seas  of 
a  world  policy,  the  events  themselves  have  proved 
stronger  than  any  theories.  Hereafter,  it  will  not  be 
possible  for  us  to  keep  aloof  from  European  affairs, 
nor,  for  that  matter,  from  world  affairs. 

Devout  Christians  may  deplore  the  use  of  force  in 
the  settlement  of  international  differences,  and  in  the 

313 


314  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

procuring  of  the  necessary  elbow-room  for  the  utilisa- 
tion of  our  gifts  and  powers  as  a  nation.  But  our  war 
with  Spain,  in  1898,  and  our  joining  in  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  Boxer  uprising,  in  1900,  have  again  dem- 
onstrated that  the  employment  of  brute  strength  is 
still  the  only  thing,  in  certain  well-defined  cases,  to 
prevent  greater  evils.  Carlyle,  in  one  of  his  sarcastic 
moods,  once  sf>oke  of  the  people  of  England  as 
"  mostly  fools."  With  even  greater  justice,  it  is  to  be 
feared,  that  saying  would  hold  true  when  applied  to 
mankind  at  large.  And  "  fools,"  as  we  know,  cannot 
be  reasoned  with ;  they  must  be  coerced. 

There  is,  however,  no  valid  reason  to  suppose  that 
we  are  on  the  way  to  becoming  a  soldier-ridden  coun- 
try. Our  geographical  position  will  mercifully  save  us 
from  the  curse  of  militarism.  Indeed  our  soldiers, 
while  they  have  done  much  hard  fighting  with  Moros 
and  other  irrational  creatures  in  the  Philippines,  have 
been  doing  just  as  effective  work  in  that  island  world 
in  the  matter  of  policing  and  practically  instructing 
the  natives  in  the  elementary  duties  of  citizenship. 
There,  as  well  as  in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  our  army 
has  been  a  highly  valuable  educational  factor,  and  there 
is  good  ground  for  surmising  that  our  regular  armed 
force  will  continue  to  do  similar  work  hereafter  in 
other  parts  of  the  world. 

The  reader  of  this  book  has  been  presented  with  a 
rather  summary  statement  of  the  main  underlying 
facts  governing  conditions  in  the  Pacific  spheres  of  the 
various  colonising  powers,  and  of  the  burning  ques- 
tions of  the  day  entering  into  the  whole  Pacific  prob- 
lem. Anyone  acquainted  with  the  state  of  affairs  may 
fitly  form  his  own  opinion  as  to  the  probable  trend  of 
future  events.    The  chief  aim  of  the  writer  has  been  to 


Conclusion  315 

direct  attention  to,  and  stimulate  interest  in,  all  the 
elements  that  make  up  a  problem  which  will  loom 
larger  with  every  hour. 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  it  is  not  overwhelmingly 
large  land  forces  such  as  Russia  possesses,  but  naval 
supremacy,  which  will  decide  the  mastery  of  the  Pa- 
cific. The  hope  may  here  be  expressed  that  the  under- 
standing obtaining  at  present  between  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  Japan  will  continue  un- 
brokenly.  All  three  of  these  powers  possess  natural  ad- 
vantages which  will  count  for  much,  if  properly  util- 
ised, in  the  future  development  of  the  Pacific  region. 
But,  in  any  event,  there  is  good  reason  for  saying  that 
this  country  will  be  the  dominant  factor  in  the  mastery 
of  the  Pacific.  The  United  States  has  all  the  advan- 
tages, qualifications,  and  some  of  the  ambitions  neces- 
sary for  the  role.  Her  unrivalled  resources  and  fast- 
increasing  population  provide  the  material  for  future 
greatness.  In  a  word,  we  are  able  to  win  and  to  hold 
the  mastery  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  the  more  impor- 
tant lands  contiguous  thereto.  That  will  require 
steadiness  of  policy,  boldness  of  commercial  concep- 
tion, and  persistence  in  carrying  this  out.  A  navy, 
adequate  to  play  the  dominant  part  in  the  Pacific,  will, 
however,  be  urgently  required.  That  sacrifice  in  men 
and  money  must  be  made  by  the  patriotic  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  The  revival  of  our  shipping  is  likewise 
a  step  which  must  precede  American  expansion  in  the 
Pacific  region.  That,  however,  will  come  of  its  own 
accord. 

The  strength  and  the  weakness  of  our  coming  chief 
rivals  in  the  Pacific  have  been  pointed  out  briefly.  One 
remarkable  fact,  though,  must  be  mentioned  in  con- 
clusion, viz.,  the  newness  of  those  countries  which  will 


3i6  The  Race  is  to  the  Wise 

play,  presumably,  the  greatest  part  in  the  approaching 
struggle  for  predominance.  Our  young  republic  is,  rela- 
tively speaking,  the  oldest,  though  our  advent  on  the 
v^orld's  stage  dates  only  a  few  years  back.  Australia 
was  bom  but  yesterday,  and  her  rawness  and  youth 
may  conceal  possibilities  which  at  present  are  not  taken 
into  account.  Japan,  though  old  as  the  hills,  as  a 
world  power  is  a  creation  of  to-day.  The  same  re- 
mark applies  to  Germany,  for  thirty-four  years  ago 
she  was  but  a  "  geographical  idea,"  scarcely  able  to 
hold  her  own.  Russia  again,  a  decade  since,  was  still 
wholly  unformed.  Without  Witte,  without  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  gold  standard,  and  without  the 
abolishment  of  her  fluctuating  currency  system,  she 
would  not  have  been  able  to  play  such  an  ambitious 
role  on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific.  And  only  since  the 
building  of  her  Transsiberian  road,  a  couple  of  years 
back,  has  she  been  able  to  throw  armies  into  the  dis- 
puted territory. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  see  the  waning  power  of 
Great  Britain,  the  stagnant  rule  (in  all  likelihood  soon 
to  pass  away)  of  the  Netherlands  in  the  Dutch  East 
Indies,  the  complete  extinguishment  of  the  ancient 
colonial  power  of  Spain,  and  the  same  fate  in  store  for 
Portugal. 

Thus,  then,  the  early  years  of  the  twentieth  century 
find  the  United  States  best  equipped  for  the  approach- 
ing strife. 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX 


ANGLO-RUSSIAN   AGREEMENT    RESPECTING   SPHERES    OF   INPLUBNCE 
IN   CHINA 

{Signed  April  28,  i8gg) 
Sir  C.  Scott  to  Count  Mouravieff  : 

The  undersigned  British  Ambassador,  duly  authorised  to  that 
effect,  has  the  honour  to  make  the  following  declaration  to  his 
Excellency  Count  Mouravieff,  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  :  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  animated  by  a  sincere  desire 
to  avoid  in  China  all  cause  of  conflict  on  questions  where  their 
interests  meet,  and  taking  into  consideration  the  economic  and 
geographical  gravitation  of  certain  parts  of  the  empire,  have 
agreed  as  follows  : 

1.  Great  Britain  engages  not  to  seek  for  her  own  account,  or 
on  behalf  of  British  subjects,  or  of  others,  any  railway  conces- 
sion to  the  north  of  the  Great  Wall  of  China,  and  not  to  obstruct, 
directly  or  indirectly,  applications  for  railway  concessions  in  that 
region  supported  by  the  Russian  government. 

2.  Russia,  on  her  part,  engages  not  to  seek  for  her  own  ac- 
count, or  in  behalf  of  Russian  subjects,  or  of  others,  any  railway 
concession  on  the  basin  of  the  Yang-tse,  and  not  to  obstruct, 
directly  or  indirectly,  applications  for  railway  concessions  in 
that  region  supported  by  the  British  government. 

The  two  contracting  parties,  having  nowise  in  view  to  in- 
fringe in  any  way  the  sovereign  rights  of  China  on  existing 
treaties,  will  not  fail  to  communicate  to  the  Chinese  government 
the  present  arrangement,  which,  by  averting  all  cause  of  com- 
plications between  them,  is  of  a  nature  to  consolidate  peace  in 
the  Far  East,  and  to  serve  primordial  interests  of  China  itself. 

(Signed)    Charles  S.  Scott. 

St.  Petersburg,  April  28,  1899. 

(A  copy  of  the  above  note  was  signed  at  the  same  time  by  the  Russiaa 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  •'  duly  authorised  to  that  effect.") 

319 


320  Appendix 

TREATY    OF    OFFENSIVE    AND     DEFENSIVE    ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    GREAT 
BRITAIN   AND   JAPAN 

{Signed  at  London,  January  jo,  igo2) 

The  governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  actuated  solely 
by  a  desire  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and  general  peace  in  the 
extreme  East,  being  moreover  specially  interested  in  maintain- 
ing the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of 
China  and  the  Empire  of  Corea,  and  in  securing  equal  oppor- 
tunities in  those  countries  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all 
nations,  hereby  agree  as  follows  : 

Article  I.  The  high  contracting  parties,  having  mutually 
recognised  the  independence  of  China  and  Corea,  declare  them- 
selves to  be  entirely  uninfluenced  by  any  aggressive  tendencies 
in  either  country.  Having  in  view,  however,  their  special  in- 
terests, of  which  those  of  Great  Britain  relate  principally  to 
China,  while  Japan,  in  addition  to  the  interests  which  she  pos- 
sesses in  China,  is  interested  in  a  peculiar  degree  politically,  as 
well  as  commercially  and  industrially,  in  Corea,  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  recognise  that  it  will  be  admissible  for  either  of 
them  to  take  such  measures  as  may  be  indispensable  in  order  to 
safeguard  those  interests  if  threatened  either  by  the  aggressive 
action  of  any  other  power,  or  by  disturbances  arising  in  China 
or  Corea,  and  necessitating  the  intervention  of  either  of  the 
high  contracting  parties  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  prop- 
erty of  its  subjects. 

Article  II.  If  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan,  in  the  defence  of 
their  respective  interests  as  above  described,  should  become  in- 
volved in  war  with  another  power,  the  other  high  contracting 
party  will  maintain  a  strict  neutrality,  and  use  its  efforts  to  pre- 
vent other  powers  from  joining  in  hostilities  against  its  ally. 

Article  III.  If  in  the  above  event  any  other  power  or  powers 
should  join  in  hostilities  against  that  ally,  the  other  high  con- 
tracting party  will  come  to  its  assistance  and  will  conduct  the 
war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement  with  it. 

Article  IV.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  neither 
of  them  will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into  separate 
arrangements  with  another  power  to  the  prejudice  of  the  inter- 
ests above  described. 

Article  V.  Whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either  Great  Britain 
or  Japan,  the  above-mentioned  interests  are  in  jeopardy,  the 


Appendix  321 


two  governments  will  communicate  with  each  other  fully  and 
frankly. 

Article  VI.  The  present  agreement  shall  come  into  effect 
immediately  after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and  remain  in  force 
five  years  from  that  date. 

In  case  neither  of  the  high  contracting  parties  should  have 
notified  twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  the  said  five 
years  the  intention  of  terminating  it,  it  shall  remain  binding 
until  the  expiration  of  one  year  from  the  day  on  which  either  of 
the  high  contracting  parties  shall  have  denounced  it.  But  if, 
when  the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either  ally  is 
actually  engaged  in  war,  the  alliance  shall,  ipso  facto,  continue 
until  peace  is  concluded. 

In  faith  whereof  the  undersigned,  duly  authorised  by  their 
respective  governments,  have  signed  this  agreement,  and  have 
afi&xed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  London,  the  30th  January,  1902. 

(L.  S.)  Lansdowne, 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(L.  S.)  Hayashi, 

Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plen- 
ipotentiary of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor 
of  Japan  at  the  Court  of  St.  James. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Acre,  i66,  195 

Alaska,  sale  of,  5  ;  lumber 
supply  in,  151,  232  ;  map  of 
coal  fields,  234 

Aleiitian  islands,  233 

Alexander  III.,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 

American  emigration  to  Can- 
ada, 55 

America,  South,  see  South 
America 

American  trading  methods  in 
China,  116 

American  trade  with  war  zone, 
29 

Amoor,  202 

Anglo-Saxon  branches,  294 

Ann  am,  240 

An  Ping,  81 

Anti-Imperialists,  313 

An  Tung,  42 

Apostolov,  Russian  battleship, 

7 
Arable  public   lands,    exhaus- 
tion of,  in  the  United  States, 

55 
Argentina,    immigration,    164; 

statistics  of,  177 
Artel,  138 

Asahi,  Japanese  battleship,  7 
Asama,  Japanese  battleship,  7 
Asuncion,  197 


Attn,  233 

Austin,  O.  P.,  on  American 
trade  in  the  war  zone,  29 

Australasia,  206 

Australia,  207;  statistics,  260; 
rainfall  map  of,  261;  Com- 
monwealth of,  262;  emigra- 
tion from,  262 

Average  wages,  in  America 
and  Germany,  60 

B 

Balance  of  trade,  in  favour  of 

the  United  States,  58 
Bali,  219 
Baltic  Canal,  vessels  passing 

through  and  tolls  collected, 

160 
Baltic    provinces    of    Russia, 

131 

Banca,  220 

"  Bannermen,"  in  China,  108 

Barrett,  John,  quoted,  209 

Bases  of  supply,  Russian,  11 

Bashi  Channel,  72 

Battle  fleet,  Japanese,  7;  Rus- 
sian, 7 

Beet-sugar  industry,  German, 
302 

Benton,  Thomas  H.,  213 

Beresford,  Lord,  quoted  from, 
112 

Bering  Strait,  233 


325 


326 


Index 


Berlin,  Congress  of,  25; 
Deutsche  Bank  of,  growth 
of,  268 

Bermudas,  158 

Beveridge,  Senator,  quoted, 
253 

Billiton,  220 

Bungo  Channel,  71 

Bismarck,  dictum  of,  310 

"Black  Flags,"  81 

Boer  war,  9,  301 

Bolivia,  statistics  of,  171 

Borneo,  219 

Borodino,  Russian  battleship,  7 

Boxers,  37,  51 

Boxer  uprising,  9,  89,  92 

Brazil,  statistics  of,  172-174; 
immigration  in,  180-182 

British  Columbia,  151  ;  data  of 
production,  259 

British  decadence,  253;  Em- 
pire, 298;  East  India  Com- 
pany, 216;  merchant-marine, 
255  ;  possessions  in  the  Pa- 
cific, 204  ;  superiority  in  cot- 
ton industry,  257;  trade  with 
war  zone,  30 

Broughton  Channel,  72 

Bubonic  plague,  304 

Buenaventura,  196 

Buenos  Ayres,  177 

Buelow,  Count  von,  37,  96,  163 


Cali,  196 

Canada,  Dominion  of,  foreign 

trade  of,  258 
Caribbean  Sea,  147,  157,  181 
Carlyle,  Thomas,  314 
Carnegie,  Andrew,  293 
Caroline  Islands,  237 


Cassini,  Count,  26 

Cauca,  196 

Celebes,  219 

Chamberlain,  "  Joe,"  64 

Characteristics,  Chinese,  90-92 

Chemulpo,  13,  77 

Cherokee  reservation,  55 

Chi  Hli,  Chinese  province,  110 

Chile,  statistics  of,  175 

Chilkat  river,  233 

China,  "open  door"  in,  32-34; 
"  spheres  of  interest,"  35  ; 
integrity  of,  46  ;  dismember- 
ment of,  48,  50  ;  area  and 
population  of,  92  ;  tabulated 
statement  by  provinces,  93  ; 
density  of  population,  93  ; 
territorial  losses  of,  95-96  ; 
railroads  of,  97  ;  mineral  re- 
sources, 98:  agricultural  data 
of,  99  ;  industries  of,  100  ; 
foreign  trade  of,  loo-ioi  ; 
revenues  of,  101-102;  expend- 
itures, 102-103;  foreign  debt, 
103;  imperial  post  office,  103; 
statistics  of  imports,  104 ; 
educational  institutions  of, 
105;  military  organisation  of, 
107-109;  its  reform,  no  ;  rail- 
road projects  in,  120 

Chinese  characteristics,  90-9a 

Chinese  indemnity  of  1900,  40 

Chin  Kiang,  202 

Chino-Japanese  war  of  1894-95, 
23,  71,  107 

Chin-Yen.  Japanese  battleship, 

7 
Circular  letter,    in   behalf    of 

"  open  door  "  in  China,  36-37 
Civil  War,  American,  9 
Clay,  Henry,  quoted,  150 


Index 


327 


Coal,  American,  abundance  of, 
59;  beds  of  Hu  Nan,  100; 
deposit  of,  at  Po  Shan,  100 

Columbia,  government  of,  146; 
statistics  of,  169 

Colorado  River,  201 

Colquhoun,  A.  R.,  quoted,  295 

Columbia  River,  201 

Commercial  export  schools  of 
Hamburg,  186 

Confucius,  86 

Congress,  agricultural,  held  at 
Rome,  163 

Consolidation  of  English-speak- 
ing race,  293 

Continental  tariff-union,  163 

Cook  Inlet,  234 

Copper  River,  234 

Cordilleras,  196 

Corea,  11,  13,  15,  16,  32;  map 
of,  21 

Cossacks,  15 

Costa  Rica,  statistics  of,  169 

Cotton  industry,  British  supe- 
riority in,  257 

Cousin,  Victor,  quoted,  148 

Cuba,  reciprocity  treaty  with, 
158 

*•  Culture  system"  of  Japan, 
218 

Gushing,  Caleb,  34 


D 


Dalny,  8,  96 

Danish  Antilles,  159 

Davidson,  Prof.,  quoted,  233 

Day,  Dr.  Clive,  217 

Diplomatic  correspondence  be- 
tween Japan  and  Russia,  19- 
20 


Disadvantages,  our,  in  trade 
with  South  America,  187-188 

Disconto  Society,  280 

Dismemberment  of  China,  48, 
50 

Djinghis  Khan,  87 

Dutch  East  Indies,  207;  statis- 
tics of,  216-227;  Chinese 
question  in,  221;  Atchinese 
war  in,  222;  Colonial  army, 
222;  the  problem  of  heritage, 
224 

Dutch  New  Guinea,  219 

Dvenadsat,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 


E 


Earnings,  Japanese,  annual 
average,  18;  do.,  Russian,  18 

Ecuador,  statistics  of,  180 

Ekaterina  II.,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 

Emerson,  H.,  235 

Emigration,  American,  to  Can- 
ada, 55 

Emporor  Alexander  II.,  Rus- 
sian battleship,  7 

Emporor  Nicholas  I.,  Russian 
battleship,  7 

Energy,  productive,  statistics 
of,  60 

English-speaking  race,  consol- 
idation of,  293 

European  manufactures,  in- 
crease of,  57 

"  Expansion,"  306 

Exports,  American,  growth  of, 
to  war  zone,  29;  to  Russia, 
30;  to  European  countries, 
126 


328 


Index 


Far  Eastern  problem,  310 

Farewell  advice,  Washing- 
ton's, 307 

Fashoda,  50 

Fiji  Islands,  237 

Formosa,  47,  71;  map  of,  79; 
colonisation  of,  by  Japan,  80- 
82;  statistics  of,  81 

France  Militaire,  periodical, 
II 

Fraser  river,  201 

Frye,  Senator,  62 

Fuji,  Japanese  battleship,  7 

G 

German-Brazilian  press,  183 
German  emperor,  his  "  yellow 

peril  "  cartoon,  85 
German    reply    to     Secretary 

Hay's  circular  note,  of  1900, 

37 

Germany,  as  our  rival  in  the 
Pacific,  53;  industrial  rise  of , 
267;  her  foreign  investments, 
267;  her  trade  relations  with 
the  United  States,  268;  her 
commerce  in  the  Pacific, 
269-271;  colonies  of  and  cot- 
ton production  of,  272;  ap- 
propriations, 275;  consular 
service,  279;  beet-sugar  in- 
dustry of,  302 

Gheorgi  Pobiedononostseff, 
Russian  battleship,  7 

Gladstone,  W.  E.,  quotation 
from,  61 

Glutted  markets,  at  home,  63 

Golden  Gate,  200 

Golushovsky,  Count,  163 


Great  Britain,  foreign  invest- 
ments of,  267 
Greene,  General  Francis  V.,  6, 

25 
Guam,  235 
Guamote,  196 

H 

Hague,  The,  tribunal,  299 
Hai  Nan,  97 

Hale,  Senator,  quoted,  243 
Hamburg,  commercial   export 

schools  of,  186 
Hang  Yang,  iron  works  of,  100 
Han  Kow,  100 
Harbin,  10,  12 
Hart,  Sir  Robert,  loi,  no 
Hashiguchi,  Jikei,  3 
Hatsuse,  Japanese  battleship, 

7 

Havana,  240 

Hawaii,  61,  236  and  subs., 
map  of,  237 

Hay,  Secretary,  22,  35,  40,  47; 
his  diplomacy  regarding 
China,  36  and  subs.;  his 
note  during  siege  of  Pekin 
legations,  38;  circular  note 
at  outbreak  of  Russo-Japa-. 
nese  war,  43,  277 

Hayashi,  Baron,  15 

Hayes,  President,  quoted,  149, 

155 
Hayti,  160,  181 
Herendeen  Bay,  235 
Hoang  Ho,  122,  202 
Homestead,    Pa.,    data  about, 

64 
Hondo,  Japanese  province,  71 
Honduras,  statistics  of,  169 
Hong  Kong,  47,  238,  264-265 


Index 


329 


Humboldt,  Alexander  von,  213 
Hu  Nan,  coal  beds  of,  100 
Hu  Pu,  loi 


•'  Idealists,"  306 

Idzumo,  Japanese  battleship,  7 

Immigration,  South  American, 

182 
"  Imperialism,"  306 
Indemnity,  Chinese,  of  1900,  40 
Indo-China,  207 
Inland      navigation      of      the 

United  States,  data  relating 

to,  62 
Integrity  of  China,  46 
Investments,  foreign,  of  Great 

Britain  and  Germany,  267 
Iron  deposits  in  United  States, 

59;  works  in  Hang  Yang,  100 
Iwate,  Japanese  battleship,  7 


Japan,  awakening  of,  4 ; 
national  debt  of,  16;  annual 
average  earnings  in,  iS; 
diplomatic  correspondence 
between  Russia  and,  19; 
population  and  area  of,  20, 
71;  agricultural  products 
of,  72-73;  revenues  of,  73; 
Sea  of,  72;  wages,  73-74; 
scale  of  living,  74;  industry 
and  commerce  of,  75-77; 
mineral  wealth  of,  77;  statis- 
tics of,  75-78;  public  edu- 
cation, 78;  press,  78;  parlia- 
ment of,  79;  "  manifest 
destiny  "  of,  84;  as  our  rival 
in  the  Pacific,  283-285 


Japanese  army,  8,  77;  battle 
fleet,  7;  cavalry,  16;  diet,  10; 
immigration  to  Formosa,  81; 
railroads,  14,  76;  shipping, 
76-77;  trade  with  United 
States,  30;  war  loans,  18 

Java,  210,  219  and  subs. 

Jecker,  French  banker,  305 

Jujuy,  194 

K 

Kamtchatka,  72,  117 

Kaneko,  Baron  Kentaro,  26 

Kau  Lung,  47 

Kee  Lung,  80 

Kenai  peninsula,  234 

Kiao  Chao,  54,  96,  120;  rail- 
roads there,  275;  exploiting 
the   adjoining  province,  276 

Kiushiu,  one  of  main  isles  of 
Japan,  71 

Knackfus,  Professgr,  85 

Kniaz  Suvoroff,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 

Kurile  Strait,  72 

Kwang  Chau  Wan,  97 


Labour  cost,  in  United  States, 

59 
Lands,  public  arable,  exhaus- 
tion of,  in  the  United  States, 

55 
La  Perouse  Strait,  72 
La  Plata  River,  179 
Las  Cuevas,  195 
Latin-America,  statistics,  164 
Lesseps,  144 
Liao  Tung,  13,  47 
Liberalising  element  in  China, 

49 


330 


Index 


Li  Hung  Chang,    no;  quoted 

from,  115 
Lima,  195 
Lombok,  219 
Los  Angeles,  240 
Louisiana  Purchase,  144 

M 

Madagascar,  254 

Madura,  219 

Mahan,  Captain,  4;  quoted, 
^59.  237;  cited,  293 

Malay  peninsula,  207 

Manchuria,  8,  10,  12,  19; 
American  trade  with,  41 

Manchus,  dynasty  of  the,  in 
China,  49 

Manila,  238 

Manufactures,  European,  in- 
crease of,  57 

Manufacturing  supremacy  of 
the  United  States,  58 

Markets,  American,  access  to, 
60;  glutted,  at  home,  63 

Martinique,  300 

Mazatlan,  212 

McKinley,  President,  85;  tariff 
bill,  302 

Mecca,  301 

Me  Kong  river,  202 

Melville,  Geo.  W.,  156;  quoted, 
156 

Mendoza,  195 

Mexican  Tehuantepec  rail- 
road, 193 

Mexico,  9;  statistics  of,  168; 
invasion  of,  305 

Mikasa,    Japanese    battleship, 

7 
Miles,  General  Nelson  A.,  6,  8, 

24 


Mississippi  Valley,  149 

Moluccas,  219 

Monroe  doctrine,  145,  166 

Montevideo,  197 

Mont  Pelee,  300 

Morley,  John,  23 

Mortality  statistics,    military, 

during  recent  campaigns,  9 
Mukden,  11,  12,  42 
Mulhall,  quotations  from,  57 


N 


Nagasaki,  76 

Napoleon  I.,  144 

Napoleon  III.,  305 

Naval  statistics,  244-248 

Navarin,  Russian  battleship,  7 

Netherlands-India,  216 

"  New  Mediterranean,"  294 

New  Zealand,  206;   statistical 

data,  262 
Nicaragua  Canal  project,  145 
Nicaragua,  statistics  of,  168 
Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha,  76 
Norman,  Henry,  27 


Ocean  carriage  of  various  na- 
tions, 61 

Oceanica,  210 

Okhotsk  Sea,  202 

Oklahoma,  55 

Olney,  Richard,  309 

"  Open  door,"  American  policy 
of,  as  regards  China,  32-44 

"  Opium  War,"  89 

Oregon,  acquisition  of,  232 

Oroya,  195 

Orthodox  Church  of  Russia, 
285 


Index 


33^ 


Pacific,  British  possessions  in 
the,  204;  American  suprem- 
acy in  the,  204 

Panama  Canal,  53,  61,  122;  his- 
tory of  the  project,  143-146; 
consequences  of  its  comple- 
tion, 148-151;  prospective 
shipping  through  it,  160; 
map  of  isthmus,  154 

Panama  Company,  145 

Pan-American  railway,  189; 
mileage  of,  191;  remeasure- 
ment  of,  192 

Pango-Pango,  238 

Paraguay,  statistics  of,  180 

Patagonia,  211 

Pearl  Harbour,  238 

Peking  Gazette,  loi 

Peninsula,  Malay,  207 

Pepo  Hwan,  80 

Pepper,  Chas.  M.,  190 ;  report 
of,  192 

Pernambuco,  197 

Perry,  Commodore,  4,  35,  70 

Peru,  statistics  of,  176 

Petropavlovsk,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 

Pfeil,  Count  J.,  217 

Philip,  Admiral,  quoted,  301 

Philip  II.  of  Spain,  143 

Philippines,  acquisition  of,  35, 
61  ;  map  of,  239  ;  as  a  dis- 
tributing centre,  256 

Pierce,  President,  4 

Poland,  Russian,  131 

Poltava,   Russian  battleship,  7 

Population,  density  of,  in  the 
various  continents,  205 

Portage  Bay,  235 


Fort  Arthur,  6,  8,  12,  13,  15,  47, 

96 
Porto  Rico,  61,  158 
Port  Townsend,  237 
Portugal,  her  waning  colonial 

power,  316 
Posadas,  197 
Posadowsky,  Count,  163 
Po  Shan,  coal  deposits  of,  100 
Powell,  Major,  55 
Prinetti,  Italian  statesman,  163 
Public  opinion,    force  of,  298- 

299 
Puget  Sound,  237 


Q 


Quito,  178,  196 
R 

Reciprocity  treaty  between 
Cuba  and  United  States,  158 

Reservation,  Cherokee,  rush 
into,  55 

Richthofen,  Prof,  von,  regard- 
ing China's  resources,  98 

Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  183 

Roman  Empire,  298 

Roosevelt,  President,  147 

Rostislav,  Russian  battleship, 
7 

Retwisan,  Russian  battleship, 

7 
Russia,  as  a  Pacific  power,  4  ; 
bases  of  supply,  ix  ;  annual 
average  earnings  of,  18;  dip- 
lomatic correspondence  be- 
tween Japan  and,  19-20  ;  re- 
lations with  United  States,  5; 
area,  population,  and  density 
thereof,  128  ;  statistics,  129  ; 
trade    with    United    States, 


332 


Index 


131 ;  Baltic  provinces  of,  131; 

Orthodox^  Church  of,     285  ; 

merchant-marine  of,  292 
Russian    army,     8;     available 

forces,    13 ;    battle    fleet,   7; 

budget,     17;      finances,     28; 

government  monopolies,  17; 

imports,    30;    national  debt, 

17;  revenues,  16;  soldier,  of 

interior,  16 
Russia's  foreign  creditors,  17; 

reply    to    Secretary     Hay's 

note  of  February  10,  1904,  44 
Russo-Turkish  war,  9 


Sacramento  River,  201 

Saghalien,  72 

Salvador,  statistics  of,  170 

Samoa,  237 

San  Diego,  233 

Sandwich  Islands,  237 

San  Francisco,  213 

Santa  Catarina,  184 

San  Stefano,  treaty  of,  25 

Santiago,  194 

Santo  Domingo,  159,  181 

Sao  Paulo,  185 

Sea  of  Japan, 72 

Sevastopol,  Russian  battleship, 

7 

Seward,  William  H.,  151,  213 

Siam,  207 

Siberia,  8,  12,  16;  as  an  Amer- 
ican market,  134;  cereal  pro- 
duction of,  134;  immigration 
into,  136-137;  inducements 
offered,  209 

Sickles,  General  Daniel  E., 
6,  24 


Si  Kiang  River,  202 

Silk,  culture  of,  in  China,  99 

Singapore,  238,  263 

Sinope,  Russian  battleship,  7 

Sissoi  Veliky,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 

Sitka,  237 

Shanghai,  commercial  treaty 
of,  42;  restitution  of,  97;  new 
industries  of,  100 

Shan  Si,  mines  of,  121 

Shan  Tung,  Chinese  province 
of,  47,  96;  as  exploited  by 
Germany,  54,  120 

Shibuzawa,  Baron,  77 

Shikishima,  Japanese  battle- 
ship, 7 

Shikoku,  one  of  main  isles  of 
Japan,  71 

Shilka,  202 

Shimonoseki,  treaty  of,  25 

' '  Shirt-sleeve  "  statesmanship, 
297 

Slava,  Russian  battleship,  7 

Smith,  Rev.  Arthur  H.,  51 

Society  Islands,  237 

South  Africa,  294 

South  America,  immigration, 
German,  Italian,  etc.,  182; 
total  foreign  trade,  185; 
statistical  data,  164;  maps 
of,  170  and  173 

Spanish-American  war,  senti- 
ments aroused,  166 

Spheres  of  interest  in  China, 

35 

Stanley,  Henry  M.,  57 

Statesman's  Year-Book,  quot- 
ed, 246 

Stead,  W.  T.,  293 

Steever,  Col.  E.  Z.,  192 


Index 


333 


Suez  Canal,  144;  neutralisation 
of,  155;  tonnage  of  vessels 
passing  through  it,  160;  ex- 
tortionate tolls,  161 

Sumatra,  219 

Summer  Palace,  89 

Supply  of  raw  materials  in 
United  States,  60 

Sydney,  238 


Tai  Nan  Fu,  81 

Takahira,  Kogoro,  26 

Takashima,  coal  of,  76 

Ta  Kau,  81 

Tamerlane,  87 

Tarn  Sui,  80 

Taquary  River,  184 

Ta  Lien  Wan,  47,  96 

TariflE  bill,  McKinley,  302 

Tariff-union,  Continental,  163 

Tavrichesky,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 

Taylor,  James  W.,  cited,  205 

Tchesme,  Russian  battleship,  7 

Tea,  culture  of,  in  China,  99 

Tehuantepec  railroad,  193 

Tien  Tsin,  97 

Timor,  219 

Titicaca,  Lake,  194 

Togo,  Admiral,  13 

Tokiwa,  Japanese  battleship,  7 

Tonkin,  254 

Tracy,  Secretary,  156 

Trade,  methods  of  American, 
in  China,  116;  American, 
with  war  zone,  29;  balance 
of,  in  the  United  States,  58; 
foreign,  of  Canada,  258;  our 
disadvantages  in,  with  South 
America,  187-188 


Trade  relations,  American, 
with  Russia,  30-32 

Transsiberian  railroad,  11-13, 
14,  18,  22;  reasons  for  build- 
ing it,  135;  deficit  of,  135; 
defalcations  in  construction 
of,  19 

Tribunal,  The  Hague,  299 

Tri  Svititelia,  Russian  battle- 
ship, 7 

Tropical  markets,  58 

Trusts  and  syndicates,  303 

Tsarevitch, Russian  battleship, 
7 

Tsi  An,  the  dowager  Empress 
of  China,  38 

Tsi  Nan  Fu,  120 

Tsing  Tao,  120 

Tupiza,  194 

Tutuila,  238 

Tyler,  President,  his  letter  for 
an    "  open  door "  in   China, 

32-34 

U 

Unalaska,  237 
Unga  Island,  235 
United  States,  trade  of,    with 
Japan,  30  ;  iron  deposits  of, 

59  ;  Louisiana  Purchase  by, 
144  ;  labour  cost  in,  59;  man- 
ufacturing supremacy  of,  58; 
supply  of  raw  materials  of, 

60  ;  exports  to  and  imports 
from  South  and  Central 
America,  168-181  ;  suprem- 
acy in  the  Pacific.  204  ;  trade 
with  Asia  and  Australasia, 
241 

Uraga,  76 

Uruguay,  river,  197  ;  statistics 
of,  179 


334  Index 

Uspallata  Pass,  194 
Ussuri,  202 

V 

Valparaiso,  194 
Vanderlip,  Frank  A.,  17,  28 
Venezuela,    statistics  of,   171  ; 

foreign  intervention,  305 
Victoria,  British  Columbia,  259 
Vienna,  Congress  of,  216 
Villa  Encarnacion,  197 
Vladivostok,  8,  12 
Vosberg,  Rekow,  Dr.,  quoted 

118 

W 

Wages,   average,   in    America 

and  Germany,  60 
Wake  Island,  235 
Walker,  Admiral,  quoted,  238 
War  zone,  trade  statistics  of, 

29;    British   trade   with,    30; 

United  States  trade  with,  29 
Webster,  Daniel,  cited,  236 
Wei  Hai  Wei,  47,  96,  121 
Wei  Hsien,  coal  beds  of,  100 
West  Indies,  180 


Wheeler,    General    Joseph,   6, 

24 
Witte,  Russian  statesman,  53, 

316 
World's    statistics    in    cotton 

industry,  257 
Wright,  Carroll  D.,  quoted,  62 
Wu    Ting    Fang,    40;    quoted 

from,  113 


Yakumo,  Japanese  battleship, 
7 

Yang  Tse,  98,  122,  202 

Yashima,  Japanese  battleship, 
7 

"Yellow  peril,"  83 

Yezo,  one  of  main  isles  of  Ja- 
pan, 71 

Yokohama,  212,  238 

Yokosuki,  76 

Yuan  Shi  Kai,  107 

Yukon,  202 


Zymotic  diseases,  10 


J-^KO' 


HfcHN  HtlilUHAL  UDMRr  ■ 


DAT 


A     000  631  066     8 


GAYLORD 


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